Pilot Ethics, Pro' Standards, Housekeeping
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Pilot Ethics, Pro' Standards, Housekeeping
From “worldpilot”, message #476 (2Nov09) under the NWA thread:
Most airline pilots would not agree on any detailed list of Cockpit Ethics, Professional Standards, nor Cockpit Housekeeping Taboos. Appended at the bottom of this message are ALPA’s Pilot Code of Ethics, and excerpts from a recent “Clarification of Professional Standards”. Both lack details, thus leaving pilots open to almost any habits, or breech of older Cockpit Housekeeping Taboos.
Just below are a few Housekeeping “Red Flags” -- few subtle factors, habits, taboos, and tiny lessons -- from past mishaps. Added together these subtle factors (red flags) should prompt the Captain or FO to ensure that there really is one attentive PF, “pilot flying”.
ALPA Code of Ethics and Canons SOURCE—Board 1956; AMENDED ...
Clarifying “Professional Standards” [dated Aug 2009]
“... a growing perception that airline pilots are unaware of their responsibilities in the cockpit.... business as usual ... Are pilots taking ... risks by virtue of negligence, ignorance, carelessness and thoughtlessness ...?”
There is no agreement about the CRZ phase “duty” of the “pilot monitoring” nor agreement the duty of the “Pilot Flying”. Currently, even the most respected aviators accept taboos such as READING while on the job. Pilots who challenge their co-worker are generally villain-ized, as an uncooperative flying partner. To “get-along” -- in a tight cockpit, for days, longer days than most jobs -- even respected aviators now allow such a breech of ethics.Most airline pilots would not agree on any detailed list of Cockpit Ethics, Professional Standards, nor Cockpit Housekeeping Taboos. Appended at the bottom of this message are ALPA’s Pilot Code of Ethics, and excerpts from a recent “Clarification of Professional Standards”. Both lack details, thus leaving pilots open to almost any habits, or breech of older Cockpit Housekeeping Taboos.
Just below are a few Housekeeping “Red Flags” -- few subtle factors, habits, taboos, and tiny lessons -- from past mishaps. Added together these subtle factors (red flags) should prompt the Captain or FO to ensure that there really is one attentive PF, “pilot flying”.
-- Pilot not seated in normal position (eg, body twisted outboard stowing Jepp’s, one pilot seated with his too-fat leg crossed heel-to-knee blocking or threatening the Control Column as in pitch-upset of AA901/ 26Jun94).
-- Pilot not strapped-in [eg, in the AA311 / 8Oct47 DC-4 NC-90432“Chuck Sisto violent upset” two management pilots impacted the overhead panel feathering three engines].
-- Pilot’s Seat not in normal position (eg, after upset of Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94 FO Piskarev’s seat was too far back to assist in recovery).
-- One pilot in-seat nodding off in micro-sleep .
-- One pilot out-of-seat [eg, “Waldo Lynch” upset B707/ 3Feb59, Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94, Copa 201, &ct.]
-- Visitor in-cockpit [many cases].
-- Visitor in-seat [various upsets, eg, Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94, AGAR 23/ 6May81 EC-135N, B307/18Mar39].
-- One pilot out-of-cockpit (this was usually combined with one other distraction factor).
-- One pilot’s head-in-logbook [several cases].
-- One pilot’s head-in-crewmeal.
-- Paper or objects obstructing view out windscreen (head-in-newspaper, flying in sunlight with maps spread across glass, head-in-laptop).
-- Use of the cockpit Glare-shield as a “shelf” for inflight stowage of manuals, meal trays, maps, &ct. Objects obstructed view of horizon during upset recovery [eg, Mac 59402/ 11Nov76].
-- Pilot tuning/listening to commercial radio station on ADF-radio (eg, FO in the Roselawn ATR-upset while PIC left cockpit).
-- Pilot fixated on the DME during Crz, counting down miles after sixty seconds, to get the required Gnd Spd check (done in earlier years before onboard RNAV).
-- Pilot attempting multiple chores during CRZ; all top-of-the-hour tasks: listen on scratchy HF-radio to copy Gander wx broadcast, respond to Nav’s Hdg change, plot the crz how-goes-it fuel log (eg, PanAm B707 / 3Feb59 spiral dive).
Often the mishap reports included pilot-distraction factors, not explicitly restated in the report’s Conclusions, Findings, nor Probable Cause. Below are a few cases in which investigators mentioned a pilot-DISTRACTION or sometimes more of a “Channelized Attention”:-- Pilot not strapped-in [eg, in the AA311 / 8Oct47 DC-4 NC-90432“Chuck Sisto violent upset” two management pilots impacted the overhead panel feathering three engines].
