AF447
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@philpop
Tonight, French TV TF1 has broadcasted a testimony from a Air France maintenance manager explaining that the pitot tubes issue was well known at Air France and shown internal documents stating that several critical problems has already occurred on AF CDG-NY as well as AF CDG-TOKYO
He’s a simple hangar mechanic. That’s it. Nothing new here as we know AF had started the process of changing them before the crash. Useless “sensational” interview as the guy had probably no clue if his instructions were dictated by a SB or an AD.
Tonight, French TV TF1 has broadcasted a testimony from a Air France maintenance manager explaining that the pitot tubes issue was well known at Air France and shown internal documents stating that several critical problems has already occurred on AF CDG-NY as well as AF CDG-TOKYO
He’s a simple hangar mechanic. That’s it. Nothing new here as we know AF had started the process of changing them before the crash. Useless “sensational” interview as the guy had probably no clue if his instructions were dictated by a SB or an AD.
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I have been wondering for a while now what could have caused the PRIM 1 and the SEC 1 to fail at the same time, at 02:13.
Losing two flight computers is not dramatic in itself as one computer is sufficient to control the aeroplane, although losing two at the same time is quite rare, in my experience.
Flight computers rely on feedback from the control surfaces to make sure the movement order was carried out, otherwise they go off-line and control gets transfered to the next computer in line.
The only control surface where both PRIM 1 and SEC 1 are in control at the same time (apart from spoilers) is the rudder:
SEC 1 at the PFTU (Artificial feel and rudder trim)
PRIM 1 at the rudder itself.
Incidentally, in Alternate Law 2, the BCM (Back Up Control Module) is also active, providing alternate yaw damping, but no turn coordination.
It is perhaps a long shot, but a rudder not responding to electrical orders may have tripped PRIM 1 and SEC 1 at the same time.
Your thoughts on this one?
Losing two flight computers is not dramatic in itself as one computer is sufficient to control the aeroplane, although losing two at the same time is quite rare, in my experience.
Flight computers rely on feedback from the control surfaces to make sure the movement order was carried out, otherwise they go off-line and control gets transfered to the next computer in line.
The only control surface where both PRIM 1 and SEC 1 are in control at the same time (apart from spoilers) is the rudder:
SEC 1 at the PFTU (Artificial feel and rudder trim)
PRIM 1 at the rudder itself.
Incidentally, in Alternate Law 2, the BCM (Back Up Control Module) is also active, providing alternate yaw damping, but no turn coordination.
It is perhaps a long shot, but a rudder not responding to electrical orders may have tripped PRIM 1 and SEC 1 at the same time.
Your thoughts on this one?
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Moderators and web designers, burn this after reading
Moderators and web designers
.... There is a problem with trying to relocate past posts, particularly as we are often slagged off by others for not reading from the start
.
...When you delete a post, permalink reference numbers of all the existing subsequent posts changes. Not only that, but if there have been several deletions, more recent posts get put back onto an earlier PAGE number.
....It becomes harder for us to keep a mental picture ,or written list, of earlier posts of relevance.Thus harder to cross refer to something vaguely remembered as having been said before.
....Is it possible for such groups as photos, or technical diagrams ,or maps.or timelines ,to be relisted and rebundled in some way , so that we can see their relationship and contradictions in one place?
.....At the very least can posts be allowed to retain their serial number? ( after all they are shown as PERMAlink)
.....Two off thread points, Moderators have and do a hell of a job on this thread, how do you get the time to keep reading it all?
......Brazillian Authorities seem to have done a good job right beyond the boundaries of their responsibility.
wilyflier
.... There is a problem with trying to relocate past posts, particularly as we are often slagged off by others for not reading from the start
.
...When you delete a post, permalink reference numbers of all the existing subsequent posts changes. Not only that, but if there have been several deletions, more recent posts get put back onto an earlier PAGE number.
....It becomes harder for us to keep a mental picture ,or written list, of earlier posts of relevance.Thus harder to cross refer to something vaguely remembered as having been said before.
....Is it possible for such groups as photos, or technical diagrams ,or maps.or timelines ,to be relisted and rebundled in some way , so that we can see their relationship and contradictions in one place?
.....At the very least can posts be allowed to retain their serial number? ( after all they are shown as PERMAlink)
.....Two off thread points, Moderators have and do a hell of a job on this thread, how do you get the time to keep reading it all?
......Brazillian Authorities seem to have done a good job right beyond the boundaries of their responsibility.
wilyflier
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Googled for more info on SATCOM, if it was SATCOM... 
The Iridium antenna does not need to be aimed. Like a cell phone antenna, its coverage is omnidirectional. It can be fixed on top of the fuselage and mounted with relatively low cost and complexity.
Inmarsat antennas are mechanically steered or electronically steered. The former type requires a steering mechanism, a lot of moving parts, and a radome big enough to cover the whole range of antenna motion.
