Newpapers report the pilot had some 7000 hours (10 years) of experience on MD-80's series and the plane had performed a Barcelona-Madrid flight previously to this one without incidents.

The oficial explanation on the maintenance performed prior to take off is:

"A malfunction of the heater of the probe that measures the outside temperature while on ground as well as flying". The failure was in the mechanism that allows the probe to be "on" during flight and automatically deactivate while on ground" (I know it's somewhat contradictory to say in the same sentence that the failure was thought to be with the heater to then say it was with the automatic on/off switch of the probe, but that's what the expert brought by Spanair said to the families).

The 41yo mechanic had 20 years of experience and decided to deactivate the *probe* (according to the ...ehhh... probably-not-too-reliable reporter writing the news piece), considering the weather conditions good enough to safely fly w/o said mechanism.

Again, freaking confusion, I think the reporters are saying the wrong thing and only the heater was de-activated due to some failure of the on/off autoswitch (to heat while in fly-mode and be off while grounded?)

Perhaps we should just assume the whole probe was innoperative.

So the "literal translation" of the news piece on the technical briefing is, once again, not-all-that-clear. Either the heater didn't work or the switch that turned it on/off on air/ground didn't work and was disconnected. Or something.

weigh in
 

Just a side note....up thread it was noted that this flight was normally not holiday types but business and residents so that luggage should be less.

As background I find that an interesting conjecture as after 30 some years in the industry I have seen it exactly the other way....couple bathing suits and sandals do not weigh much for the tourist but island residents will bring everything including the kitchen sink in an attempt to get around paying duty and higher prices on the island for the same goods than on the mainland.....and in more than a few cases goods that cannot even be found on the island at any price. In fact I see island residents pool together and send one on a shopping trip to bring back for many.....the one traveling get's a free trip to be the 'buyer'.

One other note in regards to weight....fuel is always far more expensive at an island station that on the mainland so aircraft are routinely fueled heavily on the outbound to reduce both cost and turn time for the return to the mainland.

Yes...all luggage is weighed but for the reason of charging for bags over the allowed weight....not to fill out a weight manifest. However, in the US the FAA has mandated that bags over 50 lbs be counted differently and a higher average weight used...whether this European carrier has the same procedure I do not know.

Overall I would expect the piece count per pax to be higher than an average Euro domestic trip/Holiday trip and the weight per piece also higher.

More speculation.

Maybe the 'OAT' probe issue combined with the whole 'return to stand' issue and time pressure/ fatigue combined and caused them to miss something else.

To me it looks like they tried to fly an aeroplane that was not quite ready to fly.

Either it was too slow or not properly configured.

The 'deployed' TR was likely a product of an attempt to stop once they found themselves 'off piste'.

Having speculated- to no useful prurpose- I don't suppose it will take long for the truth to surface with this one.

There but for the Grace of God.......................

Do I understand that
1) the aircraft lifted off and then landed again
2) prior to the flight something was wrong with and/or done to a probe and/or its controller
3) the data from said probe is only used in flight?

Unacceptable
 

From Post # 358:

(emphasis added)

* * * * * * * * * *

And THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG!!!

The various regulatory agencies (FAA here in the States) should have, as their top priorities, the advancement of safe operating practices, accident prevention, and a safe environment for passengers and crew. Instead, proposals such as this are permanently shelved because these agencies are, as you say, more concerned about bad PR for the airport and the airline.

I heard that, a few years ago, a very advanced version of the "black box" was being sabotaged by the Industry because the more information it could collect, the more likely it could pinpoint possible negligence by the Carrier. Heaven forbid. The corporate lawyers certainly can't have any of THAT!!!

The airlines call all the shots and the regulatory agencies just go along with it all. The tail wagging the dog. :mad:

So far, after all the posts wasted on the subject, it's not even confirmed whether it was the OAT or RAT/TAT probe that caused the problem.

Suggest we maintain the status quo!
 

This is my first (and last!) post since joining this forum. I would just like to say that even the 'clinically thick' are able to determine whether comments submitted to the PPRuNe are from individuals who are either CPL/ATPL and therefore know and understand the substance of matters they are talking about. I have long since been intrigued by the character of any individual who is able to sit at the front of a high powered tube and traverse long-distances over plains and oceans, where at any moment the dull and ordinary can rapidly move to the most terrifying of experiences.

It is clear (to me at least), those who truly understand what FADEC/EICAS/EGT/EPR/DME/ILS/AoA/BA/V1....etc means, and how these systems and processes are applied to control modern commercial flight. The quest for knowledge is liberating and the professionals on this forum should remain, so that those who do not know what they are talking about are clearly exposed.

