Managing time critical checklists!

[A380 Jockey]

I recently completed my licence renewal simulator check(very successfully,I might add..).
On one particular exercise I was asked very politely but extremely candidly to 'please expedite the procedure'.
This exercise was an engine fire on one of my engines..
Now I am a trainer myself,but not wanting to take anything away from this 'green' TRI,it got me thinking.
I was always taught thru the entire course of my flying history,AND thru the course of my training history that when you have an emergency that is time critical but not time starved,slow down your pace and buy whatever few milli seconds you are able to,therby giving you the space(AND time) to take sensible decisions. These are,after all, life altering decisions.
On discussion,his thought was that I could do better by 'hurrying up the checklist' of a 550T aircraft. I had actually done 4 items in about 30 seconds which could easily have taken close to 60 had I stuttered or stumbled.
Having seen several,innumeral students and trainees cut wrong engine(s),and fire the wrong fire shot in the wrong engine,pull the wrong generator drive and switch the wrong hydraulic pump,turn the hydraulics off for the fuel pumps etc etc,I have come to establish the golden rule that when you have to rush something,please take your time. Or 'hurry up slowly'. Apparantely,my training hasn't sunk thru enough minds. Or maybe it is incorrect to begin with...
Would appreciate your comments on my chain of thought..
Howsoever correct or otherwise it might be. Many thanks. Cause I am really dissappointed. If for nothing else....in myself.

[PJ2]

A380 Jockey;

I will share a similar experience in hopes of providing perspective on what shouldn't be felt as a "disappointing" comment. I certainly understand the feeling - let me explain why.

We were being checked by a government ministry check pilot recently qualified on the A320 and the ride was being run by a designated company check pilot.

We were going through a drill, engine fire or hydraulic failure as I recall and executing the ECAM drills and reviewing the STATUS pages as per the books.

One of the comments at the end of the ride was, "too much talking during the ECAM action drills...I want a 'curtain' drawn down between you two so that one flies the airplane and one does the drill".

Our 'talking' during the drills was the CM2's confirmation with CM1 that he wished the APU started (due loss of one generator)...confirmation that it was to be a Config FULL landing, (calculations for landing distance application) and full review and confirmation of understanding of all STATUS items. In other words...SOPs.

We were confused, angry and certainly disappointed because that's what went on the report. That the SOPs were thus and we had been trained, (very well) in them and had had fine reports on previous rides doing the same thing did not alleviate the feeling that we'd not done well on the ride.

I did respond, in writing, to our Chief Pilot and the Ministry. I learned in discussion with others that our experience was not unique with this particular inspector. The ride was thankfully viewed "in historical perspective" but even then it was still not easy to forget.

We are examined as no other profession. We submit the validity of our licence to medical and standards checks essentially every six months. If either hiccup, we cannot work and must fix whatever the problem was before we can practise our craft again. No other profession is as stringent. Sensitivity to what is understood as unjustified criticism (vice a "suggestion") when we are our own severest critics, is both a fact of the profession and a result of setting extremely high personal standards.

We pride ourselves in achieving and problem-solving, and it is more than "ego". It is our "service to our passengers" which I believe is primary behind this standard. In this high standard I suspect the medical profession is the same, although in many other aspects the disimilarities between aviation and medicine are topics of concern, discussed elsewhere.

When our personal standards are placed under such scrutiny, even the most minor comment can be disappointing if truly unwarranted. In my view, as a 35-year retiree off the A330/A340, your standard of "taking the necessary time" is absolutely spot on; it is no time to rush a drill or a checklist or an ECAM action process.

The Airbus has designed the ECAM process such that it requires completion. One can get into a lot of trouble if, while rushing, some steps are missed.

Recalling the drill again to find out why something went off the rails is worse and less safe than completing the drill deliberately and at a pace commensurate with all cockpit crew members' comfort.

If one needs to get the airplane on the ground, that is an airmanship call, not an ECAM or Airbus requirement, (a red Land ASAP contemplates that the drills are still completed), and a check pilot's need for you to increase the pace requires a discussion after the session on "why?"

FWIW

PJ2

[A380 Jockey]

Many thanks for at least agreeing with some of my POV's,if not endorsing them. Very heartening to know others feel similarly if not exactly the way I do.
Feeling better already. And more endorsed....
Thx PJ2

[411A]

Recalling the drill again to find out why something went off the rails is worse and less safe than completing the drill deliberately and at a pace commensurate with all cockpit crew members' comfort.

If one needs to get the airplane on the ground, that is an airmanship call, not an ECAM or Airbus requirement, (a red Land ASAP contemplates that the drills are still completed), and a check pilot's need for you to increase the pace requires a discussion after the session on "why?"

Yes, take your time and do it right, the first time will save your hide, make NO mistake. So-called 'rushed' procedures are NEVER a good idea.

[safetypee]

Views on the subject:-

When time is short and odds are long!

Time-to-Think-and-Time-to-Do.

Fostering successes rather than reducing failures.

Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off.

“Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards.”

And don’t forget Merton’s “Laws of Unanticipated Consequences”

[Landroger]

Respect to you guys who have to put your jobs on the line, from time to time. I am neither pilot nor ex-military, but I have a point of view which supports your position. Many years ago I used to work with an engineer whose skills and work ethic I greatly respected. He was an ex-RAF Weapons Electronics Officer in the Vulcan, at a time when some of his electronics included a very large bomb indeed.

He explained that on occasion things would go wrong, his panel would light up red and every breaker in the place would trip. He had been taught and his experience had shown the truth of the teaching, that ones first action in those circumstances, was to "sit on your hands."

I have never been in the sort of situation to which you refer, but I have never forgotten his phrase and in difficult situations you may be sure it is not I who confuses action with progress.

