Loss of Control In-Flight solutions

[bburks]

Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) accidents are the leading cause of death and loss of airframes worldwide. The trend has not been improving. The very day AF 447 was lost, a conference opened in London under the auspices of the Royal Aeronautical Society, targeted at providing industry with long-term solutions in reducing LOC-I through enhanced Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT).

ICATEE was formed (International Committee for Aviation training in the Extended Envelope) to provide these solutions. The work is just being completed, but the solutions involve long-term enhancements to pilot training, beginning at the initial licensing level and continuing through initial type and recurrent operator training. They involve emphasis on basic aerodynamic academics, practical "on-aircraft" training in an aerobatic capable aircraft (with a qualified UPRT instructor) at the commercial (or MPL) licensing level, followed with type specific UPRT training in Full Flight Simulators, delivered with enhanced all-envelope aero models and enhanced feedback tools to pilots and instructors.

What we "learned" in our intensive review of LOC-I accident literature, as well as a review of the existing capabilities of current training infrastructure, is there has been a lot of negative training in industry. Examples; practical test standards that emphasize "minimum loss of altitude" for stall training, lack of academic understanding of aerodynamics (by pilots AND instructors), incomplete aero models in FFS, and in-appropriate use of FFS for upset training (AA 587), and lack of realistic training environments for typical LOC-I events.

The solutions are forthcoming. ICATEE has a website, but these deliverables will be disseminated through ICAO as well as the FAA. There will be briefings about LOC-I/UPRT/ICATEE at many up-coming industry events such as WATS, EATS, ALPA Air Safety Week, etc. We hope to reverse the sad trend of losing perfectly good aircraft, passengers and crew due LOC-I.

[BOAC]

Thanks bburks - a continuing move in the right direction.

http://icatee.org/

Needs updating.

[Gretchenfrage]

Wow!

We might even come back to the syllabi of the 70ies and 80ies .....

Great progress, thanks to all you bean counters and modern managers!!

It took xx accidents and a whole rainforest of paper, zillions of hours of debating by armchair pilots to reach such a conclusion. One that was cried for by the real professionals out there for years now.

Again, wow!


By the way, does the following exerpt mean AB will finally get feedback????

" .... enhanced feedback tools to pilots .... "

or is "feedback" another forest to be processed to paper?

Brave new World!

[macdo]

Judging by the amount of time we have spent discussing, analysing and practicing this subject and associated scenarios in the Sim and in our annual CRM courses, I think it is safe to say that my (and I suspect all UK airlines) are taking this subject very seriously. Discussion points have ranged from Cadet capabilities through to the aging rump of pilots about to retire. Very promising for the future.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage

One that was cried for by the real professionals out there for years now.

- indeed, but who was listening? Not "bean counters and modern managers" who all knew much better than the "real professional". At least the SNR is mounting, for which we should be thankful.

[Wirbelsturm]

Every instrument check in my 'previous life' used to involve some gratuitous 'throwing around' of the aircraft at an altitude/height safe to do so!

The routine was the Instrument Examiner took control of the aircraft, I closed my eyes and placed my chin on my chest, he manoeuvred the aircraft into a variety of high/low energy, climbing/descending profiles and then I had to recover with a minimum height loss/gain technique. Any pilot from my 'previous career' could tell you the same!

Oddly enough, after all these years, I can still do it with my eyes closed and ascertain what it going on with the wings/rotors!

Perhaps a return to such scenarios as part of the LOFT or perhaps the LOE in the simulator would teach the 'yung uns' a thing or two of how, irrespective of the control type, an aeroplane with two wings and a tail flies!!!!

Oh, and don't forget to do it in direct law for the bl**dy Airbus, I does have a pitch power couple after all!!!!!

[BEagle]

Under the nonsense of EASA, pilots will need to have achieved 40hrs PIC time (or 120 launches on sailplanes) since licence issue before being able to hold the Aerobatic Rating....

No other sensible nation (e.g. USA and Australia) has such stupid prerequisites - which are both safety negative and a disincentive to be taught confidence manouevres and very basic aeros. The EASA CPL doesn't even require chandelles or lazy eights, let alone anything more adventurous.

At the recent EASA Loss of Control confidence, there was unanimous agreement that new pilots would benefit hugely from being taught how to cope with dynamic events from an early part of their training - such as is given to military pilots.

But even though all those who know what they're talking about agree that the 40hrs/120 launches as PIC since licence issue is total nonsense, the €urocratic rulemakers have a square headed Befehl ist Befehl attitude and cannot be persuaded to change their views....

