AF447
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2 out of 3 aint bad
Will, I think part of the logic behind the recommendation to replace only 2 of the 3 probes is due to the emerging idea that 3 identical units are more likely to suffer the same problem at the same time than differing units; coupled with the lack of firm hard data characterising the exact nature of icing / blockage at this time.
It is not known as fact whether the BF Goodrich units are impervious to similar issues, so the recommendation allows some additional redundancy in the form of component variation.
It is not known as fact whether the BF Goodrich units are impervious to similar issues, so the recommendation allows some additional redundancy in the form of component variation.
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Clear Prop
If as you say the theory behind leaving a suspect Thales probe on speaks of divergent design, bravo. DD is not additional redundancy, it's a form of fault isolation due to engineering approach. Keep in mind that the new Thales has a failure on record already. To my knowledge, the Goodrich replacements are unblemished, thus far.
I'd like to believe the remaining Thales is related to 'improved' safety considerations, unfortunately, it is a face saving crumb thrown to France.
I would not rule out that the Thales is vulnerable due to drain block. The inspect/clean/reinstall may be the fly in the ointment. If the drain is blocked even a little, water plugs the tube. If ICE was the issue, the Goodrich would likely have logged some failures, (they may have).
If as you say the theory behind leaving a suspect Thales probe on speaks of divergent design, bravo. DD is not additional redundancy, it's a form of fault isolation due to engineering approach. Keep in mind that the new Thales has a failure on record already. To my knowledge, the Goodrich replacements are unblemished, thus far.
I'd like to believe the remaining Thales is related to 'improved' safety considerations, unfortunately, it is a face saving crumb thrown to France.
I would not rule out that the Thales is vulnerable due to drain block. The inspect/clean/reinstall may be the fly in the ointment. If the drain is blocked even a little, water plugs the tube. If ICE was the issue, the Goodrich would likely have logged some failures, (they may have).
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Automation can mitigate the effects of fatigue because it doesn't get distracted, lose situational awareness or suffer from any of the other very elementary human frailties such as vertigo or fear. Automation is a fine and "loyal" servant, used wisely and intelligently.
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Don't just do something, stand there !
Excellent summary. As I get older and more experienced in my profession, sometimes I realize that the best response to a dire computer generated warning is to simply do nothing: scan instruments and perform a quick "reality check" but not take aggressive action unless warranted....
Cheers !
Cheers !
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The problem is that MOST automation has NO situational awareness, as situational awareness is recognizing not only where you ARE, but remembering where you WERE and knowing the difference.
They compare multiple inputs and when they disagree (presumed fail) the FADEC latches at the last known reliable condition of flight.
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lomapaseo;
I think I understand what you mean and I think we understand that there may be as much a philosophical meaning as a semantic one here. No software is "aware". My very simple understanding of software is, while software can mimic learning, software doesn't "learn" in the meaning of the term we usually understand. While I am aware that those that work in AI will likely take issue with such views, the kind of sofware that guides an airliner is by comparison, pretty basic, an algorithm, without the ability to anticipate or recall in a human way. cessnapuppy touches on this in an interesting way. The processors and memory capacity are similarly pretty basic as are the displays. The trade is perhaps in robustness.
For a number of reasons, I am not sure that "fuzzy logic" solutions are suitable to airline work. I may be missing something but I don't think the problems of flight are that complex that such a sophisticated approach is necessary. The problems driving change and "improvement", (sometimes known as "progress"...), are all about cost, not physics.
An example of situational awareness would be the FADEC systems on engines.
For a number of reasons, I am not sure that "fuzzy logic" solutions are suitable to airline work. I may be missing something but I don't think the problems of flight are that complex that such a sophisticated approach is necessary. The problems driving change and "improvement", (sometimes known as "progress"...), are all about cost, not physics.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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The great benefit the human brain has over the artificial is the capacity to 'think outside the box' which by definition AI cannot do. I fear also that the human pilots are on the way to losing that faculty too.
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BOAC
I'm seeing some overlap between this thread and the Colgan accident.
