KAL whoops!
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>>Final 3 greens, so if we change Korean Air to say, Kimchee Air then their previous losses do not count? <<
Kinda like USAir became US Airways after five fatal crashes in five years. Or Valuejet morphed into AirTran after the fiery plunge at MIA.
Kinda like USAir became US Airways after five fatal crashes in five years. Or Valuejet morphed into AirTran after the fiery plunge at MIA.
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Innuendo
I simply stated a fact in answer to a question that you asked. Your argument may or may not be valid, don't know enough to agree/contest, but the fact is that BA did not lose a 707 over Mt Fuji, as it was formed about 8 years later, so Norman Stanley Fletcher's assertion was true and he should not do porridge for it.
Air bubba
I am not familiar with the transformations you mention, but can state as a fact that BA was formed by the British Government by amalgamating BOAC, BEA and a few other small airlines due to the implementation of a recommendation from the Edwards Committee report of 1969. This recommendation was based on creating a more efficient organisation with economies of scale.
I simply stated a fact in answer to a question that you asked. Your argument may or may not be valid, don't know enough to agree/contest, but the fact is that BA did not lose a 707 over Mt Fuji, as it was formed about 8 years later, so Norman Stanley Fletcher's assertion was true and he should not do porridge for it.
Air bubba
I am not familiar with the transformations you mention, but can state as a fact that BA was formed by the British Government by amalgamating BOAC, BEA and a few other small airlines due to the implementation of a recommendation from the Edwards Committee report of 1969. This recommendation was based on creating a more efficient organisation with economies of scale.
Last edited by Final 3 Greens; 22nd Sep 2002 at 19:05.
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We forgot to mention the Milan incident last month. Where a B744 freighter on the VOR approach into MXP, used the wrong mode inbound and headed for the ground setting off the GPWS but the crew ignored it and carried on. It was an expat skipper on the upper deck who was dead heading who ran into the flight deck and initiated a go around. The crew then tried to do the same again on the next approach!
The statistics game is running out of time.
The statistics game is running out of time.
Paxing All Over The World
lomapaseo: "Service sells ... safety doesn't"
I agree that, overall, it does not. All carriers are reluctant to use it for the fear of the next prang providing the media with even more horrible headlines.
However, Saftey does sell - for me. Service I can adjust to by eating before the flight and making sure that I have a bottle of water in my hand case. Saftey - I cannot touch and I willingly pay more money for a seat on a carrier that I trust. Or, trust more than the competition!
I agree that, overall, it does not. All carriers are reluctant to use it for the fear of the next prang providing the media with even more horrible headlines.
However, Saftey does sell - for me. Service I can adjust to by eating before the flight and making sure that I have a bottle of water in my hand case. Saftey - I cannot touch and I willingly pay more money for a seat on a carrier that I trust. Or, trust more than the competition!
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Amhart,
How are you today,
Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?
a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?
Thanks and with best regards
A.V.
How are you today,
Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?
a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?
Thanks and with best regards
A.V.
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To be honest I havent followed the KAL accident history, but Ive flown with lots of the cadets in their training facility in California.
What I saw were people with extreme disipline and will to excel.
The group pressure to succed were nothing like Ive expirienced before at other flight schools Ive worked at.
They have very good knowledge of general math&physics etc
What I didnt like with the program were the short time they had to complete zero to 255 hours (PVT thru COM INST ME).
They had only 9 months to do it all, and as you know, their english is usually quite weak when they arrive, so I can see how this seriously hampers performance later on in their careers.
Also, I noticed that they often use memorization to get good exam results but their knowledge are still quite high and well within what are the norm in USA.
Ive flown with Europeans and Americans for every level of certificate, and when it comes to work ethics noone ever came close to the KAL cadets.
What happens trainingwise when they come to Korea I do not know, but quite a few of the cadets in our group were born to be pilots.
Maybe something about the commandstructure?
The cadets that spoke of their future in KAL mentioned "years of doin nothing more than watching the captain flying the plane"
but they said that depended on the Captain.
