AF447
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Unreliable airspeed
RE: Hyperveloce (#3856)
Did they say that?
During this meeting in Toulouse, it was agreed that Airbus would modify the check-lists/procedures about unreliable airspeeds situations,
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Unreliable airspeeds
Here is what H.H. the Air Caraïbe's Flight Security Officer says about this meeting at Airbus's Toulouse facilities (oct.2008):
"Despite these contradictory aspects (note of the translator: in the QRH), the PNT (pilots) of the FDF have had the appropriate reactions when the two false stall alarms sounded. Moreover, the Airbus engineers have fully taken the measure of the crew difficulties for a swift and efficient implementation of the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION procedure. They agreed that our remarks are justified and will study a check-list modification. To be continued..."
Jeff
PS) Since words may be important (if you can read French), this is an attempt of translation of the very last page and paragraph of the Air Caraïbe report http://www.eurocockpit.com/docs/ACA.pdf
PPS) Page 69 of the interim BEA report, I quote: for information, the “Memory Item” in the Airbus QRH relative to the same fault is shown below in the version in force on the date of the accident:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf
"Despite these contradictory aspects (note of the translator: in the QRH), the PNT (pilots) of the FDF have had the appropriate reactions when the two false stall alarms sounded. Moreover, the Airbus engineers have fully taken the measure of the crew difficulties for a swift and efficient implementation of the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION procedure. They agreed that our remarks are justified and will study a check-list modification. To be continued..."
Jeff
PS) Since words may be important (if you can read French), this is an attempt of translation of the very last page and paragraph of the Air Caraïbe report http://www.eurocockpit.com/docs/ACA.pdf
PPS) Page 69 of the interim BEA report, I quote: for information, the “Memory Item” in the Airbus QRH relative to the same fault is shown below in the version in force on the date of the accident:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf
Last edited by Hyperveloce; 23rd Jul 2009 at 23:01.
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Unreliable airspeeds
Hyperveloce,
I wasn't quite sure about the meaning of "recevabilité" and "réfléchissent". Thank you for helping out a non-french-speaking person.
regards,
HN39
I wasn't quite sure about the meaning of "recevabilité" and "réfléchissent". Thank you for helping out a non-french-speaking person.
regards,
HN39
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My instructions were that meal service was to end prior (giving the cabin crew 4-ish hours from T/O) to crossing the wx, and that we were not to be disturbed until we signaled that we were clear. I was always up front when I was junior, and learned that lesson when I got senior.. to be there as well. There would be plenty of time on the other side to rest, eat and deal with Dakar. The same for the reverse (southbound) leg.
excellent post,
The measures you would take as a pilot during the crossing were very prudent. But do all pilots and all carriers do the same. At this time should these types of measures be mandatory?
Some of the F/O's I flew with took this area as seriously as I did, and some did not. I know I'll read/hear about the ones that did not someday.
Drawing a parallel, when the Titanic sank in 1912, no one knew exactly what failed on the ship that caused it to sink...in fact we are finding out new information to this day about equipment failures that led to the ships sudden demise.......But after the accident mandatory safety measures were instituted that helped avoid a repeat occurrence: more life boats, 24 hr wireless, change in traditional routes, etc.....
So even if we do not know exactly what happened, shouldn't we accept that certain procedures should be in place when crossing such severe areas? Procedures that are followed by all carriers........
If anything, there would be less questions and mystery if standard procedures had been in place.....
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Singpilot had it right.
In my opinion the most important part of the a/c to recover is the CVR. The FDR will only reveal the 'result' whereas the CVR will provide the 'why'.
As I have mentioned before, understanding what was happening in the cockpit after 0135z to around 0209z is far more important than the last 5 minutes. Loss of IAS, Q-corner stall/overspeed, ACARS etc. are all part of the 'result' and neither should have happened. So understanding the 'why' will be the most enlightening part of this whole sad event.
mm43
In my opinion the most important part of the a/c to recover is the CVR. The FDR will only reveal the 'result' whereas the CVR will provide the 'why'.
