"Guarding" the controls while on autopilot
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During approach and landing , the flying pilot should be guarding the controls and ready to take over any time , flying is an attiude and flying during critical stages of the flight needs more attention and good lookout, I've been watching pilots sitting x-legged and hands on top of each on chest , and many behaviours like looking for something in their briefcases relying on automation , removing their feet from rudder pedals.It does not look good and may be only one day in your life you'll find out it is very important.
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Johnman has it right. Guard the controls ie, have your hands and feet ready to take control, resting very lightly on the controls, just in case the billion-dollar automatics decide to abandon you at the critical moment (which they will, if you have my sort of luck). Have a nice flight!!
Even with calm winds on a clear day, if you fly the glideslope/loc on autopilot and any other plane is near the ILS transmitters or you have wake turbulence, the plane will fly in a way that will scare some passengers. The other planes are only held well clear during Cat 2/3 approaches, or if an ILS 'hold' line is designated.
Do you know your planes' limits and your own comfort limits?
By the way, don't all (real) pilots want to hand fly many of their approaches, unless the ceiling is less than 1,000' or the visibility is somewhere near minimums? Even after 'flying' the 757 for over three years, I only saw Captains make a required (once a month) autoland about two or three times, total, because it is so easy to fly by hand. But even a normal 'altitude capture' might not go smoothly so just disconnect it and reselect one of three autopilot buttons. A Lufthansa A-340 pilot told me in SFO that his plane once made a sudden 20-25 degree roll during climbout in Munich behind a 757(!), due to wake turbulence. Anyway, some of our 757 Captains often hand-flew departures to above FL 180...or so. If some pilots are afraid to hand-fly or are required to use automation all the time, that would seem really strange to me. This topic reminds me of another one on Pprune. Some younger pilots seem confused about who is really working for whom, i.e., the one in the seat versus the autopilot/VNAV/LNAV/autothrottle systems??
One of the pilots who works "over there" (from the "native tribes") told me that in the UK the airlines are not really interested in piloting skills. If so, do they feel that piloting skills are just for smaller planes because automation is always a safer substitute? Could some Flight Standards Departments around the world have actually desired years ago that the highest levels of flight automation be developed as a substitute for very low experience levels, because the time for this experience to accumulate bothered them? Do some departments therefore demand that pilots always leave automation "in command" because hand-flying most of the departure and approach makes them uncomfortable, or don't want the non-flying pilot to be then constantly pushing buttons on the MCP and FMC? confused:
Do you know your planes' limits and your own comfort limits?
By the way, don't all (real) pilots want to hand fly many of their approaches, unless the ceiling is less than 1,000' or the visibility is somewhere near minimums? Even after 'flying' the 757 for over three years, I only saw Captains make a required (once a month) autoland about two or three times, total, because it is so easy to fly by hand. But even a normal 'altitude capture' might not go smoothly so just disconnect it and reselect one of three autopilot buttons. A Lufthansa A-340 pilot told me in SFO that his plane once made a sudden 20-25 degree roll during climbout in Munich behind a 757(!), due to wake turbulence. Anyway, some of our 757 Captains often hand-flew departures to above FL 180...or so. If some pilots are afraid to hand-fly or are required to use automation all the time, that would seem really strange to me. This topic reminds me of another one on Pprune. Some younger pilots seem confused about who is really working for whom, i.e., the one in the seat versus the autopilot/VNAV/LNAV/autothrottle systems??
One of the pilots who works "over there" (from the "native tribes") told me that in the UK the airlines are not really interested in piloting skills. If so, do they feel that piloting skills are just for smaller planes because automation is always a safer substitute? Could some Flight Standards Departments around the world have actually desired years ago that the highest levels of flight automation be developed as a substitute for very low experience levels, because the time for this experience to accumulate bothered them? Do some departments therefore demand that pilots always leave automation "in command" because hand-flying most of the departure and approach makes them uncomfortable, or don't want the non-flying pilot to be then constantly pushing buttons on the MCP and FMC? confused:
Last edited by Ignition Override; 22nd Jul 2004 at 05:48.
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IgnitionO w.r.t. 'UK the airlines are not really interested in piloting skills' - sorry to report but that's not true. Veritably many of our Ops Manuals specifically state that we should guard against erosion of hand-flying' skills.
Indeed, to help make the point, I recently opperated the following flights in a B737-300 :
Departed in darkness from London-Gatwick ( en-route Innsbruck / INN; it being a Cat C airfield worthy of considerable respect ) with both autopilots u/s. On approach (LOC 26) to INN weather was such that at MDA we were unable to see anything at all ( except heavy snow and a big dollop of ice on the wiper nuts & wings ) so, "GoAround" followed by diversion to Munich. The whole trip, and return to LGW, was hand flown; When we got back to LGW the next flight, by a different crew, similarly despatched ( sans autopilots ) for Tenerife and back ( were at just over 4 hours in each direction, plus a turn-around in the middle, that's got to be a long night !
