AF447
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SaturnV remarked
Unless I miss my guess the depth was considerably less and the terrain considerably smoother where AI182 went down near 51N 15W. That makes location a whole lot easier. I seem to remember reading here that the pinger receivers used were limited to something above the tops of the underwater mountains. The debris is probably down in a canyon somewhere and will be hard to find.
The numbers for depth of pinger receiver, its expected range, and the depth of the mountainous ocean floor where AF447 went down left me wondering, "Why bother except to put on a good show?"
JD-EE
On AI182, they located the pingers within two weeks of the accident. The pingers led to recovery of both boxes, and both boxes were ashore within three weeks of the accident.
The numbers for depth of pinger receiver, its expected range, and the depth of the mountainous ocean floor where AF447 went down left me wondering, "Why bother except to put on a good show?"
JD-EE
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JD-EE remarked:-
Yes, agreed for the following reasons -
The effectiveness of the 'pingers' in very deep water has always been questionable. Diverse currents and abrupt water temperature changes with depth create inversion layers. 37.5kHz propogation in water behaves in a similar manner to that which results in anomylous propogation in the VHF/UHF and higher spectrum, ie "ducting". High surface water temperatures, depth and bathymetry in an area of the equatorial North Atlantic reknowned for strong currents, effectively reduced the faint possibility that the DFDR or CVR would be located in the available time to something close to zero.
Moving on; the effectivenes of multibeam sonar in detecting specific parts of the debris is not doubted. C & C Technologies, Inc. Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) can operate at a depth of 4,500m and the resolution of the multibeam sonar in 2002 produced the following for the BBC of wreckage of a Fairey Swordfish Mk1 and a Hangar Lift Deck which parted company with HMS "Ark Royal" when it sunk in 1066m of water in 1941.
The yellow and cyan description/text has been added by me.
For good measure, here is a photo of a Fairey Swordfish ("Stringbag") on a Royal Navy carrier deck.
The problem with AF447, is where to start looking using sidescan sonar initially.
mm43
The numbers for depth of pinger receiver, its expected range, and the depth of the mountainous ocean floor where AF447 went down left me wondering, "Why bother except to put on a good show?"
The effectiveness of the 'pingers' in very deep water has always been questionable. Diverse currents and abrupt water temperature changes with depth create inversion layers. 37.5kHz propogation in water behaves in a similar manner to that which results in anomylous propogation in the VHF/UHF and higher spectrum, ie "ducting". High surface water temperatures, depth and bathymetry in an area of the equatorial North Atlantic reknowned for strong currents, effectively reduced the faint possibility that the DFDR or CVR would be located in the available time to something close to zero.
Moving on; the effectivenes of multibeam sonar in detecting specific parts of the debris is not doubted. C & C Technologies, Inc. Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) can operate at a depth of 4,500m and the resolution of the multibeam sonar in 2002 produced the following for the BBC of wreckage of a Fairey Swordfish Mk1 and a Hangar Lift Deck which parted company with HMS "Ark Royal" when it sunk in 1066m of water in 1941.
The yellow and cyan description/text has been added by me.
For good measure, here is a photo of a Fairey Swordfish ("Stringbag") on a Royal Navy carrier deck.
The problem with AF447, is where to start looking using sidescan sonar initially.
mm43
Last edited by mm43; 31st Oct 2009 at 04:02.
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Just to point out, Multibeam and Sidescan are 2 different things. Multibeam is genearally mounted to an AUV or WROV and tends to give a Hi-res image but a very small focal area. Sidescan is generally a 'towed fish' arrangement with a much wider swath but lower res. For this type of search a deepwater sidescan would be required with the fish flown at low alt above the sea floor behind a depressor weight for stability.
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Unusual Attitude wrote:-
Duh! You're absolutely right, and I will amend the previous post.
mm43
Just to point out, Multibeam and Sidescan are 2 different things.
mm43
Last edited by mm43; 31st Oct 2009 at 00:05.
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Aviation Week - comment on December report
BEA Preliminary Report Expected December | AVIATION WEEK
A few more clues about where the focus will be in December's report.
A few more clues about where the focus will be in December's report.
