Do you realise the importance of communication?
Have they heard you?
One aspect to this debate is that when an individual is concentrating hard (at times of high workload for example) they just do not hear what the other pilot says. That is to say the sense of hearing hears the sound but the message does not arrive at the brain! Human beings are what I call "deletion creatures" ´- right now you are not (consciously) aware of the blood pulsing though your left ear lobe or your heart beating away! In fact if we were aware of every sensory input we would not be able to cope.
If you are not convinced by this have you ever had an occasion when you have walked in the kitchen and your partner shouts "bring the salt with you when you come back!". You open the cupboard door but whilst doing so you start saying "I cannot see the salt....I cannot see the salt", only to have your partner walk in and say "here it is - right in front of you!". So the question is did your eye see the salt? I would answer yes but it did not register with the brain because your incantation was different. I believe in psychological terms its called a "schotoma".
So getting back to the flight deck just because you have said something does NOT mean that it has registered with your fellow crew member. In these situations you may have to create a "pattern interrupt" and resort to, for example, touching (yes) your colleague, asking a crazy question to get his attention, and/or inextremis taking over control. This latter action may take some moral courrage (aka "balls") but if it saves the a/c who cares!
If you are not convinced by this have you ever had an occasion when you have walked in the kitchen and your partner shouts "bring the salt with you when you come back!". You open the cupboard door but whilst doing so you start saying "I cannot see the salt....I cannot see the salt", only to have your partner walk in and say "here it is - right in front of you!". So the question is did your eye see the salt? I would answer yes but it did not register with the brain because your incantation was different. I believe in psychological terms its called a "schotoma".
So getting back to the flight deck just because you have said something does NOT mean that it has registered with your fellow crew member. In these situations you may have to create a "pattern interrupt" and resort to, for example, touching (yes) your colleague, asking a crazy question to get his attention, and/or inextremis taking over control. This latter action may take some moral courrage (aka "balls") but if it saves the a/c who cares!
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"Handing Over"
"Taking Over"
Was once a member of a court of inquiry into a double fatal where the only conclusion that could be reached was that the instructor had not confirmed the handing over procedure in a tandem trainer - Wirraway/Harvard type - at night in the circuit and a confirmed problem with a much deteriorated intercom.
Result - no one in control all the way to impact.
Do instructors and others now insist on a responsive waggle of a control of a tandem trainer to confirm a control handover?
"Taking Over"
Was once a member of a court of inquiry into a double fatal where the only conclusion that could be reached was that the instructor had not confirmed the handing over procedure in a tandem trainer - Wirraway/Harvard type - at night in the circuit and a confirmed problem with a much deteriorated intercom.
Result - no one in control all the way to impact.
Do instructors and others now insist on a responsive waggle of a control of a tandem trainer to confirm a control handover?
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http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...92MA022&rpt=fi
I think it was Peter Garrison who did a story about this accident in his "Aftermath" series in Flying magazine some years back. Apparently there was more info than in the FAA report.
I think it was Peter Garrison who did a story about this accident in his "Aftermath" series in Flying magazine some years back. Apparently there was more info than in the FAA report.
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I am always surprised at how the trainers will then congratulate me on my "good CRM" and say how pleasantly surprised they were to see someone challenge a management pilot
Recent incident comes to mind where the captain failed to notice the speed brake did not automatically extend on touch down. The F/O was doing the landing, and as the wheels touched he noticed across the cockpit the speed brake lever did not operate even though it was correctly armed. The F/O called "Speed brake not up" and the captain just sat there. By now in reverse thrust, the F/O again called "Speed brake NOT UP." The captain disregarded him. So the F/O reached right across the pedestal to the captain's side and pulled up the speed brake lever himself meanwhile steering down the runway still in reverse.
The captain turned to the F/O with the aircraft doing 100 knots plus on the landing run and roared at him saying "Stay away from my side of the cockpit - the speed brake lever is my responsibility - not yours...."
The F/O was shaken by this outrageous outburst of petulance from the captain, but shrugged it off as the captain was well known for his temper.
CRM - a highly lucrative cottage industry to some, that seldom gets through to those that need it most.
There is a series of three books titled "Air Disasters" which are compulsary reading for anyone involved in the business of flying. Produced by an Australian named Macarther Job.
It just so happens that this link to Amazon includes a excerp from a chapter covering the Tenerife disaster with some reader reviews:
http://www.amazon.com/Air-Disaster-V.../dp/1875671110
I highly recommend all three volumes.
It just so happens that this link to Amazon includes a excerp from a chapter covering the Tenerife disaster with some reader reviews:
http://www.amazon.com/Air-Disaster-V.../dp/1875671110
I highly recommend all three volumes.