In the UK we will still be able to fly aerobatic manoeuvres and teach upset recovery on non-EASA aeroplanes such as the Chipmunk or Bulldog without needing the EASA Aerobatic Rating - but, after April 2015, it will be strengsten verboten to fly aerobatic manoeuvres in EASA aircraft such as the CAP 10B or Cessna Aerobat without holding the EASA Aerobatic Rating.

I hope that ICATEE will join the growing number of voices demanding that EASA thinks again!

[sheppey]

I closed my eyes and placed my chin on my chest, he manoeuvred the aircraft into a variety of high/low energy, climbing/descending profiles and then I had to recover with a minimum height loss/gain technique.

I am amazed that that sort of nonsense is still used by some simulator instructors. I just cannot imagine in a jet transport aircraft the pilot closing his eyes and placing his chin on his chest and miraculously waking up to find his 747 inverted.
In a real situation that caused the UA in the first place it is likely the pilot would have had his eyes glued to the flight director which had gone ape and wondered which inputs were needed to get out of trouble. But eyes closed and chin on chest sleeping soundly - can't imagine that happening.

In ab-initio instrument flying training in real aeroplanes, for decades different sorts of in-flight cloud simulation was used. In my day we had two-stage amber screens and blue goggles which worked a treat because you couldn't cheat by peeking outside. Next came instrument flying hoods or even pulled down baseball caps. Both did not prevent pilots from glancing up or sideways - anything to see a bloody horizon. So instructors told the student to close his eyes while the instructor did awful things with the aircraft and said handing over Bloggs.

But some students only closed the eye nearest the instructor and cheated with the good eye. So then came the time when the instructor said look down at the floor AND close both eyes and then he would do more awful things designed to give the hapless student the practice at righting the aircraft to even keel solely by using his flight instruments. All this to prevent the student from trying to see a visual horizon to aid in recovery on instruments. If the student looked up from the floor the instructor could see the bastard was trying to cheat.

But in the simulator we can simulate cloud and so the student has now no choice but to recover without cheating even though he can watch the instructor wrestling the controls in all directions before the dreaded "Handing over Bloggs". Ergo - no more need to close eyes and chin on chest.

[Wirbelsturm]

The reasoning behind it Sheppey is not that you would expect the student to be asleep when the departure occurred, irrespective of which aircraft type you are training in (we used to fly it in the aircraft not the sim).

The primary reason for closing the eyes and placing the chin on the chest was to purposfully introduce a mild form of spacial disorientation. The aircraft would be flown, with the student in this position, for quite a few manoeuvres prior to placing the aircraft in the final 'critical recovery' manoeuvre. By the process of moving the chin off the chest to the eyes horizontal position you can induce spatial disorientation there by achieveing maximum training benefit. Try playing the 'forehead on a broom handle game' to see an adequate demonstration.

By doing this we were able to simulate the loss of control in IMC with turbulence and a breakdown of the scan. Often this would be done on 'head down' instruments which were, being generous, rubbish.

Whatever 'other' reasons for doing it that have subsequently come out are not the primary purpose.

[Tee Emm]

The primary reason for closing the eyes and placing the chin on the chest was to purposfully introduce a mild form of spacial disorientation

Well,well,well. That's a new one out of the box. Instructors did this fifty years ago on Chipmunks and even in DC3's. While spacial disorientation has been around since aeroplanes first flew in clouds, I can assure you Sheppey was right when he stated the original reason for heads down arse up with eyes closed was to discourage student pilots from looking outside and recovering half visual half instruments. I think its called corporate history

Purposeful attempts to specifically induce spacial disorientation was never part of the exercise although spinning on limited panel `under the hood` was part of the military training syllabus and this certainly could cause disorientation . In any case what is the point of attempting to give the pilot spacial disorientation in current jet transport simulators by making him go chin on chest and close eyes when the G forces involved cannot be replicated...

[Wirbelsturm]

Tee Emm,

I think we'll have to disagree on what syllabus was taught in the Uk and that that was taught elsewhere then or at least our interpretation of it. I remember being shown a series of prior manouevres specifically designed to disorientate the student prior to entering the required, demonstrated recovery. To be honest you could do the manouevres 'eyes up' and the student would probably still be as disorientated! Depends on how good the Stude was.

As the aircraft were quite prone to departing controlled flight it was considered essential for the correct recovery techniques that the student was placed in a mildly uncomfortable scenario.

No it was not 'airliners' but, indeed, something a little more 'sporty' so to speak. However the basic principles of 'fly the plane' are identical. The AF accident was as a result of two/three pilots not recognising the aerodynamic state the aircraft was in and potentially relying too deeply on the fabled Airbus protections. Oddly enough the BA 747 which was almost rolled over Africa also had to utilise recovery techniques after their scrape with a mad passenger. The pilot flying (at the time the Co-Pilot, a friend of mine) was attacked and didn't have his eyes 'glued' to the PFD. He, however, recovered well (I believe they reached close to 80 degrees AOB and 60 degrees ND). He was not military trained but had flown aerobatics.