As one of those SLF's who smells fear the moment the wings of any aeroplane moves a mm from the horizontal, my sincere respect to all those individuals who we rarely meet and equally less get to know, who are prepared to apply all their professionalism and skill to take us safely to any far flung part of this planet.

Finally, I would like to close with my deepest condolences to all those who have been affected by this most recent tragedy in Madrid.


sAx

Any guesses how many weeks/months before the official inquiry results are out?

sAx_R54,

Informed comments do not only come from "individuals who are either CPL or ATPL", who "truly understand what FADEC/EICAS/EGT/EPR/DME/ILS/AoA/BA/V1....etc means".

There are those individuals who design and/or maintain aircraft, who know equally well what that alphabetti-spaghetti refers to, and whose informed comments can be equally valuable.

CJ

Also the alphabettii - spaghetti can confuse the debate.

IF, and it is a big if, the evidence shows that this aeroplane left the ground at less than required aerodynamic flying speed or failed to maintain speed for more than a few seconds then it simply aerodynamically could not fly. Most student pilots who have studied the principles of flight could deduce that.

The reason for that could be down to the complex issues people are throwing into the ring here, or it may not. The only people who will truly know are those that decode the Flight Data Recorder.

Well, that's it. It seems the media has lost interest in the story and information has stopped to a trickle.

Information given is VAGUE and by non-experts, therefore conclusions as to what happened are somewhat speculative. But what was said before applies. Here are known facts coupled with my own free interpretation.

-Flight prepares for T/O but returns to gate after pilot warns PAX of a malfunction indicator (red light) he is unsure about and he wants checked by a technician. Plane returns to gate where technician and pilot agree it's a warning related to the outside temperature probe heating device (probably a faulty automatic on/off switch). Either the heating device (likely) or perhaps the whole probe (unlikely, just a few reports probably mistakenly speak of this) was tripped-off (or fuse removed). Pilot and technician agree no suspected wheather condition will make the heating device needed operative (no danger of ice to perhaps foil reading the outside air temperature). They both sign the plane fit-to-fly. Pilot informs PAX that the small problem with the "heating sensor" is fixed and they are now going to leave (after about 1h delay).

-Plane starts acceleration and rolls. Some account the plane as moving slow, rolling quite late in the strip (but at least +600m still available), perhaps having a "weird nose angle" (a bit too steep?) without any other visible indications of malfunctions. Politicians witnesses of the security tape insists on the plane looking like "it didn't have enough power to take off".

-Front wheels (and likely back wheels) leave the ground, only to have the airplane behave erratically and "fall" soon afterwards.

-Once on the ground, the plane suffers unspecified damage. Some official speaks of a wing briefly touching the ground. The plane, probably, tries to brake and briefly thereafter loses control and turns right, getting off the strip (when at least +300m, possibly +500m of flat surface was still available in front of them). It then crashes.

Information being insisted upon: No visible damage (i.e. fire) on the plane on the video recording of the accident until after it "came down and touched the ground". And "the plane looked like it lacked enough 'power' to take off", for unknown reasons. Fire or engine problems, from a visual point of view, only seemed to have hapenned as a RESULT of the inability to sustain flight (or fully take-off, as it can be interpreted also), and not as a CAUSE. Again, speaking visually from the outside of the airplane. There is definetly no "explosions" or obvious visual malfunctions of any kind with the engines at that point.

I have no idea how, in such a long runaway, the pilots couldn't notice on time a severe lack of thrust (presumably on both engines) and couldn't correct it (or abort) and instead tried to take off presumably below V2m and perhaps at a steep angle (or perhaps the angle was shallow and they were trying to compensate ... the angle is spoken of as only being "slightly weird" or "slightly unusual", but doesn't mention whether it was steep or shallow). No mention whatsoever of flaps/slats.

It seems reasonable that after hitting the ground (on the landing gear) and bouncing around a bit the pilots possibly decided to try to stop (i.e. deploy reversers, brake hard). Somehow control was lost and the airplane didn't continue (much longer) on a straight line, coming off the side and finally hitting terrain obtacles several hundred meters later at a very high speed (as plane damage and victim's injuries would suggest, where every single survivor spoken about had one or more fractures and reports of several hard to ID victims with limbs severed would suggest).

Unfortunately, the Flight Data Recorder suffered some damage, which would no doubt delay a better understanding of what happened and what could've caused it.