Combine Operations
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Links to commercial sites are not permitted by the owners.
However, the intent of formulaben's post can be met by running a search on, for example, "aircraft performance data", or similar, via your favourite search engine .. and then take your pick of the URLs returned.
JT
However, the intent of formulaben's post can be met by running a search on, for example, "aircraft performance data", or similar, via your favourite search engine .. and then take your pick of the URLs returned.
JT
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Regarding the communications problem, I always remember (actually I use it an example on how good the interpersonal skills must fit in the cockpit) an interesting "true-story".
I think I've read it in Airport Confidential (or was it Airport International) by Brian Moynahan. I don't know how true is it, but it sound a good story that makes an interesting point.
The story puts a captain and co-pilot in a complicated approach somewhere in Europe (I sincerely don't recall the place).
When the aircraft reached decision height, the PIC decided to execute a missed approach, and ordered "take-off power" (asking the co-pilot to set take off power to go around) but the co-pilot understood "take off power" so he took off the power.
As far as I remember, I beleave the aircraft touched down hard and short of the runway... I don't remember if there were any injuried or casualties.
But for me is a good example of how "tuned" must be whole flight crew. There is no place for missunderstandings in there...
I think I've read it in Airport Confidential (or was it Airport International) by Brian Moynahan. I don't know how true is it, but it sound a good story that makes an interesting point.
The story puts a captain and co-pilot in a complicated approach somewhere in Europe (I sincerely don't recall the place).
When the aircraft reached decision height, the PIC decided to execute a missed approach, and ordered "take-off power" (asking the co-pilot to set take off power to go around) but the co-pilot understood "take off power" so he took off the power.
As far as I remember, I beleave the aircraft touched down hard and short of the runway... I don't remember if there were any injuried or casualties.
But for me is a good example of how "tuned" must be whole flight crew. There is no place for missunderstandings in there...
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Extracts from Conclusions Presented to the Netherlands Board of Inquiry by the Director General of Civil Aviation.
Accident Inquiry Involving Boeing 747’s PH-BUF and N736A.
Tenerife March 1977.
1. Before I commence my argument I want to commemorate the 583 crew members and passengers who have lost their lives so tragically in this accident and to express my sympathy to their next of kin.
2. The Pam Am crew was alarmed by the way in which the Air Traffic Clearance was issued. The captain has declared to have feared that, from this communication, the KLM could possibly take the ATC clearance as a take off clearance and, immediately after the tower controller had said ‘0kay’, and pauses for almost two seconds, he and his first officer jumped in to inform the KLM crew that they were still taxiing on the runway.
3. The message of the Pan Am crew coincided with the message of the tower controller who, at that moment, told the KLM aircraft to wait for take-off clearance.
4. The coinciding transmission on the same frequency resulted, in the KLM cockpit only, in a strong squeal.
5. Because of this, both vital messages were lost to the KLM crew.
6. The primary cause, therefore, must be sought in the fact that the safety of the system in which all concerned were operating was depending, and still is depending on, the weakest link - the radio communication.
7. This fatal accident has shown, once more, that the oral transmission of essential information via a single and vulnerable radio connection implies considerable dangers.
8. Facts and circumstances show that information transmitted by radio communication can be understood in a different way to that intended as a consequence of ambiguous terminology and the obliteration of essential parts.
9. As I have said in the beginning of my argument, the eminent lesson to be drawn from this accident is the urgent need for improvement of the communication between aircraft and control tower.
10. Compared with other developments in aviation radio communication has lagged far behind in that the fail safe principle, which has been generally applied in modem aviation in the field of construction, systems and procedures, and which has materially contributed to attain a higher level of safety, does not apply to radio communication. The latter is not fail safe.
11. It is known that at several airports all over the world, but also during flights, a number of incidents have occurred in the last few years which arose from radio communication.
12. Although these did not result in accidents some of them bore a great resemblance to the Tenerife accident. To my opinion the situation is more serious then is being presented.
13. Although from the statements of the experts these past days it may be derived that serious problems hardly exist I have the opinion that, considering the potential risks, urgent attention is needed for possibilities to improve the radio communication system. It is obvious that improvements in the field of communications can only be achieved at an international level and this will require research and time.
14. On an international level the existing interest within the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Air Transport Association and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations should be fostered.
15. The problem of radio communication is recognised. IATA has established a working group to study the best approach to handle this problem. The Federal Aviation Administration requested a number of research institutes to make a fundamental study of the communications problems in which also NASA is involved.
