Fly-By-Mouth, the new CRM?

[A37575]

With the steady increase of more and more “standard procedures” whereupon the PNF is required to virtually talk down the pilot to landing from cruise altitude, it seems the principle of the much vaunted silent cockpit introduced to stop excessive non-operational chatter below 10,000 ft, is now dead and gone.

I always thought the wonderful sophistication of EFIS and associated map displays was designed to give the crew all the information they needed for safe navigation. Yet it seems even with this information overload on EFIS, operators are still not satisfied until the PF is overwhelmed with ever increasing “support” calls of altitude, speed, system status - and we haven’t included automated radio altimeter call-outs, or checklist challenge and responses.

Have the airlines gone too far the other way from the silent cockpit? Does excessive talking in climb and descent really lead to a safer operation? Is it all driven by fear of litigation if something goes wrong?

The silent cockpit below 10,000 ft was supposed to enhance flight safety. How come that theory has been replaced with the very opposite? I am talking about the once derogatory term Fly-By-Mouth – because that is today’s flight deck.

[hetfield]

A37575,

I fully agree with your thoughts. We also used to have the "silent" cockpit philosphy, but now the PNF is trained as a prompter to call out all these FMA modes which are right in front of my eyes, Jesus....

[tubby linton]

The best prompt I have ever heard of was the call of "ground star" by an F/O when his skipper was just about to plant aircraft into tarmac!

[Chris Scott]

Hi A37575,

Have been retired since the end of 2001, but my experience was that FMA calls by the PNF peaked into madness during the 1980s in my airline; specifically on the DC10 and A310. By 1988, with the introduction of the A320, we cut them by about 60 or 70 percent. He/she continued to call any change of armed altitude made by the other pilot, and 1000ft-to-go. I presume you are not arguing against those two?

Which types have you been flying recently?

[virgo]

With automation taking over more and more of the task of " flying" the aeroplane, the task of pilots is becoming increasingly one of simply monitoring - which humans are not particularly good at, they get bored and distracted very easily.

By giving a running commentary of what the automatics are doing, it is hoped that this will ensure that at least one of the pilots is paying attention and will spot any irregularity.

Believe me, it's gonna get a lot worse !

[Cardinal]

Yes, one can see the trend and it is worrying. As any aircraft program matures, more and more extraneous nonsense creeps in, none of it recommended by the manufacturer. Our lot uses a few silent checklists, which are quite nice in maintaining some peace. (After takeoff and After landing)

[ahramin]

This is indeed a big problem. In my experience it comes from SOPs being written by people with little understanding of the human factors and reasoning behind having SOPs. Instead the feeling seems to be that SOPs are needed in order to be professional. Ergo, the more SOP calls we have, the more professional we are.

Specifically there are three types of calls which should be regarded as very suspect:

1. Situation Normal calls. On loc, on slope. Pressurization normal. Approach armed.
2. Pertinent Negative calls. No flags. No RAIM warning.
3. Reminders of readily available information. HSI set. Next step down altitude xxx feet.

Lets hear some examples of SOP calls which are more trouble than they are worth.

[Denti]

Thank god our SOPs lately were driven by the aim to reduce aimless talking just for the sake of talking. Calling out FMA changes? Why? Its right there on my PFD, if i dont look at that i have another problem.

Might be though that boeing based procedures are just a bit more pilot friendly

[Mercenary Pilot]

Stop talking and FLY THE AIRCRAFT!!!

I couldn't agree more, also I think "CRM" is sadly becoming an alternative for proper training.

Example....

"Would crews make sure they are using effective CRM to implement the new SOP's described in the latest update of the operations manual."

[Dani]

well, well - people who worry about too extensive SOPs are sometimes those who don't want to follow them...

Let me assure you that modern SOPs have increased aviation standards and safety tremendiously. Most modern aircraft like Airbus are simply not flyable without very strict SOPs.

And experience show that as soon as you stop calling out those FMA modes, at least some of your pilots corps stop looking at them. Give me an autoland session with random failures around minimum and I prove it to you right on the spot.

