A 380 (Merged)
Originally Posted by lomapaseo
Not a very significant statement. The idea behind certification is to certify it safe today. New concepts need apply today's knowledge both in their design and certification. Old concepts which have seasoned experience under continued airworthiness review certainly have less questions to answer.
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Originally Posted by Volume
Even if this statement would be an engineering statement, and no marketing statement (called lie before political correctness became popular), it is still half of the truth.
Of course a structure designed and certified per 1960s rules is much lighter than a modern one. Different crashworthiness requirements, damage tolerant structure, larger rapid decompression hole size, different uncontained engine failure rules etc. costs weight and gains safety. Of course a 1960s Renault 4 is lighter per passenger seat than a 2006 Renault Megane, but would you buy one today, if you could ? Even if it would be equiped with a 21st century fuel economic engine and tinted glass windows ?
Of course a structure designed and certified per 1960s rules is much lighter than a modern one. Different crashworthiness requirements, damage tolerant structure, larger rapid decompression hole size, different uncontained engine failure rules etc. costs weight and gains safety. Of course a 1960s Renault 4 is lighter per passenger seat than a 2006 Renault Megane, but would you buy one today, if you could ? Even if it would be equiped with a 21st century fuel economic engine and tinted glass windows ?
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Havent they already got an order in for A380(F)......?
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles...passenger.html
Originally Posted by Groundloop
Boeing managed to get the 737NG certified as a variant of previous 737s, even with a completely new wing. If they had had to meet the latest requirements significant changes would have had to have been made to the fuselage to meet emergency exit requirements. Compare the exits on an A321 (certified under newer requirements) with those on the 737-800 and 737-900 which used old 737 "grandfather rights".
Not true. The B737-800 met the same standards as the A321 albeit not in the same way. The regulations in an attempt to permit novel or new concepts, do accept alternate means of compliance as long as there is no loss of comparitive safety. However, where new and novel design approaches are employed, such alternate means or equivalency may have to be published beforehand for public comment. This was done via the Federal register and coments for and against were recieved. After review of these coments the FAA found that the equivalent or alternate means of compliance met or exceeded the basis of the rule for the B737-800.
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From the original article "For example, the A380 is the first airliner to incorporate a complex electronic "central nervous system" - dubbed the network server system - and is also the first to feature electrically operated passenger doors "
Central nervous system- what like the ASCB-D on primus Epic systems?
electrically operated passenger doors - what like the L1011?
Not much new stuff really.
Central nervous system- what like the ASCB-D on primus Epic systems?
electrically operated passenger doors - what like the L1011?
Not much new stuff really.
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I think the 744 was certified as a new type
The
FAA 747 TCDS Nr. A20WE clearly shows, that all 747 variants are one type design, and the 747-8 most probably also will be.
Check page 15 and 16 for the new paragraphs, special conditions and excemptions introduced for the 747-400.
747-400 (continued):
Certification Basis: Part 25 of the FAR, effective February 1, 1965, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-59
with the following exceptions:
SECTION NO. TITLE THRU AMDT.25-
25.107 Takeoff speeds 41
25.109 Accelerate-stop distance 41
25.149 Minimum control speed 41
25.251 Vibration and buffeting 22
25.305 Strength and deformation 22
25.331 General 45
25.351 Yawing conditions 45
25.365 Pressurized cabin loads 53
25.571 Damage-tolerance and fatigue
evaluation of structure 9
25.607 Fasteners 22
25.631 Bird Strike damage (NA)**
25.657 Hinges 22
25.675 Stops 37
25.683 Operation tests 22
25.772 Pilot compartment doors 46
25.773(b)(2)(ii) Pilot Compartment View 72
25.783 Doors 53
25.785 Seats, berths, safety belts, harnesses 50
25.787 Stowage Compartments 31
25.789 Retention of items of mass in passenger
and crew compartments 45
25.809 Emergency exit arrangement 45
25.812 Emergency lighting 31
25.832 Cabin ozone concentration (NA)**
25.858 Cargo compartment fire detections systems (NA)**
25.1103 Induction system ducts and air duct systems 45
25.1401 Anticollision light system 26
25.1438 Pressurization and pneumatic systems (NA)**
25.1529 Instructions for continued airworthiness (NA)**
etc.