Your last post focuses directly on the interface of Automation and manual flight. It isn't a stretch to say that the heightened hazard is at handoff. AF447 and Colgan both had a/p drop in a charged and atypical F/D setting. It is unknown what the exact chain was in 447, except to say that the a/c was lost in/at the time frame in question; with Colgan the a/p disconnect happened just prior to shaker.
With 447, the challenges appear to be IAS and/or weather related, with Colgan pilot error(s). Either way, training 'to the moment' is under review.
In 447 the 'errors' in question appear to be mechanical in origination, with Colgan, likely PE. Either way, it's of interest where the training in both instances takes the discussion. Pitch and Power.
It's inescapable that the default is manual flight. 447 aside, I've noticed broad similarities in many of the more recent accidents. Turkish, Perpignan, Colgan, Birgenair, even Continental off runway, these are accidents whose direct cause was a loss of Pitch awareness/control. 447 may have been. It may be simplistic, especially for the more detail oriented, but to the extent that tragic consequences have resulted, a focus and consequent discussion of basic flight issues seems to need to be had.
Personally, I don't think it's necessary to start Stall training ATP's. It seems to be something else that is present, or lacking. If a disease can be prevented, it doesn't need to be treated.
I'm seeing some overlap between this thread and the Colgan accident.
Your last post focuses directly on the interface of Automation and manual flight. It isn't a stretch to say that the heightened hazard is at handoff. AF447 and Colgan both had a/p drop in a charged and atypical F/D setting. It is unknown what the exact chain was in 447, except to say that the a/c was lost in/at the time frame in question; with Colgan the a/p disconnect happened just prior to shaker.
With 447, the challenges appear to be IAS and/or weather related, with Colgan pilot error(s). Either way, training 'to the moment' is under review.
In 447 the 'errors' in question appear to be mechanical in origination, with Colgan, likely PE. Either way, it's of interest where the training in both instances takes the discussion. Pitch and Power.
It's inescapable that the default is manual flight. 447 aside, I've noticed broad similarities in many of the more recent accidents. Turkish, Perpignan, Colgan, Birgenair, even Continental off runway, these are accidents whose direct cause was a loss of Pitch awareness/control. 447 may have been. It may be simplistic, especially for the more detail oriented, but to the extent that tragic consequences have resulted, a focus and consequent discussion of basic flight issues seems to need to be had.
Personally, I don't think it's necessary to start Stall training ATP's. It seems to be something else that is present, or lacking. If a disease can be prevented, it doesn't need to be treated.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Some (me and my 330 mate) see it as a pity that when airspeed info is lost the automatics are not programmed to hold the appropriate attitude and power thus allowing the crew to concentrate on comms and possible fixes without the need to handle the aircraft at the same time.
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But isn't that why there are two of you? What I learned--okay, 40 years ago--was that if you had a problem, the captain gave either himself or his first officer the job of flying/controlling the aircraft, while the PNF got out the emergency checklists, sent necessary comms and did the troubleshooting. Try to both do it and you can put an entire L-1011 into the Everglades without even knowing it....
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I suspect that there is room for understandings here. Let's put aside the cost aspect as it tends to divert these kinds of discussions.
Generally the idea behind a product design function is to provide what the pilot wants (cost is a later gate that it must pass). So IMO the discussion should be arround the area of what the pilot needs.
IF "improvement and progress" are the desired output. Then the idea is to agree on what constitutes this and proceed from there. For this problem area I was tending along the thinking that the crew needed the confidence to take the time to sort out the changing situation. So I was following the thread hint (my read may have been wrong here) that a computer could not help much here. Thus my response was aimed at the example of how the computer can best be trusted vs the rapid responses of man.
I don't think the problems of flight are that complex that such a sophisticated approach is necessary. The problems driving change and "improvement", (sometimes known as "progress"...), are all about cost, not physics.
Generally the idea behind a product design function is to provide what the pilot wants (cost is a later gate that it must pass). So IMO the discussion should be arround the area of what the pilot needs.