The above scenario is the scenario of which I speak for LOFT/LOE. The ability to fly the IMC we all know and love in the sim coupled with the ability to fail partial panel gives enough clues to the trainee. The previously stated scenario was given in fast jets that could depart very, very rapidly if not handled correctly.

[PEI_3721]

Re “In any case what is the point of attempting to give the pilot spacial disorientation in current jet transport simulators by making him go chin on chest and close eyes when the G forces involved cannot be replicated...” and the differing interpretations of the training objectives.

Simulators have significant limitations in generating meaningful disorientation, yet have advantages over actual flight training proposals by relating the experience to the type of aircraft being flown. Both aspects depend on how the tool is used.

Military training used (uses) the ‘eyes closed’ technique when teaching rapid situation assessment; which of course must precede recovery action. A significant aspect of closing the eyes was to remove the sequence of events leading up to the (unusual) situation which had to be assessed.
I recall that some definitions of situation awareness include … ‘in space and time’; thus a change of ‘space’ and the generation of events in the ‘absence’ of time (visual cues) add to the surprise and potential confusion of the unusual situation – disorientation, but not necessarily spatial disorientation.

Amongst the vast range of LOC recovery training materials focusing on handling skills, there is scant reference as to how to use instruments to assess the situation. Most procedures assume that instrument awareness is self-evident, but this may be far from the truth. Recovering on ‘tape’ instruments is not the same as with dials, EFIS PFD attitude displays claim improved awareness, but few pilots may have seen the ‘upset’ symbology (pitch chevrons) and a de-clutter mode is often a distraction – ‘what’s that, why, ….’; and is the dominating FD ‘command’ always removed – automation dependency!
Note for ICATEE, check some earlier presentations showing upset instrument displays – what happens if you follow the FD which is shown?

There are occasions in training where spatial disorientation can be induced, but also in actual instrument flying during initial training, and indeed subsequently in operations. These encounters reinforced the methods of situation assessment, where ‘fly the instruments’ has to be the primary activity.

I have often wondered if it is necessary to have been spatially disorientated (in training) in order to recognize such situations in operation; particularly where specific attention to instrument flight or even handing over control was required. I suspect that experience will always help and emphasis on good instrument flying skills and repeated practice remain key issues. [I have suffered disorientation and not recognized it].

As much as the industry calls for upset recovery training etc, the most effective safety activity may be to focus on good instrument flying skills and situation awareness training to avoid the upset situations. This does not exclude the need for recovery training. The principles of TEM relate to detect, avoid, and mitigate (recover), thus training should be prioritized in line with these, which might also be more palatable to the bean counters – cost effective training.

[Brian Abraham]

I wonder how an individual, who has only flown normal category and airline type aircraft, would react to being exposed to significant "g". I note that a recent 737 accident pulled in excess of 5 "g". Must find it just a little bit more than disconcerting if not previously experienced. ie adding to the mix of trouble you find yourself in.

How about crews be required to undergo an hour of aero's each six months in something like an Extra or Pitts.

[Tee Emm]

I note that a recent 737 accident pulled in excess of 5 "g". Must find it just a little bit more than disconcerting if not previously experienced. ie adding to the mix of trouble you find yourself in.

You are possibly referring to the Adam Air Indonesia Boeing 737 that got into a steep spiral dive in IMC while both pilots were reading a checklist on an IRS malfunction. The captain had no idea how to correctly recover; meaning the advice in the FCTM meant nothing to him or the copilot. The FDR read-out revealed he simply hauled back hard during the spiral and pulled the wings off. No future in that...

It also showed that his presumed "training" in the simulator for unusual attitude recovery was either non-existent or poor quality. Either way his basic instrument flying skill was appalling. The latter is more common in many of today's airline pilots used to blind reliance on automatics, than national civil aviation authorities often care to admit.

[A37575]

Purposeful attempts to specifically induce spacial disorientation was never part of the exercise although spinning on limited panel `under the hood` was part of the military training syllabus and this certainly could cause disorientation

My next door neighbour now nearly 80, is a former RAF Canberra pilot. He learned to fly on Harvards. He told me instrument flying was done from the back seat with a cover over the complete cockpit so the student could not have a sneak look outside. I asked him did he have to close his eyes and put chin on chest?

He looked astonished and said what the hell for - I couldn't see outside. Spacial disorientation practice? He'd never heard of it...

[MungoP]

Unusual Attitudes..

