AF 447 Thread No. 6
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Heavy Metallist. Like the Iceman says, "You are dangerous".
You think my commentary is what, Inexplicable? To you, I am sad to say, it no doubt is.
If one never challenges the status quo, one cannot complain when it kills.
I, for one, am not here to look good, sound clever, and impress the wife. Those people end up dead and gone, with thousands of passengers still clinging hopefully to your short coattails.
You think my commentary is what, Inexplicable? To you, I am sad to say, it no doubt is.
If one never challenges the status quo, one cannot complain when it kills.
I, for one, am not here to look good, sound clever, and impress the wife. Those people end up dead and gone, with thousands of passengers still clinging hopefully to your short coattails.
Definition of "properly trained IR pilot" includes, but is not limited to: proper initial IR training, proper type rating training and proper recurrent training. ~Clandestino~
The last two are now done in a simulator which maintains its physical heading, and can only simulate long term horizontal accelerations or very short term vertical (e.g. light turbulence). There is no spatial disorientation in a simulator. What makes you think it is now properly trained? ~Rudderrudderrat~
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46062...ml#post6653278 ~ Retired F4~
Most important and most often checked information in "blind flying" is attitude. If one cannot read it properly or cannot maintain it properly, the rest of instrument scan is in vain.
(Per your earlier post ...) Performance as cross check for attitude ... which takes us to ...
When pilot is handflying by sole reference to instruments, it is important to keep movement smooth and precise to avoid unnecessary maneuvering that might upset pilot's sense of balance and induce illusions of turning or banking. Pilots who, when without outside visual reference, start flying by their senses instead by their instruments, get far more often killed than not. ~Clandestino~
So, as instrument rated pilot, I don't fly by feeling Gs, I fly by reference to my instruments.~Clandestino~
Let me add to that, it is not only refence to the flight instruments, but also to the performance instruments . It ís in the former mentioned reference upset recovery training at the beginning.
It is not understandable to change altitude (intentional or unintentional) without attention to powersetting, speed change and vvi change. Change attitude, change power, except you want to accelerate in diving or decelerate in climbing. No need to wait what the speed will be doing, because that can bring one already behind the aircraft. ~Retired F4~
It is not understandable to change altitude (intentional or unintentional) without attention to powersetting, speed change and vvi change. Change attitude, change power, except you want to accelerate in diving or decelerate in climbing. No need to wait what the speed will be doing, because that can bring one already behind the aircraft. ~Retired F4~
Zorin, bear with me. 447 is descending rapidly with a reasonable attitude ~bearfoil/Lyman~
rudderrat ... I can't help thinking, "I really really don't want to go down into that storm," was bouncing around in that poor fellow's {PF} head. So, ironically, he descended all the way down through that storm he might have been trying with all his might and soul to avoid. ~JE-EE~
Back to Davies "when given the choice between stall and something else, try something else." What gets me in the gut is that the PF never seems to have acknowledged the fact of stall being his in-flight condition.
* Only experienced pilots would recover from "falling" by trying to fall faster. They've been trained that this is the way you get the required airspeed over the wings to give you lift. For real stick and rudder pilots and even military FBW pilots who have hours upon hours of active joysticking behind them this becomes the intuitive response as insane as it seems to a lay person. ~JE-EE~
). The US Air Force has a similar approach. Fairly early in the training syllabus, in flight, you teach the simple stall, which is a gentle maneuver. You trim the aircraft, stall it wings level, note that you are falling, then lower the nose to reduce AoA to unstall it (and of course add power to resume airspeed and altitude.)
A few flights later, the spin is taught. You raise the nose up quite a bit higher, and at stall (you get a bit of buffet or a rudder shaker) you kick in full rudder to induce a three dimensional upset. You depart in the direction of the rudder. Your nose is down as you fall. You end up recovering in the T-34C (as we did in the T-28B/C in the era when dirt was recent) by applying full opposite rudder, and stick forward of neutral. (Well, slightly forward is the correct technique).
But this is taught VFR.
Spins on instruments (me under the bag, the flight must be in VFR so that the check pilot isn't in actual IFR doing spins) isn't something I was exposed to until I was trying to get my special instrument rating. That was about 2000 hours into my flying career.
But my point is that the idea of lowering nose to get out of a stall is taught early on. (If I am not mistaken, this is likewise taught in Cessna's in civil aviation, but maybe there are subtle differences I am not aware of).