Inmarsat services, Aero L
The Aero L service operates in the Inmarsat global beams and provides aircraft with real-time, low-speed, two-way data communications capability. Aero L is a packet data service designed primarily for aircraft operators who require a highly reliable data communications capability. Using a packet data link at speeds up to 1.2 kbps, Aero L is International Civil Aviation Organization/Standard and Practices (ICAO/SARPS) compliant and is an essential service for commercial airline customers who require a backup communications system for transmitting cockpit data or for real-time flight monitoring in critical operational environments. Aero L uses a small low-gain antenna.
Global data communications at 600 to 1200bps, principally to support air traffic control and airline operations. Supports Acars/Aircom messaging. ICAO approved for safety services.
Looks that it was Inmarsat, Aero L or better service. At least 600\1200 bps.
I am not 100% excuding HF, just from my expierence it less reliable than SAT, especialy when you have lighting nearby.
Found on wiki about ACARS : SATCOM provides worldwide coverage, with the exception of operation at the high latitudes (such as needed for flights over the poles). HF datalink is a relatively new network whose installation began in 1995 and was completed in 2001. HF datalink is responsible for new polar routes. Aircraft with HF datalink can fly polar routes and maintain communication with ground based systems (ATC centers and airline operation centers). ARINC is the only service provider for HF datalink.
If it was HF - at 2:14z A447 had VS in place.
If it was SATCOM Inmarsat - at 2:14z plane wings were more or less horizontal.
Usualy SATCOM antena positioning device has its own GPS, so hard to tell was IR data available or not. Will try dig more info about SATCOM Inmarsat antenas
The Iridium antenna does not need to be aimed. Like a cell phone antenna, its coverage is omnidirectional. It can be fixed on top of the fuselage and mounted with relatively low cost and complexity.
Inmarsat antennas are mechanically steered or electronically steered. The former type requires a steering mechanism, a lot of moving parts, and a radome big enough to cover the whole range of antenna motion.
Inmarsat services, Aero L
The Aero L service operates in the Inmarsat global beams and provides aircraft with real-time, low-speed, two-way data communications capability. Aero L is a packet data service designed primarily for aircraft operators who require a highly reliable data communications capability. Using a packet data link at speeds up to 1.2 kbps, Aero L is International Civil Aviation Organization/Standard and Practices (ICAO/SARPS) compliant and is an essential service for commercial airline customers who require a backup communications system for transmitting cockpit data or for real-time flight monitoring in critical operational environments. Aero L uses a small low-gain antenna.
Global data communications at 600 to 1200bps, principally to support air traffic control and airline operations. Supports Acars/Aircom messaging. ICAO approved for safety services.
Looks that it was Inmarsat, Aero L or better service. At least 600\1200 bps.
I am not 100% excuding HF, just from my expierence it less reliable than SAT, especialy when you have lighting nearby.
Found on wiki about ACARS : SATCOM provides worldwide coverage, with the exception of operation at the high latitudes (such as needed for flights over the poles). HF datalink is a relatively new network whose installation began in 1995 and was completed in 2001. HF datalink is responsible for new polar routes. Aircraft with HF datalink can fly polar routes and maintain communication with ground based systems (ATC centers and airline operation centers). ARINC is the only service provider for HF datalink.
If it was HF - at 2:14z A447 had VS in place.
If it was SATCOM Inmarsat - at 2:14z plane wings were more or less horizontal.
Usualy SATCOM antena positioning device has its own GPS, so hard to tell was IR data available or not. Will try dig more info about SATCOM Inmarsat antenas
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Keeping Track
@wilyflier:
Had the same problem in keeping track myself - so now make a note of the last poster's user name and the time of their post (LH side of post) - then much easier to establish where you left off
FWIW
.... There is a problem with trying to relocate past posts, particularly as we are often slagged off by others for not reading from the start
...When you delete a post, permalink reference numbers of all the existing subsequent posts changes. Not only that, but if there have been several deletions, more recent posts get put back onto an earlier PAGE number.
....It becomes harder for us to keep a mental picture ,or written list, of earlier posts of relevance.Thus harder to cross refer to something vaguely remembered as having been said before.
....Is it possible for such groups as photos, or technical diagrams ,or maps.or timelines ,to be relisted and rebundled in some way , so that we can see their relationship and contradictions in one place?
.....At the very least can posts be allowed to retain their serial number? ( after all they are shown as PERMAlink)
...When you delete a post, permalink reference numbers of all the existing subsequent posts changes. Not only that, but if there have been several deletions, more recent posts get put back onto an earlier PAGE number.
....It becomes harder for us to keep a mental picture ,or written list, of earlier posts of relevance.Thus harder to cross refer to something vaguely remembered as having been said before.
....Is it possible for such groups as photos, or technical diagrams ,or maps.or timelines ,to be relisted and rebundled in some way , so that we can see their relationship and contradictions in one place?
.....At the very least can posts be allowed to retain their serial number? ( after all they are shown as PERMAlink)
FWIW
A couple maps of the debris finds can be found on page 49, post 975 of this thread.
Thanks to Google and SeattlePi.com (Air France Flight 447 update: Body count, maps & reports)...
