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Still no videos of the MIG-29.
In case of unlawful interference shouldn't it be two FJ? |
Does FR use datalink?
Could someone with adequate knowledge confirm if FR does use ACARS or any other kind of operational datalink? Reason for me asking is I hear them inquire about destination WX with ATC ever so often…
Beeing unable to communicate with company OCC in this special situation and having to rely on local information only would be a major contributing factor to the outcome ‚as is‘ in my point of view… |
No they don't. One day hopefully.
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Don't blame the crew. They were trapped. Should they have ignored ATC in a situation like that? With a planeload of passengers?
We still don't know how they ended up turning around and flying way longer instead of continuing descending right to their destination. I agree that we are fed conflicting information for the sake of it and to blur the picture. |
I don't - so does probably Mäx.
What I am asking: Do operations striped down for max. cost efficiency and thereby lacking certain technical and personal ressources have contributed? |
Less Hair
Not a question of blame and we simply can't say without more info, BUT, in the LHS you are in command and need to make hard judgements quite often. There are times when ignoring ATC would most definately be justified. |
I don’t think airline pilots, certainly not in Europe, ever have had to worry about being “tricked” by ATC. Up until now we all assumed that ATC would be there to help in a situation like this, it’s not part of our training or experience to suspect ATC instructions or recommendations in a security event. So in my humble opinion, most reasonable pilots would have done exactly the same as these guys did, why would you further complicate your already uncomfortable situation by playing spy games??
And yes, Ryanair, like all EU airlines, have a 24/7 OCC with trained security assessors. |
7574ever,
While what you say is correct in Europe, in my experience, that is not always the case in some other parts of the world, for example in Africa, the Middle East and India. This is particularly the case when wars and civil conflicts occur, or even with simple plain incompetence on the part of the ATC organisation in recognising diplomatic overflight clearances, etc. In the past, I and colleagues have had to blag our way through some awkward situations. However, as you say, this is not something you might expect in Europe. I have no idea what the Ryan Air crew had to deal with since all that we read and hear about this incident is so (deliberately?) muddled. And even with the help of 24/7 OCC security assessors it would not have been easy to make the right decisions. My sympathies are with the crew, at least they got the aircraft safely on the ground, even if it wasn't the optimum place. |
Well, a lot of you guys seem to swallow this so called authentic ATC transcript whole.... I would love to hear a transcript from a credible source (NATO?).
Anyhow, this crew is well within EYVI VHF coverage, and had ample time to call "friendly" sources for info on box 2. As for the "the bomb will detonate over Vilnius" part, I am no EOD expert, but I have never heard of a crude device in an aircraft bomb threat situation that is supposed to go off at a specific location.. (pressure, time etc yes, but this?). A call to Vilnius control to see whether they had received any so called threat email, and then land at the nearest suitable airport (EYVI in this case), or if in doubt go to Kaunas in Lithuania, which is way closer than Minsk. Again, we do not know what has actually being said and so forth, but based on the info we have, I simply do not understand why they did not press on into friendly airspace and landed either at VNO or KAU. |
7574ever
Well said. The fact that the captain decided to divert in this way suggests that it was considered the safest course of action. Any crew would want to continue so there had to be something else to prioritise a diversion. We still don’t know what exactly was communicated to the crew or when. Regarding contact with the company, say by satcom or ACARS, may not have helped in this situation IMHO. I hope the international and aviation authorities will treat this with the severity it deserves. Now the USA is back in the fold maybe it will happen. |
Lukashenka just had a speech on this, a few bullets:
1. regarding the emailed threat: The President noted that in the case of the Athens-Vilnius flight, the signal to mine the plane was received from abroad - from Switzerland. Moreover, the message arrived at the airports of Athens, Vilnius and Minsk at the same time. 2. regarding the sender of the email: "Hamas, not Hamas - it doesn't matter today. " 3. regarding the order to make the plane land: "“The point is not only and not so much in this fighter, which was raised absolutely in accordance with all the rules. The point is also what we are not talking about, that at my order all the protection systems of the nuclear power plant, including air defense, were raised by alarm, instantly put on full alert. According to my official duties, I had to protect people, I thought about the security of the country. And understand a simple thing: if the plane was mined, and there would be a desire for terrorists to blow it up, we would hardly But I could not allow the plane to fall on the heads of our people. After that ... We didn’t forget it… These two guys died while taking the plane away from residential buildings. So don’t reproach me. I acted legally, protecting my people . This will continue to be so, "the Belarusian leader emphasized. " source: https://www.belta.by/president/view/...i-443021-2021/ To put it together: even though the email was published and claimed to be from Hamas, now it is not from Hamas. Also, the email is claimed to be received simultaneously in Athens and Vilnius, but there are no information of this is there? The Greek and Lithuanian authorities have not stated it have they? And as third, what can be interpreted is that Lukashenka did order to make the landing happen. |
It already went up to UN general secretary level. This will not just fade away.