The "experienced pilot" bit you suggest seems to me an "in IMC" limited condition. So while I agree somewhat on your point there, I disagree that it is only experienced pilots who will lower the nose to overcome falling in a stall. Any pilot would do that, if he or she recognized being in a stall.
What is critical IMO here is that with Airspeed on the fritz, the typical cross check on performance information (as AoA isn't available in the c/p) was missing. Why he'd not believe he was stalled when nose was up and VSI was high descent and altitude was clicking off is another point, but typical upset/out of control flight remedy procedures will include checking your airspeed to see if you are stalled or not (or at an unsuitable airspeed). So, even if he'd had some training on stalls, his cross check of performance would have been frustrated early in the event since early on, he didn't have airspeed as a valid cross check ... and he knew that. He knew it so well that even as airspeed (in retrospect) seems to have returned to utility, he would not or could not or did not check it so ascertain his in flight condition ... other than falling nose-high. <= That condition didn't trigger the correct response from three different pilots.
And I'll wager that that condition isn't part of typical sim training, or at least wasn't.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 22nd Aug 2011 at 14:32.
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Lonewolf. Of all people, I would hope you could pause once in a while before making a quick conclusion.
The "Assiette" (That is a brilliant word, so much more descriptive than "Attitude"). Is REASONABLE. By that is meant, it isn't spun, tumbling, or disintegrating. Reasonable in the sense it can be recovered.
We were talking UA, so from there, her assiette is 'reasonable'. That is what I meant, it is not what you think I meant.
I so wish we could avoid the quick conclusion, the short synopsis of ab initio, and interminous example. (This is a broad whine, and not intended for Lonewolf, a man of great patience, and surpassing skill.)
The "Assiette" (That is a brilliant word, so much more descriptive than "Attitude"). Is REASONABLE. By that is meant, it isn't spun, tumbling, or disintegrating. Reasonable in the sense it can be recovered.
We were talking UA, so from there, her assiette is 'reasonable'. That is what I meant, it is not what you think I meant.
I so wish we could avoid the quick conclusion, the short synopsis of ab initio, and interminous example. (This is a broad whine, and not intended for Lonewolf, a man of great patience, and surpassing skill.)
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Just a nitpick about "Airbus SAS"....
Airbus is a SAS, which stands for "Société par Actions Simplifiée" and refers to a "société anonyme with special statutes" according to French commercial law (I'm no expert in commercial law, and had to look up he term in Wikipedia).
I would say "Airbus SAS" is the common way of referring to the company, when trying to avoid confusion with the aircraft 'as such'.
Airbus is a SAS, which stands for "Société par Actions Simplifiée" and refers to a "société anonyme with special statutes" according to French commercial law (I'm no expert in commercial law, and had to look up he term in Wikipedia).
I would say "Airbus SAS" is the common way of referring to the company, when trying to avoid confusion with the aircraft 'as such'.
Bear, in that case, if that's where you were headed, I'd recommend that you consider using the term "Recoverable" rather than "reasonable" as it's
more precise / less general / less ambiguous,
and
more "air minded"
as a descriptive term.
Thank you for spelling that out.
Insofar as opinion goes ...
In French, perhaps.
In English, attitude for aircraft relative orientation to various axes is concise and descriptive, as well as standard professional jargon.
It's meaning is clear.
Beyond that modest lexiconography, the distinction between Angle of Attack and Attitude is a necessary one, hence two terms for those two different frames of reference: on relative to the airmass, one relative to a (Cartesian?) coordinate system. (It seems in the past few threads, sometimes Assiette is interpreted as AoA and sometimes Attitude ... but that may just be the usual "lost in translation" issue).
more precise / less general / less ambiguous,
and
more "air minded"
as a descriptive term.
Thank you for spelling that out.
Insofar as opinion goes ...
The "Assiette" (That is a brilliant word, so much more descriptive than "Attitude").
In English, attitude for aircraft relative orientation to various axes is concise and descriptive, as well as standard professional jargon.
It's meaning is clear.
Beyond that modest lexiconography, the distinction between Angle of Attack and Attitude is a necessary one, hence two terms for those two different frames of reference: on relative to the airmass, one relative to a (Cartesian?) coordinate system. (It seems in the past few threads, sometimes Assiette is interpreted as AoA and sometimes Attitude ... but that may just be the usual "lost in translation" issue).
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Thanks Lonewolf. Recoverable is good.