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Another Pitot incident suspected
A Jetstar Airways A330-200 with 209 passengers and crew onboard suffered momentary erratic speed data indications from its computers in apparent bad weather and possible icing conditions on an Oct. 29 flight from Tokyo Narita to Gold Coast. (Australia)
ATW Daily News
ATW Daily News
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4523 Manuel Garcia, Jr.: The New Crisis in Aviation
hi there. I tried to post this on 2nd of july as I think it makes an invaluable contribution. You deleted my post, or rather did not post it; now you post the article, 4 months later. Just wondering why.... made me give up trying to post to help solve this tricky puzzle of AF447...
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First post
Don't worry!
" I tried to post this on 2nd of july .... or rather did not post it"
Probably you never sent the link.
This is my first post, as yours.
" I tried to post this on 2nd of july .... or rather did not post it"
Probably you never sent the link.
This is my first post, as yours.
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New technology could revolutionize the black box
Calgary firm's data-streaming system would enhance safety. But what's really caught the airlines' attention is the cost-saving properties
New technology could revolutionize the black box - The Globe and Mail
Calgary firm's data-streaming system would enhance safety. But what's really caught the airlines' attention is the cost-saving properties
New technology could revolutionize the black box - The Globe and Mail
John47;
If I were marketing this product, (and I have no opinion on it because I have no information on it), I would not be using Jacques Kavafian.
Mr. Kavafian is speaking as an investor and a businessman, not as a safety or data specialist. He is known as a controversial commentator on the commercial aspects of the airline business in Canada. He knows nothing about flight data analysis, about installations, about how this work is really done and how the data is used and handled.
Any flight data analysis product faces the same challenges of buy-in and competing for limited resources. I think the concept is a good one but as "FLYHT"'s website states up front, data security guarantees by users including flight crews is a requirement. However, no information is provided by FLYHT as to how those problems are addressed. With others, I've been doing flight data analysis for a long time and these issues are not easily resolved, either procedurally, technically or politically.
PJ2
Originally Posted by From the linked GM Report on Business article
. . .
Jacques Kavafian, vice-president of Research Capital Inc., is also impressed by AeroMechanical. He owns stock in the company and Research Capital has a relationship with the company as an investment banker. "[The technology] is attractive because it helps airlines save a lot of money by tracking fuel consumption and by also tracking maintenance occurrences and alerting the airlines in real time of any problems that occur. No one else really can do that in a way that is economical like AeroMechanical does. Their technology is essentially the cheaper way to transmit the data in real time from the airplane to the ground. ..."
"That $50,000 [installation cost] will save airlines anywhere from $100,000 per plane per year up to $500,000 per plane per year. It's a savings amount that no one can ignore."
AeroMechanical, which has about 50 employees, already has the appropriate supplemental-type certificates for their equipment to be used on a number of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, and Mr. Bradley says it is compatible with all major aircraft manufacturers. Mr. Kavafian says AeroMechanical has installed 180 AFIRS units on aircraft at various airlines.
"We see ourselves as being in the right place at the right time, with the right product," he says.
Jacques Kavafian, vice-president of Research Capital Inc., is also impressed by AeroMechanical. He owns stock in the company and Research Capital has a relationship with the company as an investment banker. "[The technology] is attractive because it helps airlines save a lot of money by tracking fuel consumption and by also tracking maintenance occurrences and alerting the airlines in real time of any problems that occur. No one else really can do that in a way that is economical like AeroMechanical does. Their technology is essentially the cheaper way to transmit the data in real time from the airplane to the ground. ..."
"That $50,000 [installation cost] will save airlines anywhere from $100,000 per plane per year up to $500,000 per plane per year. It's a savings amount that no one can ignore."
AeroMechanical, which has about 50 employees, already has the appropriate supplemental-type certificates for their equipment to be used on a number of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, and Mr. Bradley says it is compatible with all major aircraft manufacturers. Mr. Kavafian says AeroMechanical has installed 180 AFIRS units on aircraft at various airlines.
"We see ourselves as being in the right place at the right time, with the right product," he says.
Mr. Kavafian is speaking as an investor and a businessman, not as a safety or data specialist. He is known as a controversial commentator on the commercial aspects of the airline business in Canada. He knows nothing about flight data analysis, about installations, about how this work is really done and how the data is used and handled.
