AF447 wreckage found
I too am gobsmacked, that in this day and age Airbus have managed to design another generation of machine that doesn't do what you could reasonably& logically expect.
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At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications"....snip... In
the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again."
the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again."
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>So PF doesn't think anything is working and lowering the nose appeared to trigger a stall warning. How many people in that situation would continue to trust the stall warning system was working?
The question was asked in a private forum I am on and every pilot there (about 2-3 dozen) said they would have pushed the nose down. At 38,000 feet it is an absolute no-brainer.
The question was asked in a private forum I am on and every pilot there (about 2-3 dozen) said they would have pushed the nose down. At 38,000 feet it is an absolute no-brainer.
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I find the crash details very worrying in terms of pilot skills, however, I find the chatter on here absolutely terrifying! My god please tell me that most of you don't fly commercially?
Power PLUS attitude = Performance
On my A330-300, set 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 for S + L flight at most weights.
You should also know what sound levels to expect in the cockpit from the Airspeed in cruise.
If you think that you might indeed be too slow then set CLB detent and lower the nose to 0, wait till the noise level returns to near normal then set it back to 2.5 and 78%.
All the while checking the GPS groudspeed from the FM to use as a gross error check whilst flying the Aircraft as smoothly as possible until I exit the area and hopefully all returns to normal.
Anytime I approach an area of suspect wx I cannot avoid I try to do 4 things:
1/ sit the cabin crew down, 2/ check the current GS and listen to the noise
levels, 3/ note the current attitude and N1 to achieve current speed and finally 4/ brief the FO on all of the above just incase all hell breaks loose.
I've done this for the last 10 years or so. Why did I consciously do this? Because our Airline has had it's share of Iced up Pitot static systems causing overspeed and stall warnings On the 744, 777 and A330 types where the crew did what I suggest above ( ie: fly the damn plane on Attitude and N1 ) to a successful outcome.
At the end of the day
Power + Attitude = Performance.
On my A330-300, set 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 for S + L flight at most weights.
You should also know what sound levels to expect in the cockpit from the Airspeed in cruise.
If you think that you might indeed be too slow then set CLB detent and lower the nose to 0, wait till the noise level returns to near normal then set it back to 2.5 and 78%.
All the while checking the GPS groudspeed from the FM to use as a gross error check whilst flying the Aircraft as smoothly as possible until I exit the area and hopefully all returns to normal.
Anytime I approach an area of suspect wx I cannot avoid I try to do 4 things:
1/ sit the cabin crew down, 2/ check the current GS and listen to the noise
levels, 3/ note the current attitude and N1 to achieve current speed and finally 4/ brief the FO on all of the above just incase all hell breaks loose.
I've done this for the last 10 years or so. Why did I consciously do this? Because our Airline has had it's share of Iced up Pitot static systems causing overspeed and stall warnings On the 744, 777 and A330 types where the crew did what I suggest above ( ie: fly the damn plane on Attitude and N1 ) to a successful outcome.
At the end of the day
Power + Attitude = Performance.
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jcjeant, thanks for the Bob Hoover video. I see him and Chuck Yeager every year at the Reno Air Races. He would come out to Riverside to a small airport to see Art Scholl a lot in the 60's. I was instructing aerobatics back then for Art. What a gentleman and great pilot. He is 89 now so we are lucky to still have him. I saw his last Shrike show about 10 years ago at Reno.
Also takes care of the water container being parallel to the earth idea.
Also takes care of the water container being parallel to the earth idea.
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At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent
and the PF maintained nose-up inputs.
The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight. Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 kt; it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up inputs.
So the puzzling part is why did he keep pulling up? Is it possible he was relying on the stall protection to sort things out? Not realizing he was in alternate law?
Can one of the bus drivers perhaps chime in with the procedure for unreliable IAS? Whatever it is, I'm pretty sure it wasn't followed here?
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crm
All this crm and where has it got us?The Captain is pilot in command and it is his/her ship from pushback to on chocks.No-one else's.All this politically-correct chat about planned rest being done according to Ops or which pilot has a baby at home or did you get undisturbed rest etc.I know what 411 would say and I am here to say it for him.The Captain looks at the planned route and forecast weather and ensures that he/she is in the LHS when weather/terrain(cabin depressure) or whatever risk he thinks might be encountered along the route is present.TIRED OR NOT.He/she decides this nobody else!And any Captain who lets this decision be made for him/her is a fool,an emasculated fool.
