At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent
So it would appear PF registered the stall warning, believed it and chose to apply TOGA. So far, so good...
and the PF maintained nose-up inputs.
To me this is really the WTF? moment...
The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight. Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 kt; it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up inputs.
So clearly he wasn't fighting the computer, but to the contrary, the computer was merely reacting to the sidestick commands as expected.
So the puzzling part is why did he keep pulling up? Is it possible he was relying on the stall protection to sort things out? Not realizing he was in alternate law?
Can one of the bus drivers perhaps chime in with the procedure for unreliable IAS? Whatever it is, I'm pretty sure it wasn't followed here?