Need some advice
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"fix it and land the plane." But he didn't 'fix it' did he? Go back and read the original post, stabilisation, flap speeds etc. etc. 
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Para...your assuming the capt flew an unstabilized approach, so much so that he should have gone around based on the 600 hr FO making that call. We know that captain landed the plane, how bad could the approach have been?
Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.
Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Angels - I take it from your post that you are not from the multi-crew/airline world - and I give you the benefit of the doubt on your actual identity.
[Did I mention, by the way everybody, that I was 'approved' as single crew on a corporate aircraft and in fact flew single crew for 17 years before that? Just to get my 'credibility' established here on multi-crew ops..................
]
Joking aside, Rananim's post at #21 says it all. There is no 'difficulty' in landing a big jet from an unstable approach on a reasonably long runway. It is just NOT RIGHT. That is where this guy (as reported) got it badly wrong. I regularly used to 'horse' swept wing fighters onto the 'numbers' from tight curved approaches from a run and break (pitch for our fellows) at Vref with the throttles closed - and aced it every time. (Did I mention that?). I'd quite rightly be sacked if I did it now.
PLEASE re-read Rananim's para 3. PLEASE also review airline SOPs on monitoring and stable approaches and the 'terms of reference' laid down by most operators for their crews and in particular their captains.
I know 20,000 hour aces can probably 'do it'. The second crew member is also there for that occasion when the ace's abilities do not exceed the task. The ones who blatantly and automatically disregard the 600 hour pilot's 'anxiety' because they know better are the potential killers.
[Did I mention, by the way everybody, that I was 'approved' as single crew on a corporate aircraft and in fact flew single crew for 17 years before that? Just to get my 'credibility' established here on multi-crew ops..................
]Joking aside, Rananim's post at #21 says it all. There is no 'difficulty' in landing a big jet from an unstable approach on a reasonably long runway. It is just NOT RIGHT. That is where this guy (as reported) got it badly wrong. I regularly used to 'horse' swept wing fighters onto the 'numbers' from tight curved approaches from a run and break (pitch for our fellows) at Vref with the throttles closed - and aced it every time. (Did I mention that?
). I'd quite rightly be sacked if I did it now.PLEASE re-read Rananim's para 3. PLEASE also review airline SOPs on monitoring and stable approaches and the 'terms of reference' laid down by most operators for their crews and in particular their captains.
I know 20,000 hour aces can probably 'do it'. The second crew member is also there for that occasion when the ace's abilities do not exceed the task. The ones who blatantly and automatically disregard the 600 hour pilot's 'anxiety' because they know better are the potential killers.
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Boac, I don't need to be an airline pilot to understand that the story clearly puts the capt in the wrong.. and that he's a cowboy..per airline standards...
As stated I would like to hear the captains story as well, before we all rush to judgement, round him up, grab some rope and Hang 'em High.
As stated I would like to hear the captains story as well, before we all rush to judgement, round him up, grab some rope and Hang 'em High.
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Angels - my post was in response to your:
Para...your assuming the capt flew an unstabilized approach, so much so that he should have gone around based on the 600 hr FO making that call. We know that captain landed the plane, how bad could the approach have been?
Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.
Note my bolding. I too would like to hear the 'Captain's story' although I doubt very much we will. We have to judge the 'story' as told - this is a forum, not a court of law. It does, however, bring out some illuminating facets to some people's attitudes.
I assume that like the others who have hit the forums en masse lately, you are a 'single crew approved' pilot? No, you do not NEED to be 'airlines' but you DO need to at least understand how multi-crew works to comment here. Like another before you, no airline will touch someone with the 'I'm on my own and I'm great' attitude.
To put another crew member so far out of the comfort zone is not on. To push that member out of the comfort zone likewise, UNLESS you are going to help, and finally to breach your employers 'rules' and ignore the comment on such from the other member is totally wrong. the approach sounded very 'bad'.
It is worth remembering that this '600 hour' co-pilot is well-versed in the rules and requirements of the company regarding a/c operation - probably fresher/better than the 20,000 hour Captain. The definition of a 'stabilised' approach is so clear that the odds are extremley high that the co-pilot was ABSOLUTELY right in the call and the 'story' as told supports that. Flap exceedance is also not 'rocket science' to see, is it?
Para...your assuming the capt flew an unstabilized approach, so much so that he should have gone around based on the 600 hr FO making that call. We know that captain landed the plane, how bad could the approach have been?
Not trying to disparage the FO, but I tend to agree with other posters on this forum that I tend to side with the 20,000 hour captain before I would the 600 hr FO when it comes to judging the difference between a stabilized approach or not.
