The account above in the Daily Telegraph is a bit "off context".

The survivor is first talking about the first aborted take-off when it refers to the captain saying "a red light has turned on" and he didn't know what it was. Later, it seems, he informed the passengers it was a "heat senso alarm" and "was repaired by the technician" during the aprox. 1 hour it took to go back to gate, bring in the technician, do the "repairs" (confirmed to have been some sort of "switch-off" or bypass) and get ready for take-off again.

The later part of her statements do refer to the accident during the "second" take-off, when the accident happened.

Not sure if you are referring to the Aena Barajas airport security cameras pointing to the airstrip, which recorded the accident. The footage is not available, but at least one spanish newspapers has cited sources within the investigation that has viewed the footage and describes it as, basically, there was no explosion or (big) engine fire during "take off", the front wheels (at least) left the ground (possibly back wheels as well, but not openly stated), a wing touched the floor whle coming down again, no (big, visible) fire started at least until the plane was fully on the ground ("hard" landed, bounced around, etc).

Sorry to be so vague, but that's what the (major) newspaper reporter has said and therefore other accounts are more speculative. My personal take is that it briefly took off without visible problems and few seconds after full ascend commenced something, either a mechanical fault/accidental damage/stall or a pilot decission, made it come down again and attempt to "land", resulting in problems that led to lack of control, damage (reportedly wing hitting the ground) and runing-off the side (not the end) of the airstrip at high speed into enviromental obstacles which caused brekage and fire.

But only a the facts stated above are "confirmed" (as reported through a newspaper citing footage viewer, which as we know, may also be innacurate). My account is totally speculative.

Windshear or bad atmospheric conditions seemed unlikely. Other than low wind low air density and high ambient temperature, conditions seemed good enough.

On most aircraft/engines with that feature - variously called things like "automatic power reserve", the official part 25 term is Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) and its regulated by § 25.904 - the thrust level even with the thrust increased by the system is still constrained by engine ratings.

Whereas, as mentioned, a manual "firewall" of the engines will generate thrust potentially far in excess of rated power - causing economic damage to the engines, but potentially saving the airframe. On a hot day, such as the accident, the engine rated thrust will be restricted by engine temperature considerations, and there will be considerable mechanical scope to increase fan and core speeds. As a complete WAG, there could be 20% or more thrust available, albeit for a limited time. Of course, in the OEI case it's generally NOT a smart move, because all your VMC numbers are also predicated on rated/ATTCS thrust levels.

Justme69 seems to have written an exact description of the current state of knowledge can further posters confine themselves to either responding to the data, or to introducing new data.

This is an interesting event and discussions about how air travel would be safer if the entire world was converted into one flat runway are obvious and uninteresting

wileydog3
 

naaaahh; well, i don't know who you fly for, but pencilwhips happen usually not with consent of the flight crew; they happen between dispatch ops, maintainance ops and the mechanic working the plane; getthereitis is the desire to accomplish the mission, mainly desire of the crew to get to the hotel, looked the other way by all ops for obvious reasons; thats why unions are such a nice thing...

Flaps?
 

Guys

I wonder if the security camera shows what flaps were set?

390

It is fair to say that they were probably in a bit of a hurry. I'd certainly want to know the flaps and slats were configured. In fact, its the first thing that came to my mind after sadly hearing about this. I see somebody has just mentioned this.

As most people here are aware a Northwest MD-82 was lost this was after the loss of the CAWS failing to alert the crew of their error.

review this thread
 

having read this subject from start to date, I'm amazed that intelligent people can be so wild in their guesses and theories. Why do you people who normally only deal maths and facts suddenly leap to speculative ideas which in reality until the official information is released is always guesswork. You complain about the media, but if you review this thread the posts are worse than than the guesses they make. Sorry but this thread just covers every possibilty that could go wrong in that situation. There's seems to be as lot of pseudo posturing about who is best at technical knowledge.
Read the thread again and see what you have all suggested.

The question is appopriate for the on-scene investigators and possibly any close up photos of Leading edge devices and flaps. But I fear greatly that we will be inunadated with analysis of fuzzy stuff like vertical stabilizers etc. just because it looks like a wing.

390cruise, the airport video, like the FDR and CVR are in possession of Spain's judiciary now.

Nothing else is known about video content beside the little reported in previous posts.

I guess they want the boxes fully decoded before making any strong statement based on the video only.

lomapaseo,

thank you. I've been reading my MD80 manuals. I was, and am, aware of ART (automatic reserve thrust) and ATR (automatic thrust restoration). Both features have previously been mentioned and put in context by xkoote in post 568 (permalink). Thanks a lot for that.

Here's what the Manual says about various takeoff power settings:

Reduced thrust (FLEX T.O.): ART off
Normal thrust: ART on
Maximum thrust: ART off

Autothrottles can be used in all three cases.

