SIC Rejected Takeoff Rights
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: France
Posts: 481
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
C100driver,
By which piece of magic does the pilot who calls 'stop' for anti-skid inop suddenly cease to do so when sitting four feet to the left of his previous place?
Notwithstanding that a certain amount of human error will always be with us, proper training and testing are key.
The trained flight crew members are responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. Your argument, I'm afraid, is about culpability and liability, not safe operation.
Yes, the military fly inexperienced crews and have SOPs to reflect that (but those are stil very good SOPs). They do not fly inadequately trained or insufficiently able crews. History tells us that the civil world does, and personal experience backs this up to the hilt.
This, of course, is why the sensible manufacturer will inhibit the anti-skid inop caution from 80 knots to 1,000 ft, and this, in turn, is why Boeing should never have been allowed to make the NG without updating then flight deck properly).
By which piece of magic does the pilot who calls 'stop' for anti-skid inop suddenly cease to do so when sitting four feet to the left of his previous place?
Notwithstanding that a certain amount of human error will always be with us, proper training and testing are key.
The trained flight crew members are responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. Your argument, I'm afraid, is about culpability and liability, not safe operation.
Yes, the military fly inexperienced crews and have SOPs to reflect that (but those are stil very good SOPs). They do not fly inadequately trained or insufficiently able crews. History tells us that the civil world does, and personal experience backs this up to the hilt.
This, of course, is why the sensible manufacturer will inhibit the anti-skid inop caution from 80 knots to 1,000 ft, and this, in turn, is why Boeing should never have been allowed to make the NG without updating then flight deck properly).
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: East of West and North of South
Posts: 549
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to Boeing either crew member should call out the malfunction, who ever sees it first. Regardless if it is the captain or not.
Only then will the one that holds the throttles (the captain in the case of Boeing) call stop. It would be pretty stupid to have the first officer call stop, as long as he is not holding the throttles.
The benefit of having this responsibility placed on the same person on every take off, is that there will be no confusion as to who should do the abort and the captain will always be in the state of mind to perform the about. The maneuver itself, while uncomplicated, is (should be) a reaction based on memorized reflexes, hence his muscles are instinctively ready to perform those reflexes on every takeoff. If the responsibility changed with every takeoff, the brain would have to process who is to perform the reject before the muscles take action causing an unnecessary delay.
But as said either can call out the malfunction, and the rules are clear cut when a rejected takeoff should be performed or not. The first officer calling "engine failure" before V1, is effectively the same as calling stop. The actual "stop" callout from the captain is a confirmation that the actions are being taken.
Only ambiguity in the rules are the "unable or unsafe to fly". Which in my opinion is a ridiculous wording. Unless you had a collision on the runway where a wing is torn off, it's pretty much impossible to say if the aircraft will fly or not until you reach VR in which case you would be out of luck with regards to stopping anyway.
Only then will the one that holds the throttles (the captain in the case of Boeing) call stop. It would be pretty stupid to have the first officer call stop, as long as he is not holding the throttles.
The benefit of having this responsibility placed on the same person on every take off, is that there will be no confusion as to who should do the abort and the captain will always be in the state of mind to perform the about. The maneuver itself, while uncomplicated, is (should be) a reaction based on memorized reflexes, hence his muscles are instinctively ready to perform those reflexes on every takeoff. If the responsibility changed with every takeoff, the brain would have to process who is to perform the reject before the muscles take action causing an unnecessary delay.
But as said either can call out the malfunction, and the rules are clear cut when a rejected takeoff should be performed or not. The first officer calling "engine failure" before V1, is effectively the same as calling stop. The actual "stop" callout from the captain is a confirmation that the actions are being taken.
Only ambiguity in the rules are the "unable or unsafe to fly". Which in my opinion is a ridiculous wording. Unless you had a collision on the runway where a wing is torn off, it's pretty much impossible to say if the aircraft will fly or not until you reach VR in which case you would be out of luck with regards to stopping anyway.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: A tropical island.