Any flight data analysis product faces the same challenges of buy-in and competing for limited resources. I think the concept is a good one but as "FLYHT"'s website states up front, data security guarantees by users including flight crews is a requirement. However, no information is provided by FLYHT as to how those problems are addressed. With others, I've been doing flight data analysis for a long time and these issues are not easily resolved, either procedurally, technically or politically.
PJ2
John47;
No, I don't think so.
I have seen no reason to be the least bit optimistic about the protection of safety data and information even though under SMS the collection and use of this data is mandated under SMS in Canada.
CVRs and DFDRs as well as QARs and when they are eventually installed, Cockpit Video Recorders, will, under rubric of "the public interest" or, more realistically, the power of the highest bidder (in the US media), always be subject to the possibility that narrow legal interests or prurient media interests, both of which are focussed on money instead of the improvement of the whole system will force court-directed appropriation of safety data in discovery.
Permit me a sidebar...
While some claim that such processes lead to changes and improvements in safety, the process is inefficient and very narrowly focussed on specific items and is largely a collateral result, often with unintended consquences. Witness the latest, where the entire Congress of the United States is collectively setting their hair on fire, (or playing solitaire) over some laptops, intent on a wholesale ban without the slightest input or study from the industry so affected.
Two weeks after two guys got distracted (and never hurt anyone and weren't in any immediate danger), we have Congress making laws to "protect" the flying public from this new, nefarious, insidiosity. It reminds one slightly, of the widespread panic over H1N1 vaccinations.
Good god, we in the profession can only imagine in our wildest dreams, such a keen response from Congress to all the science and now the accident reports concerning crew fatigue. But you will never see it because it costs the airlines too much. Banning laptops is attaboys-for-free.
To those who understand flight safety and how our system got so safe, a bunch of publicity-seeking congresspeople banning laptops is a joke and the fools are the lawmakers themselves. This is a clear, obvious example of why individual industry incidents cannot, in and of themselves, form a basis upon which policy and law are made.
The case for the protection of flight safety data of all kinds is abundant and clear - it improves the level of safety of an entire industry.
Sorry for the sidebar, but it is an important and relevant understanding in this conversation, and are matters which must be addressed in practical terms if one is going to market one's organization as the answer to irretrievable flight data of the kind under discussion, (447).
but perhaps one day
I have seen no reason to be the least bit optimistic about the protection of safety data and information even though under SMS the collection and use of this data is mandated under SMS in Canada.
CVRs and DFDRs as well as QARs and when they are eventually installed, Cockpit Video Recorders, will, under rubric of "the public interest" or, more realistically, the power of the highest bidder (in the US media), always be subject to the possibility that narrow legal interests or prurient media interests, both of which are focussed on money instead of the improvement of the whole system will force court-directed appropriation of safety data in discovery.
Permit me a sidebar...
While some claim that such processes lead to changes and improvements in safety, the process is inefficient and very narrowly focussed on specific items and is largely a collateral result, often with unintended consquences. Witness the latest, where the entire Congress of the United States is collectively setting their hair on fire, (or playing solitaire) over some laptops, intent on a wholesale ban without the slightest input or study from the industry so affected.
Two weeks after two guys got distracted (and never hurt anyone and weren't in any immediate danger), we have Congress making laws to "protect" the flying public from this new, nefarious, insidiosity. It reminds one slightly, of the widespread panic over H1N1 vaccinations.
Good god, we in the profession can only imagine in our wildest dreams, such a keen response from Congress to all the science and now the accident reports concerning crew fatigue. But you will never see it because it costs the airlines too much. Banning laptops is attaboys-for-free.
To those who understand flight safety and how our system got so safe, a bunch of publicity-seeking congresspeople banning laptops is a joke and the fools are the lawmakers themselves. This is a clear, obvious example of why individual industry incidents cannot, in and of themselves, form a basis upon which policy and law are made.
The case for the protection of flight safety data of all kinds is abundant and clear - it improves the level of safety of an entire industry.
Sorry for the sidebar, but it is an important and relevant understanding in this conversation, and are matters which must be addressed in practical terms if one is going to market one's organization as the answer to irretrievable flight data of the kind under discussion, (447).
