UPS 1354 NTSB Investigation - CVR
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GlobalNav:
Except they would have had a Baro VNAV path as part of the database approach; e.g., a perhaps much easier task for them than trying to meld FMS paths with a LOC procedure.
Anything dispatch did, or failed to do, is minor compared to this crew's (presumed with the RNAV 18) lack of judgment and competency for either IAP to Runway 18. Nonetheless, dispatch is "fair game" in the overall scheme of a Part 121 accident investigation.
A big part of such investigations is supposed to be to avoid a repeat.
Had the crew decided or been advised by the dispatcher to fly the RNAV (GPS) Runway 18 procedure instead, they would have had the same approach path, VGSI note, FAF and approach fixes, same altitude restrictions, minima, visiblity and so forth.
Anything dispatch did, or failed to do, is minor compared to this crew's (presumed with the RNAV 18) lack of judgment and competency for either IAP to Runway 18. Nonetheless, dispatch is "fair game" in the overall scheme of a Part 121 accident investigation.
A big part of such investigations is supposed to be to avoid a repeat.
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Would any pilots here actually have been offended by a dispatcher giving you a heads up about the closed runway and the fact that a non-precision approach on a short runway is what you have instead?
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"Would any pilots here actually have been offended by a dispatcher giving you a heads up about the closed runway and the fact that a non-precision approach on a short runway is what you have instead?"
I would say thank you.
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aterpster:
Nope.... GlobalNav is correct. With the exception that the crew would have selected NAV instead of LOC for the roll mode (and an interim step-down fix prior to BASKN), the two procedures would be flown the same way. The nuts and bolts for Final Approach Mode are the same for both IAPs.
The irony of it is that if they had chosen to do the RNAV (GPS) 18, the controller would have cleared them to a fix, or to intercept the the final course. This would have almost certainly prompted them to extend the center line (sequence the FMC) or they would have failed to capture the inbound course.... a very big clue, hard to miss. This then would have been the missing step that would activate the vertical profile, and no reason why it shouldn't have captured. Then we wouldn't be having this conversation.
Except they would have had a Baro VNAV path as part of the database approach; e.g., a perhaps much easier task for them than trying to meld FMS paths with a LOC procedure.
The irony of it is that if they had chosen to do the RNAV (GPS) 18, the controller would have cleared them to a fix, or to intercept the the final course. This would have almost certainly prompted them to extend the center line (sequence the FMC) or they would have failed to capture the inbound course.... a very big clue, hard to miss. This then would have been the missing step that would activate the vertical profile, and no reason why it shouldn't have captured. Then we wouldn't be having this conversation.
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The dispatcher expected them to use the RNAV approach; he had the chart without the night LOC correction, so he did think it was N/A. He also gave them an alternate (Atlanta, I think?) since they only had one runway with one approach.
It would have made more sense to me to have simply delayed the trip by a half hour, and give BHM time to finish the work on 6/24. Or... to give the crew the heads up about the situation.
It would have made more sense to me to have simply delayed the trip by a half hour, and give BHM time to finish the work on 6/24. Or... to give the crew the heads up about the situation.
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Showbo:
My "low end" Garmin WAAS navigator provides "LNAV+V" on the RNAV 18. So, in this case it is flown like a precision approach, albeit with NPA obstacle clearance. If an LNAV IAP has a VDA on source, Jeppesen codes the vertical path. I would think in general terms most modern air carrier FMS systems would provide a Baro VNAV path when the source includes a VDA and Jeppesen codes it.
If not, then a guy with a Garmin WAAS navigator is better off on Runway 18 that the big package delivering bird.
I flew the 767, but it was so long ago that VNAV was not even authorized.
EDIT TO ADD: I checked with group I work with who are both avionics designers and biz jet pilots.
They told me that the Collins, Universal, and Honeywell FMSes would provide an "advisory" Baro VNAV path in the BHM RNAV 18 final approach segment.
Nope.... GlobalNav is correct. With the exception that the crew would have selected NAV instead of LOC for the roll mode (and an interim step-down fix prior to BASKN), the two procedures would be flown the same way. The nuts and bolts for Final Approach Mode are the same for both IAPs.
If not, then a guy with a Garmin WAAS navigator is better off on Runway 18 that the big package delivering bird.
I flew the 767, but it was so long ago that VNAV was not even authorized.
