Do you realise the importance of communication?
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Do you realise the importance of communication?
A factor that is instrumental in determining interpersonal behaviour on the Flight Deck is the “Role” of a pilot. The problem is, when the other pilot is not handling things the way they should, ideally you’d like to take control away from him but since doing so may be perceived as a lack of faith in the other’s ability, you don’t. This is where MCC plays a vital part in avoiding catastrophe.
Although there are a lot of other factors contributing to safety, I reckon good communication is the best method to avoid most mistakes.
For e.g:
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.
Although there are a lot of other factors contributing to safety, I reckon good communication is the best method to avoid most mistakes.
For e.g:
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.
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Is that a true incident?
So I also presume, then, that the FO didn't even look at the Captain either during or after the checks cause I sure as hell wouldn't notice that something was wrong with my Captain if he was not replying to my checks, slumped in his chair and turning blue....
SpeedBird22
So I also presume, then, that the FO didn't even look at the Captain either during or after the checks cause I sure as hell wouldn't notice that something was wrong with my Captain if he was not replying to my checks, slumped in his chair and turning blue....
SpeedBird22
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I guess it means that he kept focusing at the Instruments whilst other things were going through his mind. Obviously, he didn't look at the Captain at all. maybe he should have asked a question and waited for an answer. Maybe he should have just LOOKED at the captain. Maybe he did look and the pilot was dead with his eyes open holding the CC. Who knows?
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There are many different ways in which pilot 'incapacitation' can have a bearing on flight operations. One of the easiest to train for is the above situation - that's why we have challenges across the cockpit that should be met with an appropriate response at critical phases of flight.
More subtle is when your colleague perhaps becomes confused with the aircraft, or starts talking b*llocks, or just aggessive. Again, this is why we try to practice these scenarios in the sim or the cabin trainer on recurrent CRM/MCC courses.
I suspect this sort of thing is included in the required MCC courses that you will do as part of your JAA ATPL - it was in mine - and then once armed with the theory, you have to go out and discover all is not quite as strightforward as it seems in the classroom with 200hrs TT!
Good CRM and MCC are two of the main reaons why it takes many years to gain your first command, even though you have the same licence as the guy sitting next to you...have fun finding out y'all
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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...
More subtle is when your colleague perhaps becomes confused with the aircraft, or starts talking b*llocks, or just aggessive. Again, this is why we try to practice these scenarios in the sim or the cabin trainer on recurrent CRM/MCC courses.
I suspect this sort of thing is included in the required MCC courses that you will do as part of your JAA ATPL - it was in mine - and then once armed with the theory, you have to go out and discover all is not quite as strightforward as it seems in the classroom with 200hrs TT!
Good CRM and MCC are two of the main reaons why it takes many years to gain your first command, even though you have the same licence as the guy sitting next to you...have fun finding out y'all
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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...
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Wasn't a major crash between a 747 and a 737 caused by an aggresive Captain many years ago. I cannot remember the airfield (it is Friday!) but it was a Dutch 747 and an American 737.
The 747 was running late and the Capt was tired and piss*d off.
The 737 was holding up the take off clearence as it was exiting the runway.
THe 747 Capt asked to go a couple of times was denied and then when fed up started to roll.
The F/O told the Capt that he didn't think they had been cleared but was to scared to do anything but alert tower they were rolling.
The 737 tried to get out of the way couldn't and the resulting loss of life was huge.
The conditions were very foggy and the accident report (by the dutch) blamed bad RT and the fog.
The American report however put the blame on bad crew interaction and a F/O being to scared to contradict the Capt.
Another case I heard was a single turbo prop doing a mail run to the netherlands was on an instruments approach. The F/O was having trouble maintaining the glide slope and was basically all over the show. On asking the Capt advice he got no firm response so he continued.
Finding himself High and fast he asked the Capt what to do. Again no firm response to either go around or continue.
F/O continued, landed well down the runway skidded, ran off the runway and ended up in the sea.
Accident report stated bad communication to be the cause. Neither pilot understanding the other and rather than clarifying what had been asked or said just blundered on.
