AF 447 Thread No. 6
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Agreed, sir - my point is just that we do have another plausible potential reason, and so I don't think we can say the AoA vanes (specifically #1) were definitely affected by ice.
I'm interested - other than the Perpignan incident (where the AoA sensors had been "abused" outside their specs before the flight), is ice affecting AoA sensors as much of a problem as pitot icing?
I'm interested - other than the Perpignan incident (where the AoA sensors had been "abused" outside their specs before the flight), is ice affecting AoA sensors as much of a problem as pitot icing?
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PIO/APC
Clandestino wrote (about PIO/APC) :
Indeed, when the aircraft is fully stalled and mushing, and PF is holding full deflection left-up on his sidestick, and he is not touching the rudder pedals, yaw damper does give orders. After some time looking at these traces, I still cannot make sense of them. This is an area of interest which I hope will be investigated.
However, more akin to the APC definition which you suggest is the start of the sequence, right when PF takes control. Roll and yaw are mixed up in an oscillation, which appears to the pilots as a pure roll movement, but where in fact rudder is actuated and lateral accelerations are measured.
Surprisingly, no trace of gyros is provided. Yaw rate gyro would be interesting to look at. Heading traces are insufficiently detailed to extrapolate yaw rate from them.
Moreover, I am greatly interested in aileron authority and response to SS inputs. It appears that right inboard aileron maximum deflection remains limited to a modest amount. This maximum available deflection decreases significantly within the first seconds after A/P quit. Such limitation is surprising in the context of a Direct Roll flight law, which is part of Alternate 2B global flight law.
Interesting elements of comparison are available with the D-AXLA accident report. FDR traces show a large number of fascinating bits of information. Such are not provided in the 3rd interim report which is our subject matter. Maximum aileron deflection appears different in this report. However, the exact type of aircraft is different of course. Expert input welcome.
There is not in yaw.
To have PIO/APC you have to start with pilot's oscillatory input. Rudder starts to oscillate without pilot's input at about 2:11:45 (following yaw damper commands) when the aeroplane is so deeply stalled that high AoA and low speed make it pretty inefficient.
To have PIO/APC you have to start with pilot's oscillatory input. Rudder starts to oscillate without pilot's input at about 2:11:45 (following yaw damper commands) when the aeroplane is so deeply stalled that high AoA and low speed make it pretty inefficient.
However, more akin to the APC definition which you suggest is the start of the sequence, right when PF takes control. Roll and yaw are mixed up in an oscillation, which appears to the pilots as a pure roll movement, but where in fact rudder is actuated and lateral accelerations are measured.
Surprisingly, no trace of gyros is provided. Yaw rate gyro would be interesting to look at. Heading traces are insufficiently detailed to extrapolate yaw rate from them.
Moreover, I am greatly interested in aileron authority and response to SS inputs. It appears that right inboard aileron maximum deflection remains limited to a modest amount. This maximum available deflection decreases significantly within the first seconds after A/P quit. Such limitation is surprising in the context of a Direct Roll flight law, which is part of Alternate 2B global flight law.
Interesting elements of comparison are available with the D-AXLA accident report. FDR traces show a large number of fascinating bits of information. Such are not provided in the 3rd interim report which is our subject matter. Maximum aileron deflection appears different in this report. However, the exact type of aircraft is different of course. Expert input welcome.
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If not, given that we know there wasn't such an ACARS message, we may safely assume that the ECAM/warning was not triggered.
Last edited by AlphaZuluRomeo; 3rd Sep 2011 at 09:08. Reason: typo
Mr. Optimistic
Are you discussing the control of the aircraft when stalled ? If so, surely the control characteristics are markedly different from what anyone is used to in normal flight, and the aircraft response ditto. Aircraft seems to have been very well behaved given the situation.
Are you discussing the control of the aircraft when stalled ? If so, surely the control characteristics are markedly different from what anyone is used to in normal flight, and the aircraft response ditto. Aircraft seems to have been very well behaved given the situation.
One thing that I find interesting in the traces is that the sidestick traces are based on a graph where left stick input relates to values > 0, whereas roll traces say that values > 0 relate to right wing down. If this is that case then PIO/APC needs to be looked into, as the traces of roll vs. sidestick show the precise opposite.
mm43
Have another look at the traces and you will find the yaw damper was working and contributed more and more as the IAS decreased. The pedals were only used from 2:13:05, and all other rudder movements were from the yaw damper.
Have another look at the traces and you will find the yaw damper was working and contributed more and more as the IAS decreased. The pedals were only used from 2:13:05, and all other rudder movements were from the yaw damper.
- sideslip estimation (except in alternate 2 or direct laws)
Check Post #373 and you will note that the second group of traces is a compilation of pitch, roll and rudder input. I don't think the yaw damper was helping with the roll as lateral stability decreased.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
(if the BEA are so big on protecting corporations like Airbus, why have the DGAC already mandated a software change?). You're clearly an intelligent guy - if you stopped fighting 24-year-old windmills and applied yourself fully to the facts we could really use you.
Fully applying to the facts is actually my main purpose, but what do you imply by stating the BEA has changed ?
Is it how finally the awaited independency and transparency are upon them, so how do you see how things were managed 20 years back ?
I can’t remember you ever publicly doubting the official line …
Originally Posted by A33Zab
An *e-rudder* version is not equipped with a rudder travel limiter unit.
Since a RTLU is found with the VS, the F-GZCP was a *m-rudder* version.
Since a RTLU is found with the VS, the F-GZCP was a *m-rudder* version.
Thanks A33Zab.
