Captain or Manager?
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Captain or Manager?
Time for a new CRM topic it seems!
Is it time to change the whole current culture idea of the "Captain" into the idea of the "Flight Manager" in order to get the accident rate to move down again?
The idea of Captain and First Officer as Pilot Flying leg for leg in normal, safe flight conditions works well. But what about when it is not a safe flight condition?
There are these constant and common known areas of threats to airline flying, which are still contributing to the majority of accidents, i.e., weather, emergency and abnormal a/c mechanical problems, night flight, unfamiliar- alternate airport, congested airspace, etc. The pilots are meant to be able to sort these things out and do most of the time, but there are those times where they don't and they should have. Why is that? 6 out of 10 airline accidents the Captain was the Pilot Flying, when the accident should not have happened at all. The one person who should be managing the flight's safe progress is the one most occupied.
The concept of the Captain- Monitored Approach is a small, narrow glimpse of this idea. Is it time to greatly expand on this to include ALL the known hazardous flight situations? Whenever there is departure, enroute or arrival weather conditions, an abnormal a/c system problem, congested airspace, night flight, alternate airport, etc. the F/O will be the Pilot Flying and the Captain becomes the Flight Manager. The pilot with the most experience in the a/c type and that airline operation and, most importantly, the one with the final responsibility, is then in a better position to observe any deviations or doubts about the flight's safety. This also gives the F/O a more direct input being an active safety defence, having control of the aircraft rather than having the age old and still current problem of somehow convincing the Captain that there is a threat developing, i.e., the F/O on the KLM 747 at Tenerife, etc., etc.
Captains don't need to constantly prove that they can fly their airplane. What they do need to do is constantly manage their airplane's safety. There was a gas plant explosion a few years ago in Melbourne, Australia and the coroner's findings included that even though the workers in the control room were all trained and competent, there was no one person managing the overall situation. Logical really, isn't it? Ship captains don't steer their own ships, even at 5 knots let alone 500 kts., and space mission commanders don't steer their own space shuttles, even several hundred NM from the nearest CFIT situation. Airline Captains still fly our airliners like they did in the 1920's!!!
What do you think?
Is it time to change the whole current culture idea of the "Captain" into the idea of the "Flight Manager" in order to get the accident rate to move down again?
The idea of Captain and First Officer as Pilot Flying leg for leg in normal, safe flight conditions works well. But what about when it is not a safe flight condition?
There are these constant and common known areas of threats to airline flying, which are still contributing to the majority of accidents, i.e., weather, emergency and abnormal a/c mechanical problems, night flight, unfamiliar- alternate airport, congested airspace, etc. The pilots are meant to be able to sort these things out and do most of the time, but there are those times where they don't and they should have. Why is that? 6 out of 10 airline accidents the Captain was the Pilot Flying, when the accident should not have happened at all. The one person who should be managing the flight's safe progress is the one most occupied.
The concept of the Captain- Monitored Approach is a small, narrow glimpse of this idea. Is it time to greatly expand on this to include ALL the known hazardous flight situations? Whenever there is departure, enroute or arrival weather conditions, an abnormal a/c system problem, congested airspace, night flight, alternate airport, etc. the F/O will be the Pilot Flying and the Captain becomes the Flight Manager. The pilot with the most experience in the a/c type and that airline operation and, most importantly, the one with the final responsibility, is then in a better position to observe any deviations or doubts about the flight's safety. This also gives the F/O a more direct input being an active safety defence, having control of the aircraft rather than having the age old and still current problem of somehow convincing the Captain that there is a threat developing, i.e., the F/O on the KLM 747 at Tenerife, etc., etc.
Captains don't need to constantly prove that they can fly their airplane. What they do need to do is constantly manage their airplane's safety. There was a gas plant explosion a few years ago in Melbourne, Australia and the coroner's findings included that even though the workers in the control room were all trained and competent, there was no one person managing the overall situation. Logical really, isn't it? Ship captains don't steer their own ships, even at 5 knots let alone 500 kts., and space mission commanders don't steer their own space shuttles, even several hundred NM from the nearest CFIT situation. Airline Captains still fly our airliners like they did in the 1920's!!!