"UNUSUAL"..............even better? Or too generic?
Did you leave out the "wings level" in Spin recovery? Did you teach the next thing? Full Rudder, Opposite Roll? I have a point re.
"UNUSUAL"..............even better? Or too generic?
Did you leave out the "wings level" in Spin recovery? Did you teach the next thing? Full Rudder, Opposite Roll? I have a point re.
Bear:
Stall recovery, as practiced, was a wings level training maneuver from start to finish.
Approach turn stall recovery included reduce AoA and level the wings, followed by power (with minimal delay) followed by climb.
Spin recovery was taught as an ailerons neutral maneuver from start to the end of rotation. You then level wings and return the nose to the horizon, wings level, with caution to Avoid Rolling Pull Out!
While the spin is in progress, we did not teach the use of ailerons to recover from the spin: they should be 'neutral' in those two models of aircraft.
In others, perhaps not. (IIRC, the T-2 was also a stick 'neutral' spin recovery, but I'll defer to those who know on other aircraft models).
NOTE: If you turned with aileron during spin entry, you could enter a spiral rather than a spin. They look pretty similar (though you don't get the clean stall break at entry) with a nose low and rotation about lateral axis.
In a spiral you aren't stalled, thus anti-spin inputs won't recover from a spiral. There are a few dead bodies that attest to same ... which takes us back to the utility of the AoA gauge.
Sorry for the digression. The above doesn't apply to the AF447, swept wing stall. That aircraft accomplished a lazy turn to the right during the stall, but was not in a spin. Ailerons remained at least somewhat effective (early on?) as well as rudder (see the Captian's directions to PF), and it seems from the released info, so too did pitch control.
A few threads back, someone described the stall as "mushy." There does not seem to have been the clean break at stall that I was familiar with in small aircraft.
Stall recovery, as practiced, was a wings level training maneuver from start to finish.
Approach turn stall recovery included reduce AoA and level the wings, followed by power (with minimal delay) followed by climb.
Spin recovery was taught as an ailerons neutral maneuver from start to the end of rotation. You then level wings and return the nose to the horizon, wings level, with caution to Avoid Rolling Pull Out!
While the spin is in progress, we did not teach the use of ailerons to recover from the spin: they should be 'neutral' in those two models of aircraft.
In others, perhaps not. (IIRC, the T-2 was also a stick 'neutral' spin recovery, but I'll defer to those who know on other aircraft models).
NOTE: If you turned with aileron during spin entry, you could enter a spiral rather than a spin. They look pretty similar (though you don't get the clean stall break at entry) with a nose low and rotation about lateral axis.
In a spiral you aren't stalled, thus anti-spin inputs won't recover from a spiral. There are a few dead bodies that attest to same
... which takes us back to the utility of the AoA gauge. Sorry for the digression. The above doesn't apply to the AF447, swept wing stall. That aircraft accomplished a lazy turn to the right during the stall, but was not in a spin. Ailerons remained at least somewhat effective (early on?) as well as rudder (see the Captian's directions to PF), and it seems from the released info, so too did pitch control.
A few threads back, someone described the stall as "mushy." There does not seem to have been the clean break at stall that I was familiar with in small aircraft.
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Could the aircraft have recovered from the stall by itself. Most jets if not in a spin will recover from a stall hands off,given enough altitude.
Is it possible for the A330 to recover from this particular stalled state?.I do not know.
Is it possible for the A330 to recover from this particular stalled state?.I do not know.
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Yes, mushy. I see it that way, and said so. So did others.
My point in bringing up Ailerons/Spoilers is this:
Roll control was evident, patent, even. She impacted with a rotation to the right of some not emphatic value. Her Flight Path was generally to the Right, but may have some number of completed rotations in the generalized right rotation.
I see, then, not just a ROLL PIO, but a sustained impetus for the PIO. A PIO generally won't stabilize at some value, and continue into eternity. PF was bouncing back off some chronic rotation to the right, that included a wing drop, likely. What do you think?
Did she complete a rotation to the right? several? Because that is yet an additional complication, and suggests more than just a heading distraction? I dare not go further, for fear of appearing foolish.
'Approach Turn Recovery' should that not also include a Rudder correction for the crab that remains?
Thanks again for your patience, and your professionalism.
My point in bringing up Ailerons/Spoilers is this:
Roll control was evident, patent, even. She impacted with a rotation to the right of some not emphatic value. Her Flight Path was generally to the Right, but may have some number of completed rotations in the generalized right rotation.