So the 747 essentially is a 1960s design meeting 1960s safety standards.
Originally Posted by Volume
.......
So the 747 essentially is a 1960s design meeting 1960s safety standards.
So the 747 essentially is a 1960s design meeting 1960s safety standards.
In today's light it no doubt operates under numerous continued airworthiness advancements. These lessons learned as well as all approriate AD,s will no doubt be applied to any similar new designs.
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This in Latest Spectator Magazine
A superjumbo-sized monument to Euro-folly
George Trefgarne
Jacques Chirac hit the nail on the head in 2002 when he opened a factory making components for the Airbus A380. The aircraft was, he said, ‘A symbol of what Europe can achieve.’ I could not put it better myself. As the vast 550-seat superjumbo wowed the crowd at Farnborough Air Show this week, there was no mistaking its significance. Conceived by French and German politicians; bureaucratic, expensive and dogged by scandal — the A380 is indeed a wonderful monument to the European Union.
In fact, so short is this engineering marvel on market logic that there is a small but distinct risk that it could bring down not only Airbus and its Franco–German parent company EADS, but the struggling premiership of the bouffant-haired Dominique de Villepin. There have already been some nasty scenes in the French parliament. And if that is not enough, Airbus could even ignite a vicious transatlantic trade war.
How appropriate, then, that Labour has got its fingerprints all over this Dome-with-wings. The DTI has spent the past four years trumpeting the government’s involvement, not least the provision of £780 million of launch aid to Airbus and engine-maker Rolls-Royce, in the form of ‘soft’ loans at below-market interest rates. Airbus is also the biggest customer of the Export Credits Guarantee Department, a quango which underwrites export orders. Last year it underwrote orders for 50 aircraft, a third of all its business. Airlines often go bust, which means the ECGD can suddenly find itself in possession of aircraft: according to its latest report and accounts it is now looking for buyers for 10 planes, though it does not reveal how many are Airbuses. Not content with that, Alistair Darling, the Trade and Industry Secretary, plans to appoint a director to the EADS board to ‘safeguard’ Britain’s interests. That, of course, is another characteristic of a Euro-project: the desire of successive British governments to jump on the careering bandwagon.
At Farnborough the punters were optimistic that Airbus would survive. Most of them agreed with the arch-optimist Tony Blair, who said at the unveiling of the A380 last year, ‘This is the most exciting new aircraft in the world, a symbol of economic strength and technical innovation. Above all, it is a symbol of confidence that we can compete and win in the global market.’ The show is attended by aircraft nuts who regard an overspend or delay in a project as par for the course. They have learnt through long experience that aerospace companies are inherently political and they remember that only a short time ago Boeing was mired in corruption and a bonking scandal. For them, there is something romantic about the A380 and the bold vision it represents.
But things look pretty dire. Two months ago BAE Systems, the company still known as British Aerospace to most people, announced it was going to sell its 20 per cent stake in Airbus. The rest of Airbus is owned by EADS, a company quoted in Paris and Frankfurt but part-owned by the French government. I remember thinking at the time, ‘Hello, what does Mike Turner [BAE’s feisty chief executive] know?’
For a moment, I thought it might have something to do with the Clearstream affair in France. An Airbus executive had been arrested for spreading a rumour that various public figures, including Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister, had taken kickbacks on a defence deal. Sarkozy was cleared. There was no connection with BAE’s decision to sell. Silly me, that was just a sideshow.
The more likely reason emerged a few weeks later, when EADS announced that the aircraft on which Airbus had bet the farm, the A380, would be delayed by six months due to problems with its electrics. EADS shares plunged by a third. Poor old BAE looked as if it would receive less for its stake than the £2.5 billion the City expected. This was confirmed a few weeks later when N.M. Rothschild, the merchant bank, independently assessed the stake to be worth less than £2 billion.
