Spanish media says that the airport tapes shows that apparently they used more runway than usual, climbed about 50m, with no visible sign of engine fire but with an attitude that indicates less available power than required. It banks to the right, the right wing touches the ground and they lost control.

forget... Yes - known since shortly after accident it's in the gully between the runways...

You say "it should not be allowed" but why? Runoff areas are specified - but in general in line with the runway. At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...

NoD

Does anyone have any idea where this extended and locked (?) reverser ended up? I don't see any blacktop within 2,000 feet of the ravine.

[IMG]http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b2...3023416691.jpg[/IMG]

I'm becoming even more baffled. The fire trucks couldn't reach part of the airfield between the runways because of terrain and scrub.

Airfield topo
 

I agree a ravine between two runways is a bit extreme but how far out do you make everything flat? If this happened at LHR on 27L then you would end up in T5!

[QUOTE]At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...[/QUOTE]

Not so. 18 is never used for take offs - we're told. :bored:

And terminals are a necessity. Ravines - not welcome.

in light of the new video:
 

a couple of ideas in light of the new video:

is it possible that the mx staff pulled the wrong circuit breaker while placing whatever system on "mel", somehow disabling the flap/slat/takeoff configuration warning system, and that the pilots somehow didn't set the flaps/slats properly? (think detroit)

is it possible that the engine power was not properly set to desired thrust?

did the pilots, when faced with problem, firewall the throttles?

a takeoff stall recovery is firewall power/slats/flaps 15 (or in the md 80, to the dial a flap detent I think)

I'm sure we'd all love to see runways which are 10km long and wide (which have the advantage of being used in any wind direction), but it simply won't fit in most locations (with the exception of maybe DEN) and would be way to expensive. Indeed most airports will have buildings, roads or even other active runways there instead of trees and ravines.

Air Traffic Controller - retired.

Airfield Safeguarding Criteria cover a range of issues, including vertical obstacles and frangible items within designated distances of the RW centre-line and end zones. I can't remember any of the numbers now, but essentially the criteria provide a degree of protection for any ac departing the RW pavement, and include an element of "reinforced grass" adjacent to the RW. They are not, however, intended to cover situations where an aircraft substantially departs the operating surfaces.

In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?

Forget's (and others) comments
 

On the ref'd comments on airport design, I would just like to let you know that LEMD follows the recomendations of ICAO Annex 14.

As forget's picture shows, there is a large FLAT area (actually 4350x300m) surrounding both runways, which is over the recomendation.

Te actual location of the crash can be seen here.

Gráficos en ELPAÍS.com


I am no airport design expert, but I now a flat area 4350x300m is a lot bigger AND wider than a lot of other airfields. It would have been better to have it 2000m wide as suggested, but in no way can it be said that LEMD is unsafe because of this: safety criteria is based on international recomendations, (which may or may not have to be amended a s aresult of this accident)

Do I need to remind you of the hundreds of international airports wtih a lot of bigger hazards surrounding the runway?



By the way: no, I am not connected in any way to that airport, other than as a user.

Very little of Madrid is built between these runways.

If you have been to Spain recently and seen the hundreds of kilometres of perfectly smooth grading they have made to their autopista network in the last five years to link cities with key airports like this then it begs the question why was this terrain left with textural consequences?

I do understand all of that - necessary compromises. But, as if the gully wasn't enough, would you operate a quarry between runways as Madrid appears to be doing? That does strike me as a little .......... er, deranged.

(Unless, of course, they're filling it in. ;) )

[IMG]http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b2...pas/quarry.jpg[/IMG]

I will admit I was looking more towards to the south-east of the airport ... where there appears [on Google Earth] to be a rather tiresome river and a lot of industrial buildings.

However, my point is more general: I say again ... how far does one go? and at what cost?


@ Forget ... I take your point. An "interesting" activity. However, well outside the safeguarding areas. Change [extend] the parameters and, world-wide, you would be bulldozing whole swathes of cities, motorways and other infrastructure [and filling in those lovely useful reservoirs west of LHR].