What do you think?
Last edited by b55; 19th Jul 2002 at 23:23.
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A great post that will, hopefully, generate a lot of discussion.
Just a minor point on statistics though, yes, Captains are flying for 6 out of every 10 accidents but that is partially because an emergency has occured and the Captain has assumed control from the F/O, albeit in an unrecoverable situation. The CVR and FDR will now show the Captain to have been the PF.
Captains will need to maintain their skills not just to fly a normal line trip but also to cope with emergencies, so flying the 'monitored' approach all the time may have a negative effect on a Captains handling skills, if not his thought process.
Well, that's two minor points, but this subeject is huge so it will be interesting to read all the varying view points.
Just a minor point on statistics though, yes, Captains are flying for 6 out of every 10 accidents but that is partially because an emergency has occured and the Captain has assumed control from the F/O, albeit in an unrecoverable situation. The CVR and FDR will now show the Captain to have been the PF.
Captains will need to maintain their skills not just to fly a normal line trip but also to cope with emergencies, so flying the 'monitored' approach all the time may have a negative effect on a Captains handling skills, if not his thought process.
Well, that's two minor points, but this subeject is huge so it will be interesting to read all the varying view points.
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BlueEagle,
Just to clarify the 6 out of 10 stat. This comes from the following N.T.S.B. safety study:A Review of Flight crew- Involved, Major Accidents of U.S. air Carriers, 1978 through 1990. report no. NTSB/SS-94/01. NTSB, 1994.
In that NTSB study of FLIGHT CREW CAUSED accidents, the F/O was the PNF in 30 (81%) of the 37 accidents reviewed. So the stat. is actually closer to 8 out of 10 captains as pilot flying in CREW CAUSED accidents.
Captains would stay current with Pilot Flying skills emphasized on their simulator sessions with min. vis. approaches, max. cross wind landings, etc. Could also stay approach current with a one hour, rostered session once a month on approved CBT flight simulators. I wonder how many captains are truely, ALWAYS current on all types of approaches, not just the ILS?!
Just to clarify the 6 out of 10 stat. This comes from the following N.T.S.B. safety study:A Review of Flight crew- Involved, Major Accidents of U.S. air Carriers, 1978 through 1990. report no. NTSB/SS-94/01. NTSB, 1994.
In that NTSB study of FLIGHT CREW CAUSED accidents, the F/O was the PNF in 30 (81%) of the 37 accidents reviewed. So the stat. is actually closer to 8 out of 10 captains as pilot flying in CREW CAUSED accidents.
Captains would stay current with Pilot Flying skills emphasized on their simulator sessions with min. vis. approaches, max. cross wind landings, etc. Could also stay approach current with a one hour, rostered session once a month on approved CBT flight simulators. I wonder how many captains are truely, ALWAYS current on all types of approaches, not just the ILS?!
Last edited by b55; 20th Jul 2002 at 00:04.
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b55
Your statement about ship Captains not steering ships at 5 knots is just NOT true.
Have been on 12 ocean cruises to date (13th shortly) and have found that in nine out of ten harbor approaches and docking maneuvers, the Captain (Master) operated the main engines, rudder and bow/stern thrusters from the bridge extension. Where a harbor pilot was required, he boarded just outside the harbor and gave advice only (which was listened to absolutely) during the approach to dockside.
Now about Captains flying aeroplanes.
Has it ever occured to you that some just really like to fly, especially hand fly?
And, where aircraft control is degraded, who better than to fly the machine...an experienced and well trained Captain, or a junior First Officer with little practical experience?
OTOH, where it is going all pear-shaped due to mistakes by the Captain, he should absolutely listen to and be prepared to explain what he is doing, and why (if there is time).
Now I know that F/O's enjoy flying the aeroplane, but you must realise that the ideas you expound will have rather limited success.