Ever since then, everyone has been speculating about what N.M. Rothschild found. Its report is confidential, but the best guess is that it discovered Airbus’s figures to have been flattered by hedging contracts taken out to protect the company against currency swings, and by advances taken from customers for planes not yet delivered.
Events have since moved rapidly. It emerged that Noel Forgeard, one of the co-chief executives of EADS (under its charter one chief is French, the other German) had sold millions of euros worth of shares before the announcement of the A 380 delay. Forgeard, a former aide to Chirac, has now resigned — with three years’ salary, worth E6 million, in his pocket — and is being investigated. He has been replaced by Louis Gallois, head of France’s railways. And a law suit has been filed by French investors claiming that 150 other Airbus executives sold EADS shares just before the delays were revealed to the market.
But the politically significant, super-jumbo of a question is: what happens now? Not only is the A380 late, but orders for Airbus’s other aircraft have collapsed to half the level of Boeing’s. The real runaway success of the airline market is the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, which is much smaller than the A380 and, critically, more fuel-efficient. For the gas-guzzling A380 was conceived when oil was cheap and green politics was not even a twinkle in David Cameron’s eye. Furthermore, the A380 is so enormous that huge upgrades to airport terminals and baggage-handling areas are required to accommodate it. One tenth of the cost of Terminal Five at Heathrow has gone on modifications for the Airbus behemoth. Boeing reckons that, because of these costs imposed on airport operators, there simply is not a big market for such an aircraft.
So how could Airbus make such a strategic error? The answer is that it is, as the man said, a classic Euro-scheme. No ordinary company, responsible to ordinary shareholders, would hazard its capital on such a risky project as the A380. But this is no ordinary company. According to the US trade representative, Susan Schwab, Airbus has been subsidised to the tune of $40 billion of ‘launch aid’ since it was formed in 1967. Two years ago, the US complained to the World Trade Organisation about state loans to Airbus. Airbus counter-claimed, saying Boeing was effectively subsidised by military and Nasa contracts and grants from its home state, Washington. That row is still bubbling away.
The A380 was the sort of project Labour could not resist. More than 10,000 people work in Airbus factories making wings at Broughton in North Wales and Filton near Bristol. And a small grant from the Welsh Assembly last year triggered a second complaint from the Americans to the WTO.
But Airbus desperately needs more ‘launch aid’ to save the company and to take on the Boeing Dreamliner with a modernised version of the A350 that was being puffed at Farnborough. It is also working on the A400M, a huge transport aircraft for those European air forces that don’t like American planes. Airbus faces development costs of billions (it could sink as much as £6 billion into the A350) and will be hard pressed to raise the funds in the capital markets, given the A380 fiasco. This means it must again go cap in hand to the treasuries of Berlin, Paris, London and even Madrid.
What do the Americans think of that? A spokesman for the US trade representative’s office says, ‘The USA has made it clear for over two years now that launch aid is unacceptable. We will litigate our case with the WTO if necessary.’ Without launch aid, Airbus will be crushed by Boeing; with launch aid, Airbus faces a shock-and-awe offensive by the Americans at the WTO. What a fine Euro-mess indeed!
A superjumbo-sized monument to Euro-folly
George Trefgarne
Jacques Chirac hit the nail on the head in 2002 when he opened a factory making components for the Airbus A380. The aircraft was, he said, ‘A symbol of what Europe can achieve.’ I could not put it better myself. As the vast 550-seat superjumbo wowed the crowd at Farnborough Air Show this week, there was no mistaking its significance. Conceived by French and German politicians; bureaucratic, expensive and dogged by scandal — the A380 is indeed a wonderful monument to the European Union.
In fact, so short is this engineering marvel on market logic that there is a small but distinct risk that it could bring down not only Airbus and its Franco–German parent company EADS, but the struggling premiership of the bouffant-haired Dominique de Villepin. There have already been some nasty scenes in the French parliament. And if that is not enough, Airbus could even ignite a vicious transatlantic trade war.
