Seat-swap, role-playing, mismatched qualification

[IGh]

De ja vue: Press stories regarding a 21st Century recurrence of that old flight discipline subject "seat swapping":

DGCA orders removal of Jet [You can count the "red flags": visitor-in-cockpit, pilot-out-of-seat, visitor-in-seat ...]

You can read line-pilot comments: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...-reported.html

Judging from the pilot-comments, these guys seem to never have encountered this old issue from decades ago. Where is the CRM & HF training on the old "seat-swapping" problem?

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...sekeeping.html

We all recall the problem, but our industry's history only recorded those fatal accidents which included "mismatched duties versus qualification". Here's some history (role-playing by unqualified airline employee), with both inflight and ground-staff playing roles for which they were unqualified [with a captain/manager OK].

Seat-swapping, role reversals, mis-match of duties versus qualifications [agents as dispatcher, ground-employee acting as flightcrew (dressed in pilot uniform during interactions with contract maintenance)].

= = = = // = = =

UA2885 / 11Jan83, DC8-54F, N8053U
"Seat-swapping"
"Contributing to the accident was the captain's allowing the second officer, who was not qualified to act as a pilot, to occupy the seat of the first officer and to conduct the takeoff."

"Finding" #10: The first officer and second officer swapped duty stations about 65 seconds before takeoff with the approval of the captain.

AAR pg 22+:
"... The crewmembers interviewed described the captain as a confident, good natured pilot, comfortable and at ease in the airplane and "generous" in allowing second officers to fly. According to these crewmembers, the captain practiced an "open crew concept" and as such expected participation and involvement from each crewmember.

[continued on AAR pg23.]
"Believing that second officers most likely desire to fly, the captain might have inadvertently influenced the second officer's decision to fly even though he might not have had a great desire to fly. Additionally, the first officer might have suggested the seat switch since one of the crewmembers interviewed reported that the first officer had offered to switch seats on a previous flight and to work the panel if the captain wanted the second officer to fly ...

"... Although the second officer had attempted to qualify as a first officer, none of the crewmembers interviewed had ever heard the second officer express a desire to fly. It appears that the second officer was surprised when on taxi out the captain said, "Are you guys trading?" and the first officer replied, "Do it." The captain then repeated, "Are you guys trading?" and the first officer then said, "ready to trade" to which the second officer replied, "oh we're going to trade now?" After the swap occurred and the takeoff roll was started, the second officer was still concerned about the last ... checklist item (transponder on) and called for it twice during the takeoff roll."

"Although the Safety Board could not determine precisely why the first officer and second officer switched seats, the Safety Board concludes that the first officer and second officer switched seats with the approval of the captain."

"Apart from the violation of both FAA and UAL regulations, the more significant aspect of the seat swapping is that neither crewmember was qualified for the duties of the position he occupied on takeoff.... the cockpit conversation contained several reassurances, cautions, and reminders by various crewmembers indicating possible tentativeness or uncertainty on the part of the first officer and the second officer. In this regard, the most critical mismatch of duties versus qualifications existed in the second officer occupying a pilot position ..."

[AAR pg 24.]
"The Safety Board is concerned about the flightcrew's disregard of federal and company rules and regulations. The Board does not believe, nor do the interviews with United Airlines flightcrew members indicate, that seat swapping is a prevalent practice on that airline. A senior captain should allow seat swapping only as outlined in company procedures and with knowledge of the involved crewmembers' flying capabilities. The flightcrew members did not perform their checklist responsibilities in a professional manner.... This accident clearly illustrates the importance of compliance with established rules, regulations, and checklists. The Safety Board believes that compliance with written directives in today's sophisticated transportation system is mandatory and basic to safe, efficient operations."

= = == = = == = = = = ===

Flight Test fatal accidents, unqualified pilot occupying seat:

30Jun94, in Toulouse, a test A330 crashed on takeoff. Test sequence lasted 60 seconds from the release of brakes until impact with the ground. Immediately after take off the following maneuvers were performed in six seconds: capture of exceptionally high angle (of climb? or pitch?) of 28 degrees to deliberately achieve minimum speed; engagement of autopilot; simulation of engine failure by bringing left engine to idle; cutting off related hydraulic circuit.

18Mar39, B307 Stratoliner, co-pilot seat occupied by visiting Dutch engineer (private pilot) during S&C testing: Yaw x Roll = DIVE upset, inflight breakup.