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"Why not get more information before you divert into a regime ruled by a dictator with a very powerful secret police."
I'm afraid that the kind of political regime in force and the power of the respective local police of the states you're overflying is not generally a part of pre-flight preparation in intraeuropean flights. I think you guys are reading way too much into the crew's actions in this particular case. As BBK said, other areas of operations may prompt crews to consider non-aeronautical factors in their decision making, but that's not really been the case (until now) in most of Europe (with the exception of Eastern Ukraine). |
A Hamas bomb threat against an insignificant, but specific Ryanair flight from Athens to Vilnius, exactly when overlying Belarus, which coincidentally carries a wanted Belarusian member of the opposition, coincidentally being advised not to land at the nearest airport (being destination Vilnius), but in Minsk.
I have constructed better lies, trying to foil my parents, when I was a teenager... |
Originally Posted by Less Hair
(Post 11051696)
It already went up to UN general secretary level. This will not just fade away.
I know the Dutch are now taking Russia to the European Court of Human Rights over the MH17 but, in practice, the only people to gain much will be Legal teams. I really don't see Putin getting too worked up about that. As Richard Dangle said at Post #59, "States like Russia, Belarus (and plenty more) don't give a fig about western democratic opinion...the more outrage they get the better. Their audience is internal...ie their own people.". I'm not saying don't do what you can ...... it's just as 2unlimited said way back in Post #38, the end result of all these sorts of things is "not a lot". |
This makes interesting reading regarding the legalities.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/belarus-and-hijacking-ryanair-flight-fr4978-preliminary-international-law-analysis News broke on Sunday about a mid-air diversion of a plane flying over eastern Europe, followed by an emergency landing. This itself would be mildly significant, but when the facts as reported are known, the story attains wider and more dramatic importance about several issues: the freedom of political protest, authoritarian rule in isolationist parts of the world and the rule of law in international affairs. According to media reports, on the afternoon of May 24, 2021, Ryanair Flight FR4978 was on route from Athens, Greece to Vilnius, Lithuania. The aircraft—bearing tail number SP-RSW—was registered in Poland. One of its passengers was Roman Protasevich—a Belarusian journalist and dissident who played a key role in protests against Alexander Lukashenko’s regime in the wake of the contested 2020 presidential elections. Sofia Sapega, a Russian law student and his partner, was travelling with him. Two officers of the Belarusian secret police, the KGB, were also onboard. Once the plane was in Belarusian airspace, those officers told the pilot of Flight FR4978 that there was an explosive device on board, and that an immediate emergency landing was required. At this point, a Belarusian Air Force MiG-29 appeared alongside and “escorted” the aircraft—not to the nearest airport in Vilnius, but to Minsk, Belarus. On landing, Protasevich and Sapega were detained. Six hours later, Flight FR4978 was allowed to resume transit to Vilnius—minus six passengers on its original manifest, including Protasevich and Sapega. Certain reports have offered harrowing accounts of Protasevich’s reaction. Told the aircraft had been diverted: he shook and held his head in his hands. While being led away in Minsk, he was reported to have said, “I’ll get the death penalty here.” There was, of course, no explosive device on board Flight FR4978. The claim that there was appears to have been a ruse by Belarus to force the aircraft to land in Minsk so that Protasevich and Sapega could be arrested. For its part, Belarus has admitted there was no bomb—but rather than own up to its actions, it has concocted a narrative whereby Hamas made the threat in order to secure a ceasefire with Israel in Gaza. Given that the actual ceasefire was obtained on May 21—three days before Flight FR4978 took off—this story seems, to put it mildly, wildly implausible. From the perspective of international law, it is difficult to overstate the seriousness of Belarus’ actions. While international law as a whole is often criticized as vague, unenforceable and prone to manipulation or convenient reinterpretation by powerful actors, not all of it operates that way. Some regimes of international law, by the agreement of states, are quite straightforward. They have clearly defined obligations to defend interests essential to the functioning of international society on a day-to-day basis, combined with appropriate routes for adjudication. One such regime is the network of treaties governing international civil aviation—most notably the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, both of which Belarus