EFATO
 

BIG BURD

The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures.

The above statement is not correct.
The crew did not contravene OPS procedures. The Emerald OPS manual clearly stated that it was at the captain's discretion to land back on if this was the safest option.
Whilst the HS748 is a Perf. A aircraft, the length of RW23 at STN was more than twice the accelerate/stop distance required at the WAT, and the take off was from the start of the runway, not an intersection.
The uncontained failure was a catastrophic event, depositing the turbine compressor wheel on the runway, the wheel had exited the cowling vertically severing fuel lines, hydraulics and fire protection system, spilling burning fuel over the wing an undercarriage. While the severe fire that followed was rapidly burning through the main spar. On the flightdeck, there was no fire warning, audible or visual, until the arcraft had safely landed back on the runway and just before the overrun onto the grass. All 46 pax and 4 crew walked away uninjured, hence the praise you refer to.

This is an identical incident with the same type of engine the Rolls Royce Dart

]The Transportation Safety Board of Canada report number H90001, Quebecair F27B CF-QBL Flight No 255[/B]Fatal accident at Quebec City Airport, 29 March 1979
The flight lasted 1min 12secs fourteen passengers and three crew died in the crash.
"At time 36 seconds(after brake release) there was a loud bang from the right engine as it disintegrated and a severe fire developed. The aircraft was at approximately 103 kts and 40 feet above the runway.
time 42 The captain started the engine failure/fire emergency drill.
At time 45 the tower controller who had noticed flames from the right engine advised flight 255 that the right engine was on fire and authorised them to land on any runway.
From time 50 to 1:05 the crew attempted to raise the landing gear which never came up.
The aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above the runway elevation and started a right turn, apparently in an attempt to complete a short circuit, remain visual and execute an emergency on the airport.
At time 1:14 the captain called for the propeller to be feathered. Up to this point the crew did not know that the right engine had separated at the first stage impeller and the forward section of the engine along with the forward section of the engine along with the propeller and some cowling had fallen onto the runway
At time 1:24 the No 1 fire bottle was fired and the aircraft continued in a right turn at about 100 feet above the terrain at a very low airspeed. The engine fire continued.
As the aircraft approached the College de Sacre Coeur, the angle of bank increased and the aircraft started to descend until impact.
Impact occured in a nose down, right wing low attitude at approximately 80 kts.
A fierce fire broke out and most of the fuselage forward of the wing was consumed by fire."

There but for the grace of God.

The MD-82
 

Just once more to clarify two important issues with an MD-82 takeoff in this particular scenario. I have already mentioned this in a previous post.

1. Madrid's runway 36L is 14271' long !

2. Given that length and given a collegues experience taking off from that runway, even at a gross TO weight of about 66 tons (given my personal guesstimate) the MD-82 would have taken of with between 2° and 3° of flaps and a rotation speed of close to 160 knots.

3. It is clear that even so the MD-82 did not even leave the airport perimeter. And that the MD-82 "appeared" to have encountered problems with still a lot of runway remaining.

4. If the crew made a derated TO, they would not have automatic emergency thrust applied as that (ART) system must be OFF when using TO FLEX.

5. Even though they did not have automatic emergency thrust, the ATR system should have set EPR G/A on the remaing engine if it was set below that EPR setting.

6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed as the MD-82 has conventional (auto)throttles.

7. Given the amount of energy they had at liftoff, the MD-82 would have no problem whatsoever in continuing it's takeoff engine failure profile.

8. For an MD-82 travelling at close 170 knots probably, it seems odd that it could not have gotten off to more than 20-50 m height.

9. The crew "appeared" to either have aborted after becoming airborne, or they encountered a deployed reverser at liftoff. Either one a far fetch. Let's hope all becomes clear in this matter.

Xander

forget, the 'quarry' you refer to is, by the looks of it anyway, a remnant of the construction of the two runways, i.e. a depot, a yard where concrete was being made.