I see, then, not just a ROLL PIO, but a sustained impetus for the PIO. A PIO generally won't stabilize at some value, and continue into eternity. PF was bouncing back off some chronic rotation to the right, that included a wing drop, likely. What do you think?
Did she complete a rotation to the right? several? Because that is yet an additional complication, and suggests more than just a heading distraction? I dare not go further, for fear of appearing foolish.
'Approach Turn Recovery' should that not also include a Rudder correction for the crab that remains?
Thanks again for your patience, and your professionalism.
"SANS WINGLIFT"? Pardonnez MOI? Something has stabilized her rapid descent at 100 knots...... DRAG, then, not lift. As you will.
The approved and trained recovery from STALL warning was working, it shows that in the traces. All that was necessary was to tweak it. TOGA, check. Maintain PITCH, oops. Find 4 degrees AoA (She did), keep the Power up, and wait. That is for 1000AGL, don't you think with seven miles of sky beneath her, it would be even easier?
a) Engine power output is reduced at altitude... something to do with 'thinner' air... see (b).
b) Air pressure, and consequently the lift--coefficient (if you like) of the air is very different - the air is "thin", yes, that would be the word in liquid terms I think. Hence you need to be going a lot faster to get the same number of molecules over the wing surface - else you plummet to the ground. Splat. (Or Ocean. Splash.)
So, what might work at 1000AGL really won't work at 7 miles up.
Physics and all that.
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Garage
Yes, definitely, thin air, less power, and that. However, she was recoverable, and had (initially) 30k feet to do so. Plenty of room to recover. Stalling on Approach is conducted in thicker air? Not Always.
Like you say, a consideration though. Mostly my point is this. At low level, maintenance of Altitude is critical, not so at the levels. The method of Recovery is up to the Pilot. Airbus and others think maintaining altitude is more important than losing it, when LOW. It is opined that PF implemented a standard low level procedure to recover from the STALLSTALL.
I say, so what? and Why Not? Like he is deficient for doing as trained, but neglecting his location? To support that, I am saying that had he tried to recover the (proper way), which was not even trained, He would have been deeper in the soup!!
I appreciate your presence, I think I am better understanding your pov.
Reciprocity?
Yes, definitely, thin air, less power, and that. However, she was recoverable, and had (initially) 30k feet to do so. Plenty of room to recover. Stalling on Approach is conducted in thicker air? Not Always.
Like you say, a consideration though. Mostly my point is this. At low level, maintenance of Altitude is critical, not so at the levels. The method of Recovery is up to the Pilot. Airbus and others think maintaining altitude is more important than losing it, when LOW. It is opined that PF implemented a standard low level procedure to recover from the STALLSTALL.
I say, so what? and Why Not? Like he is deficient for doing as trained, but neglecting his location? To support that, I am saying that had he tried to recover the (proper way), which was not even trained, He would have been deeper in the soup!!
I appreciate your presence, I think I am better understanding your pov.
Reciprocity?
Bear, based on the info available from BEA, which they look to have gotten from the heading trace from the FDR, there was no "rotation" but a gradual heading change of about 270 degrees (roughly) to the right. (In three or four minutes, to turn that many degrees I'll describe as "a gentle turn to the right" as an outcome (turn rate) but given the PIO early on in the upset, maybe that description is false).
Takata and a few others posted the picture a couple of threads back based on the BEA data/reconstruction.
As to PIO in roll:
It appears that the PF was able to eventually get a grip on that after his initial trouble in the roll channel. (Provisional verdict: the A330 is pretty stable in roll even at that AoA). I don't think I am the first to consider that his initial difficulty in controlling his roll once in "Alt 2, here, you have it," may have contributed to a scan breakdown regarding pitch.
We can't read minds, no less read minds from over two years ago, but JD-EE has raised (in the other thread, I think) the suggestion that in the back of his mind, he was worried about descending down into the goo he was flying in. We'll never know.
Insofar as
We taught a balanced flight recovery, meaning center the ball as you fly. The approach turn stall was entered in balanced flight. We had another maneuver we taught, a skidded turn stall, that was a similar maneuver with the ball out, which tended to depart from controlled flight dramatically. (Not uncommon to roll over during the course of it). It was, of course, practiced at altitude.