-- Pilot’s Seat not in normal position (eg, after upset of Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94 FO Piskarev’s seat was too far back to assist in recovery).
-- One pilot in-seat nodding off in micro-sleep .
-- One pilot out-of-seat [eg, “Waldo Lynch” upset B707/ 3Feb59, Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94, Copa 201, &ct.]
-- Visitor in-cockpit [many cases].
-- Visitor in-seat [various upsets, eg, Aeroflot A310/ 22Mar94, AGAR 23/ 6May81 EC-135N, B307/18Mar39].
-- One pilot out-of-cockpit (this was usually combined with one other distraction factor).
-- One pilot’s head-in-logbook [several cases].
-- One pilot’s head-in-crewmeal.
-- Paper or objects obstructing view out windscreen (head-in-newspaper, flying in sunlight with maps spread across glass, head-in-laptop).
-- Use of the cockpit Glare-shield as a “shelf” for inflight stowage of manuals, meal trays, maps, &ct. Objects obstructed view of horizon during upset recovery [eg, Mac 59402/ 11Nov76].
-- Pilot tuning/listening to commercial radio station on ADF-radio (eg, FO in the Roselawn ATR-upset while PIC left cockpit).
-- Pilot fixated on the DME during Crz, counting down miles after sixty seconds, to get the required Gnd Spd check (done in earlier years before onboard RNAV).
-- Pilot attempting multiple chores during CRZ; all top-of-the-hour tasks: listen on scratchy HF-radio to copy Gander wx broadcast, respond to Nav’s Hdg change, plot the crz how-goes-it fuel log (eg, PanAm B707 / 3Feb59 spiral dive).
Pan Am / 3Feb59 B707 big dive , over the North Atlantic. Night, CRZ FL350, one pilot out-of-cockpit, visitor-in-cockpit (dispatcher), steep descending spiral continued until about 6000 feet. AAR pg 2+; “..."At approximately 2150 GMT, Captain Lynch went to the main cabin. Captain Peters remained in the cockpit, seated in the copilot's seat.... cruise ... Mach 0.82 in smooth air; autopilot was engaged ... At approximately 2200 the navigator posted a change in heading requiring a left turn of about 20 degrees. Captain Peters complied, using the turn knob of the autopilot ... he observed the new heading on his RMI ... the autopilot was holding the heading ... He then began to work on the "How Goes It" curve attached to a clipboard resting on his lap ... computations ... time, distance, cruising speed, and fuel consumption ... his headset was positioned on both ears ... waiting to copy the 2205 Gander weather broadcast, and he said he did not observe the forward instrument panel during this time.... first indications ... was when he felt the aircraft buffet.... his [F/O's] INTSTRUMENT PANEL LIGHTS WENT OUT. Quickly he looked at the captain's instrument panel which remained lighted and saw that the CAPTAIN'S ARTIFICIAL HORIZON HAD TUMBLED ... aircraft was in a nose-down right spiral ...”
TWA841/ 4Apr79, night, CRZ FL390, mysterious Yaw x Roll = DIVE upset. AAR pg 2, “... aircraft on autopilot ... While he was sorting maps or charts ... located in his flight bag on the left cockpit floor, he felt a buzzing sensation.... ADI showed 20 to 30 degrees bank ... continuing to bank ...” AAR pg 2 “the first officer stated that he was not aware of the buffeting or the aircraft’s attitude because he was in the process of calculating the aircraft’s groundspeed ...”
Zantop 931 /30May84 L-188A Lockheed Electra, N5523, near Chalkhill PA, . CVR indicated gyro problem during CLB, \\ Zantop CVR preserved the pilot's comments about the suspected Attitude displays: "Gyro's ah screwed-up ---- * ... Wings level now.... Chuck could you switch it over to Number One ..." \\ crew selected #1 VG to drive both ADIs; entered right descending spiral as IAS increased; inflight break-up, debris spread over large area. P.C.-- entry into unusual attitude and inability of the flight crew to analyze the flight condition before there was a complete loss of control . . . an undetermined failure of a component in the #2 Vertical Gyro system . . . amplifier and associated circuitry . . . bad data to Copilot's horizon indicator. Speculation included that Captain had a history of turning cockpit lighting full bright during night flights (so he could read while the F/O flew the aircraft), CVR had sounds of pages turning, lack of outside visual clues inhibited the F/O's recognition of the developing upset.... \\ From aar pg 29, “Behavior Factors” -- “... Safety Board could not determine conclusively that the captain was reading at the onset of the accident sequence. Coworkers established that it was his habit to read in flight with the cockpit thunderstorm lights set on bright. On the CVR transcript, the captain made a comment about lighting that may have referred to adjusting cockpit lights for reading ... If the captain was reading, regardless of the nature of the material, he would have been distracted ... Safety Board recognizes that operational material is read by flightcrew ... However, reading of nonoperational material is not a good practice because it detracts from the pilot’s primary duty, and therefore should not be tolerated in an airplane cockpit.... possible that the captain was inattentive ... and that his inattention was a factor ...”