= = = == = = = = == = = = = = =

Mohawk Airlines Flt 112 / 2Jul63 Martin 404 N449A crashed while attempting T/O during thunderstorm. Planed flight from Rochester NY to EWR. 43 sob, 7 fatally injured (including both pilots). Accident occurred at 1649 EDT. Planned T/O at Rochester Rwy 28; TRW northwest, approaching. During T/O aircraft entered heavy rain, shifting winds, left wing contracted ground, aircraft cartwheeled, destroyed. P.C. = Lost control when attempted T/O into severe thunderstorm. WX: forecast severe thunderstorms, possible tornados. Pirep of tops 50,000' at 1545 edt; at 1640 edt wx observer reported thunder. Pax Boarding finished as thunderstorm approached (one non-rev yanked, paying-pax boarded). Agent observed the Capt in the right seat; as aircraft taxied away some rain hitting ramp, voluminous dark clouds nearby. As "Mohawk 112" taxied into the takeoff position, passengers (survivors) observed "raining hard" with some hail hitting aircraft. Witnesses saw aircraft start the T/O roll then disappear into a torrential downpour. At 1647 edt Wx observer noted strong winds, gusts of 40 kts. Passenger-survivors observed: co-pilot in the left seat flying the aircraft during the T/O roll; after liftoff aircraft entered a wall of rain, left wing dropped, then Capt also manipulating the controls, leveled-off, buffet, right wing dropped, then left wing dropped and contacted ground. Wing impacted 220' south of Rwy 28, aircraft then disintegrated in left turn. Fuselage circumferential fracture aft of wing spar. [Emergency services unit had responded to an earlier "crash siren" at 1644 edt (nuisance siren due to lightening strike on pole), equipment went out and then returned by 1648. Tower sound the second siren at the time of the crash; wx observer noted RVR half mile, wind e-SE, half-inch hail.] Captain's prior record marginal: 15,000 hours TT, 414 hours in Martin, a wheels-up landing (he was demoted to F/O); incident of inflight prop reversal; reprimands; fail checkride on 5Jan, then passed checkride on 8Jan. That Company check pilot (for the 8Jan test) was later censored and left company; testified at hearing that he thought the Captain was "a hazard". An FAA check pilot had observed the Capt's 8Jan ride, said the captain "was a good pilot." ["AW" Jul 13 '64, pg 74-79.]

Mohawk112/2Jul63, CAB's AAR pg5, mid:
"... engines ... were started about the time the last passenger boarded ... Customer Service Agent and the stewardess observed the captain occupying the right seat in the pilot's compartment ... [Footnote #12] The Mohawk Airlines Operations Manual ... relative to placing the first officer in the left seat states 'Captains must have a minimum of 250 hours command time in that aircraft type. First Officers must have 24 active months service as a pilot with Mohawk Airlines and 900 total hours in Mohawk Convairs.' This requirement also applied to Martin 404 aircraft according to testimony of company officials."

AAR pg6:
"... time of takeoff was 1649 ... Passengers were in agreement that the copilot, in the left seat, manipulated the controls during the takeoff run and liftoff; that as the aircraft gained altitude it entered a 'wall of rain'; that upon entry, and as the left wing dropped the captain also began to manipulate the controls; that the aircraft then leveled out; that buffeting followed, and the right wing dropped.... thereafter the left wing dropped ... contact with the ground."

AAR pg 11, bottom:
"... dispatch release should be signed ... The captain must also review the documents ... There is strong evidence that this was not done. Allowing the copilot to occupy the left seat on takeoff was contrary to the Mohawk Operations Manual in that the captain had insufficient pilot flight time in this type aircraft to permit it. The first officer also had insufficient service, according to company manual, to occupy the left seat. Further evidence of noncompliance with the Company's Operations Manual is manifested in the failure of the crew to accomplish the ... pre-takeoff checklist."

AAR pg 12, top:
"... When Flight 112 commenced its takeoff, that thunderstorm must have been apparent to the crew and its intensity should have been immediately apparent to a professional pilot. The failure of the captain to properly appraise the weather conditions and his attempted takeoff into a severe thunderstorm raises serious doubt as to his judgment."

P.C. = "... a loss of control during an attempted takeoff into a severe thunderstorm."

= = = = = = / / = = = = =

Ground-staff role-playing --

Confused roles, mismatch of duties versus qualifications, ground-staff role-playing, "seat-swapping".

Nationair / 11Jul91 Canadian registered DC-8-61 C-GMXQ, chartered as "Nigerian Airways flight 2120" (religious pilgrim flight), crashed after an inflight fire; inflight breakup; impacted 1.75 miles short of runway 34C at Jeddah. Prior to flight, mechanic determined that an inboard tire on Left MLG had low-pressure. To avoid a delay aircraft departed without servicing tire.

A "Project Manager" had been hired by Nation Air as ground- staff for a remote contract at Jeddah.

"... lead mechanic spoke to a member of the crew"; footnote #6, "The Project Manager wore a Captain's uniform." [Saudi AAR section1.6.2.4.5, "11July Preflight Check".]


"... On the morning of the accident, the project manager, unaware of the significance of under-inflated tyres, when told that obtaining nitrogen would take time ... said: 'forget it.' ... did not communicate the information to the operating crew ... " [AAR section 2.10.4.3, "Inter-Departmental Communication".]

Finding 3.2.11, "The project manager was aware of a low tyre pressure but was not qualified to assess its importance."

Finding 3.2.12, "The project manager ... directed that the aircraft depart without servicing the tyre."

[ehwatezedoing]

Originally Posted by IGh

= = = = = = / / = = = = =

Ground-staff role-playing --


A "Project Manager" had been hired by Nation Air as ground- staff for a remote contract at Jeddah.

"... lead mechanic spoke to a member of the crew"; footnote #6, "The Project Manager wore a Captain's uniform." [Saudi AAR section1.6.2.4.5, "11July Preflight Check".]

Finding 3.2.11, "The project manager was aware of a low tyre pressure but was not qualified to assess its importance."

I'm going to stop you right there!
The fact that this person was not qualified to assess a low tire/tyre pressure is not to contradict, he paid the price too by being one of the victims.

But this has nothing to do with him wearing 4 bars.

Wearing uniforms is a way of gaining respect, open doors and get things done with locals in "third world countries" This was at list a very common practice in Africa for station managers (Air Afrique, UTA) to wear fours stripes while on duty.

This company procedure actually saved my father (ex station Manager for UTA) in the late 70's.
One time he was arrested by two drunken local soldiers while driving toward the airport at night.
After cocking their guns and asking him to stand out of his car they realized he was in uniform and just let him go.