Brazilian military release of search efforts with maps can be found in pdfs here: https://www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/m..._MATERIA=33110
Thanks to Google and SeattlePi.com (Air France Flight 447 update: Body count, maps & reports)...
Brazilian military release of search efforts with maps can be found in pdfs here: https://www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/m..._MATERIA=33110
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AF908 CDG-TNR, captain PF report
F-GNIH is an A340-313X but this is the closest to the information we have about AF447 and the Air Caraibes incidents detailed in the report posted in this thread. This is in French and unfortunately I do not have time now to translate all of it, but if you need any assistance I'll be glad to help later on.
After losing all 3 pitots failure, the aicraft got the same warnings as in the above. The crew sent a MAYDAY message. Finally the crew was able to recover and opted for the pursuit of the flight to Tananarive.
F-GNIH AF908 CDG - TNR -
ALARME STALL ET PERTE DES INDICATIONS DE VITESSE SUR LES PFD
CDB PF en place gauche et OPL L. xxxx PNF en place droite
OPL R. xxxx de repos
Au FL 370 avec une SAT à -51°C et un vent du 080 pour 18 Kts environ sur l'AWY UB612 avec un OFF SET 1R, entre les points OBD et MLK en contact radio avec KHARTOUM, comme nous étions en limite de couche nuageuse avec quelques turbulences légères, j'avais attaché les PAX.
Nous étions au crépuscule avec une faible luminosité.
Puis nous sommes entrés dans la couche, et peu après nous avons commencé par avoir une odeur de brûlé légère qui a duré une vingtaine de secondes et qui ne semblait pas être d'origine volcanique (pas d'odeur d'oeufs pourris) mais plutôt d'odeur électrique pour moi et d'odeur conditionnement d'air pour l'OPL. Puis cette odeur a disparu. Cette odeur a été confirmée en cabine par les PAX et les PNC entre les rangs 3 et 14 par la suite.
Nous avions le radar météo en marche sur calibré sans échos apparents toujours dans la couche et environ minute après cette odeur de brûlé, nous avons eu des turbulences fortes. J'ai donc fais le message « Ici le poste de pilotage PNC assis attachés turbulences fortes ». J'ai réduit la vitesse à
Mach 0,80 (un tout peu au-dessus de green dot)
Quelques secondes après l'indication de vitesse sur le PFD OPL passe brusquement de 280 Kts à 100 Kts dans le bandeau rouge et cela à duré de nombreuses secondes. En même temps sur le PFD CDB variation très forte de vitesse avec vitesse indiquée green dot moins 15Kts et un speed trend à
moins 50 Kts.
Au même moment (il était 15h10 TU) Alarme rouge A/P OFF puis dans la foulée alarme ambre ADR DISAGREE, IAS DISCREPANCY, ALTN LAW PROT LOST, REAC W/S DET FAULT.
Suivi à 15h11 de l'alarme ambre RUD TRV LIM FAULT.
Suivi immédiatement de l'alarme STALL STALL STALL (sans l'alarme cricket associée) avec indication de TOGA LK. Comme j'avais toujours le speed trend à moins 50 Kts, j'ai piloté l'avion en manuel avec mise en descente et léger virage à droite pour sortir de l'AWY. L'avion répondant très mollement avec sur le PFD CDB plusieurs régressions de vitesse dans le bandeau rouge inférieur. En même temps j'ai demandé à l'OPL d'envoyer un message MAYDAY. Pendant la descente bruit d'impact (grêle ???) entendu au cockpit.
Descente jusqu'au FL 340. La vitesse avion étant redevenue correcte j'ai débraillé l'ATHR pour sortir du TOGA LK. Les indication de vitesse étant similaires coté CDB et OPL, mais avec en bas des 2 PFD sur l'échelle des vitesses l'indication SPD LIM rouge qui est restée jusqu'à la fin du vol.
Stabilisation de l'avion, puis application de la procédure IAS DOUTEUSE, et en même temps mise en marche des anti givrages ENG et WING ainsi que passage des PACKS FLOW sur HIGH (dans le doute d'un nuage de poussière ou de fumée pour éviter le pompage GTR comme dans la procédure
nuage volcanique). Comme les indications de vitesse et d'altitude étaient correctes (avec cross check avec les indications de Ground speed et d'altitude GPS, ainsi quand comparant les données de vent de l'OCTAVE), ré engagement de l'AP1 et de l'ATHR.
À aucun moment nous n'avons eu d'alarme ICE DETECTION.
J'ai réveillé le second OPL qui était en repos, puis nous avons traité les check-list ECAM.
Descente au FL 330 puis cancel du MAYDAY et poursuite du vol à ce niveau.
L'avion étant passé en ALT LAW (MAX IAS 330Kts/M.82) j'ai préféré avoir une plage de domaine de vol élargie et continué le vol à Mach 0,80.
Au niveau du bilan : avion en ALT LAW confirmé par le status et les croix ambres sur les PFD, REAC W/S DET FAULT, ALT LAW PROT LOST, ADR DISAGREE et F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (2
NOGO).
FOR LDG USE FLAP 3.