How appropriate, then, that Labour has got its fingerprints all over this Dome-with-wings. The DTI has spent the past four years trumpeting the government’s involvement, not least the provision of £780 million of launch aid to Airbus and engine-maker Rolls-Royce, in the form of ‘soft’ loans at below-market interest rates. Airbus is also the biggest customer of the Export Credits Guarantee Department, a quango which underwrites export orders. Last year it underwrote orders for 50 aircraft, a third of all its business. Airlines often go bust, which means the ECGD can suddenly find itself in possession of aircraft: according to its latest report and accounts it is now looking for buyers for 10 planes, though it does not reveal how many are Airbuses. Not content with that, Alistair Darling, the Trade and Industry Secretary, plans to appoint a director to the EADS board to ‘safeguard’ Britain’s interests. That, of course, is another characteristic of a Euro-project: the desire of successive British governments to jump on the careering bandwagon.
At Farnborough the punters were optimistic that Airbus would survive. Most of them agreed with the arch-optimist Tony Blair, who said at the unveiling of the A380 last year, ‘This is the most exciting new aircraft in the world, a symbol of economic strength and technical innovation. Above all, it is a symbol of confidence that we can compete and win in the global market.’ The show is attended by aircraft nuts who regard an overspend or delay in a project as par for the course. They have learnt through long experience that aerospace companies are inherently political and they remember that only a short time ago Boeing was mired in corruption and a bonking scandal. For them, there is something romantic about the A380 and the bold vision it represents.
But things look pretty dire. Two months ago BAE Systems, the company still known as British Aerospace to most people, announced it was going to sell its 20 per cent stake in Airbus. The rest of Airbus is owned by EADS, a company quoted in Paris and Frankfurt but part-owned by the French government. I remember thinking at the time, ‘Hello, what does Mike Turner [BAE’s feisty chief executive] know?’
For a moment, I thought it might have something to do with the Clearstream affair in France. An Airbus executive had been arrested for spreading a rumour that various public figures, including Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister, had taken kickbacks on a defence deal. Sarkozy was cleared. There was no connection with BAE’s decision to sell. Silly me, that was just a sideshow.
The more likely reason emerged a few weeks later, when EADS announced that the aircraft on which Airbus had bet the farm, the A380, would be delayed by six months due to problems with its electrics. EADS shares plunged by a third. Poor old BAE looked as if it would receive less for its stake than the £2.5 billion the City expected. This was confirmed a few weeks later when N.M. Rothschild, the merchant bank, independently assessed the stake to be worth less than £2 billion.
Ever since then, everyone has been speculating about what N.M. Rothschild found. Its report is confidential, but the best guess is that it discovered Airbus’s figures to have been flattered by hedging contracts taken out to protect the company against currency swings, and by advances taken from customers for planes not yet delivered.
Events have since moved rapidly. It emerged that Noel Forgeard, one of the co-chief executives of EADS (under its charter one chief is French, the other German) had sold millions of euros worth of shares before the announcement of the A 380 delay. Forgeard, a former aide to Chirac, has now resigned — with three years’ salary, worth E6 million, in his pocket — and is being investigated. He has been replaced by Louis Gallois, head of France’s railways. And a law suit has been filed by French investors claiming that 150 other Airbus executives sold EADS shares just before the delays were revealed to the market.
But the politically significant, super-jumbo of a question is: what happens now? Not only is the A380 late, but orders for Airbus’s other aircraft have collapsed to half the level of Boeing’s. The real runaway success of the airline market is the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, which is much smaller than the A380 and, critically, more fuel-efficient. For the gas-guzzling A380 was conceived when oil was cheap and green politics was not even a twinkle in David Cameron’s eye. Furthermore, the A380 is so enormous that huge upgrades to airport terminals and baggage-handling areas are required to accommodate it. One tenth of the cost of Terminal Five at Heathrow has gone on modifications for the Airbus behemoth. Boeing reckons that, because of these costs imposed on airport operators, there simply is not a big market for such an aircraft.