China Air 006 /19Feb85, B747SP lost control at FL410. Investigators attributed the initial upset to thrust asymmetry. "Airplane rolled to the right, nosed over, and entered and uncontrollable descent." Passing 19083' aircraft experienced 5.1 G's ... leveled at 9,500 feet. Suffered major structural damage ... // "The autopilot effectively masked the approaching onset of the loss of control of the airplane." (AAR pg 33.) P.C. = Captain's preoccupation with an inflight malfunction and his failure to monitor the flight instruments, which resulted in his losing control.
Delta Flight 1141 / 31Aug88, Dallas TX, B727 takeoff crash; pilots failed to set flap/slats during taxi-out. 13 killed. \\ Distraction-- AAR pg 92, Finding #4: “Extensive non-duty related conversations and the lengthy presence of the flight attendant in the cockpit reduced the flightcrew’s vigilance in ensuring that the aircraft was prepared for flight.”
Evergreen Int’l Awys, (JAL charter "JAL41E") / 12Dec91 B747-121 (cargo), roll upset, supersonic dive, about 4:20am CST, 35nm SE Nakina Ont (near Thunderbay, Ontario). \\ With autopilot engaged (Channel A, Alt Hold, INS nav, Auto Throttles Off), FL310, Cruise M.84, at night with no visual horizon; while Capt was busy turned outboard looking down (left & down), F/O completing nav log, the aircraft entered a steep bank; INS FAIL annunciation illuminated, pilots looked-up, "oh-uh", suspected ADI failure, rolled to 96 degree right bank, (press reported a 45 degree nose-down pitch). All three ADI's displayed similar banked unusual attitude. F/O assessed right roll, Capt told F/O to take control for recovery, F/E Check Airman retarded throttles at sound of Overspeed Warning clacker. F/E and F/E Check Airman selected Engine Ignition ON. Airspeed reached 435 knots (Mach .98, max of 3 Gs on pullout (certified for 2.5 with flaps up), rate of descent 12,000+ fpm, total loss of altitude was 11,000 feet, leveled at FL190). Diverted to Duluth ...
Jet Link 2733 (Continental Express) / 29Apr93, Embraer EMB-120RT Brasilia (N27406), inflight upset at 1533 CDT ... near Pine Bluff Arkansas, visitor-in-cockpit (F/A). Upset in IMC, icing conditions, climbing through 17000 feet aircraft stalled, aircraft out of control (time 1533:16) -- entered inverted spin. Control regained at 5500 feet. .... Board blamed captain for failure to "maintain professional cockpit discipline, inattention to flight instruments and ice accretion." At the time of the upset, Captain with engaged in conversation with the F/A (noting snow on windscreen), and the F/O was busy with logbook duties and eating crew meal. AAR-94/02/SUM, pg 24+, “Flightcrew Inattentiveness ... cockpit conversation ... flight attendant was consistent with a complacent and lax atmosphere ... the captain permitted the flight attendant to enter the cockpit and then engaged in casual conversation for over 4 minutes before the loss of control ... Meanwhile the first officer was making entries into the airplane’s log book, which diverted his attention from the flight instruments.... captain ... continued to talk to the flight attendant and was not attentive to his flight instruments.... Board believes ... flightcrew’s inattention ... led directly to ... failure to maintain a safe airspeed.” AAR-Sum pg 31, P.C. = “... the captain’s failure to maintain professional cockpit discipline, his consequent inattention to flight instruments and ice accretion ... improper autoflight vertical mode ...”
https://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/.../2009/CodeEthicsCanons_9-23-09.pdfTWA841/ 4Apr79, night, CRZ FL390, mysterious Yaw x Roll = DIVE upset. AAR pg 2, “... aircraft on autopilot ... While he was sorting maps or charts ... located in his flight bag on the left cockpit floor, he felt a buzzing sensation.... ADI showed 20 to 30 degrees bank ... continuing to bank ...” AAR pg 2 “the first officer stated that he was not aware of the buffeting or the aircraft’s attitude because he was in the process of calculating the aircraft’s groundspeed ...”