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@John47,
Of course the search was fruitless in the South Atlantic!
mm43
The staff of AeroMechanical Services Ltd. watched the fruitless search for flight-data recorders of Air France Flight 447 in the South Atlantic from afar earlier this year knowing that their technology could have helped to reconstruct the tragedy.
mm43
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Investigators have played down any link between problems with Qantas A330s & AF447
No link between Qantas A330 problems and Air France crash | The Australian
A second interim report into a Qantas A330-300 that nosedived twice 154km west of the West Australian town of Learmonth last October said investigators had yet to find a reason for erroneous data provided by a component known as an air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU).
The report said there several important differences between the Qantas and Air France accident, including the fact that the ADIRUs were made by different manufacturers, cockpit messages followed a different sequence and pattern and the airspeed sensors (pitot probes) on the two aircraft were different models made by different manufacturers.
A European airworthiness directive that pitot probes made by Thales Avionics be replaced with units manufactured by Goodrich also did not apply to Qantas aircraft.
An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report released today emphasised the importance of seatbelts and said new procedures and software modifications on A330s were aimed at preventing further nosedives.
The investigation team is continuing to evaluate a problem with ADIRU’s called "dozing", where the units stop outputting data during a flight, and are looking at the possibility that cosmic rays or solar radiation may have affected the unit.
A test plane equipped with sensors was also flown near the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications station near Learmonth while it was transmitting but an analysis did not reveal any anomalous results.
The report said there several important differences between the Qantas and Air France accident, including the fact that the ADIRUs were made by different manufacturers, cockpit messages followed a different sequence and pattern and the airspeed sensors (pitot probes) on the two aircraft were different models made by different manufacturers.
A European airworthiness directive that pitot probes made by Thales Avionics be replaced with units manufactured by Goodrich also did not apply to Qantas aircraft.
An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report released today emphasised the importance of seatbelts and said new procedures and software modifications on A330s were aimed at preventing further nosedives.
The investigation team is continuing to evaluate a problem with ADIRU’s called "dozing", where the units stop outputting data during a flight, and are looking at the possibility that cosmic rays or solar radiation may have affected the unit.
A test plane equipped with sensors was also flown near the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications station near Learmonth while it was transmitting but an analysis did not reveal any anomalous results.
please wait
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do you mean "misuse" of CVR and DFDR data?
CVRs and DFDRs as well as QARs and when they are eventually installed, Cockpit Video Recorders, will, under rubric of "the public interest" or, more realistically, the power of the highest bidder (in the US media), always be subject to the possibility that narrow legal interests or prurient media interests, both of which are focussed on money instead of the improvement of the whole system will force court-directed appropriation of safety data in discovery.
could you please tell me in which recent accident CVR, DFDR or QAR became "in the public interest" the power of the highest bidder in the US or anywhere on this planet?
I think you would have to agree that it is and hopefully will continue to be common practize that DFDR data, once transfered out of the box and AFTER (!) it got analyzed by the pro's in charge with this job, will become published in the official accident investigation report under ICAO Annex 13? Anything wrong with that?
Now in regards to CVR transcripts I think you would have to admit that they may be published by some countries and other won't publish them. Nevertheless
this information is vital for the understanding and thereby to required prevention of similar incidents and accidents or did I get something wrong here?
Again, please correct me if I'm wrong.
Otherwise please come on and enlighten me.
rgds
TvB
The USN lent sonar equipment and personnel the first time out. There are 4 deepwater navies - the French are obviously involved, the USN was as well, that leaves two.
Which would be more problematic diplomatically, Russian or British sonar?
Which would be more problematic diplomatically, Russian or British sonar?
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Accident experts seek clues into AF Airbus disaster from recent S Atlantic incident
The French air accident investigation agency, the Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses (BEA) is examining the incident involving an Air France A330-200 airliner over the South Atlantic on December 1......
Accident experts seek clues into Air France Airbus disaster from recent S Atlantic incident
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Another brush with the ITCZ
The Daily Telegraph is reporting an incident to AF445 on the Rio to CDG run in the same area as AF447 disappeared. According to the report the aircraft lost 5,000 ft in severe turbulence.
Air France jet plunges 5,000ft in same spot as doomed flight from Brazil - Telegraph
Rgds.
24V
Air France jet plunges 5,000ft in same spot as doomed flight from Brazil - Telegraph
Rgds.
24V
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