Il est important de noter que l'indication sur la page circuit de l'écran SD ,du RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER était ambre mais à mi-course entre le neutre et le plein débattement gouverne de direction.
Contact avec le CCP pour savoir quel était l'état de la cabine et des PAX. Seule la turbulence forte a été ressentie par les PAX.
J'ai appelé par SAT COM la maintenance pour faire une recherche plus poussée des problèmes et suites à leurs recommandations nous avons reseté tous les calculateurs de commandes vol PRIM et
SEC sans aucun résultat. (à ce moment là nous avions le carburant pour un retour vers NCE ou FCO).
Sur la check-list développée de F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST) on peut lire pour APPR PROC FOR LDG USE FLAP 3. (Il n'y a pas d'indication dans le QRH sur le tableau de correction après panne)
Par contre dans la développée du F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT en APPR PROC FOR LDG USE FLAP 2, ce qui est confirmé par le QRH dans le tableau de correction après panne.
Comme il est apparu cette anomalie entre le QRH qui demande de se poser volets 2 et le status qui nous demande de se poser volets 3 il était donc nécessaire de nouvelles recherches et donc la décision d'un appel plus tard à QB.
Nouvel appel SAT COM à QB qui n'a pas trouvé d'explication supplémentaire sur la différence de braquage volet, puis au CCO pour voir avec eux pour la suite du vol et le dépannage de l'avion, le retour vers l'Europe n'étant plus possible avec le carburant restant, il se posait alors la décision de
continuer sur TNR ou de dérouter sur RUN. Décision de continuer sur TNR avec demande de ma part de surseoir au réveil des collègues qui devaient ramener l'avion sur CDG compte tenu des 05h00 minimum de recherche de panne à TNR.
Nous avons continué le vol avec le Pitot heat sur on et le calibrage radar sur MAX.
Il est à noter que pendant toute la descente en ALT LAW, l'avion ne répondait pas à ma demande de régression de vitesse par l'intermédiaire de la commande SPD du FCU (nous étions en OPEN DES), et j'ai donc du débrayer l'AP pour faire régresser la vitesse. Le pilotage de l'avion m'a donné l'impression d'un avion très mou aux commandes, qui ne correspondait pas au ressenti du pilotage pendant le décollage et la montée. Du fait de la différence entre le QRH et le status, j'ai donc suivi le
status et nous nous sommes posés volets 3.
En regardant en ACMS nous avons vu les indications de Pitot 1 & 2, 2 & 3 et 1 & 3 fault à 15h10TU En post flight report
15h07 BMC 3
15h10 AUTO FLIGHT AP OFF
REAC W/S DET FAULT
IAS DISCREPANCY
NAV ADR DISAGREE
15H11 F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
J'ai fais le tour de l'avion avec un des OPL et aussi bien le radôme que les pitots semblaient intacts.
Seule la sonde d'incidence coté OPL était fortement inclinée presque verticale. Il n'y avait pas de trace d'impact ni de rayure sur la peinture du radôme, ni sur les pare-brises.
J'ai fait, après avoir réuni tout l'équipage (PNT et PNC) un débriefing pour expliquer ce que nous avions vécu et rassurer tout le monde et répondre aux questions.
Pour les questions de la DM
Vol au FL 370 pas de cisaillement de vent ressenti (vent du 080/18Kts) le vent était stable depuis plus d'une demi heure en force et direction.
Vol à mach 0,80 car légère turbulence (PAX attachés)
Pas de présence audible de grêle au début des incidents (mais nous avons entendu pendant la descente des bruits d'impacts au cockpit (grêle ???).
Température SAT -51°C (nous n'avons jamais eu d'alarme ICE DETECTION)
Pas de phénomène orageux (rien au radar météo qui était sur calibré et pas d'éclair d'orage visible).
Début de la turbulence forte vers 15h09 suivie des alarmes citées ci-dessus à 15h10 et 15h11 TU
L'indication de vitesse côté OPL est passé de 280 Kts à 100 Kts dans le bandeau rouge et est restée de nombreuses secondes comme cela.
Coté CDB la vitesse indiquée est passée de green dot - 15 Kts avec un speed trend à -50 Kts.
Alarme STALL (sans l'alarme cricket) plusieurs séries avec plusieurs incursions de speed indiquée dans le bandeau rouge inférieur.
Stabilisation avion au FL340 puis poursuite du vol au FL 330.
Durée estimé des incidents 3 à 5 minutes.
After losing all 3 pitots failure, the aicraft got the same warnings as in the above. The crew sent a MAYDAY message. Finally the crew was able to recover and opted for the pursuit of the flight to Tananarive.
F-GNIH AF908 CDG - TNR -
ALARME STALL ET PERTE DES INDICATIONS DE VITESSE SUR LES PFD
CDB PF en place gauche et OPL L. xxxx PNF en place droite
OPL R. xxxx de repos
Au FL 370 avec une SAT à -51°C et un vent du 080 pour 18 Kts environ sur l'AWY UB612 avec un OFF SET 1R, entre les points OBD et MLK en contact radio avec KHARTOUM, comme nous étions en limite de couche nuageuse avec quelques turbulences légères, j'avais attaché les PAX.
