Airbus Alert Height - What is it?
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Thanks Hetfield. Appreciate the help.
So I understand the definition now but how is it used in practice?
I see that in some EUR regulation here, that they say:
-
-
So I understand the definition now but how is it used in practice?
I see that in some EUR regulation here, that they say:
-
Ground training. An operator must ensure that the initial ground training course for low visibility operations covers
at least:
at least:
(12) the importance and significance of alert height if applicable and the action in the event of any failure above and
below the alert height;
below the alert height;
Just used it this morning (A319, RVR 125).
I called out "ALERT HEIGHT" at 100 ft RA
Captain checked that everything worked fine and called out "CONTINUE"
Uneventful autoland ensued.
In practice during CAT III DUAL NO DH approach, before Alert height, we would have gone around for folowing indications
-alpha floor activation
-AP off
-loss of CAT III dual
-amber caution
-engine failure
-no LAND mode at 350 ft
- incorrectly displayed loc course at 350 ft
- NWS or antiskid failed
Below alert height we'd go around only in the case of autoland warning light. It goes off if both autopilots have failed, excessive deviations or loss of loc / G/S signal is detected or difference greater than 15 feet between radalts exists.
I called out "ALERT HEIGHT" at 100 ft RA
Captain checked that everything worked fine and called out "CONTINUE"
Uneventful autoland ensued.
In practice during CAT III DUAL NO DH approach, before Alert height, we would have gone around for folowing indications
-alpha floor activation
-AP off
-loss of CAT III dual
-amber caution
-engine failure
-no LAND mode at 350 ft
- incorrectly displayed loc course at 350 ft
- NWS or antiskid failed
Below alert height we'd go around only in the case of autoland warning light. It goes off if both autopilots have failed, excessive deviations or loss of loc / G/S signal is detected or difference greater than 15 feet between radalts exists.
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Never heard of it. Never used it.
Airbus P1, 4000+ hours on type.
Edited to add - checked the Airbus FCOM 3 and there is a reference there to AH of 100 ft. However in our SOP's we would initiate a go-around for any failure resulting in a warning, caution, Cat downgrade etc. below 1000 ft RA. Probably explains why the AH doesn't register.
Airbus P1, 4000+ hours on type.
Edited to add - checked the Airbus FCOM 3 and there is a reference there to AH of 100 ft. However in our SOP's we would initiate a go-around for any failure resulting in a warning, caution, Cat downgrade etc. below 1000 ft RA. Probably explains why the AH doesn't register.
Last edited by spin_doctor; 9th Jan 2009 at 15:05.
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Spin Doctor,
you're saying that with over 4000hrs on Airbus aircraft (Assuming A320 series), you were less that Alert in relation to Airbus SOPs?
It's called "Fail Operational" and is of significance when you are operating Cat 3B with no DH.
you're saying that with over 4000hrs on Airbus aircraft (Assuming A320 series), you were less that Alert in relation to Airbus SOPs?
It's called "Fail Operational" and is of significance when you are operating Cat 3B with no DH.
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I found this in my company's operation manual. I guess I should have started here in the first place but thought I'd include it in this thread for information purposes.
Failures and Associated Actions
In general there are three possible responses to the failure of any system,
instrument or element during the approach.
1. CONTINUE the approach to the planned minima.
2. REVERT to higher minima and proceed to a new DH (above
1000ft).
3. GO AROUND and reassess the capability.
The nature of the failure and the point of its occurrence will determine
which response is appropriate.
As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1000ft AGL the approach may
be continued reverting to a higher DH, providing the appropriate
conditions are met.
Below 1000 ft (and down to AH when in CAT III DUAL) the occurrence of
any failure implies a go-around, and a reassessment of the system
capability. Another approach may then be undertaken to the appropriate
minima for the given aircraft status. It has been considered that below
1000ft, not enough time is available for the crew to perform the necessary
switching, to check system configuration and limitations and brief for
minima.