IF "improvement and progress" are the desired output. Then the idea is to agree on what constitutes this and proceed from there. For this problem area I was tending along the thinking that the crew needed the confidence to take the time to sort out the changing situation. So I was following the thread hint (my read may have been wrong here) that a computer could not help much here. Thus my response was aimed at the example of how the computer can best be trusted vs the rapid responses of man.
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There was some discussion about what is the appropriate reaction to a stall warning. Now, it is not clear at this time whether or not there was a stall warning in this case. But even if a stall warning can not be issued in ALTN2, I think it remains possible that it happened earlier? For example, in case the initial CAS drop has been below the 30kt/second threshold?
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It's inescapable that the default is manual flight. 447 aside, I've noticed broad similarities in many of the more recent accidents.
I use those 2 crashes during my profchecks, and yes I am no crash-investigator nor expert, but i do have "some" hours both up-front and behind in the sim. And i have seen a tendency among pilots to fixate instead of AT LEAST 1 (ONE) PILOT FLYING!
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I remember reading some impressions by a russian test pilot of, among other things, an A310. He was rather down on the stall behavior. The stall came on at low AoAs with little or no warning, and the ac lost lateral stability rather dramatically and pitched up making the situation worse. He described the ac as a case of the mfg trying to compensate for the ills of an aerodynamically questionable platform with electronic doodads.
Granted that AF447 is a different plane, although sharing the same gene pool as the A300/310, how sound IS the airframe? When the electronic protections cut out under less than optimal conditions and the pilots are required to manually fly what may be an evil-handling airframe?
Granted that AF447 is a different plane, although sharing the same gene pool as the A300/310, how sound IS the airframe? When the electronic protections cut out under less than optimal conditions and the pilots are required to manually fly what may be an evil-handling airframe?
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At cruise, a/p is at its most practical and important aspect. To select a/p only to sit on the edge of the seat and birddog every bump and discrepancy is to eliminate the need for it. On a sophisticated transport, autoflight is a form of commanded complacency. So its disconnect (uncommanded) of course comes at an inopportune moment. After a series of warnings, chimes, and an uncertainty in the F/D, one pilot needs to retrieve the checklists and troubleshoot, solo ? Yes, because the PF needs to update his scan, 'get' the panel and the 'feel' starting with Pitch and Power, from a degraded (of course) SA. The PNF is at an immediate disadvantage, all the alerts are after the fact (of course), and there are many. Both Pilots are behind the a/c. The a/p was behind enough to need to disconnect. No matter the reason, an unexpected a/p disconnect demonstrably causes problems, some of which seem to have gone unaddressed.
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Un-Substantiated rumor doing the rounds that the a/c may have reached 47000 ft during it's upset. (Convective lift?)
Sorry if this has already been posted. I believe it is a result of further analysis of the recieved ACAR's reports. However I repeat only a rumor.
Sorry if this has already been posted. I believe it is a result of further analysis of the recieved ACAR's reports. However I repeat only a rumor.
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The Russian test pilot's comments reminded me that I am not enamoured with the FCC's on AI products making rudder inputs without the pilot's knowledge or desire (yaw damper inputs excepted). Watching any video of the 380 shows substantial rudder inputs and reversals on short final.
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The stall came on at low AoAs with little or no warning, and the ac lost lateral stability rather dramatically and pitched up making the situation worse.
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IF...
IF 35,000 > 47,000 ft
4 minutes at 50 ft/s (a v. high thermal climb rate in the troposhere, 20 ft/s is quite normal)
If a/t out, manual flight, the throttles would need to be cut quick if encountering that sort of thermal bubble. And going 'over the falls' out the backside of that could be quite an experience.
IF...
4 minutes at 50 ft/s (a v. high thermal climb rate in the troposhere, 20 ft/s is quite normal)
If a/t out, manual flight, the throttles would need to be cut quick if encountering that sort of thermal bubble. And going 'over the falls' out the backside of that could be quite an experience.
IF...