Nous étions au crépuscule avec une faible luminosité.
Puis nous sommes entrés dans la couche, et peu après nous avons commencé par avoir une odeur de brûlé légère qui a duré une vingtaine de secondes et qui ne semblait pas être d'origine volcanique (pas d'odeur d'oeufs pourris) mais plutôt d'odeur électrique pour moi et d'odeur conditionnement d'air pour l'OPL. Puis cette odeur a disparu. Cette odeur a été confirmée en cabine par les PAX et les PNC entre les rangs 3 et 14 par la suite.
Nous avions le radar météo en marche sur calibré sans échos apparents toujours dans la couche et environ minute après cette odeur de brûlé, nous avons eu des turbulences fortes. J'ai donc fais le message « Ici le poste de pilotage PNC assis attachés turbulences fortes ». J'ai réduit la vitesse à
Mach 0,80 (un tout peu au-dessus de green dot)
Quelques secondes après l'indication de vitesse sur le PFD OPL passe brusquement de 280 Kts à 100 Kts dans le bandeau rouge et cela à duré de nombreuses secondes. En même temps sur le PFD CDB variation très forte de vitesse avec vitesse indiquée green dot moins 15Kts et un speed trend à
moins 50 Kts.
Au même moment (il était 15h10 TU) Alarme rouge A/P OFF puis dans la foulée alarme ambre ADR DISAGREE, IAS DISCREPANCY, ALTN LAW PROT LOST, REAC W/S DET FAULT.
Suivi à 15h11 de l'alarme ambre RUD TRV LIM FAULT.
Suivi immédiatement de l'alarme STALL STALL STALL (sans l'alarme cricket associée) avec indication de TOGA LK. Comme j'avais toujours le speed trend à moins 50 Kts, j'ai piloté l'avion en manuel avec mise en descente et léger virage à droite pour sortir de l'AWY. L'avion répondant très mollement avec sur le PFD CDB plusieurs régressions de vitesse dans le bandeau rouge inférieur. En même temps j'ai demandé à l'OPL d'envoyer un message MAYDAY. Pendant la descente bruit d'impact (grêle ???) entendu au cockpit.
Descente jusqu'au FL 340. La vitesse avion étant redevenue correcte j'ai débraillé l'ATHR pour sortir du TOGA LK. Les indication de vitesse étant similaires coté CDB et OPL, mais avec en bas des 2 PFD sur l'échelle des vitesses l'indication SPD LIM rouge qui est restée jusqu'à la fin du vol.
Stabilisation de l'avion, puis application de la procédure IAS DOUTEUSE, et en même temps mise en marche des anti givrages ENG et WING ainsi que passage des PACKS FLOW sur HIGH (dans le doute d'un nuage de poussière ou de fumée pour éviter le pompage GTR comme dans la procédure
nuage volcanique). Comme les indications de vitesse et d'altitude étaient correctes (avec cross check avec les indications de Ground speed et d'altitude GPS, ainsi quand comparant les données de vent de l'OCTAVE), ré engagement de l'AP1 et de l'ATHR.
À aucun moment nous n'avons eu d'alarme ICE DETECTION.
J'ai réveillé le second OPL qui était en repos, puis nous avons traité les check-list ECAM.
Descente au FL 330 puis cancel du MAYDAY et poursuite du vol à ce niveau.
L'avion étant passé en ALT LAW (MAX IAS 330Kts/M.82) j'ai préféré avoir une plage de domaine de vol élargie et continué le vol à Mach 0,80.
Au niveau du bilan : avion en ALT LAW confirmé par le status et les croix ambres sur les PFD, REAC W/S DET FAULT, ALT LAW PROT LOST, ADR DISAGREE et F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (2
NOGO).
FOR LDG USE FLAP 3.
Il est important de noter que l'indication sur la page circuit de l'écran SD ,du RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER était ambre mais à mi-course entre le neutre et le plein débattement gouverne de direction.
Contact avec le CCP pour savoir quel était l'état de la cabine et des PAX. Seule la turbulence forte a été ressentie par les PAX.
J'ai appelé par SAT COM la maintenance pour faire une recherche plus poussée des problèmes et suites à leurs recommandations nous avons reseté tous les calculateurs de commandes vol PRIM et
SEC sans aucun résultat. (à ce moment là nous avions le carburant pour un retour vers NCE ou FCO).
Sur la check-list développée de F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST) on peut lire pour APPR PROC FOR LDG USE FLAP 3. (Il n'y a pas d'indication dans le QRH sur le tableau de correction après panne)
Par contre dans la développée du F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT en APPR PROC FOR LDG USE FLAP 2, ce qui est confirmé par le QRH dans le tableau de correction après panne.
Comme il est apparu cette anomalie entre le QRH qui demande de se poser volets 2 et le status qui nous demande de se poser volets 3 il était donc nécessaire de nouvelles recherches et donc la décision d'un appel plus tard à QB.