As I have mentioned before, understanding what was happening in the cockpit after 0135z to around 0209z is far more important than the last 5 minutes. Loss of IAS, Q-corner stall/overspeed, ACARS etc. are all part of the 'result' and neither should have happened. So understanding the 'why' will be the most enlightening part of this whole sad event.
mm43
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Causes
The first ACARS message after 0210 was
2:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF
This indicates that the autopilot has been automatically switched off. I'm not a pilot, so I ask those who are familiar with standard procedures:
a) when the decision is taken to avoid potentially hazardous weather systems, is it necessary to switch the autopilot off?
b) same question regarding autothrust.
c) assuming that the answer to both these questions is YES, and given the final known position of the ill-fated flight (I understand that it was relatively close to an active weather system), is it surprising that both autopilot and autothrust were ON at 0210? That is, if they had been turned off temporarily to evade weather, is it likely that they would have been turned on again in relative proximity to the weather?
c) could the aircraft continue to fly more or less in a stable way for some time if there was no pilot control after the loss of autopilot and autothrust?
d) if a Mayday was sent, is it likely that it would have been received by other aircraft in the vicinity?
e) how much redundancy is there in systems to detect loss of cabin pressure on this model of aircraft?
My questions are partly motivated by discussion a while ago about the possibility of flight crew incapacitation. I thought it was significant that autopsies reportedly showed that the recovered victims did not die by drowning.
Robert
2:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF
This indicates that the autopilot has been automatically switched off. I'm not a pilot, so I ask those who are familiar with standard procedures:
a) when the decision is taken to avoid potentially hazardous weather systems, is it necessary to switch the autopilot off?
b) same question regarding autothrust.
c) assuming that the answer to both these questions is YES, and given the final known position of the ill-fated flight (I understand that it was relatively close to an active weather system), is it surprising that both autopilot and autothrust were ON at 0210? That is, if they had been turned off temporarily to evade weather, is it likely that they would have been turned on again in relative proximity to the weather?
c) could the aircraft continue to fly more or less in a stable way for some time if there was no pilot control after the loss of autopilot and autothrust?
d) if a Mayday was sent, is it likely that it would have been received by other aircraft in the vicinity?
e) how much redundancy is there in systems to detect loss of cabin pressure on this model of aircraft?
My questions are partly motivated by discussion a while ago about the possibility of flight crew incapacitation. I thought it was significant that autopsies reportedly showed that the recovered victims did not die by drowning.
Robert
Last edited by eswdev; 24th Jul 2009 at 06:46. Reason: Clarification and addition
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This indicates that the autopilot has been automatically switched off
Mayday
Yes, it would be expected, with some provisos
Drowning
When an a/c impacts very hard (and it seems likely it did) the cause of death would invariably be physical trauma of one sort or another. Thus it is not unexpected that drowning would not take place (in the majority of cases anyway).
NB. There could be more deductions to come with the full autopsy reports
Incapacitation
I also 'feel' that insufficient information is yet available to completely rule out some sort of crew incapacitation, but such suggestions will no doubt encourage (& have) dismissal or flak here...
The reason for this is it has to be said, with autopilot off, and no-one flying the a/c, it might be expected that from cruise altitude it would exceed speed/structural limits long before arriving at sea level - and - BEA (French accident investigation authority) and many here think that it was probably in one piece at the time of impact.
Recap:
The last ascertain(ed) crew action appears to have been at 2.01 hrs - a 3rd attempt to contact DAKAR control, approx 9 minutes before that A/P disconnect msg. I think we have it on good authority that this couldn't have been a pre-programmed action.
Speculation:
The a/c entered heavy turbulence (probably for the first time) between 2.01 and 2.10 hrs.
Additionally:
The a/c seems to have been apprpx. 3 nm West of expected track at 2.10 hrs. This could have been a deliberate action or the result of a prior disturbance
Last edited by HarryMann; 24th Jul 2009 at 09:15.
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HarryMann
I didn't make myself clear. I understand the point about automatic switch off. I'm suggesting that the crew were not responsive. First of all, they did not take evasive action before entering the weather system. Second, if your suggestion about turbulence is correct, surely the crew would have responded and the autopilot would have manually disconnected.
The turbulence theory could persuade me if some aerodynamic effect triggered the pitot errors that caused (?) the automatic disconnect. But isn't there some delay in the automated decision making, during which the crew would be taking action leading to manual disconnect?