EDIT TO ADD: I checked with group I work with who are both avionics designers and biz jet pilots.
They told me that the Collins, Universal, and Honeywell FMSes would provide an "advisory" Baro VNAV path in the BHM RNAV 18 final approach segment.
Last edited by aterpster; 4th Mar 2014 at 15:23.
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aterpster stated:
"Your form of confrontation is counter-productive.
Let's wait for the final report and read what the NTSB analysis and conclusions have to say about dispatch in general, dispatch that night, and the failure of the dispatch department to detect for a long time a Jeppesen chart that was defective on its face. And, why didn't they pick up on the FDC P-NOTAM when it was in the system?"
You're pretty hung up on the "failure" of dispatch to detect the NOTAM removing the night restriction. I would bet that more than 90% of the time most airlines utilize runways 6-24 in BHM. So why would a pilot or dispatcher even analyze the other runways NOTAMS (if they actually had the NOTAMS) and compare them to the charts. A professional airman has a reasonable expectation that Jeppesen has kept up with the plates and to help you finally put this to bed, I'll point out that the FAA already has.
Please see the docket titled Operations 2 Exhibit 2-FF - Attachment 31 – FAA Responses
"Your form of confrontation is counter-productive.
Let's wait for the final report and read what the NTSB analysis and conclusions have to say about dispatch in general, dispatch that night, and the failure of the dispatch department to detect for a long time a Jeppesen chart that was defective on its face. And, why didn't they pick up on the FDC P-NOTAM when it was in the system?"
You're pretty hung up on the "failure" of dispatch to detect the NOTAM removing the night restriction. I would bet that more than 90% of the time most airlines utilize runways 6-24 in BHM. So why would a pilot or dispatcher even analyze the other runways NOTAMS (if they actually had the NOTAMS) and compare them to the charts. A professional airman has a reasonable expectation that Jeppesen has kept up with the plates and to help you finally put this to bed, I'll point out that the FAA already has.
Please see the docket titled Operations 2 Exhibit 2-FF - Attachment 31 – FAA Responses
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wood:
The FAA hasn't put anything to rest. All they are saying is the approach was legal in spite of the erroneous Jepp chart because the subject FDC NOTAM worked in their favor. The FAA also states such a NOTAM could work against the operator when a NOTAM is restrictive rather than permissive.
Air carriers, unlike non-commercial operators, are responsible for the accuracy of either Jeppesen or LIDO charts. If you are familiar with the requirements of air carrier operations specifications you should know that the FAA does not approve either Jeppesen or LIDO charts. They merely "accept" them as submitted by the carrier into its operations specifications. The carrier is jointly responsible with Jeppesen for the charts to accurately portray the FAA-issued standard instrument approach procedure.
Nothing in the attachment you make reference to suggests that the FAA is not still looking at the UPS dispatch department (or charts department if UPS has one).
You're pretty hung up on the "failure" of dispatch to detect the NOTAM removing the night restriction. I would bet that more than 90% of the time most airlines utilize runways 6-24 in BHM. So why would a pilot or dispatcher even analyze the other runways NOTAMS (if they actually had the NOTAMS) and compare them to the charts. A professional airman has a reasonable expectation that Jeppesen has kept up with the plates and to help you finally put this to bed, I'll point out that the FAA already has.
Please see the docket titled Operations 2 Exhibit 2-FF - Attachment 31 – FAA Responses.
Please see the docket titled Operations 2 Exhibit 2-FF - Attachment 31 – FAA Responses.
Air carriers, unlike non-commercial operators, are responsible for the accuracy of either Jeppesen or LIDO charts. If you are familiar with the requirements of air carrier operations specifications you should know that the FAA does not approve either Jeppesen or LIDO charts. They merely "accept" them as submitted by the carrier into its operations specifications. The carrier is jointly responsible with Jeppesen for the charts to accurately portray the FAA-issued standard instrument approach procedure.
Nothing in the attachment you make reference to suggests that the FAA is not still looking at the UPS dispatch department (or charts department if UPS has one).
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OK465
If you need to make time and fuel burn is a lesser concern than getting there closer to on time, FL270 (the highest TAS flight level in a 747) will net you ~530KTAS, which breaks 600MPH.
Sorry for the thread drift...
