AF447 Thread No. 3
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@KMD - I say again, not in real-time safety-critical software engineering you don't. You're getting generic corporate/sales culture (which I've ranted about on this very forum at great length some time ago) and the work that many very talented and safety-conscious people have done to make modern aircraft as safe as they are badly confused.
OK. After this I'll never mention it again
The thread was beginning to settle down into serious discussion, and I could see it taking off once again on another familiar tangent.
On your second observation re a "bus ain't a non-bus" , you've never flown the Airbus so you can't comment on it with any foundaton of knowledge or experience.
I've said many times here that where the airplane deserves critical assessment, and I've done lots of that over the decades, then I''m all for solid feedback based upon knowledge. But to be fair, and to be taken seriously in discussion, one has to go beyond what others say about the airplane, and know for oneself, the subject of criticism. The airplane is nowhere near as different as you have the impression, an impression gained through hearsay, not actual experience. The incident/accident record of the airplane is adequate proof of this.
The trim, and its availability to the pilots of AF 447, has been discussed at length as has standard responses to the stall. If managements of airlines, in their wisdom fail to teach about the airplane and, either through parsimony or the illusion that 'these airplanes fly themselves', fail run a sufficiently robust recurrent training program to ensure a depth of knowledge and that training precludes hand-flying and system knowledge, (vice Need-to-know nonsense), then that needs to be firmly resisted and changed. There is plenty of evidence now in place for change, beginning with those up front.
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Dozywannabe; I think we're on the same wavelength. Risk management has a different definition in engineering and corporate culture. Engineers apply a risk factor to their equations to protect the applications of their work, MBA's try to see how much risk they can get away with before they declare bankruptcy and then create a new corporation to try it again. How many MBAs have died as a result of their aircraft management decisions? K
Originally Posted by PJ2
One doesn't lose one's skills, one permits flying skills to be lost, and THAT is a professional standards matter, not an airplane, airline, regulator or other matter. Disconnect the damn airplane and the autothrust and stay familiar with the airplane.
There's far too much blame about "loss of skill" directed elsewhere when the real one responsible for any loss of one's skills and professionalism is in the mirror. If your airline wont' let you hand-fly because they like automation, to hell with them and their MBAs, fight them on it!
Take a look at the stats: we've had far too many fatal accidents resulting from the most basic failure of all and which we're trained to avoid and prevent from Hour One in our first flight...stalling the airplane. If the training isn't there in the syllabus, demand it.
There's far too much blame about "loss of skill" directed elsewhere when the real one responsible for any loss of one's skills and professionalism is in the mirror. If your airline wont' let you hand-fly because they like automation, to hell with them and their MBAs, fight them on it!
Take a look at the stats: we've had far too many fatal accidents resulting from the most basic failure of all and which we're trained to avoid and prevent from Hour One in our first flight...stalling the airplane. If the training isn't there in the syllabus, demand it.
Do you really expect a bright-eyed, bushy tailed sprog to jump up and down on a training course demanding more stall training in the supposedly uncrashable Airbus?
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I'm still hoping some with Airbus A330/340 experience will be willing to discus their experiences with Alt 2 Law. This version of Alternate law is a 'Roll Direct' mode of operation.
How much training do pilots get in this mode?
If the aircraft was laterally imbalanced when you assumed control, wouldn't you have a heck of a time keeping the wings level? (Particularly if you are one of those AB pilots who routinely flies cruise with feet on the floor.)
I can see some serious potential for interference with proper pitch control until the aircraft is trimmed up with the rudder.
How much training do pilots get in this mode?
If the aircraft was laterally imbalanced when you assumed control, wouldn't you have a heck of a time keeping the wings level? (Particularly if you are one of those AB pilots who routinely flies cruise with feet on the floor.)
I can see some serious potential for interference with proper pitch control until the aircraft is trimmed up with the rudder.
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PJq - re your note to DozyWannabe is there a distinct display for the pilots when the plane is actually stalled rather than facing an imminent stall? If not, wouldn't that be a worthwhile addition to the software?