Your statement about ship Captains not steering ships at 5 knots is just NOT true.
Have been on 12 ocean cruises to date (13th shortly) and have found that in nine out of ten harbor approaches and docking maneuvers, the Captain (Master) operated the main engines, rudder and bow/stern thrusters from the bridge extension. Where a harbor pilot was required, he boarded just outside the harbor and gave advice only (which was listened to absolutely) during the approach to dockside.
Now about Captains flying aeroplanes.
Has it ever occured to you that some just really like to fly, especially hand fly?
And, where aircraft control is degraded, who better than to fly the machine...an experienced and well trained Captain, or a junior First Officer with little practical experience?
OTOH, where it is going all pear-shaped due to mistakes by the Captain, he should absolutely listen to and be prepared to explain what he is doing, and why (if there is time).
Now I know that F/O's enjoy flying the aeroplane, but you must realise that the ideas you expound will have rather limited success.
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b55 has a very valid point...
...but there is no reason to make the captain PNF as long as everything is working fine.
When things start to go haywire it may be a good idea for the captain to hand over the actual flying to the co-pilot leaving himself free to analyse the situation and communicate with others that can give him advice and help. After all, the actual flying of an aeroplane is not that difficult unless something like strutural damage has messed it up.
I believe this is more or less what captain Haynes did when his DC-10 spontaneously scrapped one of its engines. He had the co-pilot fly the plane and the instructor that came to help handled the thrust on the remaining engines leaving himself free to handle the situation together with the FE.
When things go very wrong it may of course be a good idea for the captain to handle the controls at some point so that he can feel the aircraft for himself for a while (which Haynes also did).
If the captain insists on doing the flying himself he uses part of his capacity for this thus degrading his performance unnecessarliy.
...but there is no reason to make the captain PNF as long as everything is working fine.
When things start to go haywire it may be a good idea for the captain to hand over the actual flying to the co-pilot leaving himself free to analyse the situation and communicate with others that can give him advice and help. After all, the actual flying of an aeroplane is not that difficult unless something like strutural damage has messed it up.
I believe this is more or less what captain Haynes did when his DC-10 spontaneously scrapped one of its engines. He had the co-pilot fly the plane and the instructor that came to help handled the thrust on the remaining engines leaving himself free to handle the situation together with the FE.
When things go very wrong it may of course be a good idea for the captain to handle the controls at some point so that he can feel the aircraft for himself for a while (which Haynes also did).
If the captain insists on doing the flying himself he uses part of his capacity for this thus degrading his performance unnecessarliy.
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I think that I can see both sides of this discussion - and a good discussion it is too! It's time has certainly arrived. However, I suspect that, in most cases anyway, when push comes to shove, the Captain knows that he's going to be held responsible for the outcome - if it is somewhat less than successful.
Now, human nature being what it is, I reckon that most Captains will want to be in control of the aeroplane. Yes, sure, the FO will undoubtedly be well qualified to handle the aircraft but, given crew rostering arrangements - especially in large airlines, there is a very real possibility that the FO will be an "unknown quality" to the Captain.
Will he be likely to entrust the flying to his FO in any sort of emergency? Notbloodylikely... methinks. Like I say, this is human nature. We've been able to modify a certain amount of "human nature" thru CRM and that has had many beneficial effects, when properly implemented.
Perhaps CRM has to take that next step, down this path.
It's a difficult path tho! It deals with the most basic of human instincts... the will to survive! A Captain is probably (emphasis on "probably") the one with the best chance of a successful outcome. The stats are probably a bit jaded, as one poster has already - and quite logically - suggested. How difficult will it be for a Captain to hand over control to the FO in a dire emergency?
I think its worth investigating this concept because there's no real data on the result of such actions, aside from the illustrious Haynes example, already stated. That could well be the model on which a CRM course can be built, but the command psychology needs to be addressed at the same time, for the benefit of all us lesser mortals who still reckon we're bullet-proof... or something!