Supposedly some of the ex military Captains had a dislike to the civilian trained pilots and will give them little practical expirience.
As I say, some of this info came from the KAL cadets, so how valid it is I dont know.
But, poor english and a tendecy to act from rote memory might be the main problem added with the command structure.
What I saw were people with extreme disipline and will to excel.
The group pressure to succed were nothing like Ive expirienced before at other flight schools Ive worked at.
They have very good knowledge of general math&physics etc
What I didnt like with the program were the short time they had to complete zero to 255 hours (PVT thru COM INST ME).
They had only 9 months to do it all, and as you know, their english is usually quite weak when they arrive, so I can see how this seriously hampers performance later on in their careers.
Also, I noticed that they often use memorization to get good exam results but their knowledge are still quite high and well within what are the norm in USA.
Ive flown with Europeans and Americans for every level of certificate, and when it comes to work ethics noone ever came close to the KAL cadets.
What happens trainingwise when they come to Korea I do not know, but quite a few of the cadets in our group were born to be pilots.
Maybe something about the commandstructure?
The cadets that spoke of their future in KAL mentioned "years of doin nothing more than watching the captain flying the plane"
but they said that depended on the Captain.
Supposedly some of the ex military Captains had a dislike to the civilian trained pilots and will give them little practical expirience.
As I say, some of this info came from the KAL cadets, so how valid it is I dont know.
But, poor english and a tendecy to act from rote memory might be the main problem added with the command structure.
N4790P
<We forgot to mention the Milan incident last month. Where a B744 freighter on the VOR approach into MXP, used the wrong mode inbound and headed for the ground setting off the GPWS but the crew ignored it and carried on. It was an expat skipper on the upper deck who was dead heading who ran into the flight deck and initiated a go around. The crew then tried to do the same again on the next approach!
The statistics game is running out of time>
Good job it wasn't a pax a/c with locked doors
The statistics game is running out of time>
Good job it wasn't a pax a/c with locked doors
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Iomapaseo:
Service sells......safety doesn't ??? Unfortunately you are right...sadly.
Unlikely to change.......
The Audit report has some valid points, but also includes quite a lot of nonsens. Definitely not work of a DL guy.
Probably a result of pressure to produce a lot of paper, or perhaps other pressure....in which case the author could have done all of us a favor by visiting the bathroom first.
Cheers
Service sells......safety doesn't ??? Unfortunately you are right...sadly.
Unlikely to change.......
The Audit report has some valid points, but also includes quite a lot of nonsens. Definitely not work of a DL guy.
Probably a result of pressure to produce a lot of paper, or perhaps other pressure....in which case the author could have done all of us a favor by visiting the bathroom first.
Cheers
Last edited by Avius; 30th Sep 2002 at 03:58.
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A.V. wrote:
Amhart
How are you today,
Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?
a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?
Thanks and with best regards
A.V.
Still waiting...
Amhart
How are you today,
Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?
a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?
Thanks and with best regards
A.V.
Still waiting...
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Eboy
The statistics you linked to are flawed and tend to exaggerate the values for airlines with a greater volume of flights. It may be that this was done unintentionally, or it may be that it was done so as to give some spread in those airlines who have had no recorded fatalities. Either way, it is not an appropriate measurement for comparison. In actual fact, there is no appropriate measure for comparison of individual airlines because the probability of a "fatal" flight is so small compared to the number of flights that most carriers perform.
The figures used are simply the difference between the expected number of fatal flights and the actual adjusted fatal flights. A brief dimensional analysis shows that this figure has "dimension" of "adjusted fatal flights" (for want of a better description) which is not independent of total flights for the airline and therefore does not give a fair comparison.
A better way of comparing would have been to simply divide the adjusted number of fatal flights by the number of flights. This yields a number which is equivalent to the probability of a fatality for a single passenger per million flights.
If you use this method, although it still shows all US carriers together have a net fatal accident rate (0.33) lower than European (0.37), the difference is not statistically significant, and can easily be attributed to random factors.