In CAT III DUAL, in general, a single failure (for example one AP failure or
one engine failure)below AH does not necessitate a go-around, but a go-
around is required if the autoland warning is triggered
In general there are three possible responses to the failure of any system,
instrument or element during the approach.
1. CONTINUE the approach to the planned minima.
2. REVERT to higher minima and proceed to a new DH (above
1000ft).
3. GO AROUND and reassess the capability.
The nature of the failure and the point of its occurrence will determine
which response is appropriate.
As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1000ft AGL the approach may
be continued reverting to a higher DH, providing the appropriate
conditions are met.
Below 1000 ft (and down to AH when in CAT III DUAL) the occurrence of
any failure implies a go-around, and a reassessment of the system
capability. Another approach may then be undertaken to the appropriate
minima for the given aircraft status. It has been considered that below
1000ft, not enough time is available for the crew to perform the necessary
switching, to check system configuration and limitations and brief for
minima.
In CAT III DUAL, in general, a single failure (for example one AP failure or
one engine failure)below AH does not necessitate a go-around, but a go-
around is required if the autoland warning is triggered
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@Nocti
Don't be too harsh with spin doctor...
I'm flying varios AB in the same company since 1989 but we startet with the ALERT HEIGHT when we adopted CAT IIIb 0-75, about six years ago....
regards
Don't be too harsh with spin doctor...
I'm flying varios AB in the same company since 1989 but we startet with the ALERT HEIGHT when we adopted CAT IIIb 0-75, about six years ago....
regards
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"alert Ht"
Funny, we have recently dropped the call to align with the Boeing a/c in our fleet, it has struck me as odd since I thought it was a/c spacific.
anybody got any brighter ideas?
DL
anybody got any brighter ideas?
DL
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ah, but what if you get no FLARE annunciation at 30'R?
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davar laad
yes the alert height is aircraft specific in quantity (the number of ft) not in quality (the arlet height concept whcih is linked to catIII b operations whic requires a fail operational system displayed on FMA by catIII dual)
dunbar,
you flare manually if you have sufficient visual reference otherwise you go around. it is valid for CAT III a & b
yes the alert height is aircraft specific in quantity (the number of ft) not in quality (the arlet height concept whcih is linked to catIII b operations whic requires a fail operational system displayed on FMA by catIII dual)
dunbar,
you flare manually if you have sufficient visual reference otherwise you go around. it is valid for CAT III a & b
For European operations, Alert Height is described in CS AWO. With recent transatlantic harmonization of requirements, I would expect the FAA interpretation to be similar, or approve the manufacturer’s recommended operation.
CS-AWO 312:- For a fail-operational system with a decision height below 15 m (50 ft) or with no decision height, an alert height must be established in accordance with CS–AWO 365(a) and must be at least 30 m (100 ft). Max alert height should not be greater than 300ft.
Concept, CS-AWO 300:- The alert height is a specified radio height, based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail-operational landing system. In operational use, if a failure occurred above the alert height in one of the required redundant operational systems in the aeroplane (including, where appropriate, ground roll guidance and the reversionary mode in a hybrid system), the approach would be discontinued and a go-around executed unless reversion to a higher decision height is possible. If a failure in one of the required redundant operational systems occurred below the alert height, it would be ignored and the approach continued.
Thus the question of the failure of FLARE at 30 ft should not occur (reliability 10-9?).
As most fail-operational certifications are aircraft specific, it might be expected that the alert height and crew procedures are also type related. Thus, aligning procedures with other aircraft types might be unwise. However, a change or deletion of a call might be approved by a national authority provided the procedures before and after alert height are clearly understood and meet the basis of the aircraft certification. Any change would be a function of training and SOP, however all changes should be verified by the manufacturer to check that nothing essential has been overlooked.
The term is also mentioned in JAR-OPS 1 Subpart E under ‘Fail-Operational flight control System’ (as CS AWO 300);training requirements are stated.