Now, human nature being what it is, I reckon that most Captains will want to be in control of the aeroplane. Yes, sure, the FO will undoubtedly be well qualified to handle the aircraft but, given crew rostering arrangements - especially in large airlines, there is a very real possibility that the FO will be an "unknown quality" to the Captain.
Will he be likely to entrust the flying to his FO in any sort of emergency? Notbloodylikely... methinks. Like I say, this is human nature. We've been able to modify a certain amount of "human nature" thru CRM and that has had many beneficial effects, when properly implemented.
Perhaps CRM has to take that next step, down this path.
It's a difficult path tho! It deals with the most basic of human instincts... the will to survive! A Captain is probably (emphasis on "probably") the one with the best chance of a successful outcome. The stats are probably a bit jaded, as one poster has already - and quite logically - suggested. How difficult will it be for a Captain to hand over control to the FO in a dire emergency?
I think its worth investigating this concept because there's no real data on the result of such actions, aside from the illustrious Haynes example, already stated. That could well be the model on which a CRM course can be built, but the command psychology needs to be addressed at the same time, for the benefit of all us lesser mortals who still reckon we're bullet-proof... or something!
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For the discussion:
This idea does NOT include "good" flying conditions( no common threats are present): leg for leg is good then, of course.
and
This idea does NOT include making the actual abnormal or emergency landing, of course. Even the captain-monitored approach has the captain to do the actual landing.
This idea does NOT include "good" flying conditions( no common threats are present): leg for leg is good then, of course.
and
This idea does NOT include making the actual abnormal or emergency landing, of course. Even the captain-monitored approach has the captain to do the actual landing.
Last edited by b55; 21st Jul 2002 at 01:07.
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I think this is an excellent discussion point - indeed, I have used the technique on two occasions (both engine out) that come to mind.
In one, the FO flew to touchdown/rollout, and in the other I took over rolling into the ILS at the FO's request.
I did cop a bit of flak from the dinosaurs for letting the FO do the landing, but he had previously demonstrated his competance to me in training, and I thought then, as I do now, that it was the right decision.
It's a matter of circumstance. For instance, I don't think I would ever have gone that way in a DC3.
Gru
PS. I meant to mention that the process must include continuous monitoring of FO performance, including perceived confidence levels. As always, the Captain must take over should FO performance decree it.
In one, the FO flew to touchdown/rollout, and in the other I took over rolling into the ILS at the FO's request.
I did cop a bit of flak from the dinosaurs for letting the FO do the landing, but he had previously demonstrated his competance to me in training, and I thought then, as I do now, that it was the right decision.
It's a matter of circumstance. For instance, I don't think I would ever have gone that way in a DC3.
Gru
PS. I meant to mention that the process must include continuous monitoring of FO performance, including perceived confidence levels. As always, the Captain must take over should FO performance decree it.
Last edited by grusome; 21st Jul 2002 at 02:28.
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For 411A
The analogy of the ship's captain moving at 5 knots was when underway only, NOT the obvious potentially dangerous situation of docking the ship at its berth. I suppose the equivalent situation to docking a ship for airline pilots is the captain-monitored approach, with min. vis. with rain, max. crosswind, etc. when it again should be the airline captain doing that type of landing, just as the ship's captain is doing a docking.
The analogy of the ship's captain moving at 5 knots was when underway only, NOT the obvious potentially dangerous situation of docking the ship at its berth. I suppose the equivalent situation to docking a ship for airline pilots is the captain-monitored approach, with min. vis. with rain, max. crosswind, etc. when it again should be the airline captain doing that type of landing, just as the ship's captain is doing a docking.
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b55
You might be interested in the following...
In twenty years of flying the Lockheed TriStar, have had three engine shutdowns, two for high vibs and one because the number one thrust lever was stuck at the cruise power position.
In all three cases, the First Officer was flying at the time, and he continued to do so, including landing and rollout.
Why you may ask? The answer is...in all three cases, the F/O was well trained and had demonstrated accurate flying skills on previous occasions, including hand flying to 200'/600m. So you see, it perhaps is done more than you think.
