BA's 80 Knot Call
Just a nitpick but if some here are going to quote "BA SOPs" for the world to see then at least get it right. It is not BA SOP to use Full Reverse above 80 knots. On at least one BA Fleet I know of the SOP is "if IAS is below 100 knots when takeoff rejected, reverse idle need only be selected".
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<<part of the 80 knt call goes back to the 707 when the t/o power had to be set by 80 knts and a cross check of the instruments>>
Not quite but lemper was partially right - in BOAC we did have nosewheel steering on both sides and the 80 kt call was essentially a reminder to the PF to take his hand off the nosewheel tiller and take the control wheel - which, up to then,was held with the requested xwind input by the PNF. No rudder fine steering on our 707's.
Not quite but lemper was partially right - in BOAC we did have nosewheel steering on both sides and the 80 kt call was essentially a reminder to the PF to take his hand off the nosewheel tiller and take the control wheel - which, up to then,was held with the requested xwind input by the PNF. No rudder fine steering on our 707's.
Shaka
Sorry to regenerate the thread but it may be worth it for of the "younger" readers because there is danger when people start to assume their type or Fleet SOPs apply Company wide
. Frankly I suspect anyone who thinks they can claim that anything is "BA SOP" ( except perhaps the FL 100/ FL 200 calls) has only flown one type in the Company....perhaps the one where the use of manual thrust levers when hand flying isn't allowed....
.
Now to answer your question, I fly the 744 ( you know, the one where the P2 now loads the FMC
) . The BA 747-436 SOP, verbatim from the Flying Manual, is "up to 80 kts the takeoff may be rejected for any apparent malfunction; Above 80 knots the takeoff should only be rejected for major malfunctions".
Then the QRH states:
"IF IAS is below 100 kts when takeoff rejected, reverse idle need only be selected". So Full Reverse below 80 kts - BA SOP?...obviously not.
In conclusion, just 'cos you do it on your Fleet, don't assume it's a Company SOP - but unlike some I think you probably knew that.
Happy Landings
. Frankly I suspect anyone who thinks they can claim that anything is "BA SOP" ( except perhaps the FL 100/ FL 200 calls) has only flown one type in the Company....perhaps the one where the use of manual thrust levers when hand flying isn't allowed.....Now to answer your question, I fly the 744 ( you know, the one where the P2 now loads the FMC
) . The BA 747-436 SOP, verbatim from the Flying Manual, is "up to 80 kts the takeoff may be rejected for any apparent malfunction; Above 80 knots the takeoff should only be rejected for major malfunctions".Then the QRH states:
"IF IAS is below 100 kts when takeoff rejected, reverse idle need only be selected". So Full Reverse below 80 kts - BA SOP?...obviously not.
In conclusion, just 'cos you do it on your Fleet, don't assume it's a Company SOP - but unlike some I think you probably knew that.
Happy Landings
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Sure the 80kts call would be good for a incap' check asothers have said, but it also works well for the PF to know his speed checks with the PNF as PF will rotate at Vr, regardless of a "rotate" call from PNF, this is when you suspect a pilot incap' if PF does not rotate or indeed PNF does not call "rotate".
A rejected take off in BA sops does call for different actions above 80KTS, and BA sops only call for a few items to reject with all are items which endanger the safety of the aircraft in the take off run. A high speed RTO as more likely to endanger the aircraft and pax than, matey boy next to you that has already become incaped !!!!!
A rejected take off in BA sops does call for different actions above 80KTS, and BA sops only call for a few items to reject with all are items which endanger the safety of the aircraft in the take off run. A high speed RTO as more likely to endanger the aircraft and pax than, matey boy next to you that has already become incaped !!!!!