).
Departure from Stansted during which both Flight Directors failed. Ergo no autopilot or lateral / vertical guidance - and we coped admirably.
Now I could go on and on with examples but, needless to say, we're actively encouraged to disconnect the 'automatics', get hands-on with the beast and keep our scan sharp; However, that said, there's the time and place ( along with crew experience levels ) to be taken into account and if, say, the TMA is busy we prefer to have the autopilot ( if available ) engaged until establised on the GS - doing so helps to keep it safe.
Indeed, to help make the point, I recently opperated the following flights in a B737-300 :
Departed in darkness from London-Gatwick ( en-route Innsbruck / INN; it being a Cat C airfield worthy of considerable respect ) with both autopilots u/s. On approach (LOC 26) to INN weather was such that at MDA we were unable to see anything at all ( except heavy snow and a big dollop of ice on the wiper nuts & wings ) so, "GoAround" followed by diversion to Munich. The whole trip, and return to LGW, was hand flown; When we got back to LGW the next flight, by a different crew, similarly despatched ( sans autopilots ) for Tenerife and back ( were at just over 4 hours in each direction, plus a turn-around in the middle, that's got to be a long night !
).Departure from Stansted during which both Flight Directors failed. Ergo no autopilot or lateral / vertical guidance - and we coped admirably.
Now I could go on and on with examples but, needless to say, we're actively encouraged to disconnect the 'automatics', get hands-on with the beast and keep our scan sharp; However, that said, there's the time and place ( along with crew experience levels ) to be taken into account and if, say, the TMA is busy we prefer to have the autopilot ( if available ) engaged until establised on the GS - doing so helps to keep it safe.
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We have the standard guard the controls on approach SOP which seems reasonable to me.
More bafflingly there's a procedure somewhere - (deliberate vagueness),one of those preference SOP /non SOPs which even the most diligent organisations end up with - which calls for the pilot in the LHS when PNF to select speedbrake if requested by pilot in RHS, then keep hold of it to be reminded of its deployment, then re-stow it on request. The RHS PF can still select and re-stow it if he chooses, A/P in or out - it matters not, but the LHS guy is the one who should hold it whilst it's deployed.
I can see the reasoning given the standard position of the speedbrake lever, instances of brakes being left out, possibly 3 primary control lever groups to be manipulated together (wheel, thrust levers, brakes) - and maybe other things, but it's too close to Captain's hand hovering for my liking. Few day to day scenes rival that for hacking people off.
More bafflingly there's a procedure somewhere - (deliberate vagueness),one of those preference SOP /non SOPs which even the most diligent organisations end up with - which calls for the pilot in the LHS when PNF to select speedbrake if requested by pilot in RHS, then keep hold of it to be reminded of its deployment, then re-stow it on request. The RHS PF can still select and re-stow it if he chooses, A/P in or out - it matters not, but the LHS guy is the one who should hold it whilst it's deployed.
I can see the reasoning given the standard position of the speedbrake lever, instances of brakes being left out, possibly 3 primary control lever groups to be manipulated together (wheel, thrust levers, brakes) - and maybe other things, but it's too close to Captain's hand hovering for my liking. Few day to day scenes rival that for hacking people off.
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Willfly380... Look at your own handle and you know you're not right... Even in the soon-to-be most modern airliner in the world, the A380, I still see a cockpit with nice seats for real human beings.
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guarding controls whilst on a/p
Our company S.O.P.s state" whilst below msa" a/p to be guarded.Hand flying is not encouraged at all,hence erosion of flying skills,Seen it too many times,A/P disengaged by enthusiastic rt. seat,A/C all over the sky.!,in fairness,cant really blame anyone,company wants automatics,especially on SIX sector days,your are too knackered to "pole" the a/c.
If you are puzzled by the requirement to guard the thrust levers and control wheel during flight below 2500', or whatever, do a search for the A300 departure accident at Bucharest, some years ago. Better still, view the AA training video which covers this particular accident and then see if it makes sense.
By all means have faith in the quality of the systems in use but bear in mind that perfection is a VERY elusive quality.
It is still a truism - "NEVER ASSUME, CHECK"
By all means have faith in the quality of the systems in use but bear in mind that perfection is a VERY elusive quality.
It is still a truism - "NEVER ASSUME, CHECK"
Cornish Jack the Trarom A310 accident in Bucharest does not clearly support the argument for guarding thrust levers. In the accident one of the thrust levers stuck at TO thrust whilst the other retarded; what the crew failed to do was monitor the system / aircraft and disconnect the automation with a deteriorating situation. Thus as you state never assume always check, but checking does not necessarily require physical hands on.
