Policy for F.O. taking controls from Captain
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Welcome to another day in planet 411. For the 2175th week running the smash hit ' Captain saves the day, FO learns the hard way not to touch or say anything' reaches number one.
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"Not choosen for ability, was 'who you know', period".
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Well that clears up any doubt about the management style of this company then !
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"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.
As it should be, in my opinion.
But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
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Interesting statement. It wasn't unusual in the past for Captains to have a good understanding of authority, but a poor understanding of responsibility. very often this manifested itself as no effective management skills. Of course this is why CRM is now a seperate subject and is so prominent in Pilot training and refreshers. Authority without good human management skills often manifests itself as bullying. For the practioner, the authority was seldom challenged which in turn reinforced the behaviour. The supervisory culture was often little better and this protected the bully.
For the recipient the path of least resistance was usually to please the antagonist. Often this resulted in saying nothing that might offend or annoy. being pro-active would only be a good thing if the" Authority " was clearly encouraging of such behaviour. Many would however view it as a challenge to their authority.
So the subjugated First Officer, kept his "nose clean" and given a healthy dose of good luck went on to become promoted to Captain. Of course this now put him in authority where hopefully he would exhibit better overall management qualities. Unfortunetaly as so often happened, it was the past experience that came to the fore. The same company culture was present, indeed the previous Captain had probably moved into the Administrative management. So the whole cycle was perpetuated.
As 411A says:
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"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.
As it should be, in my opinion.
But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
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So many accidents resulted from this behaviour, that the whole subject became a serious cause for concern. Nowadays a better understanding of human behaviour and people management should enable a Captain and indeed all of his crew to better understand the bounds of authority and the skills necessary to ensure that those bounds do not impede safety or willfully stifle proper expression.
CRM in many of its aspects has always existed and I am not suggesting it is anything new. However a better teaching , understanding and awareness of it has contributed to breaking this cycle of bullying and subservience that was so often a feature of "Crew management" in days of old.
As Chris has pointed out, being an Airline Captain isn't just about being a good Pilot anymore. It is about being a good Manager as well.
As has been highlighted by 411A's example, the Captain sometimes had to be a quick thinker and a good Pilot, to compensate for the lack of effective communication and crew management. These days people often bemoan the demise of the Flight engineer with some justification. It is sad that in this example with 3 flightdeck crew (including an F/E) nobody was managed with the task of effectivley cross checking the fuel uplift.
Dripping the fuel tanks is never a popular task and one is left wondering why neither the F/E nor the F/O was tasked to do this. Perhaps it is understandable that the Captain didn't want to, but given their seeming contempt for their right hand seat colleagues would it not have been a fitting charge ?
As time moves on it is rare to see advocation such as this, and from a CRM point of view it is good to be able to discuss it in a forum dedicated to the subject.
"Not choosen for ability, was 'who you know', period".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well that clears up any doubt about the management style of this company then !
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.
As it should be, in my opinion.
But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interesting statement. It wasn't unusual in the past for Captains to have a good understanding of authority, but a poor understanding of responsibility. very often this manifested itself as no effective management skills. Of course this is why CRM is now a seperate subject and is so prominent in Pilot training and refreshers. Authority without good human management skills often manifests itself as bullying. For the practioner, the authority was seldom challenged which in turn reinforced the behaviour. The supervisory culture was often little better and this protected the bully.
For the recipient the path of least resistance was usually to please the antagonist. Often this resulted in saying nothing that might offend or annoy. being pro-active would only be a good thing if the" Authority " was clearly encouraging of such behaviour. Many would however view it as a challenge to their authority.
So the subjugated First Officer, kept his "nose clean" and given a healthy dose of good luck went on to become promoted to Captain. Of course this now put him in authority where hopefully he would exhibit better overall management qualities. Unfortunetaly as so often happened, it was the past experience that came to the fore. The same company culture was present, indeed the previous Captain had probably moved into the Administrative management. So the whole cycle was perpetuated.
As 411A says:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Were the First Officers in this company 'stepped on' big time if they fell out of line?
Absolutely.
As it should be, in my opinion.
But hey, they are Captains now, and get to return the 'favor'. "
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So many accidents resulted from this behaviour, that the whole subject became a serious cause for concern. Nowadays a better understanding of human behaviour and people management should enable a Captain and indeed all of his crew to better understand the bounds of authority and the skills necessary to ensure that those bounds do not impede safety or willfully stifle proper expression.
CRM in many of its aspects has always existed and I am not suggesting it is anything new. However a better teaching , understanding and awareness of it has contributed to breaking this cycle of bullying and subservience that was so often a feature of "Crew management" in days of old.
As Chris has pointed out, being an Airline Captain isn't just about being a good Pilot anymore. It is about being a good Manager as well.
As has been highlighted by 411A's example, the Captain sometimes had to be a quick thinker and a good Pilot, to compensate for the lack of effective communication and crew management. These days people often bemoan the demise of the Flight engineer with some justification. It is sad that in this example with 3 flightdeck crew (including an F/E) nobody was managed with the task of effectivley cross checking the fuel uplift.
Dripping the fuel tanks is never a popular task and one is left wondering why neither the F/E nor the F/O was tasked to do this. Perhaps it is understandable that the Captain didn't want to, but given their seeming contempt for their right hand seat colleagues would it not have been a fitting charge ?
