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19th Jan 2021, 12:05
Replies: 871
Views: 963,746
Posted By VicMel

In my two posts on 11.1.21, which were deleted...

In my two posts on 11.1.21, which were deleted for some reason, I stated (in my opinion as someone who has worked on various aspects of aircraft safety) that the CG position on SJ-182 could be...
14th Apr 2019, 20:07
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Before I address your specific points, I’ve had a...

Before I address your specific points, I’ve had a re-think on some aspects:-
1) I had noticed on ET302’s FDR that the pilot, just after take-off, seemed to stop pulling the Control Column back a...
13th Apr 2019, 20:32
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Back in the days when I was working on A320...

Back in the days when I was working on A320 software we were restricted on how much we could send to the FDR. We would have loved to send raw data as well as processed data for a parameter, it would...
12th Apr 2019, 20:44
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

The correction applied for the difference between...

The correction applied for the difference between AoA vane and AoA body is dependant on Mach number, Pitch rate, Side slip, Flaps, Gear Position and Ground Effect. It is difficult to tell from the 6...
12th Apr 2019, 11:31
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

I agree that loss of a vane is questionable for 2...

I agree that loss of a vane is questionable for 2 reasons:-
1) The idea that there are 2 (or 3) different AoA sensor faults were experienced on the 2 Lion Air flights and ET302 flight seems to me to...
10th Apr 2019, 17:50
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

And it is not just AoA vanes that are a Common...

And it is not just AoA vanes that are a Common Mode Failure by design, the 3 (or 4) pitot tubes for measuring TAS are all same technology, all located near to one another. The purpose of AOA sensors...
10th Apr 2019, 16:43
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

From #3820 “Aviation Week: Boeing Expands MCAS...

From #3820 “Aviation Week: Boeing Expands MCAS Demos To Speed Lifting Of 737 MAX Grounding”: There is not a single mention of SMYD, obviously Boeing cannot allow the stick shaker to still be driven...
8th Apr 2019, 20:09
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

It did not need loss of an aircraft to decide...

It did not need loss of an aircraft to decide MCAS should be Level A, any software that has direct control of a piece of equipment, which if erroneously controlled could lead to a fatality, IMO must...
8th Apr 2019, 11:44
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

I fully agree Bernd. As someone who has worked...

I fully agree Bernd. As someone who has worked for years on aviation safety critical software, I am stunned at the poor specification and implementation for the MCAS software. The Ethiopian flight...
2nd Apr 2019, 14:51
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

I’m not sure if you are misinterpreting my point....

I’m not sure if you are misinterpreting my point. I am concerned about any automation system that might not do what it is supposed to, for example, it might refuse to drop out and hand over when it...
2nd Apr 2019, 11:10
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

I absolutely agree. The aviation authorities have...

I absolutely agree. The aviation authorities have the hardest of evidence possible that “average” pilots are unlikely to cope. Boeing’s dilemma is this then means the MCAS system (at least) has to be...
2nd Apr 2019, 09:23
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Depends on what causes the holes to line up. On...

Depends on what causes the holes to line up. On a new system it is more likely to be random occurrence as it is just a case of a very low probability of event(s) that eventually just happens. On an...
31st Mar 2019, 18:28
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

OK, having considered why the MCAC failures only...

OK, having considered why the MCAC failures only appear on some flights, possible candidates (the holes in the cheese) that could trigger a software fault in the processing of an AoA correction table...
29th Mar 2019, 14:55
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

In which case the software in the ADRIUs *has* to...

In which case the software in the ADRIUs *has* to be different, one side has to add the correction, the other has to subtract it. I can well believe from bitter experience that the software team did...
29th Mar 2019, 11:55
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Thank you wiedehopf, your annotations have helped...

Thank you wiedehopf, your annotations have helped me a lot to make sense of the preliminary report.

I have worked for years on the software for aircraft ‘black boxes’ and spent many long days...
26th Mar 2019, 21:51
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

This multiple and varied mix of fault reports...

This multiple and varied mix of fault reports (all ADIRU related) suggests the problems are nothing to do with a faulty AoA sensor, but a problem within the ADIRU. Perhaps something like a erratic...
25th Mar 2019, 21:11
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Boeing first needs to get over the first high...