Interestingly, if you assume a normal distribution for fatal flights among airlines, there are only two airlines that fall outside the 95% probability for the figures being just as a result of random factors: China Airlines (marginal at 2.32 standard deviations from mean) and Cubana (weighing in at a massive 8.23 standard deviations from mean).
The figures used are simply the difference between the expected number of fatal flights and the actual adjusted fatal flights. A brief dimensional analysis shows that this figure has "dimension" of "adjusted fatal flights" (for want of a better description) which is not independent of total flights for the airline and therefore does not give a fair comparison.
A better way of comparing would have been to simply divide the adjusted number of fatal flights by the number of flights. This yields a number which is equivalent to the probability of a fatality for a single passenger per million flights.
If you use this method, although it still shows all US carriers together have a net fatal accident rate (0.33) lower than European (0.37), the difference is not statistically significant, and can easily be attributed to random factors.
Interestingly, if you assume a normal distribution for fatal flights among airlines, there are only two airlines that fall outside the 95% probability for the figures being just as a result of random factors: China Airlines (marginal at 2.32 standard deviations from mean) and Cubana (weighing in at a massive 8.23 standard deviations from mean).
Iconoclast
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As compared to what?
To: Covenant
Statistics can be bent in any direction depending on the point being made. What you have to do is compare the number of flight hours on a specific aircraft series and measure the MTBC (Mean time Between Crashes) or MTBF (Mean Time Between Fatalities) as guaranteed by the manufacturer in order to gain certification.
The FAA has a safety requirement that states that a system failure that is catastrophic and results in death of one or more passengers or crew can occur no more frequently that 1 10 9 or one time in a billion hours. The safety engineers at the airframe manufacturers can by the use of Boolean algebra show that a system failure that results in a single death will occur no more frequently than 1 10 12 all the way up to 1 10 17. This is a total sham and no system in the world can actually meet those figures. In fact there is no system that can meet the 1 10 9. The figures quoted are for the total flight hours for a fleet of the same type of aircraft. Some aircraft can’t even reach a total of a million hours before a fatal accident caused by system failure. Case in point is the 737, which had at least six or seven major rudder incidents and three fatal crashes for the same reason.
The airlines also perpetrate a sham on the flying public by tying their safety record to passenger seat miles. An airline can show that they have generated multi millions of passenger seat miles since their last accident and don’t tell the public that they may have only flown 20-25,000 total hours to generate the number of passenger seat miles quoted in their advertisements. The FAA requirement of catastrophic system failure rate of 1 10 9 is yet to be met on any aircraft presently flying any other types no longer in service.
When it comes to hours just think of this to put it in perspective. Jesus Christ was born about 17,537,520 hours ago.
Liars’ figure and figures lie.
Statistics can be bent in any direction depending on the point being made. What you have to do is compare the number of flight hours on a specific aircraft series and measure the MTBC (Mean time Between Crashes) or MTBF (Mean Time Between Fatalities) as guaranteed by the manufacturer in order to gain certification.
The FAA has a safety requirement that states that a system failure that is catastrophic and results in death of one or more passengers or crew can occur no more frequently that 1 10 9 or one time in a billion hours. The safety engineers at the airframe manufacturers can by the use of Boolean algebra show that a system failure that results in a single death will occur no more frequently than 1 10 12 all the way up to 1 10 17. This is a total sham and no system in the world can actually meet those figures. In fact there is no system that can meet the 1 10 9. The figures quoted are for the total flight hours for a fleet of the same type of aircraft. Some aircraft can’t even reach a total of a million hours before a fatal accident caused by system failure. Case in point is the 737, which had at least six or seven major rudder incidents and three fatal crashes for the same reason.
The airlines also perpetrate a sham on the flying public by tying their safety record to passenger seat miles. An airline can show that they have generated multi millions of passenger seat miles since their last accident and don’t tell the public that they may have only flown 20-25,000 total hours to generate the number of passenger seat miles quoted in their advertisements. The FAA requirement of catastrophic system failure rate of 1 10 9 is yet to be met on any aircraft presently flying any other types no longer in service.
