Check Pilot as part of ops crew (P.I.C)
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Check Pilot as part of ops crew (P.I.C)
Greetings. Can somebody point me at info regarding the problems (or not ) resulting in a Company Check Airman flying as Pilot in Command whilst doing a checkride. The implications are that they would fly right hand seat as P.I.C. when checking Captains. I did a search but could not find anything factual. I need legal, and factual info. i.e JARs FARs,CRM studies e.t.c. Many thanks
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The rules allow a check-chappy to sit anywhere they like. The problem is an integrity/union problem. If you have a checker who is part of the crew and they are not very good, how do you appeal? Also, what happens if the checker makes a mistake? Are they checking? Do you take over? What happens if you don't and should have etc. By not giving matey boy knobs and buttons to play with, you force them to do the job which they have been tasked to do - assess a person's/crew's performance.
So basically, do you trust the checker?
PM
So basically, do you trust the checker?
PM
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Agreed. However, I need to convince a company hell bent on saving man-hours that including the check airman as part of the crew will result in, at best, a box ticking exercise. So somewhere out there I am hoping for a factual study at the very least....
Why does it require a factual study? It is surely a 'no brainer' that a person acting as checker cannot also act as an integral member of the crew. Whichever role they are fulfilling at any given time inevitably means less attention being paid to the other role. There is a conflict of interests. The checker may gain a general impression as to the competence of the other pilot but will not have the capacity to monitor closely and maintain appropriate records of events??
Helen
Helen
check pilot/trainer
When I was In ABZ back In the early eighties on a line check with the checker In the left hand seat , I had asked him on the approach for the landing checks he went through them but had not picked me up on the altimeter check The app was a visual and not a ful ILS. In the later stages of the approach he told me I had failed my line check because I had ommited to set my altimeter to QFE . I then pointed out to him he had not completed the landing checks properly, He then thought about it and retracted my fail Into a Pass.Personaly I think the checker should not be In the normal crew config and only Intervene If their Is a dire Emergencey If the operating crew are not coping.
Check Airman
HI dadtoo, I should have also put on my reply to you the other day Is that In the company I flew for when a Capt was being line checked the checker sat In the jump seat and then when It was F/o that needed a check the trainer come checker did It from the left hand seat On the small fleets i flew on we all knew each other very well. So In the people I flew with you new who were the good safe operators and the ones that were A--e h--es you knew how far to let them go before It got dangerous the best thing that happened to our outfit was when they Introduced SOPs they are a big life saver sorry about the small digress. t211
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The following extract is taken from Jar-OPS but the most recent legislation in EU-OPS/EASA also contains the same wording.
JAR-OPS 1 Subpart N SECTION
(v) Line checks must be conducted
by commanders nominated by the operator
and acceptable to the Authority. [The
person conducting the line check, who is
described in JAR-OPS 1.965(a)(4)(ii), shall
be trained in CRM concepts and the
assessment of CRM skills and shall
occupy an observer’s seat where installed.
In the case of longhaul operations where
additional operating flightcrew are carried,
the person may fulfil the function of a
cruise relief pilot and shall not occupy
either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure,
initial cruise, descent, approach and
landing. His CRM assessments shall solely
be based on observations made during the
initial briefing, cabin briefing, cockpit
briefing and those phases where he occupies
the observer’s seat.]
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.965 (continued)
Hope this helps as in Europe it is the law that a line check instructor must occupy the observers seat except in aircraft with no observer seat ( such as jetstream 31 aircraft)
WAP
JAR-OPS 1 Subpart N SECTION
(v) Line checks must be conducted
by commanders nominated by the operator
and acceptable to the Authority. [The
person conducting the line check, who is
described in JAR-OPS 1.965(a)(4)(ii), shall
be trained in CRM concepts and the
assessment of CRM skills and shall
occupy an observer’s seat where installed.
In the case of longhaul operations where
additional operating flightcrew are carried,
the person may fulfil the function of a
cruise relief pilot and shall not occupy
either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure,
initial cruise, descent, approach and
landing. His CRM assessments shall solely
be based on observations made during the
initial briefing, cabin briefing, cockpit
briefing and those phases where he occupies
the observer’s seat.]
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.965 (continued)
Hope this helps as in Europe it is the law that a line check instructor must occupy the observers seat except in aircraft with no observer seat ( such as jetstream 31 aircraft)
WAP
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In the later stages of the approach he told me I had failed my line check because I had ommited to set my altimeter to QFE .
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Check Airman - as a distraction
"... point me at info regarding the problems... a Company Check Airman ... whilst doing a checkride. ... I did a search but could not find anything ..."