The turbulence theory could persuade me if some aerodynamic effect triggered the pitot errors that caused (?) the automatic disconnect. But isn't there some delay in the automated decision making, during which the crew would be taking action leading to manual disconnect?
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Turbulences and A/P or A/THR
So as to the A/THR (and A/P) settings & procedures about bad weather or turbulences, the Air Caraïbe crew applied the "weather deviation in oceanic controlled airspace" proc. altering their altitude to try to find better conditions ; then they applied the QRH 5.01, "severe turbulences" proc.: the crew disengaged the A/THR and fixed the N1 between 81 and 82% (for a mass of 206T and FL350). The A/P remained engaged untill its automatic disconnection (along with the ADR disagreement and the sequence of Pitots induced ECAM alarms). The AF 447 had probably not disengaged its A/THR: the AF 447 was probably not experiencing severe turbulences but only moderate ones then ? (at least before 02:10Z)
About a link between Pitots induced phenomenons & turbulences: even if the turbulences it experienced may not have been so severe, if the AF 447 had narrowed its upper aerodynamical margin (increasing its speed, due to stall alarms and maybe (?) a speed that had already been increased by the A/THR just before its disengagement), it may have been far more vulnerable to turbulences ? (even not so severe)
Jeff
PS) I have been said that if the A/THR was not disengaged, it should have been in managed speed mode ? If the measured airspeeds vary due to turbulences, the A/THR (maybe 3 or 4 sec. of reaction time) could also vary the engines regime trying to follow these sensed airspeed fluctuations as it could try to follow an airspeed rollback.
PPS) http://www.a330jam.com/documents/turbulence.pdf
About a link between Pitots induced phenomenons & turbulences: even if the turbulences it experienced may not have been so severe, if the AF 447 had narrowed its upper aerodynamical margin (increasing its speed, due to stall alarms and maybe (?) a speed that had already been increased by the A/THR just before its disengagement), it may have been far more vulnerable to turbulences ? (even not so severe)
Jeff
PS) I have been said that if the A/THR was not disengaged, it should have been in managed speed mode ? If the measured airspeeds vary due to turbulences, the A/THR (maybe 3 or 4 sec. of reaction time) could also vary the engines regime trying to follow these sensed airspeed fluctuations as it could try to follow an airspeed rollback.
PPS) http://www.a330jam.com/documents/turbulence.pdf
Last edited by Hyperveloce; 25th Jul 2009 at 00:55.
Robert;
a) when the decision is taken to avoid potentially hazardous weather systems, is it necessary to switch the autopilot off?
No. Weather avoidance is a routine flight operation requiring no special handling. The autoflight system on the A330, like all transport category aircraft, is designed to handle moderate turbulence should it be encountered. The autopilot almost always gives a better ride and less 'g' loads to the airframe.
In heavy turbulence which may be beyond the autopilot's design capabilities, the autopilot is disconnected to permit the aircraft to ride up or down encountered severe vertical drafts without the autopilot trying to maintain altitude. The autothrust is similarly disconnected. In such encounters the goal is to maintain the last settings before disconnection and ride the turbulence out without changing pitch or power, permitting small excursions of same to ease the load on the airframe.
Such conditions and responses are rare because avoidance techniques are so successful.
b) same question regarding autothrust.
Same answer, same reasons, essentially. If the autothrust chases the speed however, it is disconnected while the autopilot may or may not be left on. A situation where the autopilot is on and the autothrust is off means that the airspeed must be monitored very carefully. Too fast is far better than too slow, even overspeeding the airframe by as much as 20kts past VMO/MMO (Velocity Maximum Operating/Mach Maximum Operating)
c) assuming that the answer to both these questions is YES, and given the final known position of the ill-fated flight (I understand that it was relatively close to an active weather system), is it surprising that both autopilot and autothrust were ON at 0210? That is, if they had been turned off temporarily to evade weather, is it likely that they would have been turned on again in relative proximity to the weather?