Zantop 931 /30May84 L-188A Lockheed Electra, N5523, near Chalkhill PA, . CVR indicated gyro problem during CLB, \\ Zantop CVR preserved the pilot's comments about the suspected Attitude displays: "Gyro's ah screwed-up ---- * ... Wings level now.... Chuck could you switch it over to Number One ..." \\ crew selected #1 VG to drive both ADIs; entered right descending spiral as IAS increased; inflight break-up, debris spread over large area. P.C.-- entry into unusual attitude and inability of the flight crew to analyze the flight condition before there was a complete loss of control . . . an undetermined failure of a component in the #2 Vertical Gyro system . . . amplifier and associated circuitry . . . bad data to Copilot's horizon indicator. Speculation included that Captain had a history of turning cockpit lighting full bright during night flights (so he could read while the F/O flew the aircraft), CVR had sounds of pages turning, lack of outside visual clues inhibited the F/O's recognition of the developing upset.... \\ From aar pg 29, “Behavior Factors” -- “... Safety Board could not determine conclusively that the captain was reading at the onset of the accident sequence. Coworkers established that it was his habit to read in flight with the cockpit thunderstorm lights set on bright. On the CVR transcript, the captain made a comment about lighting that may have referred to adjusting cockpit lights for reading ... If the captain was reading, regardless of the nature of the material, he would have been distracted ... Safety Board recognizes that operational material is read by flightcrew ... However, reading of nonoperational material is not a good practice because it detracts from the pilot’s primary duty, and therefore should not be tolerated in an airplane cockpit.... possible that the captain was inattentive ... and that his inattention was a factor ...”
China Air 006 /19Feb85, B747SP lost control at FL410. Investigators attributed the initial upset to thrust asymmetry. "Airplane rolled to the right, nosed over, and entered and uncontrollable descent." Passing 19083' aircraft experienced 5.1 G's ... leveled at 9,500 feet. Suffered major structural damage ... // "The autopilot effectively masked the approaching onset of the loss of control of the airplane." (AAR pg 33.) P.C. = Captain's preoccupation with an inflight malfunction and his failure to monitor the flight instruments, which resulted in his losing control.
Delta Flight 1141 / 31Aug88, Dallas TX, B727 takeoff crash; pilots failed to set flap/slats during taxi-out. 13 killed. \\ Distraction-- AAR pg 92, Finding #4: “Extensive non-duty related conversations and the lengthy presence of the flight attendant in the cockpit reduced the flightcrew’s vigilance in ensuring that the aircraft was prepared for flight.”
Evergreen Int’l Awys, (JAL charter "JAL41E") / 12Dec91 B747-121 (cargo), roll upset, supersonic dive, about 4:20am CST, 35nm SE Nakina Ont (near Thunderbay, Ontario). \\ With autopilot engaged (Channel A, Alt Hold, INS nav, Auto Throttles Off), FL310, Cruise M.84, at night with no visual horizon; while Capt was busy turned outboard looking down (left & down), F/O completing nav log, the aircraft entered a steep bank; INS FAIL annunciation illuminated, pilots looked-up, "oh-uh", suspected ADI failure, rolled to 96 degree right bank, (press reported a 45 degree nose-down pitch). All three ADI's displayed similar banked unusual attitude. F/O assessed right roll, Capt told F/O to take control for recovery, F/E Check Airman retarded throttles at sound of Overspeed Warning clacker. F/E and F/E Check Airman selected Engine Ignition ON. Airspeed reached 435 knots (Mach .98, max of 3 Gs on pullout (certified for 2.5 with flaps up), rate of descent 12,000+ fpm, total loss of altitude was 11,000 feet, leveled at FL190). Diverted to Duluth ...