Nouvel appel SAT COM à QB qui n'a pas trouvé d'explication supplémentaire sur la différence de braquage volet, puis au CCO pour voir avec eux pour la suite du vol et le dépannage de l'avion, le retour vers l'Europe n'étant plus possible avec le carburant restant, il se posait alors la décision de
continuer sur TNR ou de dérouter sur RUN. Décision de continuer sur TNR avec demande de ma part de surseoir au réveil des collègues qui devaient ramener l'avion sur CDG compte tenu des 05h00 minimum de recherche de panne à TNR.
Nous avons continué le vol avec le Pitot heat sur on et le calibrage radar sur MAX.
Il est à noter que pendant toute la descente en ALT LAW, l'avion ne répondait pas à ma demande de régression de vitesse par l'intermédiaire de la commande SPD du FCU (nous étions en OPEN DES), et j'ai donc du débrayer l'AP pour faire régresser la vitesse. Le pilotage de l'avion m'a donné l'impression d'un avion très mou aux commandes, qui ne correspondait pas au ressenti du pilotage pendant le décollage et la montée. Du fait de la différence entre le QRH et le status, j'ai donc suivi le
status et nous nous sommes posés volets 3.
En regardant en ACMS nous avons vu les indications de Pitot 1 & 2, 2 & 3 et 1 & 3 fault à 15h10TU En post flight report
15h07 BMC 3
15h10 AUTO FLIGHT AP OFF
REAC W/S DET FAULT
IAS DISCREPANCY
NAV ADR DISAGREE
15H11 F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
J'ai fais le tour de l'avion avec un des OPL et aussi bien le radôme que les pitots semblaient intacts.
Seule la sonde d'incidence coté OPL était fortement inclinée presque verticale. Il n'y avait pas de trace d'impact ni de rayure sur la peinture du radôme, ni sur les pare-brises.
J'ai fait, après avoir réuni tout l'équipage (PNT et PNC) un débriefing pour expliquer ce que nous avions vécu et rassurer tout le monde et répondre aux questions.
Pour les questions de la DM
Vol au FL 370 pas de cisaillement de vent ressenti (vent du 080/18Kts) le vent était stable depuis plus d'une demi heure en force et direction.
Vol à mach 0,80 car légère turbulence (PAX attachés)
Pas de présence audible de grêle au début des incidents (mais nous avons entendu pendant la descente des bruits d'impacts au cockpit (grêle ???).
Température SAT -51°C (nous n'avons jamais eu d'alarme ICE DETECTION)
Pas de phénomène orageux (rien au radar météo qui était sur calibré et pas d'éclair d'orage visible).
Début de la turbulence forte vers 15h09 suivie des alarmes citées ci-dessus à 15h10 et 15h11 TU
L'indication de vitesse côté OPL est passé de 280 Kts à 100 Kts dans le bandeau rouge et est restée de nombreuses secondes comme cela.
Coté CDB la vitesse indiquée est passée de green dot - 15 Kts avec un speed trend à -50 Kts.
Alarme STALL (sans l'alarme cricket) plusieurs séries avec plusieurs incursions de speed indiquée dans le bandeau rouge inférieur.
Stabilisation avion au FL340 puis poursuite du vol au FL 330.
Durée estimé des incidents 3 à 5 minutes.
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AIR CARAIBE TIMELINE
22:22:20 to 22:22:36 TAT increases from -14 to -5
22:22:36 to 22:23:00 TAT constant at -5
22:22:59 CAS reduces from 273 to 85 kt (AP disengage FD flags)
22:23:36 to 22:23:45 STALL warnings
22:23:00 to 22:23:54 TAT decreases to -14
22:24:25 CAS recovers to 275kt
22:24:24 to 22:24:40 FD's re-engaged
22:24:41 AP re-engaged
Elapsed time 2 mins 21 secs.
Flight time with unreliable speed 1 min 26 secs
Working assumption:degree of turbulence far less severe to AF447
Does anybody technically-minded have anything to say re post #1148 from Interflug.Confirmation of:
-ACARS message advisory not warning(already established)
-Rudder travel limit gelee(frozen) at ten degrees after ADR disagree?Correct?
-SEC controls this "lock-out" function?
-Not theoretically possible for rudder travel limit to default to higher travel limit than TEN?
-Full travel available after slats out?What keeps slats in?Airloads only?
(Interflug)
(Wytnucls)
Anything at all that could have let the crew get more rudder deflection than they bargained for ??
22:22:20 to 22:22:36 TAT increases from -14 to -5
22:22:36 to 22:23:00 TAT constant at -5
22:22:59 CAS reduces from 273 to 85 kt (AP disengage FD flags)
22:23:36 to 22:23:45 STALL warnings
22:23:00 to 22:23:54 TAT decreases to -14
22:24:25 CAS recovers to 275kt
22:24:24 to 22:24:40 FD's re-engaged
22:24:41 AP re-engaged
Elapsed time 2 mins 21 secs.