Rudder was necessary to keep ball centered, particularly as in the prop plane adding power typically yaws the aircraft and must be countered with Rudder. (Heh, one of the first Approach Turn Stalls I ever did in a T-28B as a student, I torque rolled due to not stepping with elan upon the rudder as power was added. Got me an earful, and rightly so).
Did so many of them, I guess that for me it sort of goes without saying.
(Again, this practice maneuver was practiced in VFR conditions).
In Re Garage Years point on thin air:
Both control authority and dampening would be attenuated in thin air, hence the potential to over control.
Takata and a few others posted the picture a couple of threads back based on the BEA data/reconstruction.
As to PIO in roll:
It appears that the PF was able to eventually get a grip on that after his initial trouble in the roll channel. (Provisional verdict: the A330 is pretty stable in roll even at that AoA). I don't think I am the first to consider that his initial difficulty in controlling his roll once in "Alt 2, here, you have it," may have contributed to a scan breakdown regarding pitch.
We can't read minds, no less read minds from over two years ago, but JD-EE has raised (in the other thread, I think) the suggestion that in the back of his mind, he was worried about descending down into the goo he was flying in. We'll never know.
Insofar as
'Approach Turn Recovery' should that not also include a Rudder correction for the crab that remains? ~lyman~
Rudder was necessary to keep ball centered, particularly as in the prop plane adding power typically yaws the aircraft and must be countered with Rudder. (Heh, one of the first Approach Turn Stalls I ever did in a T-28B as a student, I torque rolled due to not stepping with elan upon the rudder as power was added. Got me an earful, and rightly so).
Did so many of them, I guess that for me it sort of goes without saying.
(Again, this practice maneuver was practiced in VFR conditions).In Re Garage Years point on thin air:
Both control authority and dampening would be attenuated in thin air, hence the potential to over control.
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The content, but also the civil technical discourse is what makes this a Forum of Professionals, and it is a pleasure to notice on this thread or others, the many members that hold steadily to that with no exceptions, like yourself.
That being said, it can be mentioned also the danger of crossing that discourse boundaries into demeaning and personal attack remarks. It may be tempting as an easy and satisfying relief at moments of frustration, but brings without exception a flavor of mud wrestling arena, tarnishing the image of Professionalism that many here I believe hold dear.
It's just a personal opinion, which happens to be also a paraphrasing of the definition and some of the rules of this Forum.
That being said, it can be mentioned also the danger of crossing that discourse boundaries into demeaning and personal attack remarks. It may be tempting as an easy and satisfying relief at moments of frustration, but brings without exception a flavor of mud wrestling arena, tarnishing the image of Professionalism that many here I believe hold dear.
It's just a personal opinion, which happens to be also a paraphrasing of the definition and some of the rules of this Forum.
@ HeavyMetallist:
- it may be fun (if kept short ; when it becomes too lenghty... BOAC perhaps has some spare application forms?)
- more seriously, it's healthy to challenge alternate theories, in the hope that "uneducated" (no harm intended) readers don't take them for "real-because-no-one-said-otherwise". At last I hope so...
- it may be fun (if kept short ; when it becomes too lenghty... BOAC perhaps has some spare application forms?)
- more seriously, it's healthy to challenge alternate theories, in the hope that "uneducated" (no harm intended) readers don't take them for "real-because-no-one-said-otherwise". At last I hope so...
Last edited by airtren; 22nd Aug 2011 at 16:10.
I have become rather lost in all this again 
Have their been any recommendations or directives yet ? Also, has anyone on this forum actually experienced a high altitude stall in a heavy ? As a nervous passenger it would be reassuring if max height was trimmed by a few thousand feet if convective storms stood in the way, weather radar or not.
Have their been any recommendations or directives yet ? Also, has anyone on this forum actually experienced a high altitude stall in a heavy ? As a nervous passenger it would be reassuring if max height was trimmed by a few thousand feet if convective storms stood in the way, weather radar or not.
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airtren You are a man of great discretion, and consummate understanding. Ordinarily, I loathe being "defended", so I'll not take it that way, and your essay on the professionalism is exquisite. Ad hominem is for the schoolyard.
You should read some of my PMs!
Lonewolf, I am not given to gush, but credit where due. The A330 is obviously forgiving, and extremely well behaved. None of the procuring single causes was sufficient to spin or tumble her, not even taken as an aggregate. She appears to have remained ready to recover, should the suss and system provide, unto impact.
