Babblespeak, the endless checklist

[WorkingHard]

like others have said, this thread is a breath of fresh air. If you are so intent on checklists a mile long how do you concentrate on actually flying the aircraft? In a similar vein I am amazed at what some people wear when flying. For myself I am mostly going somewhere on business and therefore wear business type clothing but an awful lot of pilots tell me I should have all sorts of thing to wear not just ordinary suits.

[By George]

I think one of the problems is the schools have introduced basic technique to check-lists such as 'seat track' and 'harness'. If you need a checklist to tell you to put on your seat-belt you should not be allowed within five miles of an airfield let alone an aircraft. I see alot of robotic flying in the airlines where pilots are not really thinking about what they are doing. There seems no real connection to the aeroplane, if you know what I mean. To read about large transport aircraft taking off without flaps, for example, is mind boggling.

[PLovett]

To read about large transport aircraft taking off without flaps, for example, is mind boggling.

By George, I think the above problem is due to pilots treating checklists as a "to do" list and not a checklist that the function has been done. Most of the crashes due to failure to set flaps seem to have been due to the checklist being interrupted by an external event, such as ATC or something similar which can only occur where it is being used as a "to do" list.

If the checklist is run as a confirmation that the action has been performed there is less chance of the action being overlooked, although to be fair, there is still the risk that the action has not been properly checked. That was the case with a CRJ crash in the US where the flaps were set to the incorrect setting.

[Sciolistes]

It occurred to me one day that if you screw up the checklist, the chances are that you screwed up something before the checklist, but less likely the other way around.

Anyway, I see a few posts referring to a new fangled single pilot ops using checklists in flight. I've never heard nor seen of such a thing. Read and do checks on the ground and 100% memory from line up to turn off. I haven't heard of anybody doing it differently

[Air Tourer]

Air checks.

Up to twin commuters, I've never seen an obvious checklist, except one A/c had a row of tabs mounted in line of sight on top of the panel. Flick 'em one way for T.O. and back again before landing.

[Centaurus]

Slightly off-thread I know, but one thing that amuses me is the habit of pilots "backing up" the throttles on take off. I was a pax in a Metro taking off from Sydney and as it turned to line up I saw two hands shoving the throttles forward and all the way on the take off run were these two large mitts completely covering the throttles until after lift off both hands vanished to later appear on respective knees.

Same in 737 cockpits. Some one presses TOGA and next second a second hand appears and follows through until rotate then magically both hands disappear. I often wonder about the trauma blood and bits of skin that would be the result of the follow up hand being squashed between the start levers and the sharp edge of both throttles if the captain (who presumably is in charge of the throttles) suddenly decides to whip the throttles closed as he calls "rejecting"

After all, politeness has it's place in society but I can't imagine him saying to the backer up of throttles "Excuse me old chap would you mind removing your hand from my throttles as I wish to reject the take off"

[clunckdriver]

Heres a classic, just had a phone call from an instructor, one of his solo students recieved a bolicking from TC for entering a live runway at an uncontrolled strip when a Citation was on final, the reason given by the student for this lapse was"I was reading the last items on the BTO checklist and didnt notice I had crossed the hold line". Whats the last item on this list? "Check for traffic on final!" Another example of stuff on checklists which should be simple airmanship, not on a written list.

[error_401]

Great thread.

Some 5 c worth from the editor side of checklists and procedures. I've been writing manuals of all sorts for 20 years. Since 8 years also in aviation.

While waiting for this first employment on a JAR 23/25 aircraft I flew a Piper Aztec E PA23-250 to keep my CPL/IR MEP rating. As I always found it fun to write up manuals and as for the Aztec there were none except of the very rudimentary 40 years old Piper documentation I built my own checklist...

It was great fun to get mislead and find back to a "good" way of flying the Aztec. Reading this thread I had to go and fetch my first example of this checklist. Huh 15 pages but only A5 (half a letter format) printed only on one side. Including Pax briefing speed tables and power settings.

The fun was to write up something and then try it in real life. Hahaha - after the first try I was back in the office shortening it. And then I shortened it again and again. It was exactly all these "Airmanship" items (such as "seatbelts") which load a checklist.

Then I changed to have an expanded checklist for training purposes and eventual preparation as I started flying also C340 and C402's just to have a reference and the checklist itself was down to 4 pages.

The last version was 4 pages including the approach speed table and all items from line-up to landing were memory items. the most useful was the approach speed table - no more long landings with that one.