P.S If anyone has spotted any mistakes here then fill in the gaps or correct. There are bound to be some.
[This message has been edited by Capt Wannabee (edited 27 April 2001).]
The 747 was running late and the Capt was tired and piss*d off.
The 737 was holding up the take off clearence as it was exiting the runway.
THe 747 Capt asked to go a couple of times was denied and then when fed up started to roll.
The F/O told the Capt that he didn't think they had been cleared but was to scared to do anything but alert tower they were rolling.
The 737 tried to get out of the way couldn't and the resulting loss of life was huge.
The conditions were very foggy and the accident report (by the dutch) blamed bad RT and the fog.
The American report however put the blame on bad crew interaction and a F/O being to scared to contradict the Capt.
Another case I heard was a single turbo prop doing a mail run to the netherlands was on an instruments approach. The F/O was having trouble maintaining the glide slope and was basically all over the show. On asking the Capt advice he got no firm response so he continued.
Finding himself High and fast he asked the Capt what to do. Again no firm response to either go around or continue.
F/O continued, landed well down the runway skidded, ran off the runway and ended up in the sea.
Accident report stated bad communication to be the cause. Neither pilot understanding the other and rather than clarifying what had been asked or said just blundered on.
P.S If anyone has spotted any mistakes here then fill in the gaps or correct. There are bound to be some.
[This message has been edited by Capt Wannabee (edited 27 April 2001).]
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CAPT WANNABE:
The accident to which you refer actually involved 2 747's, one operated by Pan-Am and the other by KLM; it occurred in Tenerrife.
The KLM 74 was given a "line-up" whilst the clipper was taxing up the runway. Yes - fog came in with vis down to about 100metres. The irritated KLM Captain commenced his take-off roll without clearance and collided with the clipper, who desperately attempted to clear the runway as they heard the roar of engines coming towards them.
I believe that the F/O on the KLM flight deck stopped the Captain 3 times by retarding the throttles; he knew they didn't have clearance. To this the Captain responded, words to the effect that he knew and told him to obtain clearance. He finally conceded and they began rolling......
Horrendous waste of life and a totally avoidable accident.
I think this accident was covered in the 'Black Box' series - quite a factual and well written book.
The 1st incident discussed here, with the Captain suffering a heart attack, and the fearful junior F/O not intervening, is another sad lesson from which we can all learn.
[This message has been edited by GJB (edited 27 April 2001).]
The accident to which you refer actually involved 2 747's, one operated by Pan-Am and the other by KLM; it occurred in Tenerrife.
The KLM 74 was given a "line-up" whilst the clipper was taxing up the runway. Yes - fog came in with vis down to about 100metres. The irritated KLM Captain commenced his take-off roll without clearance and collided with the clipper, who desperately attempted to clear the runway as they heard the roar of engines coming towards them.
I believe that the F/O on the KLM flight deck stopped the Captain 3 times by retarding the throttles; he knew they didn't have clearance. To this the Captain responded, words to the effect that he knew and told him to obtain clearance. He finally conceded and they began rolling......
Horrendous waste of life and a totally avoidable accident.
I think this accident was covered in the 'Black Box' series - quite a factual and well written book.
The 1st incident discussed here, with the Captain suffering a heart attack, and the fearful junior F/O not intervening, is another sad lesson from which we can all learn.
[This message has been edited by GJB (edited 27 April 2001).]
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And my point is - in the real world that's a lot easier said than done, CW.
The best advice - try to think of your own strategy for questioning things you don't understand/agree with before you find yourself in a sticky situation. Good CRM starts in the crewroom.
PH - MCC usually means Multi-crew co-operation/co-ordination, unless you're a cricket fan.
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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...
The best advice - try to think of your own strategy for questioning things you don't understand/agree with before you find yourself in a sticky situation. Good CRM starts in the crewroom.
PH - MCC usually means Multi-crew co-operation/co-ordination, unless you're a cricket fan.
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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...
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I don't think the flight in the first post was an actual event.