And that with all the undiscovered flaws and glitches no one anticipated!
I cannot merge the rotation with only 270 degrees off heading. It was perceptible via BEA, though not with an attached rate, so I'll just accept it, you are probably correct.
I take JD-EE's comment re: 'fear of descent' with a great deal of salt, I assume she meant it that way? Making mistakes does not mean one is also a coward. Nothing suggests such a thing.
You should read some of my PMs!
Lonewolf, I am not given to gush, but credit where due. The A330 is obviously forgiving, and extremely well behaved. None of the procuring single causes was sufficient to spin or tumble her, not even taken as an aggregate. She appears to have remained ready to recover, should the suss and system provide, unto impact.
And that with all the undiscovered flaws and glitches no one anticipated!
I cannot merge the rotation with only 270 degrees off heading. It was perceptible via BEA, though not with an attached rate, so I'll just accept it, you are probably correct.
I take JD-EE's comment re: 'fear of descent' with a great deal of salt, I assume she meant it that way? Making mistakes does not mean one is also a coward. Nothing suggests such a thing.
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That remark is so disgusting, that it merits being immortalized as one of Lieman/bearfoil's gems.....
Being scared to death (and rightly so this time, no 'pun' intended) makes one a "coward"? Making mistakes is often a result.
Being scared to death (and rightly so this time, no 'pun' intended) makes one a "coward"? Making mistakes is often a result.
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Again with the putdown without asking the complete meaning. Patience?
Bravery is not the lack of Fear, It is action in the face of it.
JD portrayed an unwillingness to descend because the pilot had a trepidation of "descending into the Storm" That is a suggestion of cowardice. If I read that wrong, I will accept a correction. I will not start calling names out when too sure of something that is obviously not well understood.
Principles, not Personalities. One is looking for reasons to vent?
Vent at Airbus, or the front office. Or those before you who wanted to get that autotrim in, without entertaining the possible results. Who will own that?
One is entitled to one's fears. One is NOT entitled to PANIC. Nor is one entitled to endanger others due his/her fears. Wait, I read "being scared to death" as Panic, is that your meaning? Because that is not acceptable, period.
Chris, are you a pilot? Do you know the Code?
Bravery is not the lack of Fear, It is action in the face of it.
JD portrayed an unwillingness to descend because the pilot had a trepidation of "descending into the Storm" That is a suggestion of cowardice. If I read that wrong, I will accept a correction. I will not start calling names out when too sure of something that is obviously not well understood.
Principles, not Personalities. One is looking for reasons to vent?
Vent at Airbus, or the front office. Or those before you who wanted to get that autotrim in, without entertaining the possible results. Who will own that?
One is entitled to one's fears. One is NOT entitled to PANIC. Nor is one entitled to endanger others due his/her fears. Wait, I read "being scared to death" as Panic, is that your meaning? Because that is not acceptable, period.
Chris, are you a pilot? Do you know the Code?
Last edited by Lyman; 22nd Aug 2011 at 18:48.
Hi AlphaZulu Romeo,
My impression is that ALTER is a publication by a somewhat marginal union of the type that are widespread in France, (perhaps because management is so often pigheaded).
I interpreted their comment as referring to the procedure to follow in case of a stall warning ( rather than the UAS procedures, which the crew clearly did not follow, perhaps because they got sidetracked by the stall), which afaik was TOGA thrust and small pull up. While I believe the procedure has now been changed, it did seems really blatantly inappropriate just on reading it, the kind of procedure that may mostly work and kill you the rest of the time.
I'm still trying to verify the claim of an actual high altitude stall flight test of an A330.
To do this w/o a recovery chute, using a 100++ million dollar airplane just boggles my mind. On the other hand, it sounds very French, they will try insane things and often pull them off.
My impression is that ALTER is a publication by a somewhat marginal union of the type that are widespread in France, (perhaps because management is so often pigheaded).
I interpreted their comment as referring to the procedure to follow in case of a stall warning ( rather than the UAS procedures, which the crew clearly did not follow, perhaps because they got sidetracked by the stall), which afaik was TOGA thrust and small pull up. While I believe the procedure has now been changed, it did seems really blatantly inappropriate just on reading it, the kind of procedure that may mostly work and kill you the rest of the time.
I'm still trying to verify the claim of an actual high altitude stall flight test of an A330.