Capn Bloggs;
Yes, it is a bit harsh, isn't it. It's how this matter, (the intoxication with automation), which I and many here and elsewhere, have been writing about since the 90s, is going to get resolved.
You're setting up a straw man argument and answering your own question. Of course I don't expect it. We both know that one person cannot change policies or world-views of large organizations (which depend upon "group-think" for continued existence), but I think it is realistic to expect the matter to be addressed maturely and through due process within the applicable groups and pilot organizations. There is sufficient material and evidence now upon which to base change. In fact, agree with the wisdom of such change or not, it is occurring in the US and in Australia; I can't speak for Europe.
Regards,
PJ2
Yes, it is a bit harsh, isn't it. It's how this matter, (the intoxication with automation), which I and many here and elsewhere, have been writing about since the 90s, is going to get resolved.
Do you really expect a bright-eyed, bushy tailed sprog to jump up and down on a training course demanding more stall training in the supposedly uncrashable Airbus?
Regards,
PJ2
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Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyFriend
I know you can practise 'manual flight' in an Airbus just like any other a/c, but please don't forget a bus ain't like a non-bus. In many ways.
But, you can also be sure that some are more qualified than others, same with any other type. In AF447 case, it is very likely that the PF was more qualified on this type and sector than the two other pilots taken together (including the Captain, also qualified for Caravelle XII, Boeing 737 and manual trim wheels).
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyFriend
Takata, to answer your first question, of course not, but the pilot held the stick back, the bus trimmed the tail 'nose up' (almost to max) and then stopped trimming.
But the very relevant fact is that they pulled up during the first minute of their stall in order to reach such a THS setting. Then, they had two and half minutes left before impact and we still have not a single clue in order to understand at which point they finally acknowlegded their full stall situation.
After this point, I wonder if that would have made any difference if the trim wheel was auto or manual, that this aircraft was A, B or C...
Until we know more about what confused the pilots, jumping in and claiming that everything was linked with the trim wheel (they were not used to) doesn't make any sense. You won't use it if you dont think first that pushing the stick will help you to recover.
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyFriend
So now, the pilot had to manually reverse, using his manual trim wheel that he never uses, a trim input that he never made!
Did you read anything about it?
How many pilots already stalled an aircraft without autotrim?
Quite a few, no?
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyFriend
Youre second point, that they ought to be able to push over even with the tail trimmed for full nose up I dispute (but only from experience of non-buses, so dismiss it if you like. These tails are really powerful though).
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyFriend
I see you are from Toulouse.
I just think the bus rather isolates its pilots from what's actually happening. That's just an opinion.
I just think the bus rather isolates its pilots from what's actually happening. That's just an opinion.
S~
Olivier
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75 additional bodies recovered from Air France crash after 2 years
Unless I skipped a page somewhere, I've not seen this posted. Apologies if it has been.
75 additional bodies recovered from Air France crash after 2 years - CNN.com
This is contrary to decisions I thought were made weeks ago. Surely it's been posted and I missed it ?
75 additional bodies recovered from Air France crash after 2 years - CNN.com
This is contrary to decisions I thought were made weeks ago. Surely it's been posted and I missed it ?
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Originally Posted by Machinbird
If the aircraft was laterally imbalanced when you assumed control, wouldn't you have a heck of a time keeping the wings level? (Particularly if you are one of those AB pilots who routinely flies cruise with feet on the floor.)
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
You're being a bit harsh. There are companies that DO NOT PERMIT less than full automation. Pilots can "fight" all they like and achieve nothing. Read a few pages back where Airbus pilots were being slapped if they touched the trim wheel.
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Hi Machinbird,
Oscillations doesn't specifically mean an heavy wing after switching to direct roll. Read the part of the FCOM I posted above and you'll see that it is mentioned that you may have to re-trim the rudder in order to stabilize your roll axis.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Yes, but before that, it takes a recognition of why the WING is heavy.
Auto trim and HUD displays
@ Galaxy:
The Viper "auto trim" seems identical to that of the Airbus except for the bank angle and pitch attitude corrections. Actually, not a bad idea for a heavy, but a bit clumsy for the fighter plane requirements. So we trimmed for gee as set using a trim wheel or the thumb hat switch on the stick ( HUD showed instantaneous gee to a tenth of a gee). We could trim for zero gee and during a fight let go of the stick and get less induced drag to "extend" or gain energy.