Jet Link 2733 (Continental Express) / 29Apr93, Embraer EMB-120RT Brasilia (N27406), inflight upset at 1533 CDT ... near Pine Bluff Arkansas, visitor-in-cockpit (F/A). Upset in IMC, icing conditions, climbing through 17000 feet aircraft stalled, aircraft out of control (time 1533:16) -- entered inverted spin. Control regained at 5500 feet. .... Board blamed captain for failure to "maintain professional cockpit discipline, inattention to flight instruments and ice accretion." At the time of the upset, Captain with engaged in conversation with the F/A (noting snow on windscreen), and the F/O was busy with logbook duties and eating crew meal. AAR-94/02/SUM, pg 24+, “Flightcrew Inattentiveness ... cockpit conversation ... flight attendant was consistent with a complacent and lax atmosphere ... the captain permitted the flight attendant to enter the cockpit and then engaged in casual conversation for over 4 minutes before the loss of control ... Meanwhile the first officer was making entries into the airplane’s log book, which diverted his attention from the flight instruments.... captain ... continued to talk to the flight attendant and was not attentive to his flight instruments.... Board believes ... flightcrew’s inattention ... led directly to ... failure to maintain a safe airspeed.” AAR-Sum pg 31, P.C. = “... the captain’s failure to maintain professional cockpit discipline, his consequent inattention to flight instruments and ice accretion ... improper autoflight vertical mode ...”
ALPA Code of Ethics and Canons SOURCE—Board 1956; AMENDED ...
The tenets of this Code shall apply to all members without regard to gender.
1. An Air Line Pilot will keep uppermost in his mind that the safety, comfort, and well-being of the passengers who entrust their lives to him are his first and greatest responsibility.
Clarifying “Professional Standards”1. An Air Line Pilot will keep uppermost in his mind that the safety, comfort, and well-being of the passengers who entrust their lives to him are his first and greatest responsibility.
a. He will never permit external pressures or personal desires to influence his judgment, nor will he knowingly do anything that could jeopardize flight safety.
b. He will remember that an act of omission can be as hazardous as a deliberate act of commission, and he will not neglect any detail that contributes to the safety of his flight, or perform any operation in a negligent or careless manner.
b. He will remember that an act of omission can be as hazardous as a deliberate act of commission, and he will not neglect any detail that contributes to the safety of his flight, or perform any operation in a negligent or careless manner.
Clarifying “Professional Standards” [dated Aug 2009]
“... typical problems that pop up in ProStan deal with CRM, crew communications/ coordination issues, personality conflicts, non-Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) operations, style of flying, and distracting personal habits....”
“...FAA representatives participated ... explaining how the NTSB wants the agency to facilitate a discussion on professionalism and training, particularly professional standards programs. They sought clarification on how ProStan representatives dealt with safety issues that arise, given that the public is putting more pressure on pilots to act professionally.
“... “ProStan does take proficiency standards issues first, but ... we need to recognize them as training issues and refer them ... so that they can get additional training ...”
“The ProStan committee has limitations ... We don’t know there’s a problem until the telephone rings, and it has to be that way. We are a service to our pilots. We’re at their disposal, should they choose to seek us out. But they don’t have to. It’s an expected standard of behavior ...
“...FAA representatives participated ... explaining how the NTSB wants the agency to facilitate a discussion on professionalism and training, particularly professional standards programs. They sought clarification on how ProStan representatives dealt with safety issues that arise, given that the public is putting more pressure on pilots to act professionally.
“... “ProStan does take proficiency standards issues first, but ... we need to recognize them as training issues and refer them ... so that they can get additional training ...”
“The ProStan committee has limitations ... We don’t know there’s a problem until the telephone rings, and it has to be that way. We are a service to our pilots. We’re at their disposal, should they choose to seek us out. But they don’t have to. It’s an expected standard of behavior ...
Last edited by IGh; 27th Jul 2010 at 17:04. Reason: added Roselawn as examle
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Hmmm....
Brillcream must have a rather unusual taste....gives a new meaning to 'a little dab'll do ya'.
'Yer damn right, if you think we will fly eastbound across Africa toward the just rising sun (without shade)...well, let's just say....ain't gonna happen.
Like...the BBC news...this ain't gonna change, make no mistake.
Lets face facts here.
FD crews will perform the task normally, quite OK...IF someone (outsider) thinks they are going to micromanage, they are in for a rude awakening.
Big time.
Next question?
-- One pilot’s head-in-crewmeal.
-- Paper or objects obstructing view out windscreen (head-in-newspaper, flying in sunlight with maps spread across glass...
-- Pilot attempting multiple chores during CRZ; all top-of-the-hour tasks...
Lets face facts here.
FD crews will perform the task normally, quite OK...IF someone (outsider) thinks they are going to micromanage, they are in for a rude awakening.
Big time.
Next question?