I have the feeling that unless some major startling discovery is made, the probable causes of this accident are a long time away. Those witnessing the tapes say things like "you can't see any problems on the plane from the footage" (perhaps the resolution is not good enough to calculate things like slats angles, etc, without heavy analysis)

Rat,art,atr
 

In the MD,the RAT probe send temp data into Air Data Computers.These, in digital format feed both digital flight guidance computers.The DFGC compute the EPR for each flight phase and pilot seleccion through the TRP(thrust rating panel).The RAT probe is heated only in flight for anti ice purpose.If for some reason,the ground sensing relays ( energized in ground) change to flight condition,the Rat sensor is heated and the EPR is reduced. This change may be for a circuit breaker open or a ground sensor relay fail .This condition may afected the takeoff condition warning too.All of this is not too much evident for pilots.
The ART ( automatic reserve trhust) is used only in normal TO EPR. Not in flex. or max. Is activated when the DFGC sense diferences (30 % ) between both N1 .Not is autothrottle funtion but inside the fuel control unit. Increase about 700 lbs thrust or .05 EPR to the present thrust.
The ATR ( auto thrust restoration) with the last DFGCs (-972 and subsequent ) only is active in noise reduction cutback procedures.
Accept grammatical corrections

777Fly, I stated this in two lines approximately 100 posts ago and you are one of the few to even address this likely issue. Rushed Crew, failure to configure, loss of CAWS power. Would fit the picture. And I believe in the absence of any further information, the scenario that fits the accident most closely so far.

ChristiaanJ,

'Those individuals', would clearly represent the collective noun of professionals of whom I earlier referred.

Over and out!

sAx

just a few thoughts
 

Before you regular posters attack me I want to point out I am a professional pilot but of the 737 classic? variety and have never flown any MD varient.

Once again, I refer to post 376.

It may well be a hoax (the poster never claimed it as his own) but it may also be genuine.

Many accounts say that the aircraft was veering to the right at an early stage. In the event of reduced but symmetrical thrust this would not happen until the stall.

I find it difficult to believe that an experienced pilot would not be able to control an engine failure, particularly in an aircraft with the engines so close to the centreline. I do take on board the points about atmospheric conditions and the possible discrepancy regarding pax weights.

In the SIM I have seen a heavy 737 get airborne with less than normal takeoff thrust get airborne at far less than normal speeds. eg Vlof <100kts.

Engines fail very rarely. The aircraft veered to the right.


In my opinion the rto will prove to be a red herring, although it is worth remebering that MEL items assume no other failures or combinations of failures.


It is only my opinion but I think an unlocked reverser is looking likely.

once again, just my own opinions

More info on the reverser required!!!
 

777. Surely the L/E devices would've given a TO Config warning. And getting airborne early might be possible with mistaken lighter performance numbers, but in the ways of staggering into the sky, as has been described, surely a tail strike would have occured, if no slats, and or an early rotate.

Bummer bout the CVR/FDR.

Was there a heavy departure prior, 747 etc, which might have offered some dirty air in a no slats, lower than required speed departure.

And a flaming left and a reverser deployed on the right does give some evidence to the right turn prior to contacting the ground, unless as you say its been in a stall situation prior, or heaven forbid, stall caused from the reverser. If that was the case. :oh:

There are no known facts:=

There are only facts that are believed to be known based on credibility of source and the experience of the interpreter to convey them.

The mods do not fit this bill.

Sorry but you are just going to have to wade through the stuff in this forum and decide for yourself what best represents credible fact according to your own experience.

I'll give you a clue some of the stuff here is "expert opininon" however much of it is wishfull theory

Another crash survivor has died
 

The BBC is reporting that one of the survivors has died, bringing the total number of dead to 154. Unfortunately burns and burn or smoke damage to the lungs can be difficult to recover from and often prove fatal later, as here.

Birgenair????
 

Birgenair ALW301: probable Pitot static blockage, suspected to be from mud dauber wasps.

Spanair 5022: ?`:confused:

Now if you suggested that AeroPeru 603 was similar (not identical: pitot vs static bloackages) to Birgenair 301....

Now, it is possible for a pitot/static event to occur at any time, not just with wasps nesting or tape applied over static ports, AND a failure would be a high risk factor on a takeoff, and historically such failures tend to be problematic for crews to manage.... one assumes that the DFDR and QAR fitted to this type will ascertain that readily, as it records IAS from the DFDAU, and while GS is not recorded directly, the L/L will provided a derived GS (which is just nice to have to identify quantitatively IAS errors when corrected).

again, common issues are;outcome.

Please, await (avidly, if you must) the formal report conducted under Annex 13. If there is something new that is identified as a threat, then one assumes the authorities know their obligations under ICAO, and under EASA and EC law.:zzz:

ref: http://www.flightsafety.org/ap/ap_oct99.pdf
AG RVS - News and Comment on the Aeroperu B757 Accident; AeroPeru Flight 603, 2 October 1996