So how could Airbus make such a strategic error? The answer is that it is, as the man said, a classic Euro-scheme. No ordinary company, responsible to ordinary shareholders, would hazard its capital on such a risky project as the A380. But this is no ordinary company. According to the US trade representative, Susan Schwab, Airbus has been subsidised to the tune of $40 billion of ‘launch aid’ since it was formed in 1967. Two years ago, the US complained to the World Trade Organisation about state loans to Airbus. Airbus counter-claimed, saying Boeing was effectively subsidised by military and Nasa contracts and grants from its home state, Washington. That row is still bubbling away.
The A380 was the sort of project Labour could not resist. More than 10,000 people work in Airbus factories making wings at Broughton in North Wales and Filton near Bristol. And a small grant from the Welsh Assembly last year triggered a second complaint from the Americans to the WTO.
But Airbus desperately needs more ‘launch aid’ to save the company and to take on the Boeing Dreamliner with a modernised version of the A350 that was being puffed at Farnborough. It is also working on the A400M, a huge transport aircraft for those European air forces that don’t like American planes. Airbus faces development costs of billions (it could sink as much as £6 billion into the A350) and will be hard pressed to raise the funds in the capital markets, given the A380 fiasco. This means it must again go cap in hand to the treasuries of Berlin, Paris, London and even Madrid.
What do the Americans think of that? A spokesman for the US trade representative’s office says, ‘The USA has made it clear for over two years now that launch aid is unacceptable. We will litigate our case with the WTO if necessary.’ Without launch aid, Airbus will be crushed by Boeing; with launch aid, Airbus faces a shock-and-awe offensive by the Americans at the WTO. What a fine Euro-mess indeed!
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"So the 747 essentially is a 1960s design meeting 1960s safety standards."
I think you would be hard pressed to find many individual Regulations within FAR 25 with an Amended Date in the '60's. Case in point - the 737 NG - though a Derivative Certified under FAR 25 - still ended up with WET Certified Takeoff Performance Numbers.
It's a bit of a stretch to say that because some parts of FAR 25 originated in the '60's - even though it has continuously changed - any airplane Certified by it is a 60's vintage A/C. It's an evolving document.
BTW - I don't intend to imply that FAR 25 is a perfect document.
Regards,
LK
I think you would be hard pressed to find many individual Regulations within FAR 25 with an Amended Date in the '60's. Case in point - the 737 NG - though a Derivative Certified under FAR 25 - still ended up with WET Certified Takeoff Performance Numbers.
It's a bit of a stretch to say that because some parts of FAR 25 originated in the '60's - even though it has continuously changed - any airplane Certified by it is a 60's vintage A/C. It's an evolving document.
BTW - I don't intend to imply that FAR 25 is a perfect document.
Regards,
LK
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Tail dragger...
Just to add insult to injury your choice of 911 was particularly poor...as from its introduction in 1965 until the last of the air cooled cars in 1997 they were essentailly the same car... the tub being pretty much interchangeable.. as were to the roof panels and other items...after that the water cooled 996 model was a totally new car....and sadly does not look like a 911 at all....
(the 956 was a Group C racer as well.. I know you meant the 356)
Just to add insult to injury your choice of 911 was particularly poor...as from its introduction in 1965 until the last of the air cooled cars in 1997 they were essentailly the same car... the tub being pretty much interchangeable.. as were to the roof panels and other items...after that the water cooled 996 model was a totally new car....and sadly does not look like a 911 at all....
(the 956 was a Group C racer as well.. I know you meant the 356)
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A380 Delays
Real reason - Airports not ready for this A/C?
Wouldn't be in the interests of the Manufactor and Airlines to have a few more than 4 airports available for operational service of this A/C. Surely this is the real reason for the delays.
Wouldn't be in the interests of the Manufactor and Airlines to have a few more than 4 airports available for operational service of this A/C. Surely this is the real reason for the delays.
Originally Posted by Capt Groper
Real reason - Airports not ready for this A/C?
Wouldn't be in the interests of the Manufactor and Airlines to have a few more than 4 airports available for operational service of this A/C. Surely this is the real reason for the delays.
Wouldn't be in the interests of the Manufactor and Airlines to have a few more than 4 airports available for operational service of this A/C. Surely this is the real reason for the delays.
