How Do you "Lock On" to an altitude with Glass Cockpit
Machinbird.
On all the tapes on the PFD if the target goes "off scale" as you put it, it becomes a number at the relative end of that scale and so is always there to remind the crew. The altitude deviation warning might also wake them up.
On all the tapes on the PFD if the target goes "off scale" as you put it, it becomes a number at the relative end of that scale and so is always there to remind the crew. The altitude deviation warning might also wake them up.
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Gilbert Klopfstein came with HUD !
Originally Posted by alf5071h
A simple ‘look-alike’ attitude display provided an easier certification route for an untested technology
Let us forget ECAM and the counterfeit 'look-alike' Airbus PFD !
Let us start with a real glass cockpit : the KLOFSTEIN Head-Up-Display
USA and MIT honored him :
OCR Document
(en) ( headupflight.net/rapports%20de%20vol/MIT )
ICARE N°64BIS (fr)
but Airbus and French-German airspace community (Zieglers and co mafia) did not accepted that a french Jewish man would be a better test-pilot and test-engineer as them.
Here you will find one of Klopfstein's message (PPRunE did not exist !)Etude Rationnelle du Pilotage des Avions (fr)
Last edited by roulishollandais; 30th May 2012 at 16:02. Reason: ">'
Roul, thank you for reviving an interesting part of the history of aircraft flight displays. By chance I am familiar with Klopfstein’s work, but I did not fly the system.
The RAE in the UK followed the research aspects (BLEU); British Aerospace and Smiths industries (Elliot Automation?) represented the manufacturers (John Wilson / Keith Dougan), who also considered operational aspects, particularly for aircraft to replace the HS 121 Trident. This involved some airline technical departments (Atlas group?).
AFAIR the main debate revolved around manual flight in Cat 3 with HUD vs autopilot/autoland; basically French – British viewpoints, determined initially by the availability of equipment. The French had HUD, the British, triplex autoland; the British HUDs were used by the military and not readily available for civil research. Also, HUD was not favoured by the operators at that time (BEA/BA?); there were certification concerns (less so in France) and installation issues, and an autopilot would still be required, which provided greater potential.
Klopfstein’s work on perspective displays with runway outline, have been used in many HUDs. There was some research in the UK which evaluated the format head-down (Smiths display, BAE Advanced Flight Deck simulator?)
This work is now reappearing in the new wide screen ‘GA’ displays, where perhaps some of the underlying concerns of these and advanced concepts are re-emerging.
The choice of many ‘simple look-alike’ attitude format in early EFIS was driven by certification concerns, particularly at a time when the FAA were requiring ‘proof-of-concept’ testing. Obviously same-type-rating and training aspects were considered; money drove the decision.
The HUD may have been the better technical display solution, but raised debates about crew consistency (flight technical error), cross monitoring, and ultimate capability in low vis. There still appears to be training issues with some of the advanced features – FPV, potential energy, etc.
Obviously this is debateable; but IMHO on a world-wide scale, there are those pilots who understand it, those who think they do but might not if tested in demanding conditions, and those who cannot comprehend.
Now is this similar to some of the issues in modern aviation?
Many of these problems were seen in early display research (RAE / NASA), now there are hints of similar issues with the new wide screen displays particularly when attempting to replicate the real world background.
The fundamental problems appear to relate to how pilots determine their mental model of the outside world. The industry has evolved with dial instruments and scanning techniques to assemble a coherent ‘picture’ – the mental model of what the aircraft is doing.
EFIS and HUD use similar but often different ‘mechanisms’ to create what is actually an illusion of the real world (synthetic vision), this is fraught with all of the problems of mental perception, situation awareness, human bias, and variable performance.
I was fortunate to be within the debates of the era, not that research or what is best technically drove the decisions; – need and money always prevailed.