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QANTAS has an one particular SOP markedly in contradiction to Boeing. In the B737 series aborted take off procedure, Boeing go for manual speed brake whereas QANTAS, in it's infinite wisdom, use the reverse thrust lever operation as as the primary means of getting the autospeed brake to up. The Boeing philosophy is that manual speed brake actuation for abort is primary with reverse thrust lever actuation as back-up. The problem with the QANTAS policy is that if the automatic function of the speed brake is inoperative there is no way of telling before the abort and precious max braking time is lost while the captain puzzles why the actuation of the reverse levers did not operate the speed brake.
In addition it may be quite dangerous to select reverse thrust during an abort if the engine selected is on fire. The British Air Tours B737 fatal at Manchester many years ago proved that conclusively. Leaking fuel was atomised by the reverse thrust plume and thus caused a major conflagration which ultimately killed many passengers. This point was made in the Accident Report.
While Boeing may issue a No Technical Objection (NTO) statement when an operator wishes to change a stated Boeing procedure, I wonder if that exposes an operator to litigation from Boeing in event of an incident in which the company procedure was a causal factor in damage or injury?
In addition it may be quite dangerous to select reverse thrust during an abort if the engine selected is on fire. The British Air Tours B737 fatal at Manchester many years ago proved that conclusively. Leaking fuel was atomised by the reverse thrust plume and thus caused a major conflagration which ultimately killed many passengers. This point was made in the Accident Report.
While Boeing may issue a No Technical Objection (NTO) statement when an operator wishes to change a stated Boeing procedure, I wonder if that exposes an operator to litigation from Boeing in event of an incident in which the company procedure was a causal factor in damage or injury?
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Sir (did you like that?),
QANTAS management pilots have always attempted to position themselves at the top of the pyramid (regardless of the logics of their propositions - refer B747 at BKK). This accounts for their divergence from the Boeing procedure (in my humble opinion, unjustified)
On the other hand, maybe they have a large number of pilots who do not have the aptitude/skills to select reverse thrust correctly at the appropriate time!! and have to write their procedures accordingly!!
Basically, I cannot understand why egos must interfere with the basic manufacturers' procedures unless dictated by significant local conditions.
QANTAS management pilots have always attempted to position themselves at the top of the pyramid (regardless of the logics of their propositions - refer B747 at BKK). This accounts for their divergence from the Boeing procedure (in my humble opinion, unjustified)
On the other hand, maybe they have a large number of pilots who do not have the aptitude/skills to select reverse thrust correctly at the appropriate time!! and have to write their procedures accordingly!!
Basically, I cannot understand why egos must interfere with the basic manufacturers' procedures unless dictated by significant local conditions.
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Quote: 'I stopped wondering why BA do the things they do long ago. Their SOP is just out of this world for some reason.'
What the hell do you mean by this trite comment?
It seems to me that everybody else (non-BA) would have a very busy and critical but short time on the runway filled with unnecessary talk between the crew.
Calling a speed and getting the other guy to call 'checked' dates back to the days of old fashioned steam driven ASI's. These days with high-tech Air Data modules and electronic displays there is surely little (no) chance of a difference in readings.
As previously posted, the 80kts call in BA is just an awareness for changes in reverse thrust handling and the reasons for stopping.
What the hell do you mean by this trite comment?
It seems to me that everybody else (non-BA) would have a very busy and critical but short time on the runway filled with unnecessary talk between the crew.
Calling a speed and getting the other guy to call 'checked' dates back to the days of old fashioned steam driven ASI's. These days with high-tech Air Data modules and electronic displays there is surely little (no) chance of a difference in readings.
As previously posted, the 80kts call in BA is just an awareness for changes in reverse thrust handling and the reasons for stopping.
What does the SOP mean
A cautionary tale for those who use a 80kt call SOP:– what does the SOP mean?
As PF of an experienced two-captain crew on a positioning detail, flying alternate sectors with seat change, my response to a 80kt call was ‘No’ (my ASI was only 75).
Human nature engaged automatic enquiry mode – both pilots; there was a quick cross check of the other instrument panel in a vain hope of determining which ASI was in error and why – an impossible task with a dual system. Then there was realization that there was a standby ASI, which confirmed a mismatch, but this required significant mental effort as the airspeed was no longer 80 kts, thus all three ASIs had to be re-inspected.