The flight should have diverted around the weather to begin with!!A good Captain would never have flirted with ITCZ weather like this.25-50nm lateral separation minimum with or w/o clearance.
The failure to carry out the stall recovery is a mystery and as others have said the only excuse can be distraction from multiple warnings,lack of training and year-in year-out automation reliance.
I look at the safety statistics and two airlines stick out;SWA and Qantas.They are beacons in this rapidly deteriorating profession.Airmanship is all that you need to stay alive up there,nothing else matters.
Could someone please explain clearly when "stall" warning is inhibited in these wonderful Airbus aircraft again?Dependent on law or speed?An aircraft that is stalling should never have the stall warning inhibited.
The flight should have diverted around the weather to begin with!!A good Captain would never have flirted with ITCZ weather like this.25-50nm lateral separation minimum with or w/o clearance.
The failure to carry out the stall recovery is a mystery and as others have said the only excuse can be distraction from multiple warnings,lack of training and year-in year-out automation reliance.
I look at the safety statistics and two airlines stick out;SWA and Qantas.They are beacons in this rapidly deteriorating profession.Airmanship is all that you need to stay alive up there,nothing else matters.
Could someone please explain clearly when "stall" warning is inhibited in these wonderful Airbus aircraft again?Dependent on law or speed?An aircraft that is stalling should never have the stall warning inhibited.
From the A330 QRH
Unreliable Airspeed check ADR Procedure above FL 250:-
1/ A/P F/D off
2/ A/THR off
3/ PITCH/THRUST 5 deg/CLB
4/ Speedbrakes. Check retracted
5/ Level off for troubleshooting. Ie set about 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 or if you have time check the sev turb attitude and N1 from the QRH.
Unreliable Airspeed check ADR Procedure above FL 250:-
1/ A/P F/D off
2/ A/THR off
3/ PITCH/THRUST 5 deg/CLB
4/ Speedbrakes. Check retracted
5/ Level off for troubleshooting. Ie set about 2.5 nose up and 78% N1 or if you have time check the sev turb attitude and N1 from the QRH.
Many comments using words like "shocked", "stunned", "surprised"
Still to be explained in the investigation is "why", because we must not be so simple as to blame the pilots on so early a release of selected data.
Some questions come to mind
Could the data be duplicated without a pilot input ?
if not, is there a possible combination of inputs (instruments or otherwise) that may fool the pilot's natural response to a stick shaker?
Still to be explained in the investigation is "why", because we must not be so simple as to blame the pilots on so early a release of selected data.
Some questions come to mind
Could the data be duplicated without a pilot input ?
if not, is there a possible combination of inputs (instruments or otherwise) that may fool the pilot's natural response to a stick shaker?
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Hi,
This is irrefutable and that really is the black dot in the automation system.
It can mean the difference between death and life.
An aircraft that is stalling should never have the stall warning inhibited.
It can mean the difference between death and life.
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Stall warning stoped ?
1/ Why this stall warning did stop ?
2/ Reading the confusion here : Is there anylonger a real pilot in the air ?
3/ Could the PF have decided to suicide ?
2/ Reading the confusion here : Is there anylonger a real pilot in the air ?
3/ Could the PF have decided to suicide ?
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Thanks, nitpicker.
I still can't (rather don't want to) believe that a professional crew would run an otherwise perfectly fine aircraft into the ground after a temporary failure of one instrument. Guess we'll have to wait for further updates from BEA to get a clearer picture.
I still can't (rather don't want to) believe that a professional crew would run an otherwise perfectly fine aircraft into the ground after a temporary failure of one instrument. Guess we'll have to wait for further updates from BEA to get a clearer picture.
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In the Mid 90s I had a very small chance to fly the Last Big Banger,a Pilots Handling Airliner ,the DC10.A much respected colleague and Ex RAF Truckie,who had flown them at Laker and Arrow,so enthused about this marvellous Pilot's Aeroplane,I applied to Caledonian while they still had them.After the Interview, I had to fly a Sim Test in an Airbus 320 Sim,which I passed after being given pointers and a brief "go" first.I was told by the Instructor that that was probably the best showing I would ever make apart from maybe the first Base/IR sim check after joining!! as I was current on a Jet that you could hand fly ,so had plenty of such practice !When told I would not be eligible because of my age to do a DC10 course,as they were to be phased out shortly for the Airbus 330,and that I would have to fly a 320(I think they only had 2),and then go onto a 330,I backed off and explained my brain could not handle the size of a 330 with only 2 engines and only computers controlling it with Alternate and Direct law as protection.I needed a big Red lever that said "I have Control".I seem to remember in the QRH emergency section "After this no further problems deemed feasible",and then blank spaces!! Could be wrong,but that features in the memory banks.I am glad I have retired.