You might be interested in the following...
In twenty years of flying the Lockheed TriStar, have had three engine shutdowns, two for high vibs and one because the number one thrust lever was stuck at the cruise power position.
In all three cases, the First Officer was flying at the time, and he continued to do so, including landing and rollout.
Why you may ask? The answer is...in all three cases, the F/O was well trained and had demonstrated accurate flying skills on previous occasions, including hand flying to 200'/600m. So you see, it perhaps is done more than you think.
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I agree with OzExpat about human nature, but then human nature is to a great extent what CRM is all about. In my CRM training I have never even considered the idea of modifying human nature, that's not the purpose of CRM and I have never heard any of my colleagues express such ideas. What we want to achieve in CRM training is an understanding of how we humans function in basically the same way as we understand the aircraft we fly and their strengths and limitations.
We can, however, modify viewpoints to some extent. Being in control is one such viewpoint as "being in control" does not automatically mean holding the controls.
I don't think there really is two sides to this discussion, only a big jumble of aspects to consider. There can probably never be a clear cut and simple solution to this, or any other situation, that will work every time. The NTSB report that b55 quotes also mentions that over half of the PNF co-pilots involved in the 37 accidents had less then 1 years experience.
It has to be a judgment call left to the captain to make in each situation, the important consideration being that the captain should choose the method that minimises his own workload and that situational awareness is maintained. A very fresh co-pilot, or a co-pilot the captain does not trust, will increase the demands on the captain.
At the same time the captain will want as much performance as possible from the co-pilot (and the rest of the crew) which he will not get unless they have some self confidence.
It's always easier to describe things using a scenario so here goes...
Let's say we have a take-off in a medium or heavy jet. The co-pilot is PF and he has a couple of years experience but the captain has only flown with him once before.
Take-off is at night and at 1500 feet they are IMC.
At 2500 feet, with the aircraft cleaned up and climbing nicely one engine fails.
If the captains first action is "Engine failure no.1! My controls!" he is basically saying to his co-pilot "Step aside little boy, you're not good enough to handle this" and in the process he is reducing his co-pilot to "a little boy". Whether the co-pilots pride is hurt is irrelevant as hurt pride has no place in this cockpit. However, the captain is going to need his assistant but he has probably reduced his assistants self confidence to "a little boy" by declaring him incompetent thus reducing the flight crew from two to one and a half. He might even have steepened the authority gradient to the point where the co-pilot becomes a passenger.
If the captains actions are to call the engine failure and to start the appropriate actions while leaving the co-pilot to do the heading/altitude/airspeed stuff he will bolster the co-pilots confidence and most likely get better perfomance from him but he also needs to keep half an eye on what the co-pilot is doing with the aircraft. If the captain takes the controls he will still have to monitor the co-pilot in the engine failure actions and possible attempts at relighting it.
If the co-pilots flies fine during the first few seconds he is likely to continue doing so but if the co-pilot is going to lose his marbles the captain needs to catch this before it happens. This can be easier than one might think; ask the co-pilot questions once every few seconds.
"How does the aircraft feel?"
"What is our airspeed?"
"What is our heading?"
If the answers get tight lipped or if he stops answering he is about to lose it and the captain should definately take over.
If he appears to be fixated on one instrument or initiates a turn in the wrong direction before turning the correct way he may be about to lose it.
If we add other difficulties to the scenario such as weather, terrain or performance the situation might be better solved by the captain doing the actual flying but he should then consider letting the co-pilot know why he is taking control.
Eastern 401 (Everglades) and a bunch of other tragedies have shown us the importance of always having one pilot flying the aircraft and maintaining situational awareness. When things start to go wrong this becomes even more important.
Again... there is no way anyone can say what is the best way, only the captain can say in any given situation and in my reasoning there is no such thing as "pilot error". The pilots always make the correct decisions in all situations considering the knowledge and information they have and how they percieve the situation.
We can, however, modify viewpoints to some extent. Being in control is one such viewpoint as "being in control" does not automatically mean holding the controls.