At which time the dutiful PNF called V1 (his ASI), which was followed immediately by rotate; it was a light weight aircraft with a low V1/Vr. The flight was completed, but not without further event as the main ASI was linked to several functions and inhibits – flap/gear interlock for one.
The company SOP stated “call 80kts … , only reject the takeoff above 80kts for engine failure, fire … etc, etc”, nothing about what if the ASIs did not agree. The aircraft type had low-level alert inhibit at 80kts, thus it could be argued that much of the pre takeoff briefing re alerts was superfluous, as only important alerts would be given anyway. The important action for ASI mismatch (or failure) was overlooked; perhaps the SOP (those who wrote it) assumed that crews would stop. Interestingly, subsequent variants of the aircraft had EFIS airspeed which included an amber comparator, which if annunciated above 80kts, was ignored as there was a selectable alternate airspeed source from the ADC. The modern systems are not as fault free as some would expect, don’t assume anything – they just have other ways in which to fail.
Lessons learnt; check your SOPs to ensure that they are workable and cover foreseeable circumstances – what if. Ensure that SOPs consider human factors – the effect of surprise and shock of the event and the natural desire to find out why something has occurred.
The SOP must be practical; exactly how will crews determine that there is an error, what are the allowable limits bearing in mind that each crew may not view their ASIs simultaneously. Does it matter which ASI is in error – just that they don’t agree?
Specify the action required, ensure that this is trained for at the appropriate level – in this instance, if an RTO is required, this should be as a skilled, automatic response to stop i.e. if ASIs disagree at 80kt any call / comment is equivalent to stop? Or should we be ‘go’ minded as per the RTO training aid?
As this stage of the tale / considering SOPs, the process is getting very messy – ‘what ifs’, ‘buts’; so back to the risks, what exactly are the risks of stopping or continuing the takeoff.
In many modern aircraft, an ASI mismatch could be a relatively low risk event, but to be sure, we have to understand all of the ramifications. Then of course, we encounter situations involving masking tape over static ports and covers left on pitot tubes – but these failings require SOPs other than an 80kt call. Then if the 80kt check is not for the ASI, then exactly how do you check for incapacitation, or do you assume the non response (mic selected off) is instant death ??!!
An air safety report? No, far too embarrassed at the time, although later there was an unproductive discussion on SOP wording with the chief pilot on the theme of what if.
As PF of an experienced two-captain crew on a positioning detail, flying alternate sectors with seat change, my response to a 80kt call was ‘No’ (my ASI was only 75).
Human nature engaged automatic enquiry mode – both pilots; there was a quick cross check of the other instrument panel in a vain hope of determining which ASI was in error and why – an impossible task with a dual system. Then there was realization that there was a standby ASI, which confirmed a mismatch, but this required significant mental effort as the airspeed was no longer 80 kts, thus all three ASIs had to be re-inspected.
At which time the dutiful PNF called V1 (his ASI), which was followed immediately by rotate; it was a light weight aircraft with a low V1/Vr. The flight was completed, but not without further event as the main ASI was linked to several functions and inhibits – flap/gear interlock for one.
The company SOP stated “call 80kts … , only reject the takeoff above 80kts for engine failure, fire … etc, etc”, nothing about what if the ASIs did not agree. The aircraft type had low-level alert inhibit at 80kts, thus it could be argued that much of the pre takeoff briefing re alerts was superfluous, as only important alerts would be given anyway. The important action for ASI mismatch (or failure) was overlooked; perhaps the SOP (those who wrote it) assumed that crews would stop. Interestingly, subsequent variants of the aircraft had EFIS airspeed which included an amber comparator, which if annunciated above 80kts, was ignored as there was a selectable alternate airspeed source from the ADC. The modern systems are not as fault free as some would expect, don’t assume anything – they just have other ways in which to fail.