is a party to. In examining those treaties, one can immediately see the outline of a powerful case as to why Belarus’ actions violate international law. Article 1(1)(e) of the Montreal Convention creates an international crime where a person unlawfully and intentionally “communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.” Secondly, per Article 10 of the Montreal Convention, a state must “in accordance with international and national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the offenses mentioned in Article 1.” It follows that, in contriving an emergency landing of Flight FR4978 off the back of a fake bomb threat, Belarus committed an outrageous breach of the Montreal Convention. In the ordinary course of events, Poland, as the flag-state of the aircraft, or any of the Montreal Convention’s 186 other relevant member states, could bring a case against Belarus before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. But that is precluded in this case by the fact that, on signature, Belarus (then the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) put in a reservation to Article 14—the Montreal Convention’s dispute settlement provision, which provides for ICJ jurisdiction. Hence, if a state attempted to bring a case against Belarus, the ICJ would most likely dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. But not all avenues are closed. Belarus failed to make a similar reservation to Article 87 of the Chicago Convention, providing that any dispute under that treaty can be referred to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—the specialized agency of the United Nations (U.N.) charged with coordinating civil air travel—with any decision of the ICAO Council subject to appeal before the ICJ. And, moreover, by breaching Article 10 of the Montreal Convention in persuading Flight FR4978 to land, Belarus appears to have equally breached Article 3bis(b) of the Chicago Convention. That provision provides that in exercising its right to ground an aircraft in transit over its territory, a state can only do so by resorting to “appropriate means consistent with relevant rules of international law.” Poland or any of the other 191 members of the Chicago Convention would conceivably have standing to commence such proceedings. What we therefore see here is a comparative rarity in international law—a clear breach of two respected international treaties by a state, combined with a clear route to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal. The remedy under international law is similarly clear. Poland, as the flag state of the aircraft—and, in international law terms, the victim of Belarus’ unlawful act—is entitled to full reparation. Other states may have similar claims. As the forerunner of the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice, put it in the Chorzów Factory case in 1928, this means that Belarus “must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, would have existed if that had not been committed.” In bluntly practical terms, this means that Protasevich and Sapega must be released from Belarusian custody and allowed to continue to Vilnius—as they would have done if Belarus had not behaved as it did. That Protasevich is a Belarusian national does not alter this conclusion. For Poland (or any other qualifying state) to be made whole in the Chorzów Factory sense, he must be permitted to leave Belarus. There is precedent for this, with Russia being made subject to similar orders by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at the request of the Netherlands in the Arctic Sunrise case in 2013. That case concerned the interception of a Dutch-flagged Greenpeace vessel in the Russian exclusive economic zone with Russian nationals aboard. Of course, this is merely an early analysis of how one international controversy appears to involve a violation of international law in a manner that can be brought before the ICJ. Various foreign ministries will have commenced their own analyses already, and more articulated cases may well be produced in the days and weeks to come. Some may find grounds for international wrongfulness beyond the civil aviation context—most likely concerning the human rights of Protasevich and Sapega. Of course, this scramble to find an appropriate jurisdictional angle on the case sheds light on one of the persistent weaknesses of international law—its lack of compulsory dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. As Lawfare readers know, there is often no real way around this reality: international law is rooted in concepts of voluntarism and cooperation, which are usually the first things to go when dealing with any inter-state dispute. One thing, however, is clear. Belarus’ decision to ground Flight FR4978 on a pretext to take a dissident and his partner into custody should cause profound disquiet within the international community and invite immediate consequences. The network of agreements governing international civil aviation is rightly seen as one of the most significant achievements of the wave of post-1945 treaty-making