The 'bus computers add to the basic one gee gee command for a bank angle. So in 30 deg of bank it trims for 1.15 gee or so. Same for pitch - a 30 deg climb would be trimmed for about 0.87 gee, otherwise pitch would continue to increase if still trimmed for one gee.
Neither the Viper or the 'bus trim for attitude, best I can tell from the manuals.
Some folks seem to misunderstand the airspeed/altitude displays and such when talking about the HUD.
BARO DATA IS NOT USED FOR THE FLIGHT PATH VECTOR in any application I have looked at except a "poor man's" FPM (flight path marker - that little airplane doofer)
What it is used for is the speed/altitude part of the display - those "thermometer" doofers on each side of the display. Same for vertical velocity, which could be baro or inertial, depending on a switch. Some planes only show baro VV. Some planes can show radar alt versus baro, and the beat goes on.
I read a symposium presentation by some dude about the Airbus HUD installed in some variants. Thing sounded like a poor man's HUD, and I can't understand a modern plane without a cosmic, large field-of-view HUD, especially for landing and takeoff. Ask 'bird about a night cat shot off the boat without a HUD. The FPM showing your vector was above the horizon was very "comfortable". It also helped getting back onboard at the very end of the task, although flying the meatball was as good or better.
In the AF447 situation, an inertial FPM would have been invaluable showing the crew their flight path with respect to local level. After all, you can have the nose up at 16 degrees and still be falling like a rock! Think I saw that number last week.
HUD "pitch lines" are also easy to read and use. So setting a 3 degree glide path or climb is a no-brainer.
PLZ try to watch the shuttle landing in an hour or so, and you can see a real HUD in action.
Otherwise, I'll hunt down some You Tube sequences to show mine. Haven't digitized my LEF failure landing but it is a good one to see how the thing helped me land.
The Viper "auto trim" seems identical to that of the Airbus except for the bank angle and pitch attitude corrections. Actually, not a bad idea for a heavy, but a bit clumsy for the fighter plane requirements. So we trimmed for gee as set using a trim wheel or the thumb hat switch on the stick ( HUD showed instantaneous gee to a tenth of a gee). We could trim for zero gee and during a fight let go of the stick and get less induced drag to "extend" or gain energy.
The 'bus computers add to the basic one gee gee command for a bank angle. So in 30 deg of bank it trims for 1.15 gee or so. Same for pitch - a 30 deg climb would be trimmed for about 0.87 gee, otherwise pitch would continue to increase if still trimmed for one gee.
Neither the Viper or the 'bus trim for attitude, best I can tell from the manuals.
Some folks seem to misunderstand the airspeed/altitude displays and such when talking about the HUD.
BARO DATA IS NOT USED FOR THE FLIGHT PATH VECTOR in any application I have looked at except a "poor man's" FPM (flight path marker - that little airplane doofer)
What it is used for is the speed/altitude part of the display - those "thermometer" doofers on each side of the display. Same for vertical velocity, which could be baro or inertial, depending on a switch. Some planes only show baro VV. Some planes can show radar alt versus baro, and the beat goes on.
I read a symposium presentation by some dude about the Airbus HUD installed in some variants. Thing sounded like a poor man's HUD, and I can't understand a modern plane without a cosmic, large field-of-view HUD, especially for landing and takeoff. Ask 'bird about a night cat shot off the boat without a HUD. The FPM showing your vector was above the horizon was very "comfortable". It also helped getting back onboard at the very end of the task, although flying the meatball was as good or better.
In the AF447 situation, an inertial FPM would have been invaluable showing the crew their flight path with respect to local level. After all, you can have the nose up at 16 degrees and still be falling like a rock! Think I saw that number last week.
HUD "pitch lines" are also easy to read and use. So setting a 3 degree glide path or climb is a no-brainer.
PLZ try to watch the shuttle landing in an hour or so, and you can see a real HUD in action.
