AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
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SPI
As for the "telltale" there is one on the ground to show control input but not airborne, it used to be available during lift off and initial climb, but then some "pilots" were incorrectly being "trained" to use it for rotation rather than attitude!!! An interesting Emirates departure from Jo'burg comes to mind. Airbus then removed the indication at nosewheel liftoff.
You're not as mixed up as I initially thought - My apologies.
Airbus made, without fanfare, some modification :
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.
Be aware that the modification is not for all serial numbers. Some still work the old way :
The indication dissapears when the aircraft passes from ground to flight (No weight on wheels).
To my knowledge, it has never been displayed for the initial climb.
FOUR REDS,
You do not have to stick around.
This thread is obviously a nice place to learn.
If you don't like it, leave it.
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Airbus made, without fanfare, some modification :
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.
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Full Disclosure
Without a full transcript I don't think we can get an accurate picture of the lead up to the incident. With the ColgenAir transcript you have a clear lack of focus from the get go. That would be one of the many contributing factors.
The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!
The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!
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Does anybody know, if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors (yes, the sidestick company and its yoke rival) or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?
This includes scientific sound eye and motion tracking under normal circumstances and simulated emergencies.
Furthermore: Is the max deflection of a sidestick clearly visible for the other crewmembers - taking into account their position in the cockpit (left / right seat or standing in the middle of the flight deck) and the illumination?
This includes scientific sound eye and motion tracking under normal circumstances and simulated emergencies.
Furthermore: Is the max deflection of a sidestick clearly visible for the other crewmembers - taking into account their position in the cockpit (left / right seat or standing in the middle of the flight deck) and the illumination?
… if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?
Yes, there were extensive human factors based evaluation programmes in order to meet the requirements of CS 25.1302 and AMC 25.1302.
The main regulation states:-
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flight crew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming the flight crew is acting in good faith. This sub-paragraph (d) does not apply to skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane.”
Note the last sentence.
For info, the background information in the AMC states:-
“Flight crews make a positive contribution to the safety of the air transportation system because of their ability to assess continuously changing conditions and situations, analyse potential actions, and make reasoned decisions. However, even well trained, qualified, healthy, alert flight-crew members make errors. Some of these errors may be influenced by the design of the systems and their flight crew interfaces, even with those that are carefully designed. Most of these errors have no significant safety effects, or are detected and/or mitigated in the normal course of events. Still, accident analyses have identified flight crew performance and error as significant factors in a majority of accidents involving transport category aeroplanes.
Accidents most often result from a sequence or combination of errors and safety related events (e.g., equipment failure and weather conditions).”
And the AMC allows the designer to assume that the crew is qualified and trained in the use of the installed equipment.
Yes, there were extensive human factors based evaluation programmes in order to meet the requirements of CS 25.1302 and AMC 25.1302.
The main regulation states:-
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flight crew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming the flight crew is acting in good faith. This sub-paragraph (d) does not apply to skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane.”
Note the last sentence.
For info, the background information in the AMC states:-
“Flight crews make a positive contribution to the safety of the air transportation system because of their ability to assess continuously changing conditions and situations, analyse potential actions, and make reasoned decisions. However, even well trained, qualified, healthy, alert flight-crew members make errors. Some of these errors may be influenced by the design of the systems and their flight crew interfaces, even with those that are carefully designed. Most of these errors have no significant safety effects, or are detected and/or mitigated in the normal course of events. Still, accident analyses have identified flight crew performance and error as significant factors in a majority of accidents involving transport category aeroplanes.
Accidents most often result from a sequence or combination of errors and safety related events (e.g., equipment failure and weather conditions).”
And the AMC allows the designer to assume that the crew is qualified and trained in the use of the installed equipment.
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CONF iture
My choice of words "initial climb" was not very good as it gave the wrong inference, I meant until airborne, apologies.
My airline has had the modification fitted to all A/C old and new.
My choice of words "initial climb" was not very good as it gave the wrong inference, I meant until airborne, apologies.