If you use Google Maps (not Google Earth), and you zoom out to 1000ft/200m, it appears to be part of a now-rerouted motorway/dual carriageway between the north-west and the south-east end of the airport (zoom out to 1km/1mi ratio, and you can see how that cleared bit merges with the southern end of 36R, and naturally appears to continue to the northern end of 33R).

Perhaps our Spanish/Madrid residents can help out on what changed when MAD T4 was built; there are two crossing points on the southern creek and the northern creek (where the fuselage ended up). But there IS elevation, that much is clear.

I found this link that explains some (but not all) of the changes: Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD/LEMD) Airport Technology

S.

Is there any way that we can convert this rumor of a video showing:

no engine fire,

a long takeoff roll

a drop back to the runway with a roll

as a fact:confused:

If so we can probably trim out quite a few speculations to date.

Unfortunately the thrust reverser questions will take some time to be disposed

I'm more inclined for a Reverser Unlock after V1...

I admit without reservation that the following is nothing more than considered speculation based on what I have read on these pages and what I have observed in similar cases in the simulator.

Aircraft has compressor stall left engine very close to VR. Witnesses report flames seen from left engine which are a characteristic of compressor stall. Reason for compressor stall unknown yet. Indications of compressor stall in cockpit may include hearing bang and slight yaw and some vibration. Vr is called and pilot (captain or first officer?) instinctively starts rotation then changes his mind and de-rotates. Someone pulls hard reverse on both engines as part of abort procedure. Probably gets reverse on right engine but possibly not on left engine depending if actual engine failure. Aircraft pulls right under influence of full reverse right engine and fatal delay in countering the right departure from runway centreline. Depending who was PF at the time, critical delay in handing over control to captain who presumably would have initiated abort process. Lack of good braking on grass or hard dirt verges extends stopping distance already compromised by abort action during rotation. Pure speculation of course but fits the reported track of aircraft.

Any number of airports the world over have significant obstacles alongside the runways, from terminal buildings to housing and roads, rivers etc..08 at LGW springs to mind as those terminal buildings and parked aircraft seem pretty damn close. Funchal perhaps?
Given the amount of fuel the aircraft would have had on board, and that it got airborne, then the likelyhood of the crash being survivable at all is very remote.
I am amazed that anyone survived; and we should be grateful for the small mercy that the only casualties were on board. At a lot of airports it could have been a very different story.

Here is a Babel Fish translation of a Spanish article that refers to the video.
El MD-82 despegó escaso de potencia y no se incendió en el aire, según las grabaciones - Nacional_Sucesos - Nacional - ABC.es


The images recorded by the cameras of security of the tracks of Barajas show that the MD-82 of Spanair that crashed Wednesday did not have sufficient power when initiated the takeoff, according to sources of the investigation consulted by ABC that already have visionado the sequence. It does not last more than two or three seconds. The image corroborates the testimony of the pilot of an airship that landed then in parallel: “That airplane does not take off, is eating the track”. As much he, as the rest of the crew of the airplane that came already from Guayaquil has been mentioned to declare by the Civil Guard. I collate of that recording, the marks left by the apparatus in the track - del wing, rest of the undercarriage, scattered to both sides, and the first successfully obtained testimonies, still without determining the causes, aim at that the accident took place of the following form.

The MD-82, with 162 passengers on board and ten crew, initiates the maneuver of takeoff to the 14,20 hours. It is the second attempt; almost one hour before a failure in the outer temperature sensor had had to return to the door of boarding when detecting the commander, that communicated to the passage. All the sources agree in which that anomaly does not have relation and so it happened later, but also it is being investigated. A technical inspector of Spanair certificó that McDonnell Douglas could fly. The manual anticipates that the switch takes off who gives energy him to the blower pipe, located under the cabin of the copilot, according to the company.