The question is almost certainly immaterial as are the assumptions. There is the possibility that one or both were disconnected and the aircraft manually flown but there are no ACARS messages indicating this. A manual disconnection would generate such a message through the FIDS, (Fault Isolation and Detection System) and the CMC, Central Monitoring Computer and ACMS, Aircraft Condition and Monitoring System, which sends maintenance messages to the ACARS. The actual process of warning/message generation is far more complex than this as I'm sure you appreciate but that is the essence of it.
c) could the aircraft continue to fly more or less in a stable way for some time if there was no pilot control after the loss of autopilot and autothrust?
This is a highly speculative, hypothetical question and, necessarily, any response is the same. Keep in mind, the flight path is a result of all forces acting on the aircraft - smooth air, less forces, turbulent air, more forces, etc.
Hypothetically speaking, in smooth air where the dynamics are relatively undisturbed, because of the autoflight system fbw - fly-by-wire design, would remain fairly stable for some time, (no inputs mean no output - autoflight retains last set attitudes). Eventually however, without altitude hold (lost upon a/p disconnect), the flight path would tend to change with changes in temperature, (very slightly reduced/increased lift) and would also begin to lose speed stability. With other transport aircraft which are not fbw, loss of the flight path would occur much more rapidly without autothrust/autopilot connection.
In the kind of weather this aircraft was "in", loss of a stable flight path would occur more quickly only because of the vertical/lateral gusts associated with the surrounding (or entered) CB's.
In either case, with autopilot off and autothrust off (leaving the engines at the cruise power setting, the ultimate outcome of a "pilotless" transport is a very high-speed dive, possibly spiral dive. In other words, a flight path a very long way from the description offered in the BEA report. The wreckage pattern alone obviates any of this scenario.
d) if a Mayday was sent, is it likely that it would have been received by other aircraft in the vicinity?
Theoretically, yes. All aircraft monitor 121.5 and the common frequency. Even an open mike would have been "heard" by other aircraft and would be on their CVRs, (which would be a matter of routine investigation to check, I should expect). Almost certainly, (and this has been pointed out dozens of times by other pilots on this thread), the crew was likely very busy handling their aircraft in what seems to have been a rapidly degrading set of circumstances. They would not have had a moment to send out a distress call nor possibly to even key the mike to broadcasts "in the blind". The RMP, radio management panel, would be set to VHF 1 on #1 and VHF 2 on #2 but they were also in the process of contacting DAKAR (if I recall) and may have been on HF1 when trouble hit.
It may have been impossible to hang onto the sidestick to key the mike - the other switch is on the audio control panel and is tiny so placing it in the "transmit" position would be difficult - the trigger switch on the sidestick would be the more obvious choice. Neither occurred.
e) how much redundancy is there in systems to detect loss of cabin pressure on this model of aircraft?
You have to bear in mind that detection of this does rest with redundant systems but such systems rely upon their correct operation. As I have posted twice now, the schematic of systems which receive input from the ADRs, if an ADR is malfunctioning that may send false information to the two CPCs, cabin pressure controllers, which in turn may degrade and possibly send BITE - built-in-test-equipment, an internal self-test mode, messages to the CMC. In other words, as the BEA report states and as I stated around June 4th or so, on the first thread, the ACARS messages may not have occurred in the order that they appear in the now-infamous ACARS list of events. Also, in these circumstances, (rapidly degrading airplane due pitot/ADR/IRS issues), the actual cabin rate may or may not have exceeded the 1800fpm needed to trigger the message. For these reasons it is exceedingly important to avoid coming to conclusions, without extensive knowledge of the aircraft, using just the ACARS messages.
My questions are partly motivated by discussion a while ago about the possibility of flight crew incapacitation.
This notion has been posited a number of times throughout the thread. While it is acknowledged that "anything is possible", (bomb, meteor strike, EMF, terrorist intervention), other indications (the above discussion re loss of control with ap/at disconnected, condition of the recovered wreckage) do not support incapacitation theories. However, as singpilot as wisely stated, the CVR will help a great deal in winnowing all theories.
Hope this helps.
PJ2
a) when the decision is taken to avoid potentially hazardous weather systems, is it necessary to switch the autopilot off?
No. Weather avoidance is a routine flight operation requiring no special handling. The autoflight system on the A330, like all transport category aircraft, is designed to handle moderate turbulence should it be encountered. The autopilot almost always gives a better ride and less 'g' loads to the airframe.