However, yes, this sort of scenario is often practised in the sim, usually at some inopportune moment the captain will die by just not doing anything and its to see if the FO responds to the situation. Its done at any time, but usually on the take off roll before V1 or on an approach in lousy weather to a go-around. Believe me, when you are single engine, cat 3, and the ILS dies, single pilots go-around becomes quite busy.
However, all FOs must remain assertive at all times. I would not hesitate to question something I was uncomfortable with. I have flown with management and done sim checks with them and even seen them do incorrect drills but I don't just sit there and let it happen, I make an input. I am always surprised at how the trainers will then congratulate me on my "good CRM" and say how pleasantly surprised they were to see someone challenge a management pilot.
In the scenario at the top, I can't believe the FO just sat there and watched the aircraft fly into the ground. I mean, come on, its his life too. When do you call it? One dot low on the glide? 2?
However, yes, this sort of scenario is often practised in the sim, usually at some inopportune moment the captain will die by just not doing anything and its to see if the FO responds to the situation. Its done at any time, but usually on the take off roll before V1 or on an approach in lousy weather to a go-around. Believe me, when you are single engine, cat 3, and the ILS dies, single pilots go-around becomes quite busy.
However, all FOs must remain assertive at all times. I would not hesitate to question something I was uncomfortable with. I have flown with management and done sim checks with them and even seen them do incorrect drills but I don't just sit there and let it happen, I make an input. I am always surprised at how the trainers will then congratulate me on my "good CRM" and say how pleasantly surprised they were to see someone challenge a management pilot.
In the scenario at the top, I can't believe the FO just sat there and watched the aircraft fly into the ground. I mean, come on, its his life too. When do you call it? One dot low on the glide? 2?
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my first lesson in MCC was on my introduction flight 6 years ago.
I told the instructor that I had flown about 40 hrs. in the airforce before I got the kick and he said that he would be doing the t/o and landing but besides that I did all the flying.
On final, full flaps ready to land..I'm waiting for him to take over and he sits on the controls but I don't feel any feedback on the yokebut still I did'nt ask him anything.
5' we both feel that something is wrong and we manage to avoid breaking the nose with a quick pull on the nose.
and we both exclaimed:
"I thought YOU had it".....
What was that with a bag of luck....or something?
DT
I told the instructor that I had flown about 40 hrs. in the airforce before I got the kick and he said that he would be doing the t/o and landing but besides that I did all the flying.
On final, full flaps ready to land..I'm waiting for him to take over and he sits on the controls but I don't feel any feedback on the yokebut still I did'nt ask him anything.
5' we both feel that something is wrong and we manage to avoid breaking the nose with a quick pull on the nose.
and we both exclaimed:
"I thought YOU had it".....
What was that with a bag of luck....or something?
DT
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i can remember seeing the tenerife accident
reported on the telly as a news flash( i was very young!).the dutch cap was the blue eyed boy of klm, and even appeared in their adverts, shock of blonde hair, super shiny teeth and bob monkhouse tan.
the panam was back tracking at the time mr shiny applied thrust for the second time , and transmitted he was rolling for t/o.
panam tried to turn off once they became aware of the gravity of the situation, but unfortunately they got hit broadside, the klm had rotated and was just airborne.
mr shiny was very experienced, senior training cap if i remember, and paid the ultimate price of believing in his own ego.
as a direct result r/t procedures were overhauled, and re-written, and hence the introduction of "departure" into the phraseology, and the growing acceptance of the importance of crm.(read the accident report if you can , also the staines trident disaster. accidents usually start way before the incident itself!)
flying isn't inherently dangerous. but the enviroment is particularly unforgiving.
reported on the telly as a news flash( i was very young!).the dutch cap was the blue eyed boy of klm, and even appeared in their adverts, shock of blonde hair, super shiny teeth and bob monkhouse tan.
the panam was back tracking at the time mr shiny applied thrust for the second time , and transmitted he was rolling for t/o.
panam tried to turn off once they became aware of the gravity of the situation, but unfortunately they got hit broadside, the klm had rotated and was just airborne.
mr shiny was very experienced, senior training cap if i remember, and paid the ultimate price of believing in his own ego.
as a direct result r/t procedures were overhauled, and re-written, and hence the introduction of "departure" into the phraseology, and the growing acceptance of the importance of crm.(read the accident report if you can , also the staines trident disaster. accidents usually start way before the incident itself!)
flying isn't inherently dangerous. but the enviroment is particularly unforgiving.
