most common failures on A320 family
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most common failures on A320 family
I fly the 320 family... and everytime i'm in cruise i keep wondering... wht if...
i have over the years faced a certain number of failures and faults....listing it below... if anyone can add anymore actual faults... it'll help
dual fm reset
engine fire on startup
unreliable airspeed
adr 1 fault
brake release on landing
blue hyd fault
air bleed fault 1+2
air pack fault
exhaust and blower fault
i'm jus trying to figure out the most common problems faced with the bus family..
i have over the years faced a certain number of failures and faults....listing it below... if anyone can add anymore actual faults... it'll help
dual fm reset
engine fire on startup
unreliable airspeed
adr 1 fault
brake release on landing
blue hyd fault
air bleed fault 1+2
air pack fault
exhaust and blower fault
i'm jus trying to figure out the most common problems faced with the bus family..
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and everytime i'm in cruise i keep wondering... wht if.....who trained you !...where did you get your 320 type rating !....as an airline pilot this should not be your frame of mind...waiting for dooms day ???
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Do you search for common failures or just failures?
If "engine fire on startup", "brake release on landing", "air bleed fault 1+2" and "extract and blower fault" are common at your airline, you are in big trouble.
P.s.: Please check your keyboard.
P.p.s.: I changed "exhaust" as "extract"
If "engine fire on startup", "brake release on landing", "air bleed fault 1+2" and "extract and blower fault" are common at your airline, you are in big trouble.
P.s.: Please check your keyboard.
P.p.s.: I changed "exhaust" as "extract"
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as an airline pilot this should not be your frame of mind...waiting for dooms day ???
When a certain DC10 pilot lost (all?) his hydraulics due to a blown out cargo door, he used skills developed in his own time on his company's simulator to get the aircraft down.
On 737's, for a while at least, pilot's trained for rudder hard-over situations (when a bug was found in the flight control system).
Why shouldn't pilots think/train for doomsday? As a passenger, I think I'd feel a lot safer with a pilot who has run through a number of likely and non-likely scenarios in his head and in the sim prior to pushing the throttles forward.
After all, isn't that why pilots do sim checks and pre-takeoff briefs?
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Thinking about possible failure scenarios and how you would handle them is a very healthy activity, as long as it does not distract from what is currently happening. In an ideal world these ideas would be fed back and reviewed for possible incorporation in training. Hazard analyses cannot consider all possible events, and depend on the skills of the practictioners and users to help identify scenarios and events.
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and everytime i'm in cruise i keep wondering... wht if.....who trained you !...where did you get your 320 type rating !....as an airline pilot this should not be your frame of mind...waiting for dooms day ???
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as long as it does not distract from what is currently happening...hence the questions who trained him ??? quality of the training dept...
the focus must on the task's on hand rather than a what if mind set...if you are well trained...and the airline runs a well oiled training dept all kinds of Threat and Error Management (TEM) training should make you a confident pilot.
the focus must on the task's on hand rather than a what if mind set...if you are well trained...and the airline runs a well oiled training dept all kinds of Threat and Error Management (TEM) training should make you a confident pilot.
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Drag climb vs cruise.
According to a presentation made by Boeing a 737-800 cruising at 35,000 feet0.74 mach (close to min drag speed) has a total drag of 8,750 pounds.
In the cruise again the total drag at mach 0.8 is the same as at 0.67 (9,500 pounds).
My question is this....how significant would the drag increase be in the climb towards this cruise altitude with a low (say 500 feet / min) climb rate at a speed of 0.67 mach.
I assume that the increase in lift generates more induced drag ...but does anyone have any rough ideas how much more than the 9,500 pounds figure?
In the cruise again the total drag at mach 0.8 is the same as at 0.67 (9,500 pounds).
My question is this....how significant would the drag increase be in the climb towards this cruise altitude with a low (say 500 feet / min) climb rate at a speed of 0.67 mach.
I assume that the increase in lift generates more induced drag ...but does anyone have any rough ideas how much more than the 9,500 pounds figure?
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Oh dear
Left Wing, you worry me. Deeply.
To so utterly believe that who ever is currently running your training is without fault, and has foreseen all eventualities, is a massive sucker trap.
OK. I'm retired, and shouldn't really comment, but what you said is to me so fundamentally wrong a way to approach your (command?) responsibilities as to cause me to feel much happier about driving from points A to B these days out of preference to flying commercially.
I could fill three blog sites refuting your approach, and then just hope something might be learned (by you.)
I will swear that every moment of my time in the air was spend in a what-if analysis.