I don't think there really is two sides to this discussion, only a big jumble of aspects to consider. There can probably never be a clear cut and simple solution to this, or any other situation, that will work every time. The NTSB report that b55 quotes also mentions that over half of the PNF co-pilots involved in the 37 accidents had less then 1 years experience.
It has to be a judgment call left to the captain to make in each situation, the important consideration being that the captain should choose the method that minimises his own workload and that situational awareness is maintained. A very fresh co-pilot, or a co-pilot the captain does not trust, will increase the demands on the captain.
At the same time the captain will want as much performance as possible from the co-pilot (and the rest of the crew) which he will not get unless they have some self confidence.
It's always easier to describe things using a scenario so here goes...
Let's say we have a take-off in a medium or heavy jet. The co-pilot is PF and he has a couple of years experience but the captain has only flown with him once before.
Take-off is at night and at 1500 feet they are IMC.
At 2500 feet, with the aircraft cleaned up and climbing nicely one engine fails.
If the captains first action is "Engine failure no.1! My controls!" he is basically saying to his co-pilot "Step aside little boy, you're not good enough to handle this" and in the process he is reducing his co-pilot to "a little boy". Whether the co-pilots pride is hurt is irrelevant as hurt pride has no place in this cockpit. However, the captain is going to need his assistant but he has probably reduced his assistants self confidence to "a little boy" by declaring him incompetent thus reducing the flight crew from two to one and a half. He might even have steepened the authority gradient to the point where the co-pilot becomes a passenger.
If the captains actions are to call the engine failure and to start the appropriate actions while leaving the co-pilot to do the heading/altitude/airspeed stuff he will bolster the co-pilots confidence and most likely get better perfomance from him but he also needs to keep half an eye on what the co-pilot is doing with the aircraft. If the captain takes the controls he will still have to monitor the co-pilot in the engine failure actions and possible attempts at relighting it.
If the co-pilots flies fine during the first few seconds he is likely to continue doing so but if the co-pilot is going to lose his marbles the captain needs to catch this before it happens. This can be easier than one might think; ask the co-pilot questions once every few seconds.
"How does the aircraft feel?"
"What is our airspeed?"
"What is our heading?"
If the answers get tight lipped or if he stops answering he is about to lose it and the captain should definately take over.
If he appears to be fixated on one instrument or initiates a turn in the wrong direction before turning the correct way he may be about to lose it.
If we add other difficulties to the scenario such as weather, terrain or performance the situation might be better solved by the captain doing the actual flying but he should then consider letting the co-pilot know why he is taking control.
Eastern 401 (Everglades) and a bunch of other tragedies have shown us the importance of always having one pilot flying the aircraft and maintaining situational awareness. When things start to go wrong this becomes even more important.
Again... there is no way anyone can say what is the best way, only the captain can say in any given situation and in my reasoning there is no such thing as "pilot error". The pilots always make the correct decisions in all situations considering the knowledge and information they have and how they percieve the situation.
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A vitally important point from the Magus above.
While monitoring a colleague or trainee's performance those three little questions are a life saver:
"How does the aircraft feel?"
"What is our airspeed?"
"What is our heading?"
In terms of this discussion the questions themselves are almost immaterial - they just simply and very effectively establish whether someone is tunneling/oversaturated long before any visual signs. Hearing shuts down first just about without exception.
If you've any doubts regarding this spend the next few trips asking this of the person next to you after their landing. What was the wind read out was when landing clearance was given? Over a month or so you'll become pretty convinced of the value The Magus offers us with those comments and thoughts above.
Rob
While monitoring a colleague or trainee's performance those three little questions are a life saver:
"How does the aircraft feel?"
"What is our airspeed?"
"What is our heading?"
In terms of this discussion the questions themselves are almost immaterial - they just simply and very effectively establish whether someone is tunneling/oversaturated long before any visual signs. Hearing shuts down first just about without exception.