that converted international law from a relatively narrow and ad hoc discipline into the comprehensive rules-based system of today. Moreover, although somewhat truncated in the era of COVID-19, air travel is a central part of international commercial life, in much the same way as international shipping, which is regulated by a similarly dense network of international treaties, most notably the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Were the international community to tolerate aerial piracy, then other state actors could well form the view that such action is a permissible way of seizing political dissidents (or any other individual they want to detain, for that matter). Regardless of the formal jurisdictional question, that cannot be permitted if states want to maintain safe and reliable international air travel as a feature of the international system. In the first instance, the burden falls greatest on the EU. Flight FR4978 was an intra-EU flight by an EU-flagged plane operated by an EU-domiciled airline. For the EU, this question is more than about ensuring freedom of overflight in the general sense. It is about its capacity to protect those who operate within its Member States from a rogue and isolated state on the bloc’s eastern border. If the EU cannot do that, then one begins to wonder what its value is, in terms of collective security. Early signs that the EU and the wider international community is taking this seriously are encouraging. The President of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, immediately described Belarus’ actions as a “hijacking”. The EU summoned the Belarusian ambassador to the EU, presumably in anticipation of a formal diplomatic demand or demarche (the expulsion of the ambassador via a declaration of persona non grata or even the severing of diplomatic relations being a measure of last resort). Sanctions—additional to those imposed in relation to the 2020 elections—are also being discussed, and are expected to be announced on the evening of May 24. At the same time, the parliamentary foreign affairs committees of a number of NATO and EU states have called for the stopping of international flights over Belarus, an investigation by ICAO and the release of Protasevich and Sapega. Some states are not waiting. The UK, for example, has suspended UK-flagged flights to and over Belarus, and has revoked landing rights for Belarus’ national carrier, Belavia. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. has also expressed grave concern, with Secretary of State Anthony Blinken also calling for an international inquiry and pledging support for collective action. ICAO itself has also expressed its willingness to undertake further action if asked, in the form of a potential investigation. Depending on the scale of these sanctions and other responses, the international community backlash to the detention of Protasevich and Sapega will leave Belarus more isolated from Europe than it already is, and generally cut off from the central and western parts of the continent. While any sanctions will generally be targeted at individuals that the EU considers responsible for the diversion of Flight FR4978 and the detention of Protasevich and Sapega (with the exception of President Lukashenko himself, who holds head of state immunity), it will be impossible to insulate ordinary people entirely from the economic impact of such measures. This could conceivably prompt further protests from the Belarusian citizenry, and further crackdowns from the government. One wonders, however, if “grave concern” will be enough to secure Belarus’ compliance with international law – even if backed by sanctions. If, as stated, international law’s principal method of enforcement is withdrawal of the benefits of international society, then what is to be done when a particular state decides it is content to go without those benefits? Certainly, in the wake of the 2020 elections, following which President Lukashenko is widely perceived to have used state violence to remain in office, the Belarusian government has made it perfectly clear that it will not bow to international pressure to change its behavior—though it remains sensitive to the Russian government’s opinion. Belarus is far from a “hermit kingdom”—as Albania once was, and North Korea still is—but there is little doubt that it is steadily turning inward, perhaps irrevocably so, and that international action may hasten this process. Whatever the answer, the international community should not balk from trying to bring Belarus into line here via coordinated political and legal means. If the international community fails to take action, other states, who are doubtlessly watching carefully, may get the idea that this kind of behavior will be generally tolerated without serious repercussions. Refusal to act may therefore usher in a new reality of international air travel—one in which airlines either refuse to fly over certain regions, or will not carry known political dissidents on their aircraft, for fear of state-backed hijacking. Topics: https://www.lawfareblog.com/sites/de...?itok=aOIcY0kI Cameron Miles is a practicing international lawyer and a barrister at 3 Verulam Buildings in London, acting for states and related entities before international and domestic courts and tribunals. He holds an LLM and PhD in public international law from the University of Cambridge |