Two cases come to mind.
Aero Mexico / 19Jan61 DC-8, Reg = XA-XAX, wintery night T/O accident at at NY Int'l A/P; 2017 EST; though the 97 pax survived, four of the nine crew were killed. PIC=AeroMexico ATP; F/O = Aero Mexico ATP; fwd Jumpseater = EAL designated checkairman (only cockpit survivor); Joint trng agreement AeroMexico/EAL & DAC. \\ Wx: quarter-mile vis, light snow and fog, wind NE 18G24 kts, Rwy 4R. \\ First 6200' of T/O roll seen by Twr. Survivor described F/O's call "100 knot", and then at 130 kts "V1" and Vr; rotation was quick and and excessive; IAS decreased to 110 kts, Capt spoke and pointed to his A/S indicator. The EAL jumpseater sensed that they just would not get airborne, he unfastened his belts, stood forward and shoved the throttles forward while observing the EPRs respond in the expected range of 2.52-2.54 EPR; then he pulled the throttles to Idle. PIC then selected Reverse Thrust, Brakes; the EAL jumpseater deployed the Spoilers. \\ A/c traveled through the end blast fence (caught fire), continued through the boundary fence, across boulevard, hit car, finally stopped (in flames) 830' beyond rwy end. \\ Rwy 4R surface condition at 1900 to 2000 hrs was: first quarter clear; second quarter scattered patches of snow 1" to 2" deep; third quarter snow patches 2" to 3" deep; and last quarter rwy scattered snow finger drifts of 4" to 6" deep. EAL's limit was 6" snow max. [ .... much more ... ] P.C. = unnecessary discontinuing of T/O as a result of checkpilot (not in either pilot seat) reaching forward and pulling throttles back (power decrease). Contributing: marginal poor wx, snow on Rwy, possible Pitot Heat _not_ ON. [AAD Vol #13]
See also Intervention of jumpseat- checker British United /14Jan69.
Two cases come to mind.
Aero Mexico / 19Jan61 DC-8, Reg = XA-XAX, wintery night T/O accident at at NY Int'l A/P; 2017 EST; though the 97 pax survived, four of the nine crew were killed. PIC=AeroMexico ATP; F/O = Aero Mexico ATP; fwd Jumpseater = EAL designated checkairman (only cockpit survivor); Joint trng agreement AeroMexico/EAL & DAC. \\ Wx: quarter-mile vis, light snow and fog, wind NE 18G24 kts, Rwy 4R. \\ First 6200' of T/O roll seen by Twr. Survivor described F/O's call "100 knot", and then at 130 kts "V1" and Vr; rotation was quick and and excessive; IAS decreased to 110 kts, Capt spoke and pointed to his A/S indicator. The EAL jumpseater sensed that they just would not get airborne, he unfastened his belts, stood forward and shoved the throttles forward while observing the EPRs respond in the expected range of 2.52-2.54 EPR; then he pulled the throttles to Idle. PIC then selected Reverse Thrust, Brakes; the EAL jumpseater deployed the Spoilers. \\ A/c traveled through the end blast fence (caught fire), continued through the boundary fence, across boulevard, hit car, finally stopped (in flames) 830' beyond rwy end. \\ Rwy 4R surface condition at 1900 to 2000 hrs was: first quarter clear; second quarter scattered patches of snow 1" to 2" deep; third quarter snow patches 2" to 3" deep; and last quarter rwy scattered snow finger drifts of 4" to 6" deep. EAL's limit was 6" snow max. [ .... much more ... ] P.C. = unnecessary discontinuing of T/O as a result of checkpilot (not in either pilot seat) reaching forward and pulling throttles back (power decrease). Contributing: marginal poor wx, snow on Rwy, possible Pitot Heat _not_ ON. [AAD Vol #13]
See also Intervention of jumpseat- checker British United /14Jan69.
