When a company SOP deliberately contradicts FCTM advice without valid reason.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Indonesia
Age: 59
Posts: 52
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is in direct contradiction of the advice given in the B737NG FCTM that states: "The autothrottle ARM mode is normally not recommended because its function can be confusing. The primary feature the autothrottle ARM mode provides is minimum speed protection in the event the airplane slows to minimum maneuvering speed. Other features normally associated with the autothrottle, such as gust protection, are not provided"
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 451
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Always the center of discussion....
Well, I ran in the rat race for several decades....pretty much been around the block once or twice. And, I've seen guys like you come an go....nothing new.
Glad you have superior knowledge of airline operations and superior knowledge of how to operate your aircraft, as well. Chuck Yeager and Bob Hoover are proud of you, no doubt.
You see, for an airline to operate, they need an airline operating certificate. One of the requirements to obtain and retain an airline operating certificate (and there are many hoops to jump through) is to have an SOP. The SOP has to be approved by the authorities who grant the airline operating certificate.
Now, the SOP....approved....has to be clear, taught to all, followed by all, and checked that all know and follow it. This is one of the requirements of the airline operating certificate.
Whether or not individual pilots agree with the SOP is totally irrelevant. And, no one cares what you think. All that matters is that the airline operating certifcate stays in force, so the people at the top can fill their pockets with money.
The SOP trumps any other procedure....including manufacturers suggested practices. Adherece to the SOP is mandatory and is paramount to maintaining the issued airline operating certificate.
If you feel there need to be improvements to your company's SOP, you should voice your opinion to the appropriate authorities within your airline. Good luck....changes are few and slow to occur. (for many reasons)
If you feel you can't live with the SOPs (You think they're stupid, crazy, etc.), you should leave....go to another airlines where the SOPs are 'better'....or, start your own airline.
Yep, seen this before....
Fly safe,
PantLoad
Glad you have superior knowledge of airline operations and superior knowledge of how to operate your aircraft, as well. Chuck Yeager and Bob Hoover are proud of you, no doubt.
You see, for an airline to operate, they need an airline operating certificate. One of the requirements to obtain and retain an airline operating certificate (and there are many hoops to jump through) is to have an SOP. The SOP has to be approved by the authorities who grant the airline operating certificate.
Now, the SOP....approved....has to be clear, taught to all, followed by all, and checked that all know and follow it. This is one of the requirements of the airline operating certificate.
Whether or not individual pilots agree with the SOP is totally irrelevant. And, no one cares what you think. All that matters is that the airline operating certifcate stays in force, so the people at the top can fill their pockets with money.
The SOP trumps any other procedure....including manufacturers suggested practices. Adherece to the SOP is mandatory and is paramount to maintaining the issued airline operating certificate.
If you feel there need to be improvements to your company's SOP, you should voice your opinion to the appropriate authorities within your airline. Good luck....changes are few and slow to occur. (for many reasons)
If you feel you can't live with the SOPs (You think they're stupid, crazy, etc.), you should leave....go to another airlines where the SOPs are 'better'....or, start your own airline.
Yep, seen this before....
Fly safe,
PantLoad
Moderator
Following on from Mutt's comments, it is accepted that limitations and regulations are prescriptive while remaining material is recommended.
One needs to have made due consideration of the OEM's recommended practices but there is no magic formula which says that an operator must operate strictly in accordance with the OEM's way of doing things. Indeed many operators over the years have made an art form of doing things differently according to their own perceptions which may vary according to who is in the chair from time to time.
NTO is a traditional way of seeking OEM de facto concurrence with alternative ways of doing things ..
One needs to have made due consideration of the OEM's recommended practices but there is no magic formula which says that an operator must operate strictly in accordance with the OEM's way of doing things. Indeed many operators over the years have made an art form of doing things differently according to their own perceptions which may vary according to who is in the chair from time to time.
NTO is a traditional way of seeking OEM de facto concurrence with alternative ways of doing things ..
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have to bow out now due to total confusion from alpa's para 1 - I wish I could understand what he/she is trying to say.
- cannot help you there. It was 'told' to me by a BA UK trained TIRE and I do not always rush to a website to try and find 'written proof' - I generally believe what I am told. Pant Load's post is worth a read. Providing, I suppose, you fully brief the required g/a rate of climb (not gradient!) in your approach briefing AND brief PNF to monitor that you are achieving it, I bow to your superior skills. I found it easier to either apply full power to start the 'up' OR use the one-push A/T setting, knowing it would be achieved. Furthermore
- I think you will find it stays the same unless you are re-writing aerodynamics. It is the detected AoA that can 'increase'.
A reminder that this topic has been done to death before here too. Comment from a UK TIRE on the regulatory aspects of manual g/a power would be useful. I guess the rules may have changed.
Originally Posted by cosmo
Further, I would be very interested if you can point me to the document that says that I am required to set full go-around thrust in my vastly overpowered aircraft. All the documents I have seen says that I must to meet the required gradient for the missed approach.