When it comes to hours just think of this to put it in perspective. Jesus Christ was born about 17,537,520 hours ago.
Liars’ figure and figures lie.
>The FAA requirement of catastrophic system failure rate of 1 10 9 is yet to be met on any aircraft presently flying any other types no longer in service. <
Methinks that you are mixing apples and oranges. The cited accidents for the most part have nothing to do with violations of system safety which is meeting E-9 under 25.1309. Also I believe that the protection is against catastrophic consequences which is multiple fatalities, not just a single fatality.
Methinks that you are mixing apples and oranges. The cited accidents for the most part have nothing to do with violations of system safety which is meeting E-9 under 25.1309. Also I believe that the protection is against catastrophic consequences which is multiple fatalities, not just a single fatality.
Iconoclast
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Dead is dead whether it is 1 or 100
To: lomapaseo
Technically, you are correct. AC-25-1309 states the following: Between 10 7 to 10 9 fleet flight hours you can incur serious injury to or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupants as well as reduction of the aircraft capability or of the crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions.
From 10 9 and beyond it states; Prevention of continued safe flight of the aircraft to include loss of the aircraft and / or fatalities meaning, more than a relatively small proportion of the occupants.
However there is one problem. 1309 addresses the aircraft and it alludes to 10 9 applying to the aircraft. In actuality 10 9th applies to a system problem that can escalate upwards and cause loss of the aircraft. In my previous post I mentioned the use of Boolean algebra to determine the safety of a system going all the way up to 10 17th which is proved through the manipulation of reliability numbers that were derived from non representational data bases and massaged with K factors. In other words GIGO (Garbage in garbage out). If you applied the same logic to determining the safety of a large aircraft that may have as many as 30-35 systems that if they were to suffer a catastrophic failure it can be shown that at the aircraft level the safety is somewhere between 10 7 to 10 8 so now the aircraft potential for catastrophic failure is well below what 1309 requires yet the FAA does nothing about it.
Technically, you are correct. AC-25-1309 states the following: Between 10 7 to 10 9 fleet flight hours you can incur serious injury to or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupants as well as reduction of the aircraft capability or of the crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions.
From 10 9 and beyond it states; Prevention of continued safe flight of the aircraft to include loss of the aircraft and / or fatalities meaning, more than a relatively small proportion of the occupants.
However there is one problem. 1309 addresses the aircraft and it alludes to 10 9 applying to the aircraft. In actuality 10 9th applies to a system problem that can escalate upwards and cause loss of the aircraft. In my previous post I mentioned the use of Boolean algebra to determine the safety of a system going all the way up to 10 17th which is proved through the manipulation of reliability numbers that were derived from non representational data bases and massaged with K factors. In other words GIGO (Garbage in garbage out). If you applied the same logic to determining the safety of a large aircraft that may have as many as 30-35 systems that if they were to suffer a catastrophic failure it can be shown that at the aircraft level the safety is somewhere between 10 7 to 10 8 so now the aircraft potential for catastrophic failure is well below what 1309 requires yet the FAA does nothing about it.
>it can be shown that at the aircraft level the safety is somewhere between 10 7 to 10 8 so now the aircraft potential for catastrophic failure is well below what 1309 requires yet the FAA does nothing about it. <
Of course! Actually air travel is no better than about E-6 for all causes including the pilots, so why dump on the aircraft design that only makes up 10%
The FAA is just being practical in regulating what can be regulated (system safety under 1309). It wouldn't be very practical to require boolean calculations on fuel tank explosions where one doesn't forsee an ignition probability or on a rudder tearing off under overstress.
On the other hand this thread drift kind of supports the lack of statistical evidence that KAL is a lousy airline, but the piloting stories persist in spite.
Of course! Actually air travel is no better than about E-6 for all causes including the pilots, so why dump on the aircraft design that only makes up 10%
The FAA is just being practical in regulating what can be regulated (system safety under 1309). It wouldn't be very practical to require boolean calculations on fuel tank explosions where one doesn't forsee an ignition probability or on a rudder tearing off under overstress.