My airline has had the modification fitted to all A/C old and new.
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xcitation wrote: “The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!” Several others have also thought that the commander missed it, as well as the PF and PNF.
The commander was not there until afterwards, AIUI. Nor was he there for the whole 3+ minutes of the descent. When he returned, he was not told that the SW had gone on for 54 seconds in one session, and twice more briefly when PF tentatively tried less SS NU, also AIUI.
(No doubt one of the real experts who have thoroughly analysed the FDR and CVR times will correct me if I am wrong.)
It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?
The commander was not there until afterwards, AIUI. Nor was he there for the whole 3+ minutes of the descent. When he returned, he was not told that the SW had gone on for 54 seconds in one session, and twice more briefly when PF tentatively tried less SS NU, also AIUI.
(No doubt one of the real experts who have thoroughly analysed the FDR and CVR times will correct me if I am wrong.)
It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?
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chrisN
It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?
It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?
He should never have been out of the loop at all.
No, certainly not. However, he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead.
Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.
A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot?
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“ . . . he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead. He should never have been out of the loop at all.”
And:
“Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew. “
Both opinions have been expressed before. I have no view, preferring to leave it to ATPLs to opine.
If there is not unanimity, what then?
I also believe that somebody said that the commander HAD to take a break to stay within permitted hours on duty. I wouldn't know.
--------------
[Hampster wheel/o-bird.]
---------------
FWIW, my take on the whole thing is that:
AF FO trainee selection might need looking at;
AF (and other majors?) training definitely needs revision. Some has started.
Regulation of training may need a look, too.
Manual flying practice needs more attention, particularly at high FLs, cruise speed,
SOP/QRH at high FLs, cruise speed needs more attention.
AF CRM needs thorough review and retraining.
-----------
Two psychological factors are still open, and I see no easy way to overcome them, nor have the experts here put forward solutions that I have seen:
Highly stressed people can be oblivious to audible warnings. What has been described as the “cavalry charge” happened when the FOs were handed control manually which they had never practiced and in circumstances they didn’t understand, or agree about (PNF showed some sign of awareness);
And the reason I followed this from the outset through all threads – when a stressed pilot forms the wrong conclusion, he/she tends to stay with it regardless of ineffective attempts to correct the wrong problem. I have seen this in my field (gliding safety and accident analysis) – only test pilots, or rare individuals, can keep a clear head and systematically fault find.
A wild suggestion – DW will probably shoot me down, as well as all the professionals.
After the system gives up and hands a basketful of trouble to the pilots to hand fly their way out of it without any training (or only inappropriate training), the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought). How about for one second out of every 4, the glass screen blocks out everything else and displays;
” STALL! You are staying stalled! Get out of it!”
Would it be beyond the wit of man to even devise a “computer knows best mode – it will recover as the pilots have not realised” before it’s too late?
Told you it was wild.
And:
“Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew. “
Both opinions have been expressed before. I have no view, preferring to leave it to ATPLs to opine.
If there is not unanimity, what then?
I also believe that somebody said that the commander HAD to take a break to stay within permitted hours on duty. I wouldn't know.
--------------
[Hampster wheel/o-bird.]
---------------
FWIW, my take on the whole thing is that:
AF FO trainee selection might need looking at;
AF (and other majors?) training definitely needs revision. Some has started.
Regulation of training may need a look, too.
Manual flying practice needs more attention, particularly at high FLs, cruise speed,
SOP/QRH at high FLs, cruise speed needs more attention.
AF CRM needs thorough review and retraining.
-----------
Two psychological factors are still open, and I see no easy way to overcome them, nor have the experts here put forward solutions that I have seen:
Highly stressed people can be oblivious to audible warnings. What has been described as the “cavalry charge” happened when the FOs were handed control manually which they had never practiced and in circumstances they didn’t understand, or agree about (PNF showed some sign of awareness);
And the reason I followed this from the outset through all threads – when a stressed pilot forms the wrong conclusion, he/she tends to stay with it regardless of ineffective attempts to correct the wrong problem. I have seen this in my field (gliding safety and accident analysis) – only test pilots, or rare individuals, can keep a clear head and systematically fault find.
