Standard Calls and Subtle Incapacitation
SNS3Guppy is right. Now retired, I find some of the above arguments depressingly familiar.
Most modern jets can be operated by one pilot most of the time. You guys have two pilots mainly to provide monitoring and redundancy (no wise-cracks, please… 
). Both pilots have to be in the loop at all times, and suitably motivated.
When − in response to an ATC clearance − the first pilot sets a new armed altitude on the FCU, he/she knows he’s got it right 
. The second pilot knows that, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, that will be true. By reading aloud what he/she sees on the FCU altitude selector, however, several things are achieved, provided the first pilot’s hand has moved clear of the altitude selector (knob):
(1) the first pilot knows that the second pilot is reasonably alert;
(2) the first pilot knows that (in the absence of qualification) the second pilot agrees with the altitude that has been set;
(3) if the first pilot meant to set a different altitude, but has unknowingly fumbled it, even an unqualified announcement should alert him to this fact, and a conference will follow.
[The second pilot knows that the first pilot is reasonably alert, provided he/she made the correct selection.]
So, in addition to the vital monitoring of the task, one simple call has acted as a check that neither pilot is suffering from “subtle incapacitation”. This philosophy was developed in response to the Trident accident at Heathrow (Staines) in the early 1970s, and other accidents involving subtle incapacitation.
The most useless type of call is one which requires no conscious thought by the speaker, as in “confirmed” or merely parroting what the other crew member has said. These were eliminated in the 1980s in my airline. And, as I’ve already said, the plethora of calls we used to make at every FMA change − associated with semi-integrated flight-guidance systems like the DC10 − was largely abandoned when we introduced the A320. But some FMA calls remain vital, including VS versus FPA.