Later in my career I had the great opportunity to write up the procedures and checklist for the ATR Turboprop. The checklist fit on a 20 x 30 cm (4 x 6") single sided laminated sheet. Still the instructors insisted in a couple additional items not in the "killer-item" class I would have omitted as they were covered by cautions or very obvious such as "document door closed" which had a caption and you would bet you can hear it being open when starting engine #1.

With my actual operator in a very complex transport jet aircraft we also have a very simple and straightforward checklist philosophy. Great working.

Today I'd always opt for the KISS (keep it short and simple) approach to any checklist. As for any aircraft I have seen up to date:

Power - V1 - rotate - V2 - gear up - flaps up

always worked just fine. And the reverse order for landing as well

Happy Landings

[LeadSled]

PLovett,
Gee, that shows you what an old style Boeing the B737NG really is!
The whole B757/767/744 checklist, once brakes are off to brakes on again, is in the middle of the control wheel, no need even for hand held list ---- they are strictly "vital actions", the rest is procedural --- SOPs if you want.
Tootle pip!!

[Denti]

Actually, you can do that with the 737 as well, all our "in motion" checklists are in the middle of the yoke and that is more than sufficient, however, in motion starts with the before take off checklist, the taxy checklist has to be read before beginning to move. However, that might not be completely standard boeing as we have boeing company tailored procedures.

[twochai]

I read that one of the proposed responses by the FAA/NTSB in the 'wake' of the US1549 ditching in the Hudson is that they might in future require a 'Dual engine failure after Takeoff' checklist. As if Sully needed it! In fact, it would in all probability have distracted him, IMHO.

Whatever happened to 'Situational Awareness'? Vital action checklists are useful, but will never replace a pilot who is constantly questioning him/herself, is aware of his/her surroundings and is alert to changes in it.

[fireflybob]

I read that one of the proposed responses by the FAA/NTSB in the 'wake' of the US1549 ditching in the Hudson is that they might in future require a 'Dual engine failure after Takeoff' checklist. As if Sully needed it! In fact, it would in all probability have distracted him, IMHO.

Interesting thing here is that the traditional ditching checklists are based on the days of Constellations and StratoCruisers flying across the pond where maybe you'd had to shutdown 2 engines and then had at least 30 mins to drift down before you had to ditch. Ditching were "premeditated". So you had time to do all sorts of preparation (get the pax/cabin crew briefed, put the lifejackets on, get the dinghies out, burn off fuel to minimum etc).

Vast majority of ditchings now are unpremeditated. A/c goes off end of runway at airport near sea or multiple bird strike after take off, eg.

The current ditching checklist on a/c such as the B737 (and I guess A320) is so long that Sully would have been mad to even consider it! Yes there is a case for an abbreviated memory "checklist" containing "vital actions" which is really what we are saying on this thread now.

It really grates me when I see a checklist which tells me to face into wind and/or look behind before running up - these are basic airmanship items!

[boofhead]

I read in the initial reports on the Hudson ditching that the crew did not do the checklist (for good reasons) and thus did not activate the Ditching Switch. I guess that switch closes the various valves in the fuselage and stops water from entering, extending the float time. It also appeared that with the valves still open, the water entered so rapidly that it tore the bottom out of the lower rear fuselage area, hastening the sinking and preventing the rear doors from being used. If the Ditching Switch had been operated, maybe the airplane would have floated better?
Probably not, but who knows?

[clunckdriver]

Boofhead, you are correct, the ditching switch was not selected to "ditch", however its my understanding that as the ditching checklist was written on the assumption that one would have lots of time gliding from high alt to get the whole thing done and as the ditching switch is way down the list F/O Styles didnt have the time to select it, again, keep it short! Mind you keeping it short and Airbus are not normally on the same page, but thats another thread altogether.

[flown-it]

Couldn't agree more.
Take the lawyer out of the cockpit and put common sense back in is my mantra.
Flows backed up by a sensible checklist not "Do" lists followed by nothing.
I remember a very able airline Captain who was accused of having one foot in the tar pit after critiquing a flight as "so much correct and so little right"!

[nnc0]

Just to clarify the checklists in question on US Air 1549, the crew were actioning the dual eng fail checklist: 3-5 pages of relight and approach preparations The ditching sequence/preparation in this procedure is towards the very end of the procedure and the landing occurred before the ditching portion could be actioned.

The stand alone DITCHING checklist is a separate checklist and was not used by the crew as it assumes both Engines operating.