This discussion reminds of similar people talking about CRM (the CRM where you talk about non-aviation related factors). Incidently, most of the pilots who don't like CRM workshops are the same group that doesn't like modern SOPs or miss the "old flying" in general.

Learn to adapt to modern cockpit cultur - times of "fly more" have definetly passed.

Dani

[edit: phrazed more clearly]

[hetfield]

- people who worry about too extensive SOPs are sometimes those who don't want to follow them...

Excuse me, but this is bull. It's not a a matter of "too extensive SOP", it's a matter of SOPs which make sense otherwise it's monkey business. And yes, I strictly follow company SOP.

[SNS3Guppy]

Perhaps some of yu have some form of increadibly laborous unending standard callouts, but this is a mystery to me. We certainly don't. The callouts don't change for us. We still call a thousand above or below the selected altitude. The standard deviation calls still apply. Otherwise the standard approach calls for localizer alive, glideslope alive,etc...those apply as do FAF, 1000', 500', approaching minimums, and minimums callouts. Would anybody suggest any of these are out of line? They've been standard every place I've ever worked, and and have been nearly universal between airline, charter, corporate, private, and the government flying I've done...pretty standard stuff.

The only additional calls I can think of are on an approach, and involve a Localizer Captured, and Glide Slope Captured call. While some of you may feel these to be extraneous and unwarranted, I disagree. Sure, one could fly the whole flight beginning to end without hardly uttering a word, and one could do it with a plethora of ADI or other display information...but that would somewhat defeat a large advantage of the two or three man crew.

One could go so far as to argue that there's no need to alert anyone else when caging an engine, as everybody can see the power lever or start lever or whatever else you might be touching, just as well as you. That's not communication though. I'd just as soon know everyone's on the same page. Particularly on an approach. Yes, you can fly it silent and single pilot, and that's fine if you're in a single pilot cockpit.

You're not in a single pilot cockpit, though. I can look at most of our procedures and checklist items and correlate them with specific reasons why they've been included. Some are obvious, some have been wrought by historical events that prompted their inclusion or creation. We have these procedures and have them standardized for a reason. It's not just mental masturbation.

Sterile cockpit doesn't imply stony silence. The cockpit isn't a temple. It's a work site. Simply because one is voicing standard callouts does not mean one has violated or desecrated the sanctity of the cockpit. CRM doesn't compromise safety. It enhances safety...so long as one isn't too busy complaining about how wrong one perceives it to be. In fact, that attitude is really a large part of the reason we have CRM and standardization in the first place. What you have is an active format to get you to do it now how you want to do it, but to do it right.

You might have all the answers and know a better way...but standardization, including standard callouts, provide the means for a level, safe playing field.

Something to think about: one of our checklist items appears several times going out, and several times coming in. Flight instruments: Set and Crosschecked. Seems simple enough...why do it three times? It happens that we've had approach or procedure changes late in the game, and a new confirmation is important. It happens that we've had items missed, even with three sets of eyes looking at them, which got caught on the second check...and just two nights ago I managed a minor miracle...caught someone else without a small item not set (it's usually me that gets caught making the mistake)...on the third and final check. Seems redundant, but the calls are there for a reason, and they work.

It troubles me when I hear others whining or complaining about them.

A very popular event in the corporate world has become the Bombardier Safety Stand-down, each year. It keeps growing. Safety Stand-downs have been incorporated in a number of fields and departments and agencies over the years...the Bombardier one is more of a seminar that's just called a Safety Stand-down. I was discussing it a few years ago with a pilot in a flight department where I worked, and he expressed distain and simply said "why would anyone want to take any time out for safety? We've got money to make."

I submit there's a reason things are the way they are, and that it's not a bad thing. Taking the extra half second to make the standard callout is time well spent, and doesn't compromise the sterile cockpit concept one iota. Talking football scores compromises sterile cockpit...but not cockpit duties.