Originally Posted by cosmo
the stalling AoA may increase
A reminder that this topic has been done to death before here too. Comment from a UK TIRE on the regulatory aspects of manual g/a power would be useful. I guess the rules may have changed.
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: East of West and North of South
Posts: 549
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BOAC,
The 737 has instant Vertical Speed. Which part in setting thrust to achieve a specific Vertical speed is difficult and requires superior airmanship?
That you find it easier, doesn't make it certified.
* Edited previous post to say speed instead of AoA.
The 737 has instant Vertical Speed. Which part in setting thrust to achieve a specific Vertical speed is difficult and requires superior airmanship?
I found it easier to either apply full power to start the 'up' OR use the one-push A/T setting, knowing it would be achieved.
* Edited previous post to say speed instead of AoA.
"8.0.2.3 A significant number of operating practices allow the discretion to the Commander to decide how the flight should be flown. These are characterised with the need to exercise sound judgement and prudent assessment and may be referred to as sound operating practises (included under the more general heading of airmanship during an earlier period).
There has been a trend within the industry to refer to all operating activity under the heading of SOPs or a desire to specify all procedures within such a concept. Such broadening of the scope of SOPs diminishes the merit and value of the concept and hence the need to highlight this differentiation."
There has been a trend within the industry to refer to all operating activity under the heading of SOPs or a desire to specify all procedures within such a concept. Such broadening of the scope of SOPs diminishes the merit and value of the concept and hence the need to highlight this differentiation."
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This operation of A/T on App has been discussed at depth before. If memory serves me well (13 years ago) it is this way on B757/767. When I transferred to B733 many asked why we could not fly in 'SPD deselected'. These were old B757/767 pilots. Trouble was the C.P didn't understand the question. However, some had experimented on the line and found it worked just fine. I didn't so have no diect knowledge of it. You can disconnect at flare I supose. Anyway, said C.P asked Boeing. Answer, not recommended. However, from flying these types it seemed Boeing flight dept's don't talk to each other that much. Advancements in later design didn't seem to filter down to earlier types, when suitable. It seems B737 line pilots fall into 2 categories, but Boeing only 1.
Moving on: about manual flight = all on, all off. IMHO that is not always wise. On B733 the TCAS manoeuvre was A/P OFF and follow guidance. Now, the NG is disconnect A/T as well. When a Boeing pilot was asked that surely this introduced a safety (speed control) threat and was a retrograde step, the reply came that Boeing has adopted the philosophy of 'all on or all off all the time' The argument of having seen dangerous developments in the sim with bad speed control, absurd ROC's, forgetting to re-engage A/T after RA, etc. met with little appreciation. Why disconnect A/T if having a CLB RA above 25,000 and then forgetting to add enough thrust; or going full power at low level and hitting 3000fpm in a crowded TMA. DAFT. So, IMHO, Boeing doesn't always have the be all and end all opinion. They changed what was a safe action into a less safe one, so as to conform to a pedantic philosophy. I hear of one airline that teaches manual approaches with A/T engaged until stabalised in final config. I assume they asked Boeing?
Moving on: about manual flight = all on, all off. IMHO that is not always wise. On B733 the TCAS manoeuvre was A/P OFF and follow guidance. Now, the NG is disconnect A/T as well. When a Boeing pilot was asked that surely this introduced a safety (speed control) threat and was a retrograde step, the reply came that Boeing has adopted the philosophy of 'all on or all off all the time' The argument of having seen dangerous developments in the sim with bad speed control, absurd ROC's, forgetting to re-engage A/T after RA, etc. met with little appreciation. Why disconnect A/T if having a CLB RA above 25,000 and then forgetting to add enough thrust; or going full power at low level and hitting 3000fpm in a crowded TMA. DAFT. So, IMHO, Boeing doesn't always have the be all and end all opinion. They changed what was a safe action into a less safe one, so as to conform to a pedantic philosophy. I hear of one airline that teaches manual approaches with A/T engaged until stabalised in final config. I assume they asked Boeing?
Why disconnect A/T if having a CLB RA above 25,000 and then forgetting to add enough thrust; or going full power at low level and hitting 3000fpm in a crowded TMA. DAFT. So, IMHO, Boeing doesn't always have the be all and end all opinion
The current FCTM 737 Classic states: "RA maneuvers require only small pitch attitude changes which should be accomplished smoothly and without delay. Properly executed, the RA maneuver is mild and does not require large or abrupt control movements. Remember the passengers and flight attendants may not be all seated during this maneuver."