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Less than one minute of problem
We have to wait for the next BEA report.
If the BEA has published such a report where the PF looks like a dumb, it probably means that the BEA has more infos about the PF fault.
I don't believe that the BEA, with all the international authorities having participated to the work, wouldn't have pointed out a real technical problem.
The Pitot tubes were incoherent for less than one minute.
Since there are still planes in the sky, it is impossible to loose a plane for this only little problem.
If the BEA has published such a report where the PF looks like a dumb, it probably means that the BEA has more infos about the PF fault.
I don't believe that the BEA, with all the international authorities having participated to the work, wouldn't have pointed out a real technical problem.
The Pitot tubes were incoherent for less than one minute.
Since there are still planes in the sky, it is impossible to loose a plane for this only little problem.
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Anyone who has looked at an unrestrained vane-type AoA sensor on a parked aircraft on a windy day will have seen the vane wandering all over the place. On take-off, as speed increases, eventually the forward component of airspeed is enough to straighten out the vane, so by 60 kts it IS reading (something related to) incidence. At some speed below 60 kts its reading means nothing. We don't want spurious stall warnings during the t/o run (or even on roll-out) so the system ignores the AoA below 60kt. All very logical until we hit this scenario. Perhaps the "ignore AoA under 60kt" rule should only apply when WoW switch is on?
It seems agreed that the flight controls were sustaining a nose-up attitude and no one has (yet !) suggested that this was not related to a back-stick command. So either (a) the crew were fixated on the "overspeed" scenario and maintained their "pull-up" input, ignoring the (intermittent) stall warnings (and pitch attitude?), believing they were trying to recover from a dive, OR under pressure they "overlooked" that the degraded control mode/ sensor input problems no longer gave a safety protection that full back stick will not be allowed to stall the aircraft?
It seems agreed that the flight controls were sustaining a nose-up attitude and no one has (yet !) suggested that this was not related to a back-stick command. So either (a) the crew were fixated on the "overspeed" scenario and maintained their "pull-up" input, ignoring the (intermittent) stall warnings (and pitch attitude?), believing they were trying to recover from a dive, OR under pressure they "overlooked" that the degraded control mode/ sensor input problems no longer gave a safety protection that full back stick will not be allowed to stall the aircraft?
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I don't agree. Hindsight is 20/20. The issue facing the captain when he came to the flight deck was simply who was in the best position to fly the plane. That's a judgement call, and a bit of a coin flip. To me, it says that he trusted in the professionalism of his fellow pilots. In hindsight, that judgement may have been wrong. But I won't second guess that decision.
It's like his decision to take his rest break when he did. In hindsight, maybe it wasn't the safest course of action. But he had no more of a crystal ball than anyone else on that flight.
I think there is a temptation to expect the captain to ride on his white steed from the bunk onto the flight deck, manfully throw the stupid PF out the door, and heroically wrestle the plane to safety. That would make for a thrilling movie plot but it doesn't reflect the way CRM actually works.
It's like his decision to take his rest break when he did. In hindsight, maybe it wasn't the safest course of action. But he had no more of a crystal ball than anyone else on that flight.
I think there is a temptation to expect the captain to ride on his white steed from the bunk onto the flight deck, manfully throw the stupid PF out the door, and heroically wrestle the plane to safety. That would make for a thrilling movie plot but it doesn't reflect the way CRM actually works.
This is not about the Captain taking control. It is inconceivable that the Captain did not seek to form a view of what was going on. The question then becomes why, given that he was not present for whatever cues led the other pilots originally to misinterpret the situation, he nevertheless joined in that misinterpretation.
Usually when a non-participant acquiesces in, whilst not sharing, an erroneous view, the non-participant is junior to the actor(s). That is not the case here. Assuming the Captain wasn't erroneously briefed by one of his colleagues, then the natural conclusion is that the Captain independently came to the same conclusion as the other pilots or, at the very least considered that no alternative explanation was sufficiently likely so as to distract other pilots by raising it.
It seems to me the likeliest explanation is that the aircraft was still giving some powerful cues consistent with the erroneous interpretation. They must have been powerful cues because three men did not interpret a stall warning as meaning that the aircraft was about to enter a stall.