The airplane initiates the takeoff by track 36 left; the commander notices the lack of power, surely just after reaching the V1 call - when no longer the maneuver can be aborted; VR or turnover rate is arrived at. The aircraft, that had not risen more than 50 meters, inclines (probably after failing the right motor, although the doubts persist); one hurries to the ground, the right wing is striking the track and the pilot loses the control. The airplane to more than 280 km per hour is undone and crawling about 500 meters - there are marks of that uncontrolled maneuver. He does not arrive at the end of the track, leaves by the right, he crosses the peripheral fence and one hurries by a semislope staggered among five and seven meters until the channel of the stream of the Fertile valley. There the loaded deposits of kerosene explode and the apparatus catches fire. The dead and bodies alive are scattered in the lowest part of valley throughout about 400 meters. The crew did not get to put the undercarriage, went it leaving after falling to both sides of her route. “An established height does not exist to gather it. The normal thing is that the “train arrives” becomes ordained two or three seconds after the rotation, when already you have sufficient height and with a positive regime of ascent”, details a pilot to ABC. From a few approaches, everything is incognito. Who have seen the images yes assure that any motor is not appraised burning in the air, the lack power, the abrupt turn and the imbalance of the aircraft.


The little power can be due to multiple reasons: overweight, heating, failure of motor or one more a failure more serious than, in theory, must have detected in the revision of maintenance. “It surely raised to the front wheels and also the backs”, explained the minister of Promotion, Magdalena Alvarez. Sources of Civil Aviation draw attention on the failure of the motor: with the one nonoperative airplane it could have flown. They say that if that failure existed it had to take place after taking off, if the commander would not have aborted the maneuver. A human error is not discarded either. Nothing is it. Now the investigation, several parallels in fact, must be giving light all to these questions. The black boxes and the recording of security already are in the power of the Court number 11 of Madrid. One of the boxes is damaged, but the data will be able to be reclaimed equal. They are two: in one they are recorded the conversations of the members of the cabin and the outer control systems; second it is the technique, the one that operation of the motors, temperatures registers more of a hundred of parameters of the situation of the airship such as, pressures or atmospheric situation.


Collection of pieces and turbines Recovered after the wreck, they constitute one of the main probatory elements. The ones in charge to analyze them are the members of the Commission of Investigation of Accidents and Civil Aircraft incidents (Ciaiac), that depend on Promotion. Are seven civil servants, supported by personnel specialized in aerial security of the United States and the European Union and expert of the implied companies. To them he is incumbent on to them to explain all the technical part. They followed in “zone zero” picking up pieces, turbines and rest to label them yesterday and began to take the material to a room yielded in the airport. This investigation, longest in the time, comes together with other three: the corpse identification, the ocular inspection and the diligences. The team of Great Catastrophes of the Civil Guard, Scientific Police of the CNP and tens of forensic work without rest to conclude as soon as possible. The experts consider that by the traditional methods - tracks, photographic reconnaissance, identification of objects it will not be possible to put name to more than 60 or 70 victims, dice the state of the bodies; for the rest it will be necessary to resort to the DNA. The ocular inspection nothing else began to finish the rescue of victims. It has been entrusted to the central equipment of the Service of Criminology of the Civil Guard with support of his laboratories. Tens of agents are dedicated from Wednesday to take photographies in the zone, to determine the point of impact, to elaborate croquis, to mark the area in which they were scattered corpses, to separate properties, documentation, to resist each found rest. The police diligences have been ordered to the Judicial Police of the Command of Three Songs, supported by members of the Operative Central Unit. The agents will reflect in hundreds of folios the declaration of the wounded - still it has not been possible to take any; the one of the witnesses - they already are being located and being mentioned: the one of the personnel of the airport, personnel of the airline, technicians of maintenance, rescue teams. Puzzle of words to try to explain what it happened and how. The testimony of the survivors of the JK5022 will be key, whose flight plan was assigned the past to commander 17 of August. They will explain if she inquired to them into what happened, if a different maneuver were tried, if they noticed something. The last critical moment tens on agents and rescatadores lived yesterday. To 8,45 in the morning they recovered the cuerpecito burnout of a baby, covered by the weeds and the fuselage. To the 13 hours they found another minor, with the member amputees. They were those that lacked.