A wild suggestion – DW will probably shoot me down, as well as all the professionals.
After the system gives up and hands a basketful of trouble to the pilots to hand fly their way out of it without any training (or only inappropriate training), the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought). How about for one second out of every 4, the glass screen blocks out everything else and displays;
” STALL! You are staying stalled! Get out of it!”
Would it be beyond the wit of man to even devise a “computer knows best mode – it will recover as the pilots have not realised” before it’s too late?
Told you it was wild.
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Originally Posted by chrisN
the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought).
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 1st Nov 2011 at 16:50. Reason: text in italics added/edited
HN39, given the huge number of possible failure states and combinations, is it possible to devise the logic to always deliver the most appropriate response ? Hell of a FMECA. Perhaps a minimalist approach might be easier given that eventually human beings have to deal with the situation and how do you train for so many eventualities ? . So tell them what you think the problem is, tell them the state of their aircraft, and let them get on with it maybe ?
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Is the movements (opening-closing latch) of the flight deck armored door is recorded by the FDR ?
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In an early transcript/translation of the CVR that was "leaked" not long before "official" CVR transcripts were released, when the first stall warning sounded, one of the co-pilots said "What's that about?", as if he'd never even heard the word "stall" before. I remember seeing it on an Austrailian web site. I hope I can find it again and compare it to the "official" transcript. Anyway, if it's true, that would be an acknowledgement that, at least, one of the crew heard it.
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one of the co-pilots said "What's that about?", as if he'd never even heard the word "stall" before.
Re the Capt's rest,
With 3 crew to operate this long sector that exceeded the FTLs for 2 pilots the capt is required to take a rest period.
If it was his sector it is perfectly reasonable that he should take the middle rest period. The company AF provided him with two 'qualified' pilots to ensure that he could take that rest period. The ITCZ transit should have been, and on previous transits probably had been, less of a hazard than a early morning, tired arrival at CDG. Thereby avoiding an AMS/THY scenario.
Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.
IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.
With 3 crew to operate this long sector that exceeded the FTLs for 2 pilots the capt is required to take a rest period.
If it was his sector it is perfectly reasonable that he should take the middle rest period. The company AF provided him with two 'qualified' pilots to ensure that he could take that rest period. The ITCZ transit should have been, and on previous transits probably had been, less of a hazard than a early morning, tired arrival at CDG. Thereby avoiding an AMS/THY scenario.
Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.
IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.
Originally Posted by Dozy
Nah, I suspect that stage will be skipped and they'll go straight to brain-mapped control, which if it keeps advancing at it's current rate will probably be plausible in about 30-50 years.
Pilot thinks about sex, plane goes up.
Pilot thinks about his ex wife, plane goes down, unlike ex-wife.
Secret to flying is a ready supply of Hooters waitresses, lap dancers, and other exotic auxiliary members of the flight crew for the duration of the flight. Oh, yes, pre flight planning requires that oysters are always on the in flight menu.
What?
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GarageYears
Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.
A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot? 1st Nov 2011 11:05
Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.
A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot? 1st Nov 2011 11:05
When I saw tech or Wx problems as a junior F/O, I wondered what 'the Old Man' would want to do about it. Later, with several thousand hours experience, I thought I knew better than he did. Later, when the whole damned aeroplane was my responsibility, I took things very seriously indeed, and was not about to trust qualified but inexperienced F/Os with my bleedin' aircraft.
No, I didn't "have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot", I had decades of going around the block, seeing failures both technical and of CRM. Further, I had the emotional constraint of being responsible for the aeroplane. NO F/O can know what that is like.
This man should not have left his aeroplane in the hands of qualified but inexperienced pilots.
1066
Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.
IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.
Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.
IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.
His was a very, very bad decision. You do not leave inexperienced (albeit qualified) F/Os to penetrate the ITCZ.