A bit more history 1968 | 1 - 0233 | Flight Archive
The RAE in the UK followed the research aspects (BLEU); British Aerospace and Smiths industries (Elliot Automation?) represented the manufacturers (John Wilson / Keith Dougan), who also considered operational aspects, particularly for aircraft to replace the HS 121 Trident. This involved some airline technical departments (Atlas group?).
AFAIR the main debate revolved around manual flight in Cat 3 with HUD vs autopilot/autoland; basically French – British viewpoints, determined initially by the availability of equipment. The French had HUD, the British, triplex autoland; the British HUDs were used by the military and not readily available for civil research. Also, HUD was not favoured by the operators at that time (BEA/BA?); there were certification concerns (less so in France) and installation issues, and an autopilot would still be required, which provided greater potential.
Klopfstein’s work on perspective displays with runway outline, have been used in many HUDs. There was some research in the UK which evaluated the format head-down (Smiths display, BAE Advanced Flight Deck simulator?)
This work is now reappearing in the new wide screen ‘GA’ displays, where perhaps some of the underlying concerns of these and advanced concepts are re-emerging.
The choice of many ‘simple look-alike’ attitude format in early EFIS was driven by certification concerns, particularly at a time when the FAA were requiring ‘proof-of-concept’ testing. Obviously same-type-rating and training aspects were considered; money drove the decision.
The HUD may have been the better technical display solution, but raised debates about crew consistency (flight technical error), cross monitoring, and ultimate capability in low vis. There still appears to be training issues with some of the advanced features – FPV, potential energy, etc.
Obviously this is debateable; but IMHO on a world-wide scale, there are those pilots who understand it, those who think they do but might not if tested in demanding conditions, and those who cannot comprehend.
Now is this similar to some of the issues in modern aviation?
Many of these problems were seen in early display research (RAE / NASA), now there are hints of similar issues with the new wide screen displays particularly when attempting to replicate the real world background.
The fundamental problems appear to relate to how pilots determine their mental model of the outside world. The industry has evolved with dial instruments and scanning techniques to assemble a coherent ‘picture’ – the mental model of what the aircraft is doing.
EFIS and HUD use similar but often different ‘mechanisms’ to create what is actually an illusion of the real world (synthetic vision), this is fraught with all of the problems of mental perception, situation awareness, human bias, and variable performance.
I was fortunate to be within the debates of the era, not that research or what is best technically drove the decisions; – need and money always prevailed.
A bit more history 1968 | 1 - 0233 | Flight Archive
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Fly3, Thank you for the point about the bug moving to the end of the scale and remaining visible.
ALF
Despite the fact that you start out with disagreement with more emphasis on manual flying skills, IMO we are very close in our evaluation of the problem.
In the example of the AF447, If you or I had taken control of the aircraft, you would have set the wings and nose for level flight and then scanned the altimeter to see how well you had done and what correction was necessary to get back to assigned altitude. This never happened with the AF447 crew. PF was oblivious to the climb he had generated. PM was not much better in that although he eventually perceived a climb, he never voiced the magnitude of the climb above assigned altitude, implying that he was not aware of it.
This is indicative of major scan problems with both AF447 pilots.
I was not convinced of this possibility until I saw the BEA report on the Air France A343 incident near Guadeloupe on Jul 22nd 2011 that similarly pitched up to a near stall. The report details how long it took the pilots to recognize the key performance parameters. This again was a scan problem with additional special circumstances of warnings being overridden by higher priority warnings.
The problem seems clear. Some pilots are becoming excessively disengaged from the actual handling process. They are not monitoring the flight parameters sufficiently to promptly catch deviations, and they are starting cold from a disengaged mental viewpoint when required to take over manual control. The process of using the eyes effectively to form the mental picture of what the aircraft is doing is taking an excessive period of time to develop and this is contributing to loss of situational awareness.
What is not clear is the full breadth of the problem. What percentage of pilots are susceptible? What airlines are particularly susceptible? What type of flight operations promote scan problems? Are there aircraft specific conditions that promote scan problems?