16. It is essential that, on an international level, this matter receives the attention which it deserves so urgently. The problem needs our strongest efforts to obtain radical improvements soon. The public inquiry of your board and the world-wide publicity of your finding will, as I hope and expect, contribute considerably to this purpose.
-------------
Wait for it! .............Wait for it!...............and now! 2006!
TITLE.
Air-Ground Communication Safety:
Causes and Recommendations
EATMP Infocentre Reference:
Document Identifier Edition Number: 1.1
Safety Occurrence Package Edition Date: 16/01/2006
Abstract.
This report presents the analysis of 535 reported occurrences related to communication problems in Europe. The occurrence data used in the current study have been collected from European airlines and Air Navigation Service Providers. A survey of European airline pilots and air traffic controllers was organised in this study to identify lessons learnt and recommendations in the area of communication safety. The report provides a summary of the recommendations made by pilots and air traffic controllers in the survey questionnaire with respect to the following types of communication problems: similar call-signs, loss of communication, frequency change, nonstandard phraseology, blocked transmission and radio interference. This report is the result of a study conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR under a contract awarded by EUROCONTROL.
Accident Inquiry Involving Boeing 747’s PH-BUF and N736A.
Tenerife March 1977.
1. Before I commence my argument I want to commemorate the 583 crew members and passengers who have lost their lives so tragically in this accident and to express my sympathy to their next of kin.
2. The Pam Am crew was alarmed by the way in which the Air Traffic Clearance was issued. The captain has declared to have feared that, from this communication, the KLM could possibly take the ATC clearance as a take off clearance and, immediately after the tower controller had said ‘0kay’, and pauses for almost two seconds, he and his first officer jumped in to inform the KLM crew that they were still taxiing on the runway.
3. The message of the Pan Am crew coincided with the message of the tower controller who, at that moment, told the KLM aircraft to wait for take-off clearance.
4. The coinciding transmission on the same frequency resulted, in the KLM cockpit only, in a strong squeal.
5. Because of this, both vital messages were lost to the KLM crew.
6. The primary cause, therefore, must be sought in the fact that the safety of the system in which all concerned were operating was depending, and still is depending on, the weakest link - the radio communication.
7. This fatal accident has shown, once more, that the oral transmission of essential information via a single and vulnerable radio connection implies considerable dangers.
8. Facts and circumstances show that information transmitted by radio communication can be understood in a different way to that intended as a consequence of ambiguous terminology and the obliteration of essential parts.
9. As I have said in the beginning of my argument, the eminent lesson to be drawn from this accident is the urgent need for improvement of the communication between aircraft and control tower.
10. Compared with other developments in aviation radio communication has lagged far behind in that the fail safe principle, which has been generally applied in modem aviation in the field of construction, systems and procedures, and which has materially contributed to attain a higher level of safety, does not apply to radio communication. The latter is not fail safe.
11. It is known that at several airports all over the world, but also during flights, a number of incidents have occurred in the last few years which arose from radio communication.
12. Although these did not result in accidents some of them bore a great resemblance to the Tenerife accident. To my opinion the situation is more serious then is being presented.
13. Although from the statements of the experts these past days it may be derived that serious problems hardly exist I have the opinion that, considering the potential risks, urgent attention is needed for possibilities to improve the radio communication system. It is obvious that improvements in the field of communications can only be achieved at an international level and this will require research and time.
14. On an international level the existing interest within the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Air Transport Association and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations should be fostered.
15. The problem of radio communication is recognised. IATA has established a working group to study the best approach to handle this problem. The Federal Aviation Administration requested a number of research institutes to make a fundamental study of the communications problems in which also NASA is involved.
16. It is essential that, on an international level, this matter receives the attention which it deserves so urgently. The problem needs our strongest efforts to obtain radical improvements soon. The public inquiry of your board and the world-wide publicity of your finding will, as I hope and expect, contribute considerably to this purpose.
-------------
Wait for it! .............Wait for it!...............and now! 2006!
TITLE.
Air-Ground Communication Safety:
Causes and Recommendations
EATMP Infocentre Reference:
Document Identifier Edition Number: 1.1
Safety Occurrence Package Edition Date: 16/01/2006
Abstract.
This report presents the analysis of 535 reported occurrences related to communication problems in Europe. The occurrence data used in the current study have been collected from European airlines and Air Navigation Service Providers. A survey of European airline pilots and air traffic controllers was organised in this study to identify lessons learnt and recommendations in the area of communication safety. The report provides a summary of the recommendations made by pilots and air traffic controllers in the survey questionnaire with respect to the following types of communication problems: similar call-signs, loss of communication, frequency change, nonstandard phraseology, blocked transmission and radio interference. This report is the result of a study conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR under a contract awarded by EUROCONTROL.