Lessons learnt; check your SOPs to ensure that they are workable and cover foreseeable circumstances – what if. Ensure that SOPs consider human factors – the effect of surprise and shock of the event and the natural desire to find out why something has occurred.
The SOP must be practical; exactly how will crews determine that there is an error, what are the allowable limits bearing in mind that each crew may not view their ASIs simultaneously. Does it matter which ASI is in error – just that they don’t agree?
Specify the action required, ensure that this is trained for at the appropriate level – in this instance, if an RTO is required, this should be as a skilled, automatic response to stop i.e. if ASIs disagree at 80kt any call / comment is equivalent to stop? Or should we be ‘go’ minded as per the RTO training aid?
As this stage of the tale / considering SOPs, the process is getting very messy – ‘what ifs’, ‘buts’; so back to the risks, what exactly are the risks of stopping or continuing the takeoff.
In many modern aircraft, an ASI mismatch could be a relatively low risk event, but to be sure, we have to understand all of the ramifications. Then of course, we encounter situations involving masking tape over static ports and covers left on pitot tubes – but these failings require SOPs other than an 80kt call. Then if the 80kt check is not for the ASI, then exactly how do you check for incapacitation, or do you assume the non response (mic selected off) is instant death ??!!
An air safety report? No, far too embarrassed at the time, although later there was an unproductive discussion on SOP wording with the chief pilot on the theme of what if.
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It may be worth noting that Boeing is evaluating the rejected takeoff flow and may as a consequence may eliminate the manual deployment of the speedbrake as oposed to the auto deplyoment with reverse thrust. In the past a carrier could go to Boeing and ask for an NTO regarding this facet of the rejected takeoff. For the last six+ years Boeing would not issue an NTO for this alternative procedure due to some previous accident investigation. Not sure how Qantas gets around this with the B737 but perhaps this is jut a FAA mandate and the Australian authorities look at it a different way. I must confess, I have fumbled with this procedure in the simulator on many occasions.
Also, IMHO, a Master Cautiion light is no reason to reject a takeoff when you are above 80Kts, unless you have specifically briefed it as such.
Also, IMHO, a Master Cautiion light is no reason to reject a takeoff when you are above 80Kts, unless you have specifically briefed it as such.
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all of you got it right...
we call out 80 kts for all those reasons, instrument x-check, possible incapacitation (or wake up call for those taking off on autopilot) and beggining of the high speed regime of take off run. We also call out, throttle hold.
Once we´ve said that the pf says "cross checked" meaning he took a look at his a/s indicator, fma, and stby a/s indicator. I believe the response is very important...wouldn´t be comfortable with an SOP calling for a response not necessary.
we call out 80 kts for all those reasons, instrument x-check, possible incapacitation (or wake up call for those taking off on autopilot) and beggining of the high speed regime of take off run. We also call out, throttle hold.
Once we´ve said that the pf says "cross checked" meaning he took a look at his a/s indicator, fma, and stby a/s indicator. I believe the response is very important...wouldn´t be comfortable with an SOP calling for a response not necessary.
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We happen to use Boeing for all of our initial and recurrent training so this little ditty was a result of one of those rec. training events. I did my "dearture briefing" as follows; I'll reject this take off for any reason prior to 80kts, between 80kts and V1, I'll reject for engine failure, fire, loss of directional control, and a windshear warning. etc. Well during that subsequent take off we had a generator drop off line at around 120kts. I rejected. During the post flight debrief the instructor reminded me that was not how I briefed the takeoff and in fact it was not a reason to reject the take off. Point well made.
We do call out 80kts and throttle hold on all departures, btw.
We do call out 80kts and throttle hold on all departures, btw.
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These days with high-tech Air Data modules and electronic displays there is surely little (no) chance of a difference in readings
With the fairly electronic Type for which I am responsible at present, we have had several aircraft snagged for just this over the past year or so ...
With the fairly electronic Type for which I am responsible at present, we have had several aircraft snagged for just this over the past year or so ...