To me it's not a case of having the airport lined up first. It's a case of the airlines identifying the proposed route and then negotiating with the airport. I would also ignore any utterance of a single US congressman as they don't always reflect the will of the people who fly.
Paxing All Over The World
harpic this is typical of any large project.
It seems as if the author has not read about ther 747? Boeing 'bet the farm' and very nearly lost. They had PanAm with them and they won trhough. I expect that the A380 will do likewise. The differance is that, 40 years on, the costs, regulatory issues, technology, stakes and publcity are 100% higher. I pick the figure as a mere example, it could well be 1,000% higher.
Forty years ago, business reporting was not so public but, due in part to the expansion of share ownership, many more people are interested. Also, business, governments and national prosperity have become very much more closely linked. The news media now report business matters in a totally different way. For example, the the main TV/radio news bulletins carry the daily close of the UK and US stock markets, as well as currency variations. There are other factors too, of course, such as the EU itself but Boeing did not have anything like the same level of public scrutiny.
I would imagine that from first test flight to being sure that the 747 was a success must have been ten years or more? Fortunately for people selling articles to magazines (be they right wing like The Spectator or any other) most folks are interested in the short term only. By the way, this is not an aplogy of the stupid and selfish behaviour of the senior mgmt of EADS and Airbus.
Let us not forget that Boeing said that there was no market for a machine of the A380 size. Now the 748i is going to be larger than anything they have done before. Catch up time?
So how could Airbus make such a strategic error? The answer is that it is, as the man said, a classic Euro-scheme. No ordinary company, responsible to ordinary shareholders, would hazard its capital on such a risky project as the A380.
Forty years ago, business reporting was not so public but, due in part to the expansion of share ownership, many more people are interested. Also, business, governments and national prosperity have become very much more closely linked. The news media now report business matters in a totally different way. For example, the the main TV/radio news bulletins carry the daily close of the UK and US stock markets, as well as currency variations. There are other factors too, of course, such as the EU itself but Boeing did not have anything like the same level of public scrutiny.
I would imagine that from first test flight to being sure that the 747 was a success must have been ten years or more? Fortunately for people selling articles to magazines (be they right wing like The Spectator or any other) most folks are interested in the short term only. By the way, this is not an aplogy of the stupid and selfish behaviour of the senior mgmt of EADS and Airbus.
Let us not forget that Boeing said that there was no market for a machine of the A380 size. Now the 748i is going to be larger than anything they have done before. Catch up time?
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This thread is really humerous.
Boeing didn't build an SST in the 70's because they knew the aircraft would have to be subsidized, just like the Concord was.
Status is expensive.
Stretching the 747 is just "meeting the market". Good business. Let AirBus spend the development money to "dazzel the masses" with, what appears to be at this point, the White Elephant, but I'm sure more EU tax subsidies can fix it.
The A-380 is just another 60's technology aircraft.
If it burns kerosene, its a 60's technology aircraft.
Put all the wires and computers in it you want, but it "ain't no different" than any other widebody, just bigger.
Maybe they should market the A-380 as a "kit aircraft" and save the overtaxed EU members money and grief.
More seats and bigger engines doesn't make it any different than any other current aircraft on the market.
Todays papers are, again, spouting the A-350 as having Singapore Airlines placing orders. Wonder how many AirBus had to give away to get that headline.
AirBus is so political that its laughable. Anytime politics run businesses you end up having Alitalia's and Aeroflots.
Boeing has been "doing this" a long time gentlemen. They seem the only ones who aren't hysterical.
Boeing just plugs along, selling airplanes and making profits, without burdening the hard working citizens.
Boeing didn't build an SST in the 70's because they knew the aircraft would have to be subsidized, just like the Concord was.
Status is expensive.
Stretching the 747 is just "meeting the market". Good business. Let AirBus spend the development money to "dazzel the masses" with, what appears to be at this point, the White Elephant, but I'm sure more EU tax subsidies can fix it.
The A-380 is just another 60's technology aircraft.
If it burns kerosene, its a 60's technology aircraft.