If you need to make time and fuel burn is a lesser concern than getting there closer to on time, FL270 (the highest TAS flight level in a 747) will net you ~530KTAS, which breaks 600MPH.
Sorry for the thread drift...
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aterpster:
Yes, it does, and it does EXACTLY the same for a BHM LOC 18 flown in Profile Mode (Airbus speak for VNAV). Forgive me if I'm wrong but I'm getting the impression that you think that the vertical path information they had would be better if they'd elected the RNAV GPS approach. If so, you're barking up the wrong tree. The vertical nav path info is the same in both cases. And yes, the A300 would fly it just like an ILS.
The captain elected and briefed a Localizer approach to be flown in Profile and they set it up that way. But the Airbus switchery is a little cumbersome and doesn't lend itself to situations in which you are rushed (e.g. you were a bit slow on the uptake or ATC keeps you high and close). The NTSB docket info shows that the crew selected gear down at around 9000 feet in a 250 kt descent to 2500ft then continued to decelerate and configure all the way to BASKN and made several scoffing comments about being kept high while on the way there. Rushed? The NTSB hearing examination of Panel 1 highlighted the need for several very distinct steps needed to activate the profile or it just plain won't work. The crew omitted sequencing the FMC so never had a profile to follow, but probably didn't realize it. The crew never mentioned that they could have descended to 2300ft once they captured the localizer so when they crossed BASKN at 2500ft, the captain once again scoffed about being "kept high" by which time he had selected Vertical Speed. I won't speculate about what his intentions were.
But if the same mistakes were to be made, the RNAV approach would not have made any difference with one exception..... if they had been cleared direct to COLIG and correctly used the FMC to navigate to it, then the FMC would have correctly sequenced and the vertical profile would have come alive.
Honeywell FMSes would provide an "advisory" Baro VNAV path in the BHM RNAV 18 final approach segment.
The captain elected and briefed a Localizer approach to be flown in Profile and they set it up that way. But the Airbus switchery is a little cumbersome and doesn't lend itself to situations in which you are rushed (e.g. you were a bit slow on the uptake or ATC keeps you high and close). The NTSB docket info shows that the crew selected gear down at around 9000 feet in a 250 kt descent to 2500ft then continued to decelerate and configure all the way to BASKN and made several scoffing comments about being kept high while on the way there. Rushed? The NTSB hearing examination of Panel 1 highlighted the need for several very distinct steps needed to activate the profile or it just plain won't work. The crew omitted sequencing the FMC so never had a profile to follow, but probably didn't realize it. The crew never mentioned that they could have descended to 2300ft once they captured the localizer so when they crossed BASKN at 2500ft, the captain once again scoffed about being "kept high" by which time he had selected Vertical Speed. I won't speculate about what his intentions were.
But if the same mistakes were to be made, the RNAV approach would not have made any difference with one exception..... if they had been cleared direct to COLIG and correctly used the FMC to navigate to it, then the FMC would have correctly sequenced and the vertical profile would have come alive.
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Thanks. Makes more sense to me now.
Yes, it does, and it does EXACTLY the same for a BHM LOC 18 flown in Profile Mode (Airbus speak for VNAV). Forgive me if I'm wrong but I'm getting the impression that you think that the vertical path information they had would be better if they'd elected the RNAV GPS approach. If so, you're barking up the wrong tree. The vertical nav path info is the same in both cases. And yes, the A300 would fly it just like an ILS.
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Since I really believe this took them by surprise, I'm also left wondering if they didn't know that the runway would be open so soon. Would they have asked to be put in a holding pattern for the few minutes it took to finish the work and clear the vehicles off the runway? If only ATC had let them know this was an option. I mean, sure maybe by that point they were so tired they just wanted to get on the ground and to the hotel; but they also might have been so tired and realized that the workload and concentration necessary increases substantially when they have...
- an unfamiliar runway and terrain
- nonprecision approach
- short runway
- at night
- low level patchy clouds (they may not even see the runway)
- etc...anything I might have missed
that they would rather wait for the ILS approach.
- an unfamiliar runway and terrain
- nonprecision approach
- short runway
- at night
- low level patchy clouds (they may not even see the runway)
- etc...anything I might have missed
that they would rather wait for the ILS approach.
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DMJ618:
Sorry, DMJ, you're not getting many takers!
Your comments are all valid, and yes, I wouldn't have been offended by a "heads up" on the LOC18.