Otherwise, I'll hunt down some You Tube sequences to show mine. Haven't digitized my LEF failure landing but it is a good one to see how the thing helped me land.
Thanks, gums I had read a magazine description of the Airbus and Falcon 7X FBW system as being flight path stable, that is, it holds a flight path, but expressed as G-stable makes better sense.
I used the crude HUD in the A-10 and loved it, as a new toy. Now, in the Global, the HUD is wide-angle, has EVS, and is invaluable for all flight regimes, especially night visuals; using EVS, figuring out if you will clear that cloud deck; single engine work.
I used the crude HUD in the A-10 and loved it, as a new toy. Now, in the Global, the HUD is wide-angle, has EVS, and is invaluable for all flight regimes, especially night visuals; using EVS, figuring out if you will clear that cloud deck; single engine work.
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Oscillations doesn't specifically mean an heavy wing after switching to direct roll. Read the part of the FCOM I posted above and you'll see that it is mentioned that you may have to re-trim the rudder in order to stabilize your roll axis.
From the brief description BEA provided, the guy flying was bombarded by more stimulus in his few minutes holding the stick than most drivers get in an entire flight.
Do you really expect him to recall the words from FCOM in that short a time period unless he actually practiced such an eventuality as he experienced that night?
Everyone has been real quiet about their experience in Alt 2 law except the test pilots.
Do you think any really constructive training was accomplished in Alt 2 law prior to this accident? (And by really constructive, I mean the kind that makes you both think and sweat.)
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options
Hi this is a question from a lay point of view,
Tim Vasquez's weather analysis seems to show that the flight passed through a smaller portion of the storm came to a clearing which perhaps caused the captain to think they had cleared the storm? when in fact they were just about to enter a larger portion which then caused the pitots to ice up causing the autopilot to kick off. Would the captain have gone to take a rest if he had known the larger part of the storm was yet to come? — and if not, why isn’t there more accurate information in flight at night when they have no sight visuals? Is it true that it is easier to know with greater certainty about storms when flying over land vs sea, because there are more sightings?
The records seem to show that the flight just before and just after chose not to go through this storm, but around. Is there any truth to a report I read at the time, that this flight (in trying to save gas) was cut so close they didn’t have the option, in terms of enough fuel, to go around the storm?
Just wondering.
It seems that if the captain was on deck, by this remark,"This is a stall. Reduce power and nose down!" he might have been able to save the flight, unless there are other factors impacting the situation which aren’t clear. I think from the discussion here there are far too many reasons why the situation might have been confusing to assess in the few minutes they had once the chain of events began. Some might know what to ignore and what to attend — though certainly having the stall warning go again when the needed action was begun certainly was no help in the short time to assess and respond. Clearly changes are needed to avoid many parts of the sequence which caused this — the freezing of the pitots, perhaps better weather analysis or clarity of weather conditions, not ever assuming in training that basic air tools would never be needed because a computer system now takes over those roles, when that system can turn off and require pilots to fill in at any time (or at least, always at a time unexpected), with pilots having both a need to know all that the system is doing for the pilot and to have it spelled out quickly and clearly, as well as an ease and comfort with all these tools and sequences, so life and death decisions can be made with clarity and accuracy in unexpected circumstances on what might otherwise be a routine flight. Since the flight just before and after diverted — was there pressure to go through weather unnecessarily?
If there is any question about conditions, is there truly the free choice option to go around the weather, as did the flights just before and after, rather than through (to save gas or time); — or at the least — there should not be any pressure to make such a safety decision based on gas related issues, if there is any truth to that (?) Was that an impact here to not simply choosing to be safer and go around?
[Should passengers be putting more pressure on airlines regarding weather decisions to give pilots more breathing space and freedom to make needed choices? (or at least not to be pressured to go towards questionable conditions, if this is indeed happening?) Is this an issue?]
At each of these earlier levels, the flight would never have been put in this situation — on the other hand, there are so many factors impacting the pilots’ decisions once the sequence began, it seems these problems simply need attending to and if not this flight, another would have brought them to the fore.