Put all the wires and computers in it you want, but it "ain't no different" than any other widebody, just bigger.
Maybe they should market the A-380 as a "kit aircraft" and save the overtaxed EU members money and grief.
More seats and bigger engines doesn't make it any different than any other current aircraft on the market.
Todays papers are, again, spouting the A-350 as having Singapore Airlines placing orders. Wonder how many AirBus had to give away to get that headline.
AirBus is so political that its laughable. Anytime politics run businesses you end up having Alitalia's and Aeroflots.
Boeing has been "doing this" a long time gentlemen. They seem the only ones who aren't hysterical.
Boeing just plugs along, selling airplanes and making profits, without burdening the hard working citizens.
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Problems facing the operation of a380?
yea yea, the A380 is what? most of these allegations are unfounded, the a380 will operate anywhere the B747 can, it's just rumours, oh sorry we are on the rumour network!
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A380 Build Problems
Boeing's being quiet for several reasons, I'm sure. But one of them must be that they're concerned that the 'build sequence' issues that A380 is suffering from will happen to the 787.
Boeing's strategy of pushing the subassembly build back up the supplier foodchain (so that they can put the big bits together in a few days once they get to Everett) was and is ambitious - perhaps even more so than the similar arrangements that Airbus have for the 380. While I was attending build planning meetings at Boeing over a year ago there was a steady drift of work sliding from the supplier locations down the build sequence line toward final assembly in Washington. Effort was being applied to having this drift 'caught' at the intermediate build locations before shipping to Everett.
But this work will continue to slide downhill - and there will be a great deal of out-of-sequence work done on the first 50+ 787's. This was being planned for, in the same way that Airbus planned for it. Airbus didn't get it right - and Boeing may not either.
Boeing's strategy of pushing the subassembly build back up the supplier foodchain (so that they can put the big bits together in a few days once they get to Everett) was and is ambitious - perhaps even more so than the similar arrangements that Airbus have for the 380. While I was attending build planning meetings at Boeing over a year ago there was a steady drift of work sliding from the supplier locations down the build sequence line toward final assembly in Washington. Effort was being applied to having this drift 'caught' at the intermediate build locations before shipping to Everett.
But this work will continue to slide downhill - and there will be a great deal of out-of-sequence work done on the first 50+ 787's. This was being planned for, in the same way that Airbus planned for it. Airbus didn't get it right - and Boeing may not either.
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Now more problems...
AND now fuselage problems....(from Yahoo news)
BERLIN (AFP) - New problems have been detected on Airbus's giant A380 super jumbo jet, adding to the woes of the fledging aircraft which is already afflicted with wiring problems.
Problems with section 19 of the fuselage were detected during trial flights in Toulouse, southern France, according to an internal Airbus document, the weekly Der Spiegel reported in its edition which goes on sale Monday.
No details were given on the nature of the problem.
The European aircraft manufacturer decided in early March to reinforce section 19, the aft cone of the fuselage, Der Spiegel reported.
Deliveries of the A380, the biggest commercial aircraft in the world, have been severely delayed.
The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which owns 80 percent of Airbus announced in June that deliveries would be delayed by six to seven months because of a production problem involving wiring connections.
Only nine of the aircraft would be delivered in 2007, seriously affecting the EADS's financial results.
The double-decker plane is designed to carry 555 to 840 passengers, about 35 percent more than the Boeing B747. To date, 16 airline companies have ordered 168 of the super jumbo jets.
BERLIN (AFP) - New problems have been detected on Airbus's giant A380 super jumbo jet, adding to the woes of the fledging aircraft which is already afflicted with wiring problems.
Problems with section 19 of the fuselage were detected during trial flights in Toulouse, southern France, according to an internal Airbus document, the weekly Der Spiegel reported in its edition which goes on sale Monday.
No details were given on the nature of the problem.
The European aircraft manufacturer decided in early March to reinforce section 19, the aft cone of the fuselage, Der Spiegel reported.
Deliveries of the A380, the biggest commercial aircraft in the world, have been severely delayed.
