Annual Safety Review - help or … …
Thread Starter
Annual Safety Review - help or … …
EASA has published its Annual Safety Review, 2022
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-...ty-review-2022
Is the review of practical value, or just a ‘glowing’ public report to the EU Commission justifying the method of safety management used by the Agency.
The ‘Safety-I’ oriented management appears to have outlived its usefulness, requiring a change of direction to a ‘Safety-II’ viewpoint; something involving the industry, to be in-charge of, and relevant to their operation.
A view from one area of the industry:-
“And as every year, completely useless, for sure in the helicopter area.
One reason why rule-making of EASA is so bad, they have no clue, where the risks are, because they have no statistics that makes sense or tells us something. Dying in overregulation, concentrating on unnecessary things, lost in useless paperwork. We live in the most stupid aviation world ever. And also this year we will overwork and rework our manuals several times independent from reality or any real necessary change, only to fulfil crazy changes in the regulations to a large extent to the worse. Most of the stakeholders lost the overview. So we run from form to form and hope we have done all the forms necessary for the next audit. All this without the slightest chance that EASA will once turn to a useful authority. EU stupidity from its best side.”
Or “Well done safety risk management team!” - unsurprisingly, an internal EASA comment !
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-...ty-review-2022
Is the review of practical value, or just a ‘glowing’ public report to the EU Commission justifying the method of safety management used by the Agency.
The ‘Safety-I’ oriented management appears to have outlived its usefulness, requiring a change of direction to a ‘Safety-II’ viewpoint; something involving the industry, to be in-charge of, and relevant to their operation.
A view from one area of the industry:-
“And as every year, completely useless, for sure in the helicopter area.
One reason why rule-making of EASA is so bad, they have no clue, where the risks are, because they have no statistics that makes sense or tells us something. Dying in overregulation, concentrating on unnecessary things, lost in useless paperwork. We live in the most stupid aviation world ever. And also this year we will overwork and rework our manuals several times independent from reality or any real necessary change, only to fulfil crazy changes in the regulations to a large extent to the worse. Most of the stakeholders lost the overview. So we run from form to form and hope we have done all the forms necessary for the next audit. All this without the slightest chance that EASA will once turn to a useful authority. EU stupidity from its best side.”
Or “Well done safety risk management team!” - unsurprisingly, an internal EASA comment !
Thread Starter
Another year, another Safety Review; this year two volumes …
"… there have been no major accidents involving European operators for many years, and the safety record of aviation continues to be exemplary.
However, the absence of major accidents in Europe should not blind us to possible threats."
Complacency as a threat. Or that EASA safety interventions risk unforeseen outcomes due to the desire to control safety with regulation, opposed to maintain current the current level of safety in a complex industry.
This year the primary operational category is retitled "Commercial air transport complex aeroplanes"; why, implications, what is (are) complex, how to compare this with safety reports based on tangible technical generations of aircraft and operations?
https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/138370/en
,,,
"… there have been no major accidents involving European operators for many years, and the safety record of aviation continues to be exemplary.
However, the absence of major accidents in Europe should not blind us to possible threats."
Complacency as a threat. Or that EASA safety interventions risk unforeseen outcomes due to the desire to control safety with regulation, opposed to maintain current the current level of safety in a complex industry.
This year the primary operational category is retitled "Commercial air transport complex aeroplanes"; why, implications, what is (are) complex, how to compare this with safety reports based on tangible technical generations of aircraft and operations?
https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/138370/en
,,,