I wanted to mention these less technical observations, simply because as a passenger now, I’ll always wonder if simple logic is being waved or honored, not so much by pilots at the time, but the myriad of technical choices made beforehand — which perhaps is at the heart of much of the concern about this loss.
Please forgive the very lay point of view, but profound interest to this sad incident.
Tim Vasquez's weather analysis seems to show that the flight passed through a smaller portion of the storm came to a clearing which perhaps caused the captain to think they had cleared the storm? when in fact they were just about to enter a larger portion which then caused the pitots to ice up causing the autopilot to kick off. Would the captain have gone to take a rest if he had known the larger part of the storm was yet to come? — and if not, why isn’t there more accurate information in flight at night when they have no sight visuals? Is it true that it is easier to know with greater certainty about storms when flying over land vs sea, because there are more sightings?
The records seem to show that the flight just before and just after chose not to go through this storm, but around. Is there any truth to a report I read at the time, that this flight (in trying to save gas) was cut so close they didn’t have the option, in terms of enough fuel, to go around the storm?
Just wondering.
It seems that if the captain was on deck, by this remark,"This is a stall. Reduce power and nose down!" he might have been able to save the flight, unless there are other factors impacting the situation which aren’t clear. I think from the discussion here there are far too many reasons why the situation might have been confusing to assess in the few minutes they had once the chain of events began. Some might know what to ignore and what to attend — though certainly having the stall warning go again when the needed action was begun certainly was no help in the short time to assess and respond. Clearly changes are needed to avoid many parts of the sequence which caused this — the freezing of the pitots, perhaps better weather analysis or clarity of weather conditions, not ever assuming in training that basic air tools would never be needed because a computer system now takes over those roles, when that system can turn off and require pilots to fill in at any time (or at least, always at a time unexpected), with pilots having both a need to know all that the system is doing for the pilot and to have it spelled out quickly and clearly, as well as an ease and comfort with all these tools and sequences, so life and death decisions can be made with clarity and accuracy in unexpected circumstances on what might otherwise be a routine flight. Since the flight just before and after diverted — was there pressure to go through weather unnecessarily?
If there is any question about conditions, is there truly the free choice option to go around the weather, as did the flights just before and after, rather than through (to save gas or time); — or at the least — there should not be any pressure to make such a safety decision based on gas related issues, if there is any truth to that (?) Was that an impact here to not simply choosing to be safer and go around?
[Should passengers be putting more pressure on airlines regarding weather decisions to give pilots more breathing space and freedom to make needed choices? (or at least not to be pressured to go towards questionable conditions, if this is indeed happening?) Is this an issue?]
At each of these earlier levels, the flight would never have been put in this situation — on the other hand, there are so many factors impacting the pilots’ decisions once the sequence began, it seems these problems simply need attending to and if not this flight, another would have brought them to the fore.
I wanted to mention these less technical observations, simply because as a passenger now, I’ll always wonder if simple logic is being waved or honored, not so much by pilots at the time, but the myriad of technical choices made beforehand — which perhaps is at the heart of much of the concern about this loss.
Please forgive the very lay point of view, but profound interest to this sad incident.
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I understand that the NPF says, "we have lost the speeds, alternate laws then"
According to the checklist, I don't get the point why the PF, which was FO No2, the one with the least flight experience, pulled the side stick.
As we know from the FDR data, the climb was commanded and not coming from an updraft turbulence.
By pulling the stick he induced a vs of 7000, which exceeds the max of the aircraft by 1000 ft/m. 6000 is max.
Secondly, the A330, same as the A320 are equipped with two GPS systems apart from the pitot tubes. Even if all of them have failed, the still could verify GS on the ADIRS panel overhead and in MCDU.
He pushes the throttle handle into TOGA which is according to the checklist alternate at that time. Somewhere I read that this is revised now.
I exercised this yesterday on an A320 sim @FL360. TOGA will not initiate a climb at 7000 ft/min. And he PF managed to reduce to 700 ft/min as per FDR data. Why the heck would he still climb. We are not talking about a propeller engine that generates dramatic updraft at full throttle.