On the other hand this thread drift kind of supports the lack of statistical evidence that KAL is a lousy airline, but the piloting stories persist in spite.
Iconoclast
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Yeah but....
To: lomapaseo
If a proper FMECA (Failure Mode Effects Criticality Analysis) is performed many of the failures that do occur could be prevented. Case(s) in point: The thrust reverser on the Lauda Air 767, The rudder problem on the 737, the engine explosion on the 737 at Manchester, England as well as many others. TWA 800 could have been prevented if a complete safety hazard analysis were performed.
Another contributor to many crashes is the FAA’s requirement that the safety of a given component or system can be proven by test or analysis. In the case of the Lauda air crash Boeing had the opportunity to demonstrate a thrust reverser deployment during flight test. It was felt that it would be both expensive and it would place the aircraft in jeopardy so they ran a complete computer flow pattern analysis, which proved that the aerodynamic disruption would be survivable and could be controlled safely. In the case of the Sioux City DC-10 crash GE performed an analysis of the fan disc and it proved that it would never fail but their quality assurance program overlooked a flaw in the disc. P&W performed an analysis on the combustor can of one of their engines and that analysis proved the can would never fail. Since the engine would never have an explosive event, which is what was indicated in the P&W FMECA Boeing did not protect the underside of the wing of the 737. The result was in the Manchester catastrophe.
The system is extremely flawed and should be changed and the public should be made aware that commercial aircraft are not as safe as they could be.
One final point regarding the loss of the rudder on the AA A-300. Structures are not placed under FMECA or, Safety Hazards Analyses as it is felt that the static and dynamic tests of the structure prove that it has a reliability of 1. In other words, it will never fail under normal flight profiles.
The FAA is just being practical in regulating what can be regulated (system safety under 1309). It wouldn't be very practical to require boolean calculations on fuel tank explosions where one doesn't forsee an ignition probability or on a rudder tearing off under overstress.
Another contributor to many crashes is the FAA’s requirement that the safety of a given component or system can be proven by test or analysis. In the case of the Lauda air crash Boeing had the opportunity to demonstrate a thrust reverser deployment during flight test. It was felt that it would be both expensive and it would place the aircraft in jeopardy so they ran a complete computer flow pattern analysis, which proved that the aerodynamic disruption would be survivable and could be controlled safely. In the case of the Sioux City DC-10 crash GE performed an analysis of the fan disc and it proved that it would never fail but their quality assurance program overlooked a flaw in the disc. P&W performed an analysis on the combustor can of one of their engines and that analysis proved the can would never fail. Since the engine would never have an explosive event, which is what was indicated in the P&W FMECA Boeing did not protect the underside of the wing of the 737. The result was in the Manchester catastrophe.
The system is extremely flawed and should be changed and the public should be made aware that commercial aircraft are not as safe as they could be.
One final point regarding the loss of the rudder on the AA A-300. Structures are not placed under FMECA or, Safety Hazards Analyses as it is felt that the static and dynamic tests of the structure prove that it has a reliability of 1. In other words, it will never fail under normal flight profiles.
Last edited by Lu Zuckerman; 9th Oct 2002 at 13:31.
> Another contributor to many crashes is the FAA?s requirement that the safety of a given component or system can be proven by test or analysis. In the case of the Lauda air crash Boeing had the opportunity to demonstrate a thrust reverser deployment during flight test. It was felt that it would be both expensive and it would place the aircraft in jeopardy so they ran a complete computer flow pattern analysis, which proved that the aerodynamic disruption would be survivable and could be controlled safely. In the case of the Sioux City DC-10 crash GE performed an analysis of the fan disc and it proved that it would never fail but their quality assurance program overlooked a flaw in the disc. P&W performed an analysis on the combustor can of one of their engines and that analysis proved the can would never fail. Since the engine would never have an explosive event, which is what was indicated in the P&W FMECA Boeing did not protect the underside of the wing of the 737. The result was in the Manchester catastrophe. <
This stuff above is just plain wrong!