So, ART can be only be used for "normal" takeoff thrust. The other mechanism, ATR, is always available.

I don't know which thrust setting was used here. A very long runway might indicate FLEX, but high weight, altitude and temperature might have dictated normal thrust.

When the ART system detects a 30% N1 difference, invalid N1 or some other conditions, it actuates, and directly opens a solenoid-operated fuel valve, giving maximum thrust, regardless of thrust lever position.

ATR has different actuation conditions, and if triggered, advanced autothrottles to the Go-Around EPR limit.


Bernd

Is the ART system's maximum thrust value dependent on the disconnected temperature probe's reading, by any chance?

Bsieker

are you sure about the 30% number? Thats an awful lot of thrust loss (29% N1) to handle on a takeoff by the plane alone. I thought it was more like 10-15% for it to trigger.

400' agl
 

funny, some airlines use the 400' agl rule to start action

ours uses 1000' afe to start clean up and actions...one could cancel a fire bell earlier, but we don't start shutting anything down till 1000'

ECAM Actions.

I think it is relevant to discuss the terrain and that it probably did affect survivability. Two main ways it could do that - changing the initial impact and delaying the rescue response.

I don't think there is much doubt about the latter - just looking at the terrain it's obvious they wouldn't have got there as quickly as on the flat, and firefighters are now being quoted saying as much: "There were too few firefighters at the beginning".

In terms of the initial impact it depends on what exactly happened, which isn't at all clear yet. If the aircraft rotated and then came down again on its wheels and then veered off the runway, then on flat ground it might well have slid on its belly for a better result. On the other hand, if it became airborne and then (for whatever reason) put a wing into the ground (as some reports have suggested) then it could have cartwheeled in and broken up even on flat ground.

Interesting one to compare to. Certianly a lot more survived 232 - almost two thirds, compared to around 1 in 10 in this case. "Bit of both" would agree with what has been written about 232. In terms of flat land it wasn't just the airfield:

In terms of the emergency response they had a lot of luck - a national guard unit happened to be at the airport to assist, and it was shift change at local hospitals meaning they had double shift of medical staff available.


There are some other differences which may considerably affect survival rate though:

- flight 232 had plenty of warning of the crash
- they were not at takeoff with full fuel load - in fact they dumped fuel (as you would expect)
- airport had advance warning and emergency vehicles were out and ready
- hospitals and surrounding emergency services had advance warning
- passengers on the plane had warning - brace position in theory allows much better survival of deceleration (although how it gets done in practice I don't know, I've never met an economy class seat it was physically possible in (excepting exit-row), and I don't think I am exceptionally tall)


Even if there are recommendations on survivability they may be largely academic - the industry tends to focus a lot more on not crashing in the first place rather than crashing and surviving. I am pretty sure that after Sioux city and Kegworth there were recommendations on infant seating and restraint - but two decades on they are still on parents laps. Then there's smoke hoods... or rather there aren't.

Spanair = Organised Chaos
 

THERE COULD BE MORE TO THIS CRASH.

The Times Online, Is now reporting that the Spanair Pilots sent numerous e-mails to the then Chief Executive - Lars?? informing him the way the Airline was run.

The Pilot's members of SEPLA, were so concerened at how the Daily operations were run they voiced their concerns.

It also said, The crews were transported around like 'Popstars' to run Spanair's busy route network.

They were concerened about the Airline's maintainence, And overall passenger safety calling it 'Organised Chaos'

SAS has being trying to sell off Spanair for the last year, And had planned to cut the 4,000 workforce by a 1/3.

There are now fears that SAS itself could lose alot of it's passengers, Due to it being the same company.

Spanair execs have not decided to ground the rest of the MD80'S believing that they are safe??

The MD80's should have been replaced by 2007 as promised.

Have Spanair being the contributory cause??

Sadly I can see a new theory of this crash now.

I hope not.

Full article @ Timesonline.co.uk

Why stop flying the type? There is no evidence for this (yet).

From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.

This idea fits with the following details:

* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground

Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all. :(

Given the above, they had little time to do anything.

ECAM Actions.

Can we agree that the supposed "facts" are being disputed when new "facts" are presented?

Let's wait for official statements from investigators.

Where Now?
 

The survivors are obviously not in the best mental condition so it is not clear how much their testimony can be relied upon at this stage. However, the way the matter is described, the vibration and yaw at and just after TO does seem to indicate a stall? Would it be reasonable to speculate on the most likely causes thereof. But then of course we are back to square one. Almost.

Regarding the terrain between parallel runways, I can only add that if this had happened under similar circumstances should there have been similar terrain between parallel runways at LAX, the Americal lawyers would already be salivating at the prospects. But then that would, of course, be true irrespective.