Sit on your hands is terribly good advice for giving your brain time to make the right decision, not just 'a decision'.

Roger.

[EW73]

In PJ2s example regarding the comment -

One of the comments at the end of the ride was, "too much talking during the ECAM action drills...I want a 'curtain' drawn down between you two so that one flies the airplane and one does the drill".

I see that comment as one which perfectly applies to the three-man flight deck, where the situation ..."that one flies the airplane and one does the drill". was the ops normal in most non-normal situations.

maybe he was from the Golden Era!

And a very good practice it was too!

EW73

[safetypee]

The presentation below follows the same theme as the references in #5, but considers a range of aspects from the individual to the organization. Perhaps a lesson for the future of safety?

Why Things That Go Right, Sometimes Go Wrong.

“It’s the black wire to the red wire, right?” (slide 31)

[Atlas Shrugged]

There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.

[PappyJ]

Yes, take your time and do it right, the first time will save your hide, make NO mistake. So-called 'rushed' procedures are NEVER a good idea.

No truer statement exists!

[rogerg]

As my instructor used to say, "why is there always a time to do it again, but never time to do it right"

[Sciolistes]

I always remember a particular HPL ATPL exam question along the lines of "How much time should you spend dealing with a problem?". The correct answer was of course "As much time as you have available." I thought it was brilliant despite being blindingly obvious, and yet totally overlooked and seldom have I seen such behaviour.

[Tee Emm]

There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.

Apart of course from finding yourself in a high speed spiral dive in IMC exceeding MMo and the radar showing all red from proximity of cloud covered granite

[KBPsen]

I have found it fairly common among "new" TRI/TREs to want things to proceed at a faster pace. Perception of time is a relative thing and very different when watching rather than doing. At the same time it is my experience that the "new" are often concerned whether there is enough time to complete the entire sim program.

[PEI_3721]

'There is absolutely NOTHING that EVER needs to be done in a hurry in an aircraft.'

‘Hurry’ is tied to ‘rush’ which is defined as to move or act swiftly. However, if the word was ‘expeditiously’ – acting or doing with speed and efficiency, then the required action might be clearer. However, both definitions require moderating by 'accuracy' - thoroughness.
These aspects depend on the context of the situation, the required action, and time available; aspects of awareness and knowledge. In my book, expeditious actions (thinking and acting) are required for an RTO, and warnings from EGPWS/TAWS, Windshear, ACAS, etc.
Not all red warnings require such action, often the difference between these is the ability to undo the action, i.e. an engine shutdown and fire drill may be more difficult to undo that an EGPWS pull up, conversely failing to pull may have no undo capability.

Thus ‘know before you go’ (SOPs) comes to mind to aid the decision to trade one aspect for another, (ETTO) as in #5 & #8.

[PJ2]

EW73;

I see that comment as one which perfectly applies to the three-man flight deck, where the situation ..."that one flies the airplane and one does the drill". was the ops normal in most non-normal situations.

maybe he was from the Golden Era!

I flew DC8s in that "era", with three (and four, with the navigator until 1974) crew members, and yes, that's the way it was done...in an emergency, one flew and did the radio work, one did the drill(s) and one monitored and assisted; BTDT. Even then, one always verbally asked for and got-before-actioning, confirmation from the pilot flying on all non-reversible items such as fuel control levers, throttles, fire-pull handles, generator/IDG disconnects and so on. Still do today.

Those kinds of communications were not what was being referred to here.

If I must, I can assure you that the inspector was not from that "Golden Era"...he wasn't nearly old enough and was not experienced in large aircraft/airline operations. I'll leave it at that.

In two-crew aircraft such as the A320/A330/A340 series, the ECAM drills were then and are today carried out very specifically and there are times when communication between crew members is required. One example among many I can cite is the review of the status page where both pilots must be aware of inoperative and/or system and performance limitations.

I'm not going to bleed on here, EW73 - you have to take my word that both the inspector and the experience were outliers. I'm posting these remarks quite candidly in order to assure one poster and perhaps others, that this kind of stuff happens and it means nothing overall but it still affects one. The remarks I see are universal...that rushing is to be avoided at all costs and only makes a mess, a point that I made in my first response.

PJ2

[Stickies]

Recommended good read for your new TRI/TRE would be the interview given to the Royal Aeronautical Society by one of the the QF32 (A380 from SIN 4th Nov.) crewmembers,1st class CRM and not a rushed moment in sight!

[SR71]

Yeah but that QF32 flight bothers me for another reason....there were 5 of them onboard the flightdeck and it still took 2 hrs to get the bird down.

Had there been 2 pilots, would it have taken 5 hrs? Is that reasonable?

A system that spits out 43 ECAM messages in the first ~60 secs and then 10(?) subsequent messages, some contradictory, expecting a 2 man crew to deal with it is a triumph of technology over commonsense isn't it?

Even the 5 man crew admitted the messages were confusing and not assisting the process of building up a mental model of what was going on.

[bfisk]

To answer the OP: going through initial type-rating (in the sim), I went from overwhelmed, slightly confident, via down again, to cocky. Unfortunately, the cocky "let's git'er done" feeling on the flight before the skill test resulted in shutting down both engines after an engine fire - the right one with condition lever and the left one with the firewall valve. We had been joking about it beforehand, that you'ld have to be pretty thick to pull a stunt like that, that it was just a matter of paying attention.

Let me tell you, that the ear-defening silence of two stopped engines, just above 1000', in solid IMC, taught me one thing and one thing only: sit on your f-ing hands until your head is cool!

You are never that short of time, that you don't have time to do things right.

[Gulfcapt]

A380, you did it right.

You musta gotten in the way of the TRI's answr 2 a txt.

Best,
GC