Note my bolding. I too would like to hear the 'Captain's story' although I doubt very much we will. We have to judge the 'story' as told - this is a forum, not a court of law. It does, however, bring out some illuminating facets to some people's attitudes.
I assume that like the others who have hit the forums en masse lately, you are a 'single crew approved' pilot? No, you do not NEED to be 'airlines' but you DO need to at least understand how multi-crew works to comment here. Like another before you, no airline will touch someone with the 'I'm on my own and I'm great' attitude.
To put another crew member so far out of the comfort zone is not on. To push that member out of the comfort zone likewise, UNLESS you are going to help, and finally to breach your employers 'rules' and ignore the comment on such from the other member is totally wrong. the approach sounded very 'bad'.
It is worth remembering that this '600 hour' co-pilot is well-versed in the rules and requirements of the company regarding a/c operation - probably fresher/better than the 20,000 hour Captain. The definition of a 'stabilised' approach is so clear that the odds are extremley high that the co-pilot was ABSOLUTELY right in the call and the 'story' as told supports that. Flap exceedance is also not 'rocket science' to see, is it?
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You guys are slitting your own throats thinking otherwise...give the FO the power to trash a capts carreer on his say so...then only 600 FOs would be flying...
Why only 600 First Officer's left flying?
You've never flown in this environment, have you?
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I have to agree with BOAC here.
We do not know the Captains version of events and probably never will. I'm not sure how you intend to get his version Angels. So we have to take the original story at face value. It may be accurate it may not but it does enable us to discuss some usefull CRM points.
In my view the Capt was badly at fault.
Its all very well saying the F/O was flying a poor profile but then he's a junior F/O. What do you expect? perfection. Clearly he had not anticipated the shortcut but then if his vastly experienced Captain had anticipated he should have intervened to ensure the profile flown would place them in an appropriate position to deal with the shortcut.
He should not have accepted the shortcut without gaining the F/0s consent. It is a lamentable breakdown in communication that he did and led directly to what then occurred as his F/O did not have the experience to deal with the new situation. He did not give his F/O the chance to respond to ATC's request and that is wrong.
If there was a good reason for accepting the shortcut if his F/O wasn't happy to fly it then he could have taken control himself and flown it or offered to talk him through it.
What was he doing allowing his F/O to use speedbrake with Flap 30 on a 737 NG ?! Boeings limit is Flap 10 and some companies limit it further to Flap 5. In any case they've both bust an airframe limit so why the hell did he just let it happen? Rushing too much? That alone is an ASR and an entry in the Tech Log requireing maintenance action before the aircraft flies again
Once his F/O voiced his intention to go around as they approached 1000' he could have taken control. Waiting for TOGA to be pressed is too late and at that point they should have continued the go around.
Stable at 300' is too late. If the company has hard gates and you miss them you go around unless you have a very good reason not to. E G burning final reserve or a significant emergency that threatens your safety of flight.
A word for the F/O. If your Captain is unstable at your companies hard gate you must tell him to go around and if he refuses consider takeing control from him to do so but do not get involved in a fight for the controls unless you believe you are about to die.
This Captain allowed an inexperienced F/O to be put in a situation outside his ability and experience. He is the Captain so blameing his F/O for his flying just mirrors back onto himself.
My advice to the F/O would be to file an ASR due to an unstable approach. This will protect you should your company look at the FLIDRAS and look for an explanation as to this shambles. Your always better to fess up as not doing so will appear as if you have tried to hide the event or hope no one notices. Ideally it is best to be up front and tell your Captain you are doing this after the debrief. If your company want to look at it further then it will provide an ideal oppertunity for learning and training if both sides approach it constructively. If you were halfway through a day then if you are not happy with your Captains response you can refuse to operate with him further but it has to be v serious before you do this. This was v serious though.
Chat to your mates, he may be a good bloke and this was an abberation, however if this Captain regularly behaves in this fashion your management need to know ASAP before the company has a major incident.
Sorry, no time for Captains who behave like this and then try to blame the F/O.
We do not know the Captains version of events and probably never will. I'm not sure how you intend to get his version Angels. So we have to take the original story at face value. It may be accurate it may not but it does enable us to discuss some usefull CRM points.
In my view the Capt was badly at fault.
Its all very well saying the F/O was flying a poor profile but then he's a junior F/O. What do you expect? perfection. Clearly he had not anticipated the shortcut but then if his vastly experienced Captain had anticipated he should have intervened to ensure the profile flown would place them in an appropriate position to deal with the shortcut.