CS-AWO 312:- For a fail-operational system with a decision height below 15 m (50 ft) or with no decision height, an alert height must be established in accordance with CS–AWO 365(a) and must be at least 30 m (100 ft). Max alert height should not be greater than 300ft.
Concept, CS-AWO 300:- The alert height is a specified radio height, based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail-operational landing system. In operational use, if a failure occurred above the alert height in one of the required redundant operational systems in the aeroplane (including, where appropriate, ground roll guidance and the reversionary mode in a hybrid system), the approach would be discontinued and a go-around executed unless reversion to a higher decision height is possible. If a failure in one of the required redundant operational systems occurred below the alert height, it would be ignored and the approach continued.
Thus the question of the failure of FLARE at 30 ft should not occur (reliability 10-9?).
As most fail-operational certifications are aircraft specific, it might be expected that the alert height and crew procedures are also type related. Thus, aligning procedures with other aircraft types might be unwise. However, a change or deletion of a call might be approved by a national authority provided the procedures before and after alert height are clearly understood and meet the basis of the aircraft certification. Any change would be a function of training and SOP, however all changes should be verified by the manufacturer to check that nothing essential has been overlooked.
The term is also mentioned in JAR-OPS 1 Subpart E under ‘Fail-Operational flight control System’ (as CS AWO 300);training requirements are stated.
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Alert height is a design criteria.
100' for a320
200 for a330
On the line you can take it that above alert height as fail passive and below as fail operational
Don't get all horny about it
Just understand your company callouts and make them.
V
100' for a320
200 for a330
On the line you can take it that above alert height as fail passive and below as fail operational
Don't get all horny about it
Just understand your company callouts and make them.
V
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Nocti,
What I'm saying is that our company SOP's do not make use of the Airbus Alert Height. We do not continue with an autoland in LVP's in the event of any failure below 1000', therefore the alert height is irrelevant. The only exception to this is if RVR > cat 1 and visual with the runway.
What I'm saying is that our company SOP's do not make use of the Airbus Alert Height. We do not continue with an autoland in LVP's in the event of any failure below 1000', therefore the alert height is irrelevant. The only exception to this is if RVR > cat 1 and visual with the runway.
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We do not continue with an autoland in LVP's in the event of any failure below 1000'
You are conducting an LVP approach, the RVR is 80m. At 95ft you lose the Green hydraulic system and the No. 1 Autopilot.
Do you go around?
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Spin Doctor,
There are always operators who do things differently to the manufacturers recommendations and procedures - generally instigated by small minded managers who think they know better.
I've seen a lot of it in the last 25 years, and some real beauties. One outfit I worked for had their own single engined NPA procedure in place for many years before the manufacturer found out and told them that a go-around would not meet the minimum climb gradient required.
Airbus have, in accordance with JAA and EASA criteria, published an Alert Height for use with All Weather Operations. For an operator to ignore the importance of this is either borne out of ignorance or arrogance.
There are always operators who do things differently to the manufacturers recommendations and procedures - generally instigated by small minded managers who think they know better.
I've seen a lot of it in the last 25 years, and some real beauties. One outfit I worked for had their own single engined NPA procedure in place for many years before the manufacturer found out and told them that a go-around would not meet the minimum climb gradient required.
Airbus have, in accordance with JAA and EASA criteria, published an Alert Height for use with All Weather Operations. For an operator to ignore the importance of this is either borne out of ignorance or arrogance.
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Stupid question from a naive person
this has nothing to do with the subject matter but i am unsure who better to ask...I have recently become an operations controller for a handling agent and have listened to atc/radar/approach etc and am puzzled as to what the phrase "zulu" or other such phoenetic phrases is current or when pilots say when they are inbound that information "lima" etc..... yes I knowI appear thick but would just love to know what I am listening to.
Many thanks for your help
CDC
Many thanks for your help
CDC