The phrase Unusual Attitudes seems appropriate here in more than one sense...
Quite frankly I'm amazed on learning that recovery from UA is not practiced by many training depts/organizations.
A pilots reaction to seeing an extreme high/low pitch att. coupled with low or excessive airspeed and extreme bank angle needs to be correct and unhesitating. Whether it's a Jet Transport or a chipmunk is of no importance whatsoever.
A 737 was lost in Africa a few years ago because it's believed that the crew 'thought' that they had engaged the A/P and flew close to a major storm cell on departure. The a/c was thrown into an extreme bank angle with consequent pitch down attitude and the captain misreading the instruments exacerbated the problem actually increasing the bank angle.
Any jet transport in the thin air of high altitude and flying in close proximity to large CBs can be at risk of an upset... especially in the tropics.
Only two months ago one of our senior 1st Officers blew an upgrade c/ride for simply failing to react correctly to an upset... just because you did it correctly during your ab-initio training years ago doesn't mean you'll do it correctly tomorrow.. unless you've had recurrent training.
Seems to me that there are more than a few people out there who are becoming victims of the automatic age, thinking that just pressing the buttons will ensure a safe arrival.

[A37575]

'd be interested to know what specific 'pass/fail' criteria are in place for evaluating upset/unusual attitude recoveries where this check-ride was administered.

Also how was the upset condition entered?

From personal experience in the 737 simulator, it all depends on the personality of the simulator instructor/check pilot in the jump seat. Sometimes the instructor will ask the PNF to grab the controls and put the aircraft into any attitude he thinks fit. That could be a steep spiral at high power or a climbing turn with low power and some idiots even pull back one engine while putting the aircraft into an unusual attitude and throw in a speed brake actuation for good measure. It takes all types

The fact that the PNF might have absolutely no experience at putting the aircraft in a UA especially if he is a low hour pilot with no qualifications as a flying instructor, doesn't seem to faze some sim instructors one bit. The original aim of the test for UA recovery competency is the pilot does his best to recover safely and promptly in the right manner and direction.

On the other hand, the instructor might decide for various reasons occupy the PNF seat in the simulator and place the aircraft in what he thinks is an appropriate unusual attitude and then hands control to the pilot under training (or under test) leaving the PF to do the best he can under the circumstances. The result of all this is that there is no standard recommended way of setting the aircraft in an unusual attitude.

What needs to be understood by simulator instructors is that they must avoid ridiculous hurling the sim around the virtual sky in an attempt to bamboozle the student into making wrong recovery actions. On the other hand, calling a steep turn then pulling up or down to 20 degrees from the horizon is hardly a challenging UA. Certainly adding unlikely smart-arse scenarios like failing an engine or winding on rudder trim during the introduction to the UA by the instructor is doubtful "training" technique.

[MungoP]

Unusual Attitudes..

I can tell you that the manoeuvre referred to in no way could have been considered to be irresponsible or extreme and involved no technical issues or failures... the candidate was faced with a steep (80 deg) bank angle and pitch down.. While trying to correct the bank and pitch attitude he neglected to pull back the thrust levers and the a/c (sim) went way beyond VNE. It had to be a fail...

[sheppey]

Only two months ago one of our senior 1st Officers blew an upgrade c/ride for simply failing to react correctly to an upset.

Not knowing the facts of the case of course but maybe his training was faulty? Much depends on the ability of the simulator instructor to first hop in the seat and actually demonstrate a recovery. Few instructors risk their reputation by daring to demonstrate in the simulate lest they themselves stuff up. . Most just shout and criticise from the safety of the jump seat at the back of the sim. That is not instruction. I have observed many pilots in the sim that had no idea how to recover safely from a UA. Back in de-briefing with a nice cup of coffee in the hand, it usually turns out they have never been taught how to recover. There are many airline operators out there that simply do not believe in UA training - or it might be treated as a last minute "fun" exercise, if time permits.

[MungoP]

Unusual Attitudes..

There seems to be a contingent out there that will always look for some reason/excuse for failure. This is a very dangerous mind-set. The fact is that the particular candidate screwed up on the day...simple. Don't for one moment think it can't happen to you and in particular don't think it can't happen in the a/c because in the sim you know it's coming... during your day to day ops you're way more relaxed. Which of us on take-off for the 4th time today are thinking "This will be the V1 cut" ...
Just accept that when it comes to screwing up that if it can happen to him.. it can happen to me. If you don't.. you have no right to be sitting up front.
It's strange to me that while an acquaintance of mine who's an Edwards AirForce Base test pilot is quite willing to admit that he's screwed up on occasion and openly admits that anyone can... there's always a few that look to blame something else for their failures.