In heavy turbulence which may be beyond the autopilot's design capabilities, the autopilot is disconnected to permit the aircraft to ride up or down encountered severe vertical drafts without the autopilot trying to maintain altitude. The autothrust is similarly disconnected. In such encounters the goal is to maintain the last settings before disconnection and ride the turbulence out without changing pitch or power, permitting small excursions of same to ease the load on the airframe.
Such conditions and responses are rare because avoidance techniques are so successful.
b) same question regarding autothrust.
Same answer, same reasons, essentially. If the autothrust chases the speed however, it is disconnected while the autopilot may or may not be left on. A situation where the autopilot is on and the autothrust is off means that the airspeed must be monitored very carefully. Too fast is far better than too slow, even overspeeding the airframe by as much as 20kts past VMO/MMO (Velocity Maximum Operating/Mach Maximum Operating)
c) assuming that the answer to both these questions is YES, and given the final known position of the ill-fated flight (I understand that it was relatively close to an active weather system), is it surprising that both autopilot and autothrust were ON at 0210? That is, if they had been turned off temporarily to evade weather, is it likely that they would have been turned on again in relative proximity to the weather?
The question is almost certainly immaterial as are the assumptions. There is the possibility that one or both were disconnected and the aircraft manually flown but there are no ACARS messages indicating this. A manual disconnection would generate such a message through the FIDS, (Fault Isolation and Detection System) and the CMC, Central Monitoring Computer and ACMS, Aircraft Condition and Monitoring System, which sends maintenance messages to the ACARS. The actual process of warning/message generation is far more complex than this as I'm sure you appreciate but that is the essence of it.
c) could the aircraft continue to fly more or less in a stable way for some time if there was no pilot control after the loss of autopilot and autothrust?
This is a highly speculative, hypothetical question and, necessarily, any response is the same. Keep in mind, the flight path is a result of all forces acting on the aircraft - smooth air, less forces, turbulent air, more forces, etc.
Hypothetically speaking, in smooth air where the dynamics are relatively undisturbed, because of the autoflight system fbw - fly-by-wire design, would remain fairly stable for some time, (no inputs mean no output - autoflight retains last set attitudes). Eventually however, without altitude hold (lost upon a/p disconnect), the flight path would tend to change with changes in temperature, (very slightly reduced/increased lift) and would also begin to lose speed stability. With other transport aircraft which are not fbw, loss of the flight path would occur much more rapidly without autothrust/autopilot connection.
In the kind of weather this aircraft was "in", loss of a stable flight path would occur more quickly only because of the vertical/lateral gusts associated with the surrounding (or entered) CB's.
In either case, with autopilot off and autothrust off (leaving the engines at the cruise power setting, the ultimate outcome of a "pilotless" transport is a very high-speed dive, possibly spiral dive. In other words, a flight path a very long way from the description offered in the BEA report. The wreckage pattern alone obviates any of this scenario.
d) if a Mayday was sent, is it likely that it would have been received by other aircraft in the vicinity?
Theoretically, yes. All aircraft monitor 121.5 and the common frequency. Even an open mike would have been "heard" by other aircraft and would be on their CVRs, (which would be a matter of routine investigation to check, I should expect). Almost certainly, (and this has been pointed out dozens of times by other pilots on this thread), the crew was likely very busy handling their aircraft in what seems to have been a rapidly degrading set of circumstances. They would not have had a moment to send out a distress call nor possibly to even key the mike to broadcasts "in the blind". The RMP, radio management panel, would be set to VHF 1 on #1 and VHF 2 on #2 but they were also in the process of contacting DAKAR (if I recall) and may have been on HF1 when trouble hit.
It may have been impossible to hang onto the sidestick to key the mike - the other switch is on the audio control panel and is tiny so placing it in the "transmit" position would be difficult - the trigger switch on the sidestick would be the more obvious choice. Neither occurred.
e) how much redundancy is there in systems to detect loss of cabin pressure on this model of aircraft?