If you imply that guarding controls is lightly resting the hands on the controls / thrust levers, then there will be improved awareness from positional feedback, a form of monitoring (N/A A320 onwards). However, caution for those operators who have autopilots with very light overpower forces (no auto cut-out) as a heavy hand may restrict the auto control input, which could cause the trim to run with more serious consequences than would be caused by a random autopilot disconnect.
I am still puzzled by the number of SOPs that appear to originate from “that’s a good idea”; without any real understanding of the design / certification principles. How many SOPs are backed up with a written explanation of ‘why’ and thus justify the management of perceived risk against higher workload or increased complexity.
Why would discretion’s company use m.s.a as a start monitoring altitude; good altitude awareness (that’s a good idea), but not entirely ‘Standard’ as in ‘SOP’. If your aircraft requires that you guard the controls so diligently, then why not hand fly the aircraft; oh, you are tired, what happens on the sixth sector when the autos are on the MEL, will you really say ‘no thankyou’. As a professional pilot the operational authorities require (or falsely believe) that you and your crew are competent to fly within prescribed limits; what is ‘all over the sky’ to one pilot may be within acceptable safety limits to the industry, but to an inexperienced pilot, or you, it could be a valuable opportunity to improve. Not blaming you – just suggesting that all of us could occasionally rethink the safety strategy.
If you imply that guarding controls is lightly resting the hands on the controls / thrust levers, then there will be improved awareness from positional feedback, a form of monitoring (N/A A320 onwards). However, caution for those operators who have autopilots with very light overpower forces (no auto cut-out) as a heavy hand may restrict the auto control input, which could cause the trim to run with more serious consequences than would be caused by a random autopilot disconnect.
I am still puzzled by the number of SOPs that appear to originate from “that’s a good idea”; without any real understanding of the design / certification principles. How many SOPs are backed up with a written explanation of ‘why’ and thus justify the management of perceived risk against higher workload or increased complexity.
Why would discretion’s company use m.s.a as a start monitoring altitude; good altitude awareness (that’s a good idea), but not entirely ‘Standard’ as in ‘SOP’. If your aircraft requires that you guard the controls so diligently, then why not hand fly the aircraft; oh, you are tired, what happens on the sixth sector when the autos are on the MEL, will you really say ‘no thankyou’. As a professional pilot the operational authorities require (or falsely believe) that you and your crew are competent to fly within prescribed limits; what is ‘all over the sky’ to one pilot may be within acceptable safety limits to the industry, but to an inexperienced pilot, or you, it could be a valuable opportunity to improve. Not blaming you – just suggesting that all of us could occasionally rethink the safety strategy.
In the TAROM incident, if the operating pilot had kept his hands on the thrust levers (even lightly) he would have had to notice that one lever was retarding as the automatics tried to maintain total power during power reduction. That he also failed to monitor the attitude change doesn't alter the fact that the sensory input from the thrust levers would have alerted him to the need for intervention. He didn't and a lot of lives were lost .... UNNECESSARILY.
“if the operating pilot had kept his hands on the thrust levers (even lightly) he would have had to notice that one lever was retarding”; quite true Cornish Jack, but alternatively how many operators require that all hands are off the thrust levers after the call of V1? A SOP supposedly to prevent inadvertent retardation after V1.
We cannot have it both ways (standardisation and improved safety) unless the relevant risks are evaluated and balanced before writing SOPs. What are the risks of an inadvertent thrust reduction after V1 with respect to a thrust lever jamming? No doubt, there are accidents in each category, but there should be solutions other than SOPs for hands on or hands off. Old-fashioned airmanship, knowledge, and discipline in obeying the meaning of V1 or by training improved engine instrument / controls / thrust lever scans may well have prevent these types of accident, but then we all know better because we think of a good idea for improving something and write a new SOP. Unfortunately, we don’t always think through all of the likely scenarios or we make too many assumptions about crew behaviours.
I think that we agree in our differences; by all means guard the controls, but do not be heavy handed with the SOPs.
We cannot have it both ways (standardisation and improved safety) unless the relevant risks are evaluated and balanced before writing SOPs. What are the risks of an inadvertent thrust reduction after V1 with respect to a thrust lever jamming? No doubt, there are accidents in each category, but there should be solutions other than SOPs for hands on or hands off. Old-fashioned airmanship, knowledge, and discipline in obeying the meaning of V1 or by training improved engine instrument / controls / thrust lever scans may well have prevent these types of accident, but then we all know better because we think of a good idea for improving something and write a new SOP. Unfortunately, we don’t always think through all of the likely scenarios or we make too many assumptions about crew behaviours.
I think that we agree in our differences; by all means guard the controls, but do not be heavy handed with the SOPs.
I 'guard' the controls whenever I am operating in terminal areas. It gives good feedback as to what the autoflight system is doing and puts my fingers close to the disconnect switches. It also helps with remaining in the loop. As terminal areas are full of aircraft going every which way, you never know when you may have to manoeuvre in a hurry!