[411A]

All this extra callouts nonsense stated at one airline where I worked, when the first Airboos arrived on the property.
Then, when these folks upgraded to the next airplane (TriStar) it was...silence once again.
One First Officer complained that his 'new' Captains on the TriStar told him to 'shut up' when the young guy tried to bring his Airboos callouts to the TriStar fleet.
The L10 fleet manager, having a limited sense of humor, sent the youngster straight back to the Bus...where he remained.

Ahhh, silence once again.

[Centaurus]

Let me assure you that modern SOPs have increased aviation standards and safety tremendiously

It is not that modern SOP's have increased standards and safety but more likely the introduction of wonderfully accurate, reliable and sophisticated automatics that have reduced over recent years, the relative risk factor of flying from A to B.

Computerised flight plans, unbelievably accurate track and height keeping through dual or triple GPS, EGPWS, QAR's and a host of other computerised information available to crews are what have increased flight safety on modern aircraft. Not the mouthing of superfluous "support" calls that repeat ad nauseum what is plainly obvious if you have two eyes and ears.

Go back in history to the introduction of the first Boeing 737 as a two pilot cockpit The certification process for a two pilot cockpit required a maximum number of switch selections and eye movements beyond which a third cockpit crew member or flight engineer was required (B727 for example).

Automatic switching solved the problem of many systems selections. Remember the auto switching of the seat belts and no smoking signs? But it wasn't long after these aircraft entered service that chief pilots and their ilk began to include additional switch movements that rapidly went beyond the intention of the designers. Soon more "SOP's" to cover the additional switch selections were introduced which increased crew workload. Of course a third crew member was not recruited to cover the extra items deemed so vital to safety. And in the years that followed there has been a further increase in superfluous switching flicking, talking and a new term was invented called CRM and nowadays TEM. Briefings became more verbose perhaps as a cover against litigation.

When a pilot is more concerned on learning off by heart all the mandated "support" or advisory calls to the extent he unconsciously depends on these calls to safely navigate the aeroplane to landing, then surely his priorities need re-examining. From the posts so far it is evident that opinons vary significantly. Personally I prefer less talk and the accent on silent but efficient monitoring.

I can just see it now; the aircraft is out of control in a jet upset and neither pilot knows how to recover (read the Adam Air accident report) and as the aircraft is a second from hitting the ground the PM calls dutifully "One thousand to go....." Well he certainly knew his SOP's but a fat lot of good that did him.

[Chris Scott]

Standard Calls and Subtle Incapacitation

SNS3Guppy is right. Now retired, I find some of the above arguments depressingly familiar.

Most modern jets can be operated by one pilot most of the time. You guys have two pilots mainly to provide monitoring and redundancy (no wise-cracks, please… ). Both pilots have to be in the loop at all times, and suitably motivated.

When − in response to an ATC clearance − the first pilot sets a new armed altitude on the FCU, he/she knows he’s got it right . The second pilot knows that, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, that will be true. By reading aloud what he/she sees on the FCU altitude selector, however, several things are achieved, provided the first pilot’s hand has moved clear of the altitude selector (knob):

(1) the first pilot knows that the second pilot is reasonably alert;
(2) the first pilot knows that (in the absence of qualification) the second pilot agrees with the altitude that has been set;
(3) if the first pilot meant to set a different altitude, but has unknowingly fumbled it, even an unqualified announcement should alert him to this fact, and a conference will follow.
[The second pilot knows that the first pilot is reasonably alert, provided he/she made the correct selection.]

So, in addition to the vital monitoring of the task, one simple call has acted as a check that neither pilot is suffering from “subtle incapacitation”. This philosophy was developed in response to the Trident accident at Heathrow (Staines) in the early 1970s, and other accidents involving subtle incapacitation.

The most useless type of call is one which requires no conscious thought by the speaker, as in “confirmed” or merely parroting what the other crew member has said. These were eliminated in the 1980s in my airline. And, as I’ve already said, the plethora of calls we used to make at every FMA change − associated with semi-integrated flight-guidance systems like the DC10 − was largely abandoned when we introduced the A320. But some FMA calls remain vital, including VS versus FPA.