Posts: 460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
...it's pretty much impossible to say if the aircraft will fly or not until you reach VR...
1) multiple engines stalling or failing
2) reverser deployment (severity varies by type of reverser)
3) structural failure
4) gear collapse (goes with 3)
There are a slew of unlikely scenarios (which have, nonetheless, happened) which would cause me (and caused those involved) to prefer running off the end rather than going in the air.
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: East of West and North of South
Posts: 549
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Before V1, you stop for an engine failure - that means for more than one in my book as well (isn't that a bit pedantic?).
An uncommanded thrust reverser deployment is a severe systems malfunction, which I would brief and stop for too before V1.
A gear collapse?? Do I have a choice to continue?
A structural failure (that is not due to a collision which I did consider above), can I have an example of that happening in the past (Wright brothers, Santos-Dumont etc. not included)?
Or did you mean after V1? In which case they are all a given too, but not really relevant to the topic. Anyway, two engines out on a twin you are not going anywhere for sure. Unlocked reverser (737) between V1 and VR you better hope for a false indication since you are sure to immediately loose control (VMCG). Collapsed gear, and structural failure - see before V1.
In my opinion the phrase "unsafe or unable to fly" was written by Boeings lawyers, not pilots.
An uncommanded thrust reverser deployment is a severe systems malfunction, which I would brief and stop for too before V1.
A gear collapse?? Do I have a choice to continue?
A structural failure (that is not due to a collision which I did consider above), can I have an example of that happening in the past (Wright brothers, Santos-Dumont etc. not included)?
Or did you mean after V1? In which case they are all a given too, but not really relevant to the topic. Anyway, two engines out on a twin you are not going anywhere for sure. Unlocked reverser (737) between V1 and VR you better hope for a false indication since you are sure to immediately loose control (VMCG). Collapsed gear, and structural failure - see before V1.
In my opinion the phrase "unsafe or unable to fly" was written by Boeings lawyers, not pilots.
Join Date: Nov 2011
Location: Somewhere
Posts: 52
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On PPRUNE, all planes fly after Vr.
In fact, because of this website, the military is considering abandoning all fighter aircraft, because once planes hit Vr they can't be shot down due to the magic force field created by the airspeed indicator after Vr.
In fact, because of this website, the military is considering abandoning all fighter aircraft, because once planes hit Vr they can't be shot down due to the magic force field created by the airspeed indicator after Vr.
cosmo, #23/25 … "unable or unsafe to fly" .... is a ridiculous wording" 
I agree with the hint of futility, the phrase does little to enhance practical safety.
For those who insist on only the Captain taking action in an RTO, do you add a speed/distance margin to account for the time taken to change control if the FO is handling? Failure to consider this might invalidate the basis of aircraft performance certification. AC25 7C page 37 onwards.
I agree with the hint of futility, the phrase does little to enhance practical safety.
For those who insist on only the Captain taking action in an RTO, do you add a speed/distance margin to account for the time taken to change control if the FO is handling? Failure to consider this might invalidate the basis of aircraft performance certification. AC25 7C page 37 onwards.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: A tropical island.
Posts: 460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cosmo, I'm referring to after V1 and before Vr (and even after Vr as well, though obviously still over the runway with some useful length remaining). While the phrase has a hint of Boeing covering it's *** to it, it does make it clear that not all circumstances can be accounted for in the book.
safetypee... Personally I believe that you should actually have a quicker reaction with the CA taking over from the FO as he should have been the first to notice the condition necessitating an abort and should already have his hands guarding the throttles and feet guarding the rudders. Where the CA is flying you have to account for some delay in response as he may not be aware of exactly what is going on until some time (even a second) is taken for evaluation.
safetypee... Personally I believe that you should actually have a quicker reaction with the CA taking over from the FO as he should have been the first to notice the condition necessitating an abort and should already have his hands guarding the throttles and feet guarding the rudders. Where the CA is flying you have to account for some delay in response as he may not be aware of exactly what is going on until some time (even a second) is taken for evaluation.