As a result I have caused sections of my then Airline's manuals to be re-written regarding electrical failure drills (they were wrong); to have (helped) have sections of Australia's accelerate/stop engine out performance parameters re-written so that in wet conditions on T/O in an Ozzie registered aircraft you are in the most safely loaded machine (which may be just) in the skies; to have Boeing review, and eventually rewrite their mad crazy 'standard approach procedures' (then max flap at the outer marker); to have the Boeing production line thrown into turmoil when I discovered that (by trialling) 9 out of 12 recently delivered 737s standby elect pwr was miss-wired & U/S: too many others to list now: and my proudest moment, a toe to toe screaming match in the 727 simulator with God (a.k.a. chief pilot) who echoed Boeing's line that you will only ever have a single engine failure in a multi-engined aircraft. I demanded the right to try to fly a multiple failure, and proved it could be done (at least in the sim.)
Boeing's standard ops now actually discuss total engine failure ! ! !
It took years to crack that nut.
Believe me, the diminishment of the analytical approach by so very many command pilots that I talk to these days sends a chill up my spine.
It was this that the pilot's dispute in Oz in 1989 was about, not money. We lost that fight, and it seems a huge swag of the aviation command structure has been lost as well, as a flow on.
Do NOT accept what is written. Fly it by all means. Follow standard ops, as you must, but in those quiet moments for God's sake,
think.
To so utterly believe that who ever is currently running your training is without fault, and has foreseen all eventualities, is a massive sucker trap.
OK. I'm retired, and shouldn't really comment, but what you said is to me so fundamentally wrong a way to approach your (command?) responsibilities as to cause me to feel much happier about driving from points A to B these days out of preference to flying commercially.
I could fill three blog sites refuting your approach, and then just hope something might be learned (by you.)
I will swear that every moment of my time in the air was spend in a what-if analysis.
As a result I have caused sections of my then Airline's manuals to be re-written regarding electrical failure drills (they were wrong); to have (helped) have sections of Australia's accelerate/stop engine out performance parameters re-written so that in wet conditions on T/O in an Ozzie registered aircraft you are in the most safely loaded machine (which may be just) in the skies; to have Boeing review, and eventually rewrite their mad crazy 'standard approach procedures' (then max flap at the outer marker); to have the Boeing production line thrown into turmoil when I discovered that (by trialling) 9 out of 12 recently delivered 737s standby elect pwr was miss-wired & U/S: too many others to list now: and my proudest moment, a toe to toe screaming match in the 727 simulator with God (a.k.a. chief pilot) who echoed Boeing's line that you will only ever have a single engine failure in a multi-engined aircraft. I demanded the right to try to fly a multiple failure, and proved it could be done (at least in the sim.)
Boeing's standard ops now actually discuss total engine failure ! ! !
It took years to crack that nut.
Believe me, the diminishment of the analytical approach by so very many command pilots that I talk to these days sends a chill up my spine.
It was this that the pilot's dispute in Oz in 1989 was about, not money. We lost that fight, and it seems a huge swag of the aviation command structure has been lost as well, as a flow on.
Do NOT accept what is written. Fly it by all means. Follow standard ops, as you must, but in those quiet moments for God's sake,
think.
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missing the point aren't we
this thread doesn't deal with left wings lack of command thinking... or thinking as a whole...
and btw... thanks guys..appreciate the backup...
well coming back to these failures... well i needed to know cuz...
the documentation on an airbus sucks.... eg.. eng stall is not a memory item... yet the ecam doesn't show the complete action...(left wing... i wouldn't have known this if i wasn't reading up and worrying about stuff)
ergo it makes it imperative to know wht the hell might go wrong...
so guys... give me all u got.. i'd apprecitate it...
and btw... thanks guys..appreciate the backup...
well coming back to these failures... well i needed to know cuz...
the documentation on an airbus sucks.... eg.. eng stall is not a memory item... yet the ecam doesn't show the complete action...(left wing... i wouldn't have known this if i wasn't reading up and worrying about stuff)
ergo it makes it imperative to know wht the hell might go wrong...
so guys... give me all u got.. i'd apprecitate it...
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not sure where this thread is going but can give you a common failure...
normal or alternate brake failure(normally due to hyd leak)
blue pump overheat.. no bl system
hehe the best one is if captain or FO tray table is broken... that p**ses crew off no end and its only a MEL CAT D
as for engine fire... your FADEC will help there... its the fire after firing the bottles i would worry about.
as for the last post .. had to TS an engine stall tonight... the engine did not shut down but gave me a PFR indicating the problem... turns out not enough bleed from APU caused HPTC vlv not actuating as instructed.
if you can get access to airbusworld there is lots of engineering info about reoccuring problems that are/were present on a320
normal or alternate brake failure(normally due to hyd leak)
blue pump overheat.. no bl system
hehe the best one is if captain or FO tray table is broken... that p**ses crew off no end and its only a MEL CAT D
as for engine fire... your FADEC will help there... its the fire after firing the bottles i would worry about.
as for the last post .. had to TS an engine stall tonight... the engine did not shut down but gave me a PFR indicating the problem... turns out not enough bleed from APU caused HPTC vlv not actuating as instructed.
if you can get access to airbusworld there is lots of engineering info about reoccuring problems that are/were present on a320