CB ceiling was up to FL550. Clearly not over-flyable. I really don't get the point why the PF pulled on the sidestick.
I did already once a deep stall an the A340 sim at FL390. I am was unable to recover. I was falling out of the skies. No matter how far forward I pushed that stick, the nose never got down to recover as I can do on the F18. My deep stall, was nose up with about 20°
Off-Topic, because was asked.
Now for all those asking about my flying experiencing. I have only Level-D sim experience and MS Flight Sim. I have 6 hours on A340 Level D and 2hrs on F-18C Level D. I am not a pilot. And realtime flying experience on MS FS about 4000+ hrs A320/A330.
According to the checklist, I don't get the point why the PF, which was FO No2, the one with the least flight experience, pulled the side stick.
As we know from the FDR data, the climb was commanded and not coming from an updraft turbulence.
By pulling the stick he induced a vs of 7000, which exceeds the max of the aircraft by 1000 ft/m. 6000 is max.
Secondly, the A330, same as the A320 are equipped with two GPS systems apart from the pitot tubes. Even if all of them have failed, the still could verify GS on the ADIRS panel overhead and in MCDU.
He pushes the throttle handle into TOGA which is according to the checklist alternate at that time. Somewhere I read that this is revised now.
I exercised this yesterday on an A320 sim @FL360. TOGA will not initiate a climb at 7000 ft/min. And he PF managed to reduce to 700 ft/min as per FDR data. Why the heck would he still climb. We are not talking about a propeller engine that generates dramatic updraft at full throttle.
CB ceiling was up to FL550. Clearly not over-flyable. I really don't get the point why the PF pulled on the sidestick.
I did already once a deep stall an the A340 sim at FL390. I am was unable to recover. I was falling out of the skies. No matter how far forward I pushed that stick, the nose never got down to recover as I can do on the F18. My deep stall, was nose up with about 20°
Off-Topic, because was asked.
Now for all those asking about my flying experiencing. I have only Level-D sim experience and MS Flight Sim. I have 6 hours on A340 Level D and 2hrs on F-18C Level D. I am not a pilot. And realtime flying experience on MS FS about 4000+ hrs A320/A330.
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flawed outlook
An observation, and a question:
By arguing against further Automation in Aviation you are inadvertantly making the case FOR further automation in avation.
To suggest automation is the wrong direction means that you have chosen to ignore the bigger picture - the overall safety situation - and, by doing so, have behaved in a flawed way, a flaw that wouldn't have been displayed in the behaviour of, for example, a machine.
To put it another way, by allowing prejudice to influence your opinion on automation, you are actually proving that automation is ultimately the only answer.
The only question is, therefore, will you realise this and choose to work 'with' progress, thus maintaining an input (pun intended) and helping to shape the future of aviation, or will you continue to resist progress, thus act as a catalyst for the very thing which you resist?
By arguing against further Automation in Aviation you are inadvertantly making the case FOR further automation in avation.
To suggest automation is the wrong direction means that you have chosen to ignore the bigger picture - the overall safety situation - and, by doing so, have behaved in a flawed way, a flaw that wouldn't have been displayed in the behaviour of, for example, a machine.
To put it another way, by allowing prejudice to influence your opinion on automation, you are actually proving that automation is ultimately the only answer.
The only question is, therefore, will you realise this and choose to work 'with' progress, thus maintaining an input (pun intended) and helping to shape the future of aviation, or will you continue to resist progress, thus act as a catalyst for the very thing which you resist?
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Ventus45 wrote:
Who are your calling "your honour"?
The A330/340 level-d sim is at least as good as the real aircraft when it come to manouvers and flight controls. Yes, agree. Maybe forces and turbulences have differences compaired to the situation you might encounter outside in real live. In the end it is a flight deck sitting on hydaulic legs.
I was not trying to blame the PF at this stage. I did not say hang him. All I try is to figure out what made him pull after disconnecting the AP. But obviously there is no real data around to get a conclusion on this.
Yes, maybe BEA will release at some point further details of the FDR and CVR. A reconstruction of the instrument situation would be interesting.
Pretty strong statement.
Convict the PF and hang him out to dry ?