The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which owns 80 percent of Airbus announced in June that deliveries would be delayed by six to seven months because of a production problem involving wiring connections.
Only nine of the aircraft would be delivered in 2007, seriously affecting the EADS's financial results.
The double-decker plane is designed to carry 555 to 840 passengers, about 35 percent more than the Boeing B747. To date, 16 airline companies have ordered 168 of the super jumbo jets.
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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I'm still quite surprised by the level of optimism shown by A380 supporters, who are noticeably fewer these days!.
All the following was here, on PPRuNe, over a year ago so it not in anyway influenced by recent events.
Airbus thought they would produce and market a B747 replacement, with a similar market to the B747. Boeing had serious doubts about the commercial viability of an Extra Large Aircraft (ELA) and offered Airbus a Boeing/Airbus consortium which Airbus declined and said they would continue with the A380 on their own. Shortly after that decision Boeing cancelled their plans for an A380 competitor.
Airbus did not accept that the B747 replacement was already defined in the shape of the B777 and to a lesser extent the A330, despite airlines like BA and SIA ordering the B777 in large numbers and reducing their B747-400 fleet by equally large numbers.
The A380 has only a niche market. The airlines will, of course, welcome the arrival of the aircraft, provided in remains fully supported. They have specific routes they want to use it on, the UK-Australia route for one, but they will never order it in the same quantities as they did the B747-400, BA and SIA won't have fleets as large as their previous B747-400 fleets at their peak, they and others like them only require the A380 in relatively small numbers.
Originally Airbus said they needed 269 sales, I believe, to break even but since that figure was announced they have had major budget overrun and major penalty payments to customers to cost in, not to mention the discounts they will have offered launch customers just to get the order book going. How many orders to date? After Farnborough still less than 200 and they are mired in technical difficulties still. It is highly unlikely they will ever reach their original break even number of aircraft let alone what the revised number must now be, closer to 500 aircraft I would suspect. Boeing, on the other hand, will still be able to produce a relatively small number of B747-800 to fill the 500 seat long haul requirement and still make a profit as so much of the aircraft is already tried, tested and above all has passenger appeal.
Technically the A380 may be ahead of the market in many respects but it is leading Airbus Industries into very serious financial trouble and commercially the A380 is a dead duck.
All the following was here, on PPRuNe, over a year ago so it not in anyway influenced by recent events.
Airbus thought they would produce and market a B747 replacement, with a similar market to the B747. Boeing had serious doubts about the commercial viability of an Extra Large Aircraft (ELA) and offered Airbus a Boeing/Airbus consortium which Airbus declined and said they would continue with the A380 on their own. Shortly after that decision Boeing cancelled their plans for an A380 competitor.
Airbus did not accept that the B747 replacement was already defined in the shape of the B777 and to a lesser extent the A330, despite airlines like BA and SIA ordering the B777 in large numbers and reducing their B747-400 fleet by equally large numbers.
The A380 has only a niche market. The airlines will, of course, welcome the arrival of the aircraft, provided in remains fully supported. They have specific routes they want to use it on, the UK-Australia route for one, but they will never order it in the same quantities as they did the B747-400, BA and SIA won't have fleets as large as their previous B747-400 fleets at their peak, they and others like them only require the A380 in relatively small numbers.
Originally Airbus said they needed 269 sales, I believe, to break even but since that figure was announced they have had major budget overrun and major penalty payments to customers to cost in, not to mention the discounts they will have offered launch customers just to get the order book going. How many orders to date? After Farnborough still less than 200 and they are mired in technical difficulties still. It is highly unlikely they will ever reach their original break even number of aircraft let alone what the revised number must now be, closer to 500 aircraft I would suspect. Boeing, on the other hand, will still be able to produce a relatively small number of B747-800 to fill the 500 seat long haul requirement and still make a profit as so much of the aircraft is already tried, tested and above all has passenger appeal.
Technically the A380 may be ahead of the market in many respects but it is leading Airbus Industries into very serious financial trouble and commercially the A380 is a dead duck.
Last edited by parabellum; 23rd Jul 2006 at 01:47.