[Tee Emm]

During type rating training of an overseas crew consisting of experienced captain and very inexperienced 250 hour first officer, I observed an ILS where the captain was hopelessly unstable at 500 ft visual; the flaps had blown back due excess speed, thrust levers idle, gear only just locked down, speed Vref +30 knots, sink rate 1500 fpm. And this was a 737.

The SOP for that company required the PM to call "Stable" at 500 afl.
Although it was clear for the last 5 miles of the ILS the aircraft was never going to be able to land safely due poor flying by the captain (a 12,000 hour veteran) the F/O kept quiet for cultural reasons - this despite assertiveness training and whatnot.

Passing 500 ft the F/O called "500 feet-stable". The instructor froze the simulator and asked the F/O recall the definition of a stable approach in the 737.

The F/O was slow to answer and then said "I don't know - the book says call "Stable" at 500 feet and that is what I did...

His previous support calls were all word perfect - and so was the last one I suppose...

[Denti]

Of course there are callouts and checks that are necessary and have to be done. For example the finger-pointing procedure (PF sets cleared ALT and points at it until PM says "checked") or other selection of important items, hopefully mode-s is put to use there soon so the millions of euros we had to spend to put it in have at least some use.

But at least in my outfit it seems that we go the way to silent checking then acting in most cases. For example there is no verbal answer on a flap call, the pm checks speed, configuration, warnings and only then selects the called flaps, but doesn't say anything, same for gears. Actually that was introduced as a result of an IOSA audit (and the checklists were changed to cover that, for example not established at 1000ft with final flaps, min 40% N1, final speed and checklist read is an automatic go around). Same for loc/gs alive/captured. Both are not mentioned anymore except if flying raw data (which is encouraged).

Of course we have auto callouts for 500, 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10 ft and we do manually call out 1000ft above/below cleared altitude, however many are reminded to do that by the 900ft wailer the boeing has built in anyway.

But we never called out FMA changes, except for one single exception: if FLARE doesn't activate below 50ft RA it is wise to do a callout to protect your own back.

[Tee Emm]

however many are reminded to do that by the 900ft wailer the boeing has built in anyway.

You would be dismayed if you saw the significant number of pilots who rely totally on the wailer to initiate their call rather than watch the altimeter. The wailer was designed as a back-up to a call that should already have taken place. We ran a series of tests in the simulator where the wailer was silenced and in almost every case crews failed to call the 1000 ft to go. I recall one pilot on hearing the wailer sound he automatically called "1000 to go" when in fact it was because the wailer was warning of a 300 ft altitude deviation from programmed altitude. A case of monkey see - monkey do..

[Chris Scott]

Quote from Denti:
Of course there are callouts and checks that are necessary and have to be done. For example the finger-pointing procedure (PF sets cleared ALT and points at it until PM says "checked")...
[Unquote]

Almost a completely wasted call, in my opinion. The "PM" would neither have to look or think. Monitoring is thinking. Evidence of thought proves awareness. You have wasted two-thirds of an opportunity. And pointing is time-wasting, as well as temporarily preventing the hand from performing another task (like flying the aeroplane).

[Dani]

Quote from Centaurus:

It is not that modern SOP's have increased standards and safety but more likely the introduction of wonderfully accurate, reliable and sophisticated automatics that have reduced over recent years, the relative risk factor of flying from A to B.

Wrong, wrong! Altough modern cockpit technology have increased the accuracy of flying, it has also increased the the workload in the cockpit. We all remember a few very famous hull losses because of this, e.g. AA 965 in Cali.

Good SOPs take this into consideration and put great emphazise on crew coordination, aka talking with each other.

It's amazing to see that there is such a great number of professional pilots here in pprune and all over the world who still considers the most important progresses in aviation worthless Go flying L-1011!

Dani