You have to bear in mind that detection of this does rest with redundant systems but such systems rely upon their correct operation. As I have posted twice now, the schematic of systems which receive input from the ADRs, if an ADR is malfunctioning that may send false information to the two CPCs, cabin pressure controllers, which in turn may degrade and possibly send BITE - built-in-test-equipment, an internal self-test mode, messages to the CMC. In other words, as the BEA report states and as I stated around June 4th or so, on the first thread, the ACARS messages may not have occurred in the order that they appear in the now-infamous ACARS list of events. Also, in these circumstances, (rapidly degrading airplane due pitot/ADR/IRS issues), the actual cabin rate may or may not have exceeded the 1800fpm needed to trigger the message. For these reasons it is exceedingly important to avoid coming to conclusions, without extensive knowledge of the aircraft, using just the ACARS messages.
My questions are partly motivated by discussion a while ago about the possibility of flight crew incapacitation.
This notion has been posited a number of times throughout the thread. While it is acknowledged that "anything is possible", (bomb, meteor strike, EMF, terrorist intervention), other indications (the above discussion re loss of control with ap/at disconnected, condition of the recovered wreckage) do not support incapacitation theories. However, as singpilot as wisely stated, the CVR will help a great deal in winnowing all theories.
Hope this helps.
PJ2
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PJ2
What a fabulous technical discussion understandable by those not in the industry, like myself. Bravo.
Concerning the ACARS message sequencing. I know it might take some time to do so, and might not be worth the effort, but has anyone entertained the thought of taking the 12 (?) ACARS messages and re-sequencing them one after another to see if one particular sequence makes more sense than another, the output of which might lead to other causal factors being discovered? Or is that just not possible? Having said that, I would imagine some of those involved in the investigation might have already performed a similar task?
Richard
What a fabulous technical discussion understandable by those not in the industry, like myself. Bravo.
Concerning the ACARS message sequencing. I know it might take some time to do so, and might not be worth the effort, but has anyone entertained the thought of taking the 12 (?) ACARS messages and re-sequencing them one after another to see if one particular sequence makes more sense than another, the output of which might lead to other causal factors being discovered? Or is that just not possible? Having said that, I would imagine some of those involved in the investigation might have already performed a similar task?
Richard
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Distracted from monitoring weather?
I've been wondering how likely it is that the pilots were distracted from monitoring the weather radar, e.g. by a mysterious series of failures in the avionics.
The other thing that I'm wondering is whether recovery of the CVR and FDR might fail to reveal all the causes of this accident. We like to believe that air travel is 100% safe, but this accident show us that there are still unknown unknowns.
The other thing that I'm wondering is whether recovery of the CVR and FDR might fail to reveal all the causes of this accident. We like to believe that air travel is 100% safe, but this accident show us that there are still unknown unknowns.
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Hi,
We are just on the begining 
PJ2
What force (G) may be deemed necessary to prevent pilot to move his arm at all ?
Bye.
Is this thread still going, or am I dreaming?
PJ2
It may have been impossible to hang onto the sidestick to key the mike
Bye.
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What force (G) may be deemed necessary to prevent pilot to move his arm at all ?
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Search for FDR / CVR
For those wondering what is going on with the search, the following Radio Navigation Warning to shipping issued by the Brazilian Navy should be of interest..
mm43
CENTRO DE HIDROGRAFIA DA MARINHA
RADIO NAVIGATIONAL WARNINGS
NAVAREA V
1544/09 – NORTHWEST OF ARQUIPELAGO DE SAO PEDRO E SAO PAULO – CHART 10 (INT 216) - VESSEL POURQUOI PAS – CARRYING OUT OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN CIRCULAR AREA WITH 70 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS CENTERED IN POSITION: 03-00.00N 030-36.00W - UNDERWATER VEHICLE NEAR THE VESSEL - PERIOD: 26/JUL TO 16/AUG. BERTH REQUESTED. CANCEL THIS WARNING 170359Z/AUG/09.
RADIO NAVIGATIONAL WARNINGS
NAVAREA V
1544/09 – NORTHWEST OF ARQUIPELAGO DE SAO PEDRO E SAO PAULO – CHART 10 (INT 216) - VESSEL POURQUOI PAS – CARRYING OUT OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN CIRCULAR AREA WITH 70 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS CENTERED IN POSITION: 03-00.00N 030-36.00W - UNDERWATER VEHICLE NEAR THE VESSEL - PERIOD: 26/JUL TO 16/AUG. BERTH REQUESTED. CANCEL THIS WARNING 170359Z/AUG/09.