I started this thread because I was not sure how easy the glass cockpit was to fly manually. The consensus seems to be that it might be a bit harder to scan, but it can be more accurate.
Perhaps someone can tell me why a scrolling altimeter does not always trigger an Uh OH exclamation when the aircraft is supposed to be at an assigned altitude? That should have been a big red flag to the crews of the two aforementioned jets.
Originally Posted by ALF
Mach, I disagree with the majority of the arguments calling for greater focus on manual flying skills; not just the view in #17.
Recent accidents indicate that the human problems were predominantly due to the choice of action, and not that the crew couldn’t fly the aircraft. In many cases the aircraft was flown (accurately) into the wrong part of the flight envelope. I exclude AF447 because there may be other system and trim issues, and we don’t have all of the details yet.
Choice of action requires good situation awareness. With inaccurate situation assessment, then flight control inputs for a chosen action might be hesitant, or exploratory – getting a feel for the situation. The resultant aircraft motion may not match the predictions from the pilot’s understanding.
With good situation assessment, choosing an appropriate action should result in a high probability of success even if the flying is not particularly accurate. Furthermore this action should change the situation to something which was expected, thus confirming the choice – thus a need to continuously reassess the situation.
Training for this should also involve how to combat surprise and 'getting back into the loop'; changing from passive monitoring (automation) to active awareness and control (manual).
Recent accidents indicate that the human problems were predominantly due to the choice of action, and not that the crew couldn’t fly the aircraft. In many cases the aircraft was flown (accurately) into the wrong part of the flight envelope. I exclude AF447 because there may be other system and trim issues, and we don’t have all of the details yet.
Choice of action requires good situation awareness. With inaccurate situation assessment, then flight control inputs for a chosen action might be hesitant, or exploratory – getting a feel for the situation. The resultant aircraft motion may not match the predictions from the pilot’s understanding.
With good situation assessment, choosing an appropriate action should result in a high probability of success even if the flying is not particularly accurate. Furthermore this action should change the situation to something which was expected, thus confirming the choice – thus a need to continuously reassess the situation.
Training for this should also involve how to combat surprise and 'getting back into the loop'; changing from passive monitoring (automation) to active awareness and control (manual).
Despite the fact that you start out with disagreement with more emphasis on manual flying skills, IMO we are very close in our evaluation of the problem.
In the example of the AF447, If you or I had taken control of the aircraft, you would have set the wings and nose for level flight and then scanned the altimeter to see how well you had done and what correction was necessary to get back to assigned altitude. This never happened with the AF447 crew. PF was oblivious to the climb he had generated. PM was not much better in that although he eventually perceived a climb, he never voiced the magnitude of the climb above assigned altitude, implying that he was not aware of it.
This is indicative of major scan problems with both AF447 pilots.
I was not convinced of this possibility until I saw the BEA report on the Air France A343 incident near Guadeloupe on Jul 22nd 2011 that similarly pitched up to a near stall. The report details how long it took the pilots to recognize the key performance parameters. This again was a scan problem with additional special circumstances of warnings being overridden by higher priority warnings.
The problem seems clear. Some pilots are becoming excessively disengaged from the actual handling process. They are not monitoring the flight parameters sufficiently to promptly catch deviations, and they are starting cold from a disengaged mental viewpoint when required to take over manual control. The process of using the eyes effectively to form the mental picture of what the aircraft is doing is taking an excessive period of time to develop and this is contributing to loss of situational awareness.
What is not clear is the full breadth of the problem. What percentage of pilots are susceptible? What airlines are particularly susceptible? What type of flight operations promote scan problems? Are there aircraft specific conditions that promote scan problems?
I started this thread because I was not sure how easy the glass cockpit was to fly manually. The consensus seems to be that it might be a bit harder to scan, but it can be more accurate.
Perhaps someone can tell me why a scrolling altimeter does not always trigger an Uh OH exclamation when the aircraft is supposed to be at an assigned altitude? That should have been a big red flag to the crews of the two aforementioned jets.