To do this w/o a recovery chute, using a 100++ million dollar airplane just boggles my mind. On the other hand, it sounds very French, they will try insane things and often pull them off.
bear/ChristiaanJ:
I don't think cowardice or even fear enters into it. I think training, experience, and how one is rewarded for one's actions play into this idea, even if the idea is a guess, or even if it is wrong.
Given
that the pilots in the cockpit had briefed with the Captain about the rough Wx ahead
Given
that they had made a course alteration (~12 degrees) to avoid rough(er)weather
Given
the crew had discussed that a planned climb could not be achieved with parameters (temp) as forecast and originally planned for
Given
this is the ITCZ with significant vertical development in the weather
Given
The crew also discussed the turbulence, and expected more, possible more robust turbulence in the next period of time based on their latest radar scans (of whatever quality, good or medium or poor)
and
Given
Pilots are trained to not fly in the upper two thirds of a thunderstorm (and if what they saw wasn't a thunderstorm, it was certainly non trivial convective activity, which you might usually treat with caution similar to CB's when you carry passengers for a living)
THEN
the pilots could be of a mind to NOT descend into the turbulent air (good thinking, on the face of it) though that does not require that one climb.
JD-EE guess is founded on the idea that concern about meterological factors was near to the front of the PF's thoughts as he worked through the "Hi, I am ALT 2 Law, latched, you have the controls" flying problem. This might be considered a compatmentalization issue, and be a productive line of inquiry for pilot community consideration and lessons learned. Trouble is, there isn't all that much evidence to support this train of thought.
As before: the pitch and power chorus, and the "maintain straight and level as one troubleshoots the UAS problem" chorus, are right.
Had those issues been his sole priorities, we'd not be having this discussion. Not a matter of fear, perhaps a matter of ordering the problems to be solved in the time available. (Won't digress into how the PNF can help with all this, it's his skin too ...)
That said, weather is always a factor in flight, and bad weather moreso. The worse weather gets, the more of one's concern and attention one tends to give to it.
At least, that is my experience.
Nothing to do with scared, coward, brave, none of that.
Typical pilot concern for the weather, and in this case, bad weather.
I don't think cowardice or even fear enters into it. I think training, experience, and how one is rewarded for one's actions play into this idea, even if the idea is a guess, or even if it is wrong.
Given
that the pilots in the cockpit had briefed with the Captain about the rough Wx ahead
Given
that they had made a course alteration (~12 degrees) to avoid rough(er)weather
Given
the crew had discussed that a planned climb could not be achieved with parameters (temp) as forecast and originally planned for
Given
this is the ITCZ with significant vertical development in the weather
Given
The crew also discussed the turbulence, and expected more, possible more robust turbulence in the next period of time based on their latest radar scans (of whatever quality, good or medium or poor)
and
Given
Pilots are trained to not fly in the upper two thirds of a thunderstorm (and if what they saw wasn't a thunderstorm, it was certainly non trivial convective activity, which you might usually treat with caution similar to CB's when you carry passengers for a living)
THEN
the pilots could be of a mind to NOT descend into the turbulent air (good thinking, on the face of it) though that does not require that one climb.
JD-EE guess is founded on the idea that concern about meterological factors was near to the front of the PF's thoughts as he worked through the "Hi, I am ALT 2 Law, latched, you have the controls" flying problem. This might be considered a compatmentalization issue, and be a productive line of inquiry for pilot community consideration and lessons learned. Trouble is, there isn't all that much evidence to support this train of thought.
As before: the pitch and power chorus, and the "maintain straight and level as one troubleshoots the UAS problem" chorus, are right.
Had those issues been his sole priorities, we'd not be having this discussion. Not a matter of fear, perhaps a matter of ordering the problems to be solved in the time available. (Won't digress into how the PNF can help with all this, it's his skin too ...)
That said, weather is always a factor in flight, and bad weather moreso. The worse weather gets, the more of one's concern and attention one tends to give to it.
At least, that is my experience.
Nothing to do with scared, coward, brave, none of that.
Typical pilot concern for the weather, and in this case, bad weather.
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Reread JD-EE: Clearly the 'pilot didn't want to descend in to the weather' because of his trepidation "Rolling around in his poor head". I take issue with the inference re: a pilot who cannot defend. I do not take issue with the right of JD to make her comment, nor do I seek to demean her, or otherwise insult.
The issue is gratuitous personal attack. Nothing to be gained.
The issue is gratuitous personal attack. Nothing to be gained.