“if the operating pilot had kept his hands on the thrust levers (even lightly) he would have had to notice that one lever was retarding”; quite true Cornish Jack, but alternatively how many operators require that all hands are off the thrust levers after the call of V1? A SOP supposedly to prevent inadvertent retardation after V1.
We cannot have it both ways (standardisation and improved safety) unless the relevant risks are evaluated and balanced before writing SOPs. What are the risks of an inadvertent thrust reduction after V1 with respect to a thrust lever jamming? No doubt, there are accidents in each category, but there should be solutions other than SOPs for hands on or hands off. Old-fashioned airmanship, knowledge, and discipline in obeying the meaning of V1 or by training improved engine instrument / controls / thrust lever scans may well have prevent these types of accident, but then we all know better because we think of a good idea for improving something and write a new SOP. Unfortunately, we don’t always think through all of the likely scenarios or we make too many assumptions about crew behaviours.
I think that we agree in our differences; by all means guard the controls, but do not be heavy handed with the SOPs.