He should not have accepted the shortcut without gaining the F/0s consent. It is a lamentable breakdown in communication that he did and led directly to what then occurred as his F/O did not have the experience to deal with the new situation. He did not give his F/O the chance to respond to ATC's request and that is wrong.
If there was a good reason for accepting the shortcut if his F/O wasn't happy to fly it then he could have taken control himself and flown it or offered to talk him through it.
What was he doing allowing his F/O to use speedbrake with Flap 30 on a 737 NG ?! Boeings limit is Flap 10 and some companies limit it further to Flap 5. In any case they've both bust an airframe limit so why the hell did he just let it happen? Rushing too much? That alone is an ASR and an entry in the Tech Log requireing maintenance action before the aircraft flies again
Once his F/O voiced his intention to go around as they approached 1000' he could have taken control. Waiting for TOGA to be pressed is too late and at that point they should have continued the go around.
Stable at 300' is too late. If the company has hard gates and you miss them you go around unless you have a very good reason not to. E G burning final reserve or a significant emergency that threatens your safety of flight.
A word for the F/O. If your Captain is unstable at your companies hard gate you must tell him to go around and if he refuses consider takeing control from him to do so but do not get involved in a fight for the controls unless you believe you are about to die.
This Captain allowed an inexperienced F/O to be put in a situation outside his ability and experience. He is the Captain so blameing his F/O for his flying just mirrors back onto himself.
My advice to the F/O would be to file an ASR due to an unstable approach. This will protect you should your company look at the FLIDRAS and look for an explanation as to this shambles. Your always better to fess up as not doing so will appear as if you have tried to hide the event or hope no one notices. Ideally it is best to be up front and tell your Captain you are doing this after the debrief. If your company want to look at it further then it will provide an ideal oppertunity for learning and training if both sides approach it constructively. If you were halfway through a day then if you are not happy with your Captains response you can refuse to operate with him further but it has to be v serious before you do this. This was v serious though.
Chat to your mates, he may be a good bloke and this was an abberation, however if this Captain regularly behaves in this fashion your management need to know ASAP before the company has a major incident.
Sorry, no time for Captains who behave like this and then try to blame the F/O.
Last edited by Ashling; 24th May 2008 at 22:57.
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I like to think of things as working together to achieve a set goal. Sure the Captain has the final say but he should rarely have to use that authority if he has led wisely.
To answer your question.
In normal circumstances Yes the Captain should go around rather than question the call provided that does not place the flight in parlous danger. People can and do become target/task/goal fixated and can miss all manner of obvious things and it may be that this is what the Captain has done so normaly it would be best to go around and then discuss why afterwards. It may be you have an emergency of some sort/lack of fuel and in these circumstances then the Captain may need to exercise discretion in order to continue. Most if not all major companies monitor FLIDRAS and stable approach's are a big thing so by listening to your F/O and going around you may well be saveing yourself from a world of hurt.
I'm a Captain but my experience as an F/O is that the vast majority of Captains behave professionaly and do not take silly risks or push their luck. They follow company SOP. The exception to that was one contract pilot we had who seemed to have to push every limit there was. To my mind he came under the cowboy label. A number of F/Os complained to management about him and he was removed at the first oppertunity.
Any F/O trying to use the regs to trap someone or play oneupmanship will get a very one sided educational conversation. FLIDRAS works very nicely to protect you in these cases.
There will always be a debate about the authority gradient on the flight deck. In times gone by it was way too biased towards the Captain but there may now well be a case for saying the gradient has become too flat.
To answer your question.
In normal circumstances Yes the Captain should go around rather than question the call provided that does not place the flight in parlous danger. People can and do become target/task/goal fixated and can miss all manner of obvious things and it may be that this is what the Captain has done so normaly it would be best to go around and then discuss why afterwards. It may be you have an emergency of some sort/lack of fuel and in these circumstances then the Captain may need to exercise discretion in order to continue. Most if not all major companies monitor FLIDRAS and stable approach's are a big thing so by listening to your F/O and going around you may well be saveing yourself from a world of hurt.
I'm a Captain but my experience as an F/O is that the vast majority of Captains behave professionaly and do not take silly risks or push their luck. They follow company SOP. The exception to that was one contract pilot we had who seemed to have to push every limit there was. To my mind he came under the cowboy label. A number of F/Os complained to management about him and he was removed at the first oppertunity.
Any F/O trying to use the regs to trap someone or play oneupmanship will get a very one sided educational conversation. FLIDRAS works very nicely to protect you in these cases.