What FDR data - we don't have any solid (hard / actual) data (evidence) yet - not re "the actual dynamic resonses of the aircraft" to those SS inputs - we only have "implied" outcomes.
I have to disagree your honour.
Would a rational pilot deliberately go for such a zoom ?
I doubt it your honour.
I fact, your honour, I am convinced, that there were other than PF influences, both external (air mass) and internal (systems - fbw autonomous inputs, and law effect confusion).
With regards to your SIM experiments, my gut feeling is that since it is a known fact that the SIM's don't have validated algorithms for outside the certified envelope, although such experiments may be interesting (even fun) to do, what (if any) value can you attribute to them ? Without flight test validation, what have we got, Garbage in - Garbage out.
I stated the bare bones of my theory on the upset in a previous post at http://www.pprune.org/6361157-post3246.html
What has so far been released "from the BEA" has not caused me to change my mind re the prime scenerio, except to refine the "slow flat spin" part into a ""stalled mush" with slow right yaw" (as we now know the aircraft did a right 270 on the way down, and of the PF's long held left stick, apparently attempting to pick up the right wing, which, by the way, none of the bus drivers have explained or even addressed yet).
The BEA have released very time porous information for what was a very time dynamic event, nowhere near good enough.
A simple spread sheet (or simple delimited text file) with only nine columns of data would give us all that is needed (all of which they have) and would be very useful.
How about it Mr BEA ?
Hereby formally request a list of (from just before the actual upset to impact) 300 seconds (second by second, line by line) worth of data covering:-
"g_vert-u/d" "g_lat-l/r" "pitch_attitude-u/d" "roll_attitude-l/r" "SS-u/d" "SS-l/r" "pedal-l/r" and "AoA".
Convict the PF and hang him out to dry ?
What FDR data - we don't have any solid (hard / actual) data (evidence) yet - not re "the actual dynamic resonses of the aircraft" to those SS inputs - we only have "implied" outcomes.
I have to disagree your honour.
Would a rational pilot deliberately go for such a zoom ?
I doubt it your honour.
I fact, your honour, I am convinced, that there were other than PF influences, both external (air mass) and internal (systems - fbw autonomous inputs, and law effect confusion).
With regards to your SIM experiments, my gut feeling is that since it is a known fact that the SIM's don't have validated algorithms for outside the certified envelope, although such experiments may be interesting (even fun) to do, what (if any) value can you attribute to them ? Without flight test validation, what have we got, Garbage in - Garbage out.
I stated the bare bones of my theory on the upset in a previous post at http://www.pprune.org/6361157-post3246.html
What has so far been released "from the BEA" has not caused me to change my mind re the prime scenerio, except to refine the "slow flat spin" part into a ""stalled mush" with slow right yaw" (as we now know the aircraft did a right 270 on the way down, and of the PF's long held left stick, apparently attempting to pick up the right wing, which, by the way, none of the bus drivers have explained or even addressed yet).
The BEA have released very time porous information for what was a very time dynamic event, nowhere near good enough.
A simple spread sheet (or simple delimited text file) with only nine columns of data would give us all that is needed (all of which they have) and would be very useful.
How about it Mr BEA ?
Hereby formally request a list of (from just before the actual upset to impact) 300 seconds (second by second, line by line) worth of data covering:-
"g_vert-u/d" "g_lat-l/r" "pitch_attitude-u/d" "roll_attitude-l/r" "SS-u/d" "SS-l/r" "pedal-l/r" and "AoA".
The A330/340 level-d sim is at least as good as the real aircraft when it come to manouvers and flight controls. Yes, agree. Maybe forces and turbulences have differences compaired to the situation you might encounter outside in real live. In the end it is a flight deck sitting on hydaulic legs.
I was not trying to blame the PF at this stage. I did not say hang him. All I try is to figure out what made him pull after disconnecting the AP. But obviously there is no real data around to get a conclusion on this.
Yes, maybe BEA will release at some point further details of the FDR and CVR. A reconstruction of the instrument situation would be interesting.
Last edited by MartinM; 1st Jun 2011 at 12:47.