You are mixing a few facts with your faulted idea of what was wrong to support your idea that critical fault analysis could of/should have prevented these accidents. You must have eyes in your backside to see things so clearly post accident. If things were really thought to never fail than there would have been no need for the manufacturers to have issued Service Bulletins against the possible malfunction before these accidents.
This stuff above is just plain wrong!
You are mixing a few facts with your faulted idea of what was wrong to support your idea that critical fault analysis could of/should have prevented these accidents. You must have eyes in your backside to see things so clearly post accident. If things were really thought to never fail than there would have been no need for the manufacturers to have issued Service Bulletins against the possible malfunction before these accidents.
Iconoclast
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Yeah, but what about....?
To: lomapaseo
The point is that equipment’s, appliances, subsystems and systems fail at a rate far lower than what is predicted in the reliability analyses. The figures derived in the reliability analyses feed into the preparation of the FMECAs and are factored into the safety hazard analysis, which is the basis for certification. If the figures used in the Reliability analyses are not accurate an /or are very optimistic then any element of the analytical process is contaminated and therefore is not a realistic representation of the ultimate safety and /or reliability of the system under analysis. When these contaminated optimistic figures are entered into the hazard analysis and then massaged using Boolean algebra the manufacturer can show that his systems safety far exceeds the safety requirements established by the certification authorities.
The basic rule of reliability, from an FAA perspective, is that if a part fails at a rate higher than predicted a service bulletin it issued and the manufacturer of the component goes back to square 1 and the failure is not chargeable even if it resulted in a crash.
The fact that the manufacturer promulgates service bulletins goes to prove that the component was not properly analyzed for potential defects and that problems arise that were either not predicted or there is another defect in the manufacturing and quality assurance in the manufacturer of that component. All of these things can be predicted and many of them most likely were but the manufacturer declined to incorporate the necessary changes in the part or the manufacturing process or the quality program. In most instances it is to save money and time.
As far as having eyes in my backside I have often been accused of having my head up my butt. However, the real reason I make the charges that I do is because I have been a Reliability, Maintainability and Systems Safety Engineer since 1968 and for thirteen years prior to that I worked in various engineering positions in the aerospace industry. I have seen it all. I have complained loudly and I have experienced the rebuff of engineering when I made a valid suggestion relative to the design. My fellow RMS engineers have often told me to be quiet as not to shake the boat. Their reasoning was that it puts bread and butter on the table. I personally don’t subscribe to that position. That is why I shoot my mouth off on technical forums such as PPRune.
You are mixing a few facts with your faulted idea of what was wrong to support your idea that critical fault analysis could of/should have prevented these accidents. You must have eyes in your backside to see things so clearly post accident. If things were really thought to never fail than there would have been no need for the manufacturers to have issued Service Bulletins against the possible malfunction before these accidents.
The basic rule of reliability, from an FAA perspective, is that if a part fails at a rate higher than predicted a service bulletin it issued and the manufacturer of the component goes back to square 1 and the failure is not chargeable even if it resulted in a crash.
The fact that the manufacturer promulgates service bulletins goes to prove that the component was not properly analyzed for potential defects and that problems arise that were either not predicted or there is another defect in the manufacturing and quality assurance in the manufacturer of that component. All of these things can be predicted and many of them most likely were but the manufacturer declined to incorporate the necessary changes in the part or the manufacturing process or the quality program. In most instances it is to save money and time.
As far as having eyes in my backside I have often been accused of having my head up my butt. However, the real reason I make the charges that I do is because I have been a Reliability, Maintainability and Systems Safety Engineer since 1968 and for thirteen years prior to that I worked in various engineering positions in the aerospace industry. I have seen it all. I have complained loudly and I have experienced the rebuff of engineering when I made a valid suggestion relative to the design. My fellow RMS engineers have often told me to be quiet as not to shake the boat. Their reasoning was that it puts bread and butter on the table. I personally don’t subscribe to that position. That is why I shoot my mouth off on technical forums such as PPRune.