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Centaurus,
It is easy for Boeing to sit in an office and write this stuff. As has been seen many times it is the human behaviour, or perhaps misbehaviour, that contributes to most accidents. In that split second moment of panic, the PF, who might be quite inexperienced, (think rapidly expanding airlines, long range cruise pilots 1/2 asleep etc.) is not always going to react in the calm relaxed manner envisaged by those who wrote the manuals. When you think you are about to die people react in extremes and full back stick and full power is just such a reaction. Worse would be full back stick and no power. What has happened in real life is excessive nose down pitch with further proof that Newton's laws of motion are alive and well. People under stress do not always react the way the manual says they should. Removing one safety net does not IMHO seem the best way to go. Remember my basic point; it was changed from B737CL to B737NG and I cant understand why. It did not improve matters.
It is easy for Boeing to sit in an office and write this stuff. As has been seen many times it is the human behaviour, or perhaps misbehaviour, that contributes to most accidents. In that split second moment of panic, the PF, who might be quite inexperienced, (think rapidly expanding airlines, long range cruise pilots 1/2 asleep etc.) is not always going to react in the calm relaxed manner envisaged by those who wrote the manuals. When you think you are about to die people react in extremes and full back stick and full power is just such a reaction. Worse would be full back stick and no power. What has happened in real life is excessive nose down pitch with further proof that Newton's laws of motion are alive and well. People under stress do not always react the way the manual says they should. Removing one safety net does not IMHO seem the best way to go. Remember my basic point; it was changed from B737CL to B737NG and I cant understand why. It did not improve matters.
Can't speak for Australia but in Europe an NTO is no longer needed, as long as a risk assessment has been carried out then this will suffice.
As you certain of that, legally??
Any modification of procedures that form part of the AFM are part of the certification, and any change is, in legal terms, a change to the certification standards.
In a recent much publicized incident in Australia, it transpired that the operator had made a unilateral change to an AFM published procedure, in this case a missed approach.
When Airbus were approached for a retrospective "approval" of the change, the answer was (in effect) "No, you are bound by the AFM ( or equivalent) as part of the aircraft certification".
Quite apart from the fact that few, if any, operators would have as much data as the original manufacturer to do an adequate risk assessment, this is an area where the legal issues are not well understood, including by regulatory authority staff.
In Australia, the regulations are very clear, operators are required to comply with all provisions of the AFM. This provision is only over-ridden by the emergency authority of the pilot in command --- as affirmed by a superior court decision.
Tootle pip!!
Join Date: Jun 1999
Location: Australasia
Posts: 362
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
AFM and Certification
Leadsled.
I'm not sure of your logic (post hoc ergo propter hoc?), since the standards only require that some procedures must be provided - subsequently altering those procedures has no effect on the certification standards, but it does have an effect on compliance therewith. That will form the basis of an interesting debate in a suitable court.
The procedures in an AFM are not exclusive - they have never purported to cover everything (see FAR 25.1585(b) for a start) and they are not necessarily published as two-crew PF/PM procedures. If we were to follow your logic, an OEM NTO would be worthless unless also approved by the NAA which approved the original AFM - a somewhat mindless process to contemplate in any value-adding sense!
I do not believe that the Airbus response took that line at all - rather it rejected the suggested procedure as inappropriate from an operational rather than legal perspective. Would you mind quoting that bit of the Airbus response which you believe supports your statement?
Generally so, but not always. I wouldn't mind a quid for every time the aircraft does not do what the OEM said it would do, a problem arises in an area not explored in meeting certification requirements or a change of players within the operations area of the OEM results in a new set of personal beliefs becoming "law". Most lawyers have no idea of the practical limitations of these OEM "Sermons on the Mount".
Yes, CAR 138(1) requires: "If a flight manual has been issued for an Australian aircraft, the pilot in command of the aircraft must comply with a requirement, instruction, procedure or limitation concerning the operation of the aircraft that is set out in the manual." But, in parallel, CAR 232 requires a CASA-approved "flight check system" to be developed and used - with no proscription on varying AFM procedures. So, your "very clear" is not so clear and the "emergency authority" granted in CAR 145 to the pilot in command has significant limits in its scope.
But what I am really interested in is:
Could you please provide a reference to this decision?
Stay Alive,
Any modification of procedures that form part of the AFM are part of the certification, and any change is, in legal terms, a change to the certification standards.
The procedures in an AFM are not exclusive - they have never purported to cover everything (see FAR 25.1585(b) for a start) and they are not necessarily published as two-crew PF/PM procedures. If we were to follow your logic, an OEM NTO would be worthless unless also approved by the NAA which approved the original AFM - a somewhat mindless process to contemplate in any value-adding sense!
When Airbus were approached for a retrospective "approval" of the change, the answer was (in effect) "No, you are bound by the AFM ( or equivalent) as part of the aircraft certification".
Quite apart from the fact that few, if any, operators would have as much data as the original manufacturer to do an adequate risk assessment, this is an area where the legal issues are not well understood, including by regulatory authority staff.
In Australia, the regulations are very clear, operators are required to comply with all provisions of the AFM. This provision is only over-ridden by the emergency authority of the pilot in command --- as affirmed by a superior court decision.
But what I am really interested in is:
---as affirmed by a superior court decision.
Stay Alive,