[A37575]

Have a look at the current 737 after take off check list. It mentions four items.
Bleeds on, Packs auto, gear and flaps. now look at the amplified procedure in the Vol One. It says "After flap retraction is complete: Set or verify that the engine bleeds and air conditioning packs are operating, Set the autobrake selector to off, set the landing gear lever to off after landing gear retraction is complete - then do the after take off checklist.

This procedure and subsequent checklist is challenged and responded to by the same pilot - the PNF. The concept of challenge by one pilot and cross-checked and then responded to by the other pilot is negated. Not much point in having the same pilot answering to himself, is there?

The glaring omission in the 737 after take off checklist is there is no FCOM specific check of the cabin pressurising by observing the cabin diff or cabin rate of climb. The original 737 checklist from years ago - until it was fiddled with by Boeing - included the specific checklist item "Air conditioning and Pressurisation System....Check" That meant ensuring the bleeds and packs were in the required setting AND the two pressurisation instruments indicating pressurisation is taking place.

What we often see as trainers, is the PNF only observing the items stated in the after take off checklist - the four items mentioned earlier. Rarely does the PF look across at the switching while the PNF does his own thing of challenging and responding to himself. The essential aim of the challenge and response is shot to pieces when the other pilot is too pre-occupied in monitoring the automatics to concern himself with what is occurring across the other side of the flight deck -and in any case he is not required to respond anyway so it takes him further out of the loop.

If for some reason the aircraft is unpressurised right from the start of the flight, then with the pressurisation in the auto mode, excessive cabin rate of climb will trigger a master caution as the pressurisation system automatically mode switches to standby. You can't miss that happening. But if the take off is planned that the Standby mode is used for the flight, this alert is negated.

To test (train) if the crew are awake to the fact the aircraft has failed to pressurise after take off, it is possible for the simulator instructor to insert a fault that prevents the aircraft from pressurising. The alarming thing is from our experience, even with trained crews, that the majority of crews fail to notice the pressurisation instruments are indicating the aircraft is not pressurising. And why is this? - because the checklist does not specifically state to look at those vital instruments and the failure of crews to use commonsense airmanship instead of relying blindly on a written checklist.

Boeing may argue that if the packs and bleeds are in the correct position the aircraft must be pressurising. Not necessarily so, as witness the ill-fated Helios airlines 737 flight where the outflow valve was open for the entire flight. The solution is to re-instate in the after take off checklist the first item as "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation....Check - and then change the checklist policy to have the PNF challenge and the PF to respond rather than a one man band job by the PNF.

[johns7022]

Well think about it...if your going to put a 200 hr Ab initio pilot in the right seat do you want him reading and verifying every checklist item, or let him do a flow, fire things up on the taxi, asking for the IFR clearance, and getting take off clearance 3 minutes later right at the end of the taxiway?

You guys hire marsh mellows: insecure, on probation, scared little robots and now you want them to think..

Sorry but if I have to sit there in row 15, peeking up at some kid in the right seat, you can sit there for 30 minutes while he runs through the checklist...

[Denti]

Boeing may argue that if the packs and bleeds are in the correct position the aircraft must be pressurising. Not necessarily so, as witness the ill-fated Helios airlines 737 flight where the outflow valve was open for the entire flight. The solution is to re-instate in the after take off checklist the first item as "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation....Check - and then change the checklist policy to have the PNF challenge and the PF to respond rather than a one man band job by the PNF.

The Helios Case however is covered in the preflight checklist: Air Cond & Press.... BLEEDS ON, AUTO, SET. If you reconfigure the pressurisation system after that you have to follow the respective supplementary procedure, those are in my outfit on the back of the (single sheet) checklist. Of course any supplementary procedure has to be thoroughly briefed, the procedures themselve is usually pretty short and easy to do. If you still forget to reconfigure the pressurisation after take off that should be cought during the FL100 check which requires the check of cabin pressurisation.

About the ab-initio pilots, that is a completely different thing and discussed ad nauseum elsewhere. Anyway it is not new since ab initio pilots are the norm for the last 50 years or so with many major airlines as well as the military.

[clunckdriver]

Never having flown a 737 I cant comment on the specifics of the checklist, but for a pilot to not check cabin diff/rate of climb when passing through every five/ten thousand on the way up without having to read it from a checklist shows how far that common airmanship is being replaced by "Babblespeak" , as one previous poster said its a bit like having to read a checklist to tell you to check behind before running up to high power, such things should be ingrained from day one in a pilots training.Judging by my e mails and the number of responses to my rant,it would seem that many experienced crew members share my frustration with this stuff, thank you all for your input. Regards, Clunck.