Mach re “… we are very close in our evaluation of the problem.”
Yes,
Also, with the views on the actions required for recovery.
The root of this is knowing what actions to take, which implies knowledge of the situation – an understanding. Thus in the example, it’s not necessarily a failure in the act of scanning, but one of obtaining an overall awareness and understanding – the bigger picture (e.g. altitude up, attitude up, probably speed down, possibility of stall).
It's suggested that previously (the old days) pilots knew what was important. Nowadays this knowledge should originate from training, or is it insufficient and being eroded by the complexity and demands of modern flying. This knowledge is part of airmanship (professionalism) and must be developed with experience.
The breath of the problem? It’s human nature. We might not be able to shape or change this, but we can constrain and guide it.
Altimeter conundrum; its digits vs dial, single cue focus vs scanning, monitoring (see http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ervention.html), reliance on alerting systems, overconfidence in technology, etc, etc.
It involves how we do things and what we pay attention to, it’s being aware of the bigger picture. This requires discipline in mental behaviour – the process at the root of professional flying.
Industry, regulators, organisations, and individuals fail to appreciate all of the implications of change.
In complex systems, small steps in experiment (design, regulation, operation, behaviour) control very little, but influence everything.
misd-agin “It eventually becomes second nature,”
From the rules of evaluation – if something is hard at the first try, then there is a deficiency (“Oh it’s me, I will learn”).
During the second try you should attempt to understand what is deficient. Its not you – look at the interface, the system; don’t just learn the tricks to overcome the problems.
The third try is easy because you have learnt some of the tricks, but you must question if have you understood why these tricks are necessary and what they imply in operation and non-normal situations.
Yes,
Also, with the views on the actions required for recovery.
The root of this is knowing what actions to take, which implies knowledge of the situation – an understanding. Thus in the example, it’s not necessarily a failure in the act of scanning, but one of obtaining an overall awareness and understanding – the bigger picture (e.g. altitude up, attitude up, probably speed down, possibility of stall).
It's suggested that previously (the old days) pilots knew what was important. Nowadays this knowledge should originate from training, or is it insufficient and being eroded by the complexity and demands of modern flying. This knowledge is part of airmanship (professionalism) and must be developed with experience.
The breath of the problem? It’s human nature. We might not be able to shape or change this, but we can constrain and guide it.
Altimeter conundrum; its digits vs dial, single cue focus vs scanning, monitoring (see http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ervention.html), reliance on alerting systems, overconfidence in technology, etc, etc.
It involves how we do things and what we pay attention to, it’s being aware of the bigger picture. This requires discipline in mental behaviour – the process at the root of professional flying.
Industry, regulators, organisations, and individuals fail to appreciate all of the implications of change.
In complex systems, small steps in experiment (design, regulation, operation, behaviour) control very little, but influence everything.
misd-agin “It eventually becomes second nature,”
From the rules of evaluation – if something is hard at the first try, then there is a deficiency (“Oh it’s me, I will learn”).
During the second try you should attempt to understand what is deficient. Its not you – look at the interface, the system; don’t just learn the tricks to overcome the problems.
The third try is easy because you have learnt some of the tricks, but you must question if have you understood why these tricks are necessary and what they imply in operation and non-normal situations.
Last edited by alf5071h; 31st May 2012 at 18:17.
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Aircraft is not a complex system. Otherwise you cannot survive with fire on board and major flight system failures, IMC, by night,etc.
If you are able to fly in these condition, why don't you fly the same manner in normal flight ?
KISS !
headupflight.net/articles2/Securiteoumarketing
(GILBERT KLOPFSTEIN)
If you are able to fly in these condition, why don't you fly the same manner in normal flight ?
KISS !
headupflight.net/articles2/Securiteoumarketing
(GILBERT KLOPFSTEIN)
Last edited by roulishollandais; 1st Jun 2012 at 16:56.