Flight time with unreliable speed 1 min 26 secs
Working assumption:degree of turbulence far less severe to AF447
Does anybody technically-minded have anything to say re post #1148 from Interflug.Confirmation of:
-ACARS message advisory not warning(already established)
-Rudder travel limit gelee(frozen) at ten degrees after ADR disagree?Correct?
-SEC controls this "lock-out" function?
-Not theoretically possible for rudder travel limit to default to higher travel limit than TEN?
-Full travel available after slats out?What keeps slats in?Airloads only?
Is there theoretically the possibility, that the RTL got a wrong - much lower - CAS/TAS before it froze?
It is perhaps a long shot, but a rudder not responding to electrical orders may have tripped PRIM 1 and SEC 1 at the same time.
Anything at all that could have let the crew get more rudder deflection than they bargained for ??
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As the VS/Rudder assembly is recovered and photography is available, it seems reasonable to analyze it as it appears.
In one image, I continue to believe the most forward mounting has remained in place, at least in part. It appears to be folded under the port side of the VS root at the front, just aft the dorsal fin attachment.
If so, and concluding an airborne (airflow induced) failure to port, the a/c was at the time yawed left. If so, it is reasonable to also consider a slight roll left, due to asym lift and differential sweep relative to airflow.
If true, that the a/c yawed left enough to fail the Vertical components, the roll will also introduce an exaggerated AoA HS relative to the airflow, which may have failed the HS/E on the starboard side. If the VS/R and HS/E (starboard) failed together, the damage to the base of the Rudder and the extreme damage to the aft mate (VS) would follow.
If the Rudder was perceived to be unresponsive (to the PRIM parameters) at this point, it might explain the Rudder message in ACARS. It might also explain the sequence of other data, including PRES. The possible failure of fuselage structure with HS loss certainly involves the aft pressure bulkhead.
Now the a/p disc. Involuntary, and purportedly due to unmitigable (a/p) control limits, the turbulence associated with its disengage is so far unknown. Grabbing hold of the now hand flown controls may have been quite a challenge (sic). With the disintegrating data on the glass and utter lack of cues..... At this point, we're back to a/p versus hand flying in severe(extreme) turbulence.
The question might be asked, Would it not be more advisable to be mentally flying the a/c along with the a/p up to a manual disconnect?
If surprisingly left with a/p unable to perform, versus hand flying well in advance of such time, what is the proper course?
In one image, I continue to believe the most forward mounting has remained in place, at least in part. It appears to be folded under the port side of the VS root at the front, just aft the dorsal fin attachment.
If so, and concluding an airborne (airflow induced) failure to port, the a/c was at the time yawed left. If so, it is reasonable to also consider a slight roll left, due to asym lift and differential sweep relative to airflow.
If true, that the a/c yawed left enough to fail the Vertical components, the roll will also introduce an exaggerated AoA HS relative to the airflow, which may have failed the HS/E on the starboard side. If the VS/R and HS/E (starboard) failed together, the damage to the base of the Rudder and the extreme damage to the aft mate (VS) would follow.
If the Rudder was perceived to be unresponsive (to the PRIM parameters) at this point, it might explain the Rudder message in ACARS. It might also explain the sequence of other data, including PRES. The possible failure of fuselage structure with HS loss certainly involves the aft pressure bulkhead.
Now the a/p disc. Involuntary, and purportedly due to unmitigable (a/p) control limits, the turbulence associated with its disengage is so far unknown. Grabbing hold of the now hand flown controls may have been quite a challenge (sic). With the disintegrating data on the glass and utter lack of cues..... At this point, we're back to a/p versus hand flying in severe(extreme) turbulence.
The question might be asked, Would it not be more advisable to be mentally flying the a/c along with the a/p up to a manual disconnect?
If surprisingly left with a/p unable to perform, versus hand flying well in advance of such time, what is the proper course?
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Rudder use -
There's an awful lot of text written on the rudder. While it's obvious it parted the aircraft at some time, I find it hard to believe it was pilot induced. I'd like to hear from those (transport pilots only, please) that actually use the rudder that much in flight OTHER than during take-off and approach/landing.
Edit:
P.S. Maybe I should clarify that by asking Airbus pilots, or more specifically, AF447 type. Although other types/mfgrs would be of interest as well.
Edit:
P.S. Maybe I should clarify that by asking Airbus pilots, or more specifically, AF447 type. Although other types/mfgrs would be of interest as well.
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Will,
there is a definitve answer: Let the a/p fly until it proves its unability. The reason is: hand-flying in such high-workload-situations definitely segregates the 2 pilots: One is occupied flying, whereas the other has to handle all the system failures. So, very little redundancy for the trouble-shooting, if at all.
I had a chat with a friend flying the 747 (I have no recent Boeing Experience, I have to confess). What he says, that the similar procedure in the -47 keeps the a/p flying until disconnected by the crew. Any informed comment?
there is a definitve answer: Let the a/p fly until it proves its unability. The reason is: hand-flying in such high-workload-situations definitely segregates the 2 pilots: One is occupied flying, whereas the other has to handle all the system failures. So, very little redundancy for the trouble-shooting, if at all.