As time moves on it is rare to see advocation such as this, and from a CRM point of view it is good to be able to discuss it in a forum dedicated to the subject.
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All very interesting comments bealzebub, but my example indicated was well before the days of CRM, and I suspect the company, knowing about the deficiencies of some of the players, arranged the management style as they did.
This is not to say of course that many of the First Officers in the company were not up to par.
Up to the time I left the company, all First Officers were sent to the USA for intensive training, and if they did not measure up, never made the line, 'knowing' someone or not.
In the rather long time I was with the company, only can recall one First Officer that was a problem. By the time they had reached the TriStar fleet, those that created problems on the B737 fleet, were kept there until they rearranged their thinking and, in several cases, were sent back to that fleet if they stepped out of line.
Another tool that was used with some success were spot line checks. The fleet manager seldom did these, but they were delagated to the fleet supervisors.
The First Officer was observed over several sectors, and if ground time permitted, were given a short oral quiz on the aircraft systems.
This is the only airline where I have worked where this was done and, if nothing else, resulted in excellent aircraft/systems knowledge. These guys knew their equipment very well, and most could handle the aircraft with ease, even in the most difficult situations...as the company demanded that hand flying skills be maintained to a well defined level....30knot crosswind, not a problem for most of these guys, they could roll it on very nicely. The TriStar is a delight to fly under these circumstances.
This is not to say of course that many of the First Officers in the company were not up to par.
Up to the time I left the company, all First Officers were sent to the USA for intensive training, and if they did not measure up, never made the line, 'knowing' someone or not.
In the rather long time I was with the company, only can recall one First Officer that was a problem. By the time they had reached the TriStar fleet, those that created problems on the B737 fleet, were kept there until they rearranged their thinking and, in several cases, were sent back to that fleet if they stepped out of line.
Another tool that was used with some success were spot line checks. The fleet manager seldom did these, but they were delagated to the fleet supervisors.
The First Officer was observed over several sectors, and if ground time permitted, were given a short oral quiz on the aircraft systems.
This is the only airline where I have worked where this was done and, if nothing else, resulted in excellent aircraft/systems knowledge. These guys knew their equipment very well, and most could handle the aircraft with ease, even in the most difficult situations...as the company demanded that hand flying skills be maintained to a well defined level....30knot crosswind, not a problem for most of these guys, they could roll it on very nicely. The TriStar is a delight to fly under these circumstances.
It's not possible to give advice for every situation but I think it's important to differentiate between what is safe or unsafe and/or what is illegal or against the SOPs.
Firstly, let me emphasise that, unless the commander has overriding flight safety reasons for doing otherwise, I would fully support the concept that commanders obey the rules, sops etc.
However, with respect to going below weather minima on a precision approach providing the FO has drawn attention to the fact that the aircraft is being operated outside the normal limits then if the FO judges that the aircraft is being operated "safely" then better NOT to take over and discuss said matters on the ground afterwards! All this, of course, is a matter of skill and judgement - who said the FOs job was going to be easy?!
On the other hand, if at any stage of the flight the FO judges that the aircraft is about to meet impending disaster then by all means take over!
Firstly, let me emphasise that, unless the commander has overriding flight safety reasons for doing otherwise, I would fully support the concept that commanders obey the rules, sops etc.
However, with respect to going below weather minima on a precision approach providing the FO has drawn attention to the fact that the aircraft is being operated outside the normal limits then if the FO judges that the aircraft is being operated "safely" then better NOT to take over and discuss said matters on the ground afterwards! All this, of course, is a matter of skill and judgement - who said the FOs job was going to be easy?!
On the other hand, if at any stage of the flight the FO judges that the aircraft is about to meet impending disaster then by all means take over!
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Surely SOP's are there because the authority has approved them as a safe way to operate the aircraft. Unless there are serious overriding factors once you deviate away from them safety is presumably compromised.
How do you suggest one can asses the safety implications as the seconds tick by continuing your descend bellow minima in IMC. Assuming a DA of 200feet and a rate of descent of 700 feet/min it does not take very many seconds before you either see something or hit something. If you take the decide call repited a couple of times and allow some time for a response you can see it is not a nice place to be. On the other hand if the PF is looking outside for a visual clue he is bound to deviate from the loc/gs.
Extreme emergencies aside this is my recipe. Be poilte and considerate, speak your mind but also be receptive, stick to the script. If the other guy does something similar a good day out ensues. Who needs a guy busting minima or forcing you to do a 4 second safety audit on his latest theory.
How do you suggest one can asses the safety implications as the seconds tick by continuing your descend bellow minima in IMC. Assuming a DA of 200feet and a rate of descent of 700 feet/min it does not take very many seconds before you either see something or hit something. If you take the decide call repited a couple of times and allow some time for a response you can see it is not a nice place to be. On the other hand if the PF is looking outside for a visual clue he is bound to deviate from the loc/gs.
Extreme emergencies aside this is my recipe. Be poilte and considerate, speak your mind but also be receptive, stick to the script. If the other guy does something similar a good day out ensues. Who needs a guy busting minima or forcing you to do a 4 second safety audit on his latest theory.