Boeing first needs to get over the first high hurdle of gaining confidence in MCAS. As a former aviation safety assessor, I find it incredulous that even if Boeing had decided the MCAS software was...
23rd Mar 2019, 15:49
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

Thanks for your detailed response with all of...

Thanks for your detailed response with all of your valid comments. As you say, I believe we, and many other posters are “on the same page”.

I fully agree with your comment regarding crew action...
20th Mar 2019, 17:39
Replies: 5,109
Views: 13,110,788
Posted By VicMel

FCeng84 - Excellent comments on the ‘bigger...

FCeng84 - Excellent comments on the ‘bigger picture’ of the problem. You refer to “the elephant in the room”, this does not only apply to MCAS. Some years ago when I was an aviation safety...
Forum: Tech Log
12th Jun 2011, 22:44
Replies: 2,070
Views: 613,673
Posted By VicMel

From LazerDog, #1729: From DozyWannabe,...

From LazerDog, #1729:

From DozyWannabe, #1730


There seems to be some suggestion of a possible problem with altitude data from ACARS Message 8 (WRN/WN0906010210 344300506NAV TCAS FAULT). ...
Forum: Tech Log
6th Jun 2011, 22:39
Replies: 2,070
Views: 613,673
Posted By VicMel

Possible Updraft Effects

There are a number of unresolved (at least for me) queries based mainly on the information in the BEA Interim Report 2 and the Update on Investigation report of 27 May 2011. A possible scenario that...
Forum: Tech Log
2nd May 2011, 12:08
Replies: 2,546
Views: 933,808
Posted By VicMel

Recorded parameters

RR_DNB,
I fear you are being far too optimistic. Although I expect all of the data to be recoverable, the recorded capacity is limited. The Honeywell 4X Unit has a max recording rate of 256...
Forum: Tech Log
26th Dec 2010, 20:54
Replies: 3,893
Views: 1,538,238
Posted By VicMel

ACARS Messages on AP reconnect

Having worked on fault detection/management on Avionics sub-systems I find difficult to comprehend how there could be such a sudden 'burst' of ACARS messages, 15 (or more) of them, in a minute, from...
Forum: Tech Log
22nd Dec 2010, 15:46
Replies: 3,893
Views: 1,538,238
Posted By VicMel

ACARS Message Timing Anomalies

The ACARS messages are intended to be read by a maintenance crew sometime before the aircraft lands in order that they can be prepared for a repair/ box swap. They are relatively low urgency, low...
Forum: Tech Log
16th Sep 2009, 12:10
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

Reply to Donkey497 #4365: a lesson to be learned?

As pointed out within the posts of 4th July (In particular Rob21, post #2964) there should have been an 'automatic' mayday response to the circumstances on the AF447 situation. An automatic response...
Forum: Tech Log
2nd Sep 2009, 10:09
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

Analysis of Sonar data

Reply to SaturnV #4296 & cessnapuppy #4297
The time and effort needed to analyse the sonar data is an interesting point as there should be a vast amount of data. I presume that the raw sonar data...
Forum: Tech Log
1st Aug 2009, 15:15
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

If Pitots are the smoking gun...

It would be a great shame if the main conclusion from the loss of AF447 is to change the supplier of the pitots, and consider 'problem solved'. The criticality of IAS seems to be in need of an...
Forum: Tech Log
17th Jul 2009, 21:30
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

TCAS derivation of closing speed

According to #1442: .

However, if as Graybeard states (#3708) no other aircraft were in transponder range, an out of spec TCAS derived parameter could not have been the reason for the message.
...
Forum: Tech Log
17th Jul 2009, 09:44
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

Rational between ACARS messages.

augustusjeremy, re #3694
It is not just the 'IR2 fault' message that questions the 'blocked pitot theory'.
As the BEA report reiterates, the ACARS messages are maintenance messages for the...
Forum: Tech Log
17th Jul 2009, 08:18
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

Vertical velocity at impact

As there were a lot of ACARS messages within the 2h 10 'window', could the aircraft already have been in trouble (and starting to drop) sometime before, say between 2h 08 and 2h 09? Also if ACARS...
Forum: Tech Log
19th Jun 2009, 16:28
Replies: 4,593
Views: 3,284,096
Posted By VicMel

I have been involved with the design and...

I have been involved with the design and integration of the software on a number of avionic embedded systems; from a Fault Detection, Recovery and Reporting perspective I have some observations and...
Showing results 1 to 31 of 31


 
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