I had a chat with a friend flying the 747 (I have no recent Boeing Experience, I have to confess). What he says, that the similar procedure in the -47 keeps the a/p flying until disconnected by the crew. Any informed comment?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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I'm having trouble keeping up with the 4 threads running on this.
Has ANYONE any latest RELIABLE info on the debris and body recovery? The latest I have seen is 7/6.
EDIT: Make that 9/6
Has ANYONE any latest RELIABLE info on the debris and body recovery? The latest I have seen is 7/6.EDIT: Make that 9/6
Last edited by BOAC; 11th Jun 2009 at 15:33.
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Will Fraser -
With over a thousand posts here and other threads on this, that would be impossible ! I simply recall mention of 'possible' over-controlling in OTHER than Normal Law.
Edit: Follow-up to your addition.
You are correct...the 'rudder' didn't leave the a/c, the whole tail did. But, as in AA587, it was claimed that the seperation was caused by the pilot overloading the rudder.
Direct me to the post that claims pilot ruddering caused anything?Direct me to the post that claims pilot ruddering caused anything
Edit: Follow-up to your addition.
You are correct...the 'rudder' didn't leave the a/c, the whole tail did. But, as in AA587, it was claimed that the seperation was caused by the pilot overloading the rudder.
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RealQuax
That's the point, 'until disconnected by the crew'. Why not a proactive D/C ? "What's it doing now?" (sic).
DC ATE- Noted, but the Rudder is at this point what is being discussed.
You are inferring I think some blame here, that's unacceptable, imo. The whole tail did NOT leave the a/c, the VS is not the tail, it is a component of the "tail".
That's the point, 'until disconnected by the crew'. Why not a proactive D/C ? "What's it doing now?" (sic).
DC ATE- Noted, but the Rudder is at this point what is being discussed.
You are inferring I think some blame here, that's unacceptable, imo. The whole tail did NOT leave the a/c, the VS is not the tail, it is a component of the "tail".
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> You are correct...the 'rudder' didn't leave the a/c, the whole tail did. But, as in AA587, it was claimed that the seperation was caused by the pilot overloading the rudder.
I have been following this thread closely since page 6, and have a pretty good memory. You are correct. In the beginning there was a great deal of claiming by the completely uninformed that the PF overcontrolled the rudder and broke it off.
Then the pictures of the VS showed up, with enough detail to show that it still had the rudder attached and yanked the roots out of the aft body section, rather than failing the attach lugs on the VS itself. Since that point most of the claims of pilot overcontrol have evaporated.
In any case, we do not, and at this point with the available information CAN NOT *KNOW*, whether the PF overcontrolled, whether some mechanical/software failure automatically overcontrolled, or whether no overcontrol occurred at all. All we KNOW is the plane fell out of the sky, and at some unknown point the VS fell off. We do not know WHY it fell off, we do not know which direction it fell off, and there isn't enough info available for the slightest productive speculation.
I have been following this thread closely since page 6, and have a pretty good memory. You are correct. In the beginning there was a great deal of claiming by the completely uninformed that the PF overcontrolled the rudder and broke it off.
Then the pictures of the VS showed up, with enough detail to show that it still had the rudder attached and yanked the roots out of the aft body section, rather than failing the attach lugs on the VS itself. Since that point most of the claims of pilot overcontrol have evaporated.
In any case, we do not, and at this point with the available information CAN NOT *KNOW*, whether the PF overcontrolled, whether some mechanical/software failure automatically overcontrolled, or whether no overcontrol occurred at all. All we KNOW is the plane fell out of the sky, and at some unknown point the VS fell off. We do not know WHY it fell off, we do not know which direction it fell off, and there isn't enough info available for the slightest productive speculation.
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rudder/fin separation and satcom links...
Rudder Travel Lim. Fault in the Acars Messages and its link to rudder/fin/whatever loss would stand valid only if someone proved that the SatCom link would keep functional after the separation.
Either it must be plausible that the a/c wings could keep minimally horizontal and also minimally stable in that position with a missing rudder/fin/whatever or it must be proven that the satcom (electronically steered / phased array ?) link would stand even to abrupt changes in the a/c roll, pitch angle.
Either it must be plausible that the a/c wings could keep minimally horizontal and also minimally stable in that position with a missing rudder/fin/whatever or it must be proven that the satcom (electronically steered / phased array ?) link would stand even to abrupt changes in the a/c roll, pitch angle.
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come on lets back on the centre line. It might make a good bedtime story talking about losing VS etc. but its unfortunately bull****.
The loss of a VS would produce many more faults than you have here, many more.
Once again acars is only a messaging system. It doesn't produce any messages it just sends them. The messages are aircraft system time stamped and not acars time stamped.
What we clearly see with these messages is the beginning of a sequence of tragic events tied to air data but still for reasons unknown.
The loss of a VS would produce many more faults than you have here, many more.
Once again acars is only a messaging system. It doesn't produce any messages it just sends them. The messages are aircraft system time stamped and not acars time stamped.
What we clearly see with these messages is the beginning of a sequence of tragic events tied to air data but still for reasons unknown.