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One direct result was that pilots would henceforth never use the words 'take-off' until ATC had cleared them for take-off.
A sound concept. We adopted it as an SOP immediately on the RAF VC10K fleet - but then along came some pompous Sqn Ldr ('Thrombo' - the wandering clot, for those who remember him) who said that it didn't correspond with the official wording in the RAF publications of the day ("C/S, Request take-off"), so we should continue to use the old wording - even though it was less safe.
Fortunately no-one paid any attention to the fool.
A sound concept. We adopted it as an SOP immediately on the RAF VC10K fleet - but then along came some pompous Sqn Ldr ('Thrombo' - the wandering clot, for those who remember him) who said that it didn't correspond with the official wording in the RAF publications of the day ("C/S, Request take-off"), so we should continue to use the old wording - even though it was less safe.
Fortunately no-one paid any attention to the fool.
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Gents, having caused my fair share of cock-ups and having recently moved to the LHS I can definately testify to the difficulty of a) speaking up when things are wrong and b) hearing a statement that things are wrong when it is 'incorrectly' couched. My advice is 2 fold. Firstly CRM has got absolutely nothing to do with being nice to each other, nor has it anything to do with being warm and fuzzy. Secondly facts is facts and words are just words.
So what am I saying? basically always make your statements as facts and never as 'veiled suggestions'
i.e. 'Captain/Bob/Bill we need to de-ice',
not 'do you think we need to de-ice?'.
i.e. 'Bob/Bill/Capt we are not stable'
not 'you '500',
him 'stable',
you 'erm....?'.
Present your fears and concerns as statements of fact, Confirmational Bias will nearly always lead an individual to confirm his previous assessment. Any question that is couched in such a way as to allow him/her to do that will cause him/her to do it. So you need to absolutely stop it, by making a simple statement of fact that absolutely denies them the ability to re-evaluate their previous decision using their previous assumptions.
This can be done in a non-hostile, friendly, 'we' way, that still allows the other to make the 'right' decision' without you robbing them of that ability. For example the 'Captain you must go-around' is a frighteningly difficult thing to say to a very senior training captain as a lowly new FO. But 'Capt/Bob/Bill, we are not stable' allows that senior training Captain to still make his command decision to go around without you taking it off him.
Cheers
BJ
So what am I saying? basically always make your statements as facts and never as 'veiled suggestions'
i.e. 'Captain/Bob/Bill we need to de-ice',
not 'do you think we need to de-ice?'.
i.e. 'Bob/Bill/Capt we are not stable'
not 'you '500',
him 'stable',
you 'erm....?'.
Present your fears and concerns as statements of fact, Confirmational Bias will nearly always lead an individual to confirm his previous assessment. Any question that is couched in such a way as to allow him/her to do that will cause him/her to do it. So you need to absolutely stop it, by making a simple statement of fact that absolutely denies them the ability to re-evaluate their previous decision using their previous assumptions.
This can be done in a non-hostile, friendly, 'we' way, that still allows the other to make the 'right' decision' without you robbing them of that ability. For example the 'Captain you must go-around' is a frighteningly difficult thing to say to a very senior training captain as a lowly new FO. But 'Capt/Bob/Bill, we are not stable' allows that senior training Captain to still make his command decision to go around without you taking it off him.
Cheers
BJ
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For e.g:
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.
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At one Australian airline the magic phrase is, "Captain you must listen to me" if a warning from the FO is being ignored.
That phrase, if ignored, on a CVR would trigger disciplinary action against the captain.
That phrase, if ignored, on a CVR would trigger disciplinary action against the captain.