If you've any doubts regarding this spend the next few trips asking this of the person next to you after their landing. What was the wind read out was when landing clearance was given? Over a month or so you'll become pretty convinced of the value The Magus offers us with those comments and thoughts above.
Rob
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PPT, would you pls explain to a non-pilot your last alinea?
In your experience does the PF usually know the answer and does this means he/she is not as a rule overburdened?
Or is the opposite your experience?
And do you mean that the question should be asked so that the pilot NF can check if his own perception of the PF's status was correct?
Purely out of interest.
In your experience does the PF usually know the answer and does this means he/she is not as a rule overburdened?
Or is the opposite your experience?
And do you mean that the question should be asked so that the pilot NF can check if his own perception of the PF's status was correct?
Purely out of interest.
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Experience levels and abilities vary flaps but in general the landing pilot given a clearance only registers that and not the wind figure that was passed. Concentration on the final stages of landing means many pilots shut down hearing in proportion to how demanding they are finding the task.
This is a simple and safe demonstration of the effect The Magus describes in the main body of his post.
This is entirely normal human behaviour - just ask your partner a simple, utterly banal question when they're concentrating on a technical task and note if you have to repeat it. The questioning technique is just a very simple but very effective tool in our armoury to assess a colleague's position in a constantly shifting situation.
Rob
This is a simple and safe demonstration of the effect The Magus describes in the main body of his post.
This is entirely normal human behaviour - just ask your partner a simple, utterly banal question when they're concentrating on a technical task and note if you have to repeat it. The questioning technique is just a very simple but very effective tool in our armoury to assess a colleague's position in a constantly shifting situation.
Rob
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"Banter/patter" approaching the airport/runway. Hmmm, some here must have been trained by Airboos.
Conversation approaching the runway should be limited to
Standard company calls,
Requested flight director/FMC mode selection (if needed),
Confirmation of landing clearance if late clearance expected.
and NOT...how is the weather, what time is it, how does it feel, what does it look like.....etc.
IF you expect the new younger guys to DEVELOP standard operating procedures, they need an example....NOT some Captain who cannot keep his mouth shut with nonsense.
Period.
Conversation approaching the runway should be limited to
Standard company calls,
Requested flight director/FMC mode selection (if needed),
Confirmation of landing clearance if late clearance expected.
and NOT...how is the weather, what time is it, how does it feel, what does it look like.....etc.
IF you expect the new younger guys to DEVELOP standard operating procedures, they need an example....NOT some Captain who cannot keep his mouth shut with nonsense.
Period.
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In defence of flt_lt_w_mitty I THINK he was only referring to the kind of 'patter' one expects from a trainer teaching a student rather than every day line trips with the stanard Capt./FO configuration.
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If it is true that this idea of "captain as manager" for abnormal and emergency situations is actually being used by crew more often than we realise(i.e., Capt. Al Haynes,United) and it now seems to have acceptance under these type of situations, does it then have enough merit to make it an SOP for all the known and easily recognised "threat" situations that are always found in the airline work environment and continue to bring airline crew and pax to a deadly end(Capt. van Zanten,KLM, etc., etc., etc.)? Hidden or latent danger is what is bringing most of our fellow pilots to grief. Leaving it to the individual pilot to decide is hapazard and is not changing the flight deck culture to a better standard for the future needs of this industry. Is it time to change who we are and what we do?
Everyone likes progress but, no one likes to change!
If it is true that this idea of "captain as manager" for abnormal and emergency situations is actually being used by crew more often than we realise(i.e., Capt. Al Haynes,United) and it now seems to have acceptance under these type of situations, does it then have enough merit to make it an SOP for all the known and easily recognised "threat" situations that are always found in the airline work environment and continue to bring airline crew and pax to a deadly end(Capt. van Zanten,KLM, etc., etc., etc.)? Hidden or latent danger is what is bringing most of our fellow pilots to grief. Leaving it to the individual pilot to decide is hapazard and is not changing the flight deck culture to a better standard for the future needs of this industry. Is it time to change who we are and what we do?
Everyone likes progress but, no one likes to change!