CONF iture etal
I'm puzzled by the arguments involving ADs, DGAC and the BEA
ADs are specific and the responsibility of the regulator to enforce
Accident causes are general (multiple layers of swiss cheese) and the responsibility of the BEA to dissect
What am I missing in understanding the arguments ?
lack of ADs don't cause accidents, but the presence of ADs may minimize future accidents
I'm puzzled by the arguments involving ADs, DGAC and the BEA
ADs are specific and the responsibility of the regulator to enforce
Accident causes are general (multiple layers of swiss cheese) and the responsibility of the BEA to dissect
What am I missing in understanding the arguments ?
lack of ADs don't cause accidents, but the presence of ADs may minimize future accidents
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Originally Posted by ChrisJ800
Originally Posted by Xcitation
Indeed, a major puzzle why ignore the stall warnings for 3 or 4 minutes? In the entire transcript of the incident not once was "stall" or "décrochage" ever mentioned by any of the 3 pilots.
Reasons
1. Both FOs overloaded for 4 minutes and did not hear it.
2. Both FOs heard it and ignored it as being false (as per recent QF72 etc malfunction.) But why not verbalize that?
3. Both FOs didn't understand it/unfamiliar "<Stall><Stall>. What's that?". Would the french décrochage or flat line tone been better warning? Were they verbalizing that they did not understand it. Perhaps confused in the heat of the moment. Or did "What's that?" refer to something else.
4. Both FOs heard it and accepted it and did not know what to do. Again why not verbalize that?
PF immediately 3/4 stick back for no known reason. After 20 seconds PNF states "ALT LAW, Protections Lo"(st). By then the speed had decayed and they were dancing the edge of the flight envelope.
PF was over controlling from the get go. Large scale stick inputs, thrust set at TOGA and then idle, Air Brakes deployed. Ignoring PNF directions. Did he panic?
Sadly if PF had left the controls alone and sat on his hands it could have been a different story. Near the end he verbalizes his desire for max nose up thus confirming it was intentional SS input. This would fit him not being aware of ALT LAW or not understanding it.
But I’ve been at maxi
nose-up for a while
No no no don’t climb
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décrochage
Can a french aviator clarify the extent of usage of the word "stall" in their training.
Is the english "stall" widely used in French aviation training or is the native "décrochage" used?
Is hearing "stall" a routine part of stall avoidance training in the sim?
Is the english "stall" widely used in French aviation training or is the native "décrochage" used?
Is hearing "stall" a routine part of stall avoidance training in the sim?
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Hi xcitation,
If he'd done that - it would have continued to roll right wing down until it was inverted.
They were struggling to keep the wings level in ALT LAW from the outset.
Sadly if PF had left the controls alone and sat on his hands it could have been a different story.
They were struggling to keep the wings level in ALT LAW from the outset.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Due to the AoA discrepancy, it is very probable that the following STATUS message was displayed on ECAM to the AF447 crew :
RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING
RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
I was just quoting your mention of that number
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
that only addresses one reaction - to the stall warning
Originally Posted by Svarin
Moreover, I am greatly interested in aileron authority and response to SS inputs. It appears that right inboard aileron maximum deflection remains limited to a modest amount.
Regarding the aileron authority: do you remember what aileron authority you had when stalling your first trainer? Widebody plummeting oceanwards at AoA higher than 35° is bound to have it even worse than that.
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Hi xcitation,
Quote:
Sadly if PF had left the controls alone and sat on his hands it could have been a different story.
If he'd done that - it would have continued to roll right wing down until it was inverted.
They were struggling to keep the wings level in ALT LAW from the outset.
Quote:
Sadly if PF had left the controls alone and sat on his hands it could have been a different story.
If he'd done that - it would have continued to roll right wing down until it was inverted.
They were struggling to keep the wings level in ALT LAW from the outset.
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Are you sure? The initial roll could have just been a nasty bit of turbulence - everything after that could be PIO/ADC - the lateral control inputs from the PF certainly seem in excess of those required at cruise altitude.
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The airplane rolled through seven degrees in two seconds, not really an alarming rate (the 'second' hand on your analogue wrist watch 'rolls' twice as fast). Upward gusts alternated with downward gusts about every five seconds.
I would not mind if someone would explain to me how releasing the SS in roll direct results in the aircraft rolling inverted, but more importantly explain this to the RAF who just sub-leased 2 of these aircraft and are probably not aware of this.
If that was the case the probability of a stable continued role to one side until inverted is rather low.
Looking at the outcome I'm with excitation on this one.
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steamchicken A thought - when we want to focus on the trend in a particular metric, we plot it on a chart like the DFDR traces. Strangely, aircraft displays show scrolling numbers or else multiple needles. Would a "value plus trend-line" be better? Medical monitoring displays do this.
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Hi OK465, DW, henra,
Unless the aircraft was trimmed exactly to balance any asymmetric thrust (due TL moved in response to thrust lock), it would tend to roll one way and continue to roll, unless counteracted by pilot or Auto Pilot input.
Since it was in Alternate Law, there was no AP or FBW roll input - only pilot input.
At what attitude do you think it would stop rolling if left by itself?
Unless the aircraft was trimmed exactly to balance any asymmetric thrust (due TL moved in response to thrust lock), it would tend to roll one way and continue to roll, unless counteracted by pilot or Auto Pilot input.
Since it was in Alternate Law, there was no AP or FBW roll input - only pilot input.
At what attitude do you think it would stop rolling if left by itself?
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I, by choice never flew the Airbus but friends that do say if you leave the plane in a bank it maintains it forever. Even in alternate law. If that is true it wouldn't roll inverted but I am sure a pilot would correct it if this information is wrong. I am so happy I only flew Boeings. They always do what you want.