There will always be a debate about the authority gradient on the flight deck. In times gone by it was way too biased towards the Captain but there may now well be a case for saying the gradient has become too flat.
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The original thread was... 'Need some advice'!
Welcome to the world of PPrune, where 'advice' comes by the bucket-load; whether you need it or not!
As the young fella said; he expected a normal pattern, yet when ATC offered him a shortcut the captain accepted it and NOT the FO; not even a short discussion; just a sidelong glance, but it was the skipper who put the FO into a very poor position... and then enjoyed putting the FO in his place by rebukeing him. Not ny idea of good CRM skills.
Come on guys; give him a break.
TCF
Welcome to the world of PPrune, where 'advice' comes by the bucket-load; whether you need it or not!
As the young fella said; he expected a normal pattern, yet when ATC offered him a shortcut the captain accepted it and NOT the FO; not even a short discussion; just a sidelong glance, but it was the skipper who put the FO into a very poor position... and then enjoyed putting the FO in his place by rebukeing him. Not ny idea of good CRM skills.
Come on guys; give him a break.
TCF
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I originally trained in an old school environment. Now I am (amongst other things) involved in implementation of some of the very latest facets of CRM and TEM. Part of these concepts are that we are all in a learning environment, and will all learn (with varying standards and quality) from each other. The learning value of this incident was obviously greatly limited and this would appear to be soley the fault of the commander. It would seem that some "old school" pilots are STILL either resistant to reasonable change (why have they been allowed to continue flying so long), or are of such super-human qualities that they are impervious to error (again why are they still flying).
For all of you who are the 'right stuff' I have to ask when you stopped learning, and why you didn't stop flying at the same time?
Remeber - It's a licence/rating to LEARN! 600hrs or 30 000hrs no matter.
For all of you who are the 'right stuff' I have to ask when you stopped learning, and why you didn't stop flying at the same time?
Remeber - It's a licence/rating to LEARN! 600hrs or 30 000hrs no matter.
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Judging from the original post, it can clearly be noticed that 'blame' can be spread in several ways.
F/O.
Had no business charging on an extend downwind at 250 knots.
Far better to actually slow down well before, leaving far more time for proper configuration changes, stabilized approach.
I suspect he now knows better (one would hope).
Now, lets look at the Captain's actions.
He doesn't ask the F/O if the base turn is OK (apparently), just goes ahead and says...yes.
Opps, now he's stuck his foot in it, right and properly.
Far better would be a little more communication between crew members, don't you think?
Something similar years ago, with a junior First Officer in a TriStar.
Approaching FRA, ATC has kept us rather high, and now wants high speed, to ten miles.
The First Officer looks very concerned, and askes for help.
I take control, extend full spoilers, and keep the speed at 340 knots indicated until the proper level is reached...the speedy dirty dive.
Stow spoilers and hand the airplane back to the F/O.
He smiles from ear to ear, starts slowing further, flaps at the proper speeds, nice and stable by five miles/1500 agl...makes a very smooth landing...could hardly feel you were on the ground.
Forget all the fancy terms...CRM, 'team building' etc.
In days gone past it was called crew co-ordination.
Worked then, and it still does, if applied properly.
NB.
A note to Captains.
Never ever rush your First Officer into anything, as you might not like the results.
F/O.
Had no business charging on an extend downwind at 250 knots.
Far better to actually slow down well before, leaving far more time for proper configuration changes, stabilized approach.
I suspect he now knows better (one would hope).
Now, lets look at the Captain's actions.
He doesn't ask the F/O if the base turn is OK (apparently), just goes ahead and says...yes.
Opps, now he's stuck his foot in it, right and properly.
Far better would be a little more communication between crew members, don't you think?
Something similar years ago, with a junior First Officer in a TriStar.
Approaching FRA, ATC has kept us rather high, and now wants high speed, to ten miles.
The First Officer looks very concerned, and askes for help.
I take control, extend full spoilers, and keep the speed at 340 knots indicated until the proper level is reached...the speedy dirty dive.
Stow spoilers and hand the airplane back to the F/O.
He smiles from ear to ear, starts slowing further, flaps at the proper speeds, nice and stable by five miles/1500 agl...makes a very smooth landing...could hardly feel you were on the ground.
Forget all the fancy terms...CRM, 'team building' etc.
In days gone past it was called crew co-ordination.
Worked then, and it still does, if applied properly.
NB.
A note to Captains.
Never ever rush your First Officer into anything, as you might not like the results.
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- what about a bar?
Further, even better is a Captains party at HOTAC, cheaper and far more effective....especially for the junior F/O who is feeling (in the broadest sense of the term) his way.