One of the risks you list....."- low level patchy clouds (they may not even see the runway)".... appeared to be an item of particular interest in the NTSB's hearing.
The ATIS they got told them, "Visibility one zero. Sky condition, ceiling one thousand broken. Seven thousand five hundred overcast."
From the Operational Factors Report, page 31 ....
http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F55000%2...2F550741%2Epdf
The pages around that quote (29 onwards) are about why those remarks were missing. I guess the NTSB are wondering if the crew might have been a bit more circumspect about what they were about to do if they had received those remarks.
Sorry, DMJ, you're not getting many takers!
Your comments are all valid, and yes, I wouldn't have been offended by a "heads up" on the LOC18.
One of the risks you list....."- low level patchy clouds (they may not even see the runway)".... appeared to be an item of particular interest in the NTSB's hearing.
The ATIS they got told them, "Visibility one zero. Sky condition, ceiling one thousand broken. Seven thousand five hundred overcast."
From the Operational Factors Report, page 31 ....
http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F55000%2...2F550741%2Epdf
The remarks section of the 0353 CDT (0853Z) weather observation that included the automated observation of a 600 foot ceiling variable to 1,300 foot ceiling was not included in the ATIS received by UPS1354.
Sorry, no disrespect intended, but "circumspect" is not the first thing that comes to mind with this crew. They HAD the required visibility needed to commence the approach. They knew that the MDA was 1'200 ft and I believe they knew what it meant. We know that instrument approach procedures include a key pilot decision no later than minimums that the requirements of 91.175(c) are met for continued descent and operation. Sufficient for safety with or without the remarks. They just didn't seem to know they passed through minimums, apparently ill aware of their vertical position. In my opinion, ill served by the VS mode.
That said, I think the investigation uncovered a shortcoming in the LIDO system, which oddly is shared with the ACARS (same source perhaps) and the ATIS. No excuse for the latter in my opinion. Not a significant contributor, but should be fixed anyway.
That said, I think the investigation uncovered a shortcoming in the LIDO system, which oddly is shared with the ACARS (same source perhaps) and the ATIS. No excuse for the latter in my opinion. Not a significant contributor, but should be fixed anyway.
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think about pre flight considerations.
read notams that runway is closed until X
read wx and note that an approach will be required
think. if I slow to slow economy cruise and get there a few minutes later I can do a simple ILS rather than a non precision approach to a shorter runway with odd rolling hills in front of it at night. and I might save a gallon or two of fuel
hmmm
read notams that runway is closed until X
read wx and note that an approach will be required
think. if I slow to slow economy cruise and get there a few minutes later I can do a simple ILS rather than a non precision approach to a shorter runway with odd rolling hills in front of it at night. and I might save a gallon or two of fuel
hmmm
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glendalegoon:
All very good points. But, the operative words you cite are "think" and "read."
think about pre flight considerations.
read notams that runway is closed until X
read wx and note that an approach will be required
think. if I slow to slow economy cruise and get there a few minutes later I can do a simple ILS rather than a non precision approach to a shorter runway with odd rolling hills in front of it at night. and I might save a gallon or two of fuel
read notams that runway is closed until X
read wx and note that an approach will be required
think. if I slow to slow economy cruise and get there a few minutes later I can do a simple ILS rather than a non precision approach to a shorter runway with odd rolling hills in front of it at night. and I might save a gallon or two of fuel
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Most of us have never been concerned about what approach we got so just wanted to be headed for the hotel. We knew we could do all of the approaches never even considering we could end up crashing. I think they were not making any bad decisions by what they tried to set up for their approach but they made a big mistake that they didn't think they could ever do.
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Most of us have never been concerned about what approach we got so just wanted to be headed for the hotel. We knew we could do all of the approaches never even considering we could end up crashing. I think they were not making any bad decisions by what they tried to set up for their approach but they made a big mistake that they didn't think they could ever do.
Also, reading the NTSB reports or watching the hearing, they do state that UPS pilots don't do nonprecision approaches very often. My impression was that they did them in sim training, and that was about it. For that reason, I would assume they would very strongly prefer an ILS approach. But who knows, they may have had more confidence in themselves and the plane?
I have to admit, if they were at all nervous about this approach, why didn't they go around when they heard the tower and ground workers saying that the work was done and 6/24 will open soon?