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Check Airman - as a P.C. (cause)
The worst recorded interference by a Check Airman was the famous case of Capt Chuck Sisto:
AA DC-4 8Oct47, sudden dive near Mt Riley TX, lost 7500' altitude. Recovered.... Dallas to LA, Captain Jack Beck in left seat (as familiarization ride), Capt Chuck Sisto [PIC] had done a seat-change, and was then seated in jump seat, and Capt Mel Logan in co-pilot's seat; at cruise altitude of 8000 feet near El Paso, Sisto initiated a practical joke on his friend Beck by engaging the Gust Lock [DC-4 mechanism activated from just behind pilots' seats]. Beck corrected the slight pitch-up by adjusting Pitch Trim, a slight pitch-up motion continued, Beck made further ND Pitch Trim adjustment; Sisto then decided that his joke had gone far enough and Disengaged the Gust Lock; aircraft immediately pitched violently Nose Down. Beck's hands were flung upward and thus he accidently feathered three of the four engines; this averted power-on dive; co-pilot could not pull back-stick, aircraft pitched-down began tuck-under as in an outside loop, so co-pilot used aileron to roll the aircraft to recover from the inverted dive at 400'; crew diverted to El Paso. Of the 49 pax, 35 received minor injuries (none sought hospital attention). ///\\\ Check Pilot Charles Sisto was charged with engaging the Gust Lock; informal testimony gathered during a preliminary investigation was used to "hang" Sisto (claimed ALPA, who's pilots threatened future non-cooperation with investigators). Sisto pressured to resign from AA, he had signed 15Oct statement : inference, admitted his activation of Gust Lock had caused dive. Formal hearings were in LA. Prior similar DC-4 tuck-under mishap: May47 EAL aircraft near Bainbridge MD (Port Deposit). [Some information was found in The Air Line Pilot, now AAR is available on the web Online Digital Special Collections Library
AA DC-4 8Oct47, sudden dive near Mt Riley TX, lost 7500' altitude. Recovered.... Dallas to LA, Captain Jack Beck in left seat (as familiarization ride), Capt Chuck Sisto [PIC] had done a seat-change, and was then seated in jump seat, and Capt Mel Logan in co-pilot's seat; at cruise altitude of 8000 feet near El Paso, Sisto initiated a practical joke on his friend Beck by engaging the Gust Lock [DC-4 mechanism activated from just behind pilots' seats]. Beck corrected the slight pitch-up by adjusting Pitch Trim, a slight pitch-up motion continued, Beck made further ND Pitch Trim adjustment; Sisto then decided that his joke had gone far enough and Disengaged the Gust Lock; aircraft immediately pitched violently Nose Down. Beck's hands were flung upward and thus he accidently feathered three of the four engines; this averted power-on dive; co-pilot could not pull back-stick, aircraft pitched-down began tuck-under as in an outside loop, so co-pilot used aileron to roll the aircraft to recover from the inverted dive at 400'; crew diverted to El Paso. Of the 49 pax, 35 received minor injuries (none sought hospital attention). ///\\\ Check Pilot Charles Sisto was charged with engaging the Gust Lock; informal testimony gathered during a preliminary investigation was used to "hang" Sisto (claimed ALPA, who's pilots threatened future non-cooperation with investigators). Sisto pressured to resign from AA, he had signed 15Oct statement : inference, admitted his activation of Gust Lock had caused dive. Formal hearings were in LA. Prior similar DC-4 tuck-under mishap: May47 EAL aircraft near Bainbridge MD (Port Deposit). [Some information was found in The Air Line Pilot, now AAR is available on the web Online Digital Special Collections Library
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How about this as a suggestion from the FARs:
Now, this may be a stretch, but I could argue that the function of PIC, the function of SIC and the function of check airman are all distinct functions, required under Part 121.
If you accept that check airman is such a function, then this regulation says you can't include a check airman in your required crew.
121.432 includes the following statement:
That can be taken two ways: I could argue that it says that the ONLY times anyone involved in checking can also be required crew is if they are being checked, thus reinforcing the 121.385 idea that check airmen can't be required crew. Or I could argue that it's really saying that FAs, Navs, etc are treated differently than pilots and FEs, and isn;t talking about check airmen at all.
The regs aren't as firm as the EU-OPS one above. But there are hints there, i think.
§ 121.385 Composition of flight crew.
(b) In any case in which this part requires the performance of two or more functions for which an airman certificate is necessary, that requirement is not satisfied by the performance of multiple functions at the same time by one airman.
(b) In any case in which this part requires the performance of two or more functions for which an airman certificate is necessary, that requirement is not satisfied by the performance of multiple functions at the same time by one airman.
If you accept that check airman is such a function, then this regulation says you can't include a check airman in your required crew.
121.432 includes the following statement:
Except for pilot line checks and flight engineer flight checks, the person being trained or checked may not be used as a required crewmember.
The regs aren't as firm as the EU-OPS one above. But there are hints there, i think.
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To get back to the original question: A company designated check airman performing a line check is not part of the operating crew. He is one silent "observer" in the cockpit, non speaking, unless spoken to. And the PIC has the authority to discontinue the line check and to exclude him from the flight deck if necessary. 