Two officers of the Belarusian secret police, the KGB, were also onboard. Once the plane was in Belarusian airspace, those officers told the pilot of Flight FR4978 that there was an explosive device on board, and that an immediate emergency landing was required. At this point, a Belarusian Air Force MiG-29 appeared alongside and “escorted” the aircraft Engineering a fake bomb threat to force a diversion to apprehend a "peson of interest" is definitely inacceptable. The coordinated media and government outrage is starting to smell foul too… |
EDLB
As per my post #115, according to Lithuanian Minister of Defense, which I consider a credible source, the MiG was never "in your window", but tens of km away. |
Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 11051742)
I have made comments to that effect and beeen rebuked that he most likely did not know about the flight routing... if true do you realy want this guy to lead a revolution, let alone a country. At least try some better casting and have some competnent team around him/her.
I guess complacency set in....... Praps he thought MOLs fiery reputation would have been enough to dissuade Lukashenko from having a go......... |
Originally Posted by 1978
(Post 11051784)
I would say that as a dissident you have to set aside some of your fears and ignore some of the theoretical risks to maintain your sanity. ..........
....... It is the responsibility of the European authorities to ensure the safety of those traveling within the EU. Thus the need for a very clear and effective reaction to this violation. |
Just a thought ... could 'someone' have access to passenger lists or getting an alert when a specific name is entered? And of course, whether or not that specific name has been confirmed as having checked in and boarded the aircraft? That's a useful starting point to get the 'game' going ...
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In the meantime did the FD crew receive a threat to the aircraft or passengers from the "KGB" agents on board via the cabin crew? That's a possibility to add the the myriad of other scenarios. We are nowhere near the full story just yet.
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Opposition politician Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya admitted on Sky News that she flew from 'Greece to Lithuania' recently, so one could assume a similar route over Belarus was flown. I am unaware if Roman Protasevich knew about her recent travel plans but if he did, he could be forgiven for thinking he would be relatively safe if Lukasheko's passed the chance to apprehend his main political opponent. Perhaps Protasevich was under close observation from Belarusian intelligence and it was a question of when rather than if he was apprehended or harmed and he was of course, blissfully unaware that he was being monitored?
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Meanwhile, nothing of any lasting consequence will happen. Belarus just pulled off a well planned and executed abduction.
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standbykid
"Meanwhile, nothing of any lasting consequence will happen. Belarus just pulled off a well planned and executed abduction." I fear you are correct. By next week, once all the huffing and puffing has died down, it will be last week's news and business as usual. |
Pistonprop
None of the passengers interviewed so far reported anything out of the ordinary until the landing. The crew did not report anything either. The people who left the aircraft were passengers booked on a further leg to Minsk (which does not mean them being innocent parties but doesn't make them state agents either). To the best of what we know so far the crew was deceived into diverting into Minsk. All considered (lack of company suport, limited information, unaware of the "high profile" passenger they had on bord) their action seems adequate. |
Perhaps someone can clarify, but by my review of what has been posted and reported, the actions don't follow the narrative.
Presuming we take everything from the Minsk authorities at face value, let's look at what happened once the plane landed. By passenger reports, Roman was immediately seized and questioned. His were the only bags sniffed. I don't think anyone else was removed from the plane... Is this SOP when you are focusing on a potential bomb threat? Did they even attempt to fake their concern over a bomb? Over 120 witnesses can attest to what they saw and observed....But, how does Minsk square their actions with a procedure to swiftly remove this person as their primary focus over the sweeping for a bomb... The passengers interviewed stated Roman was singled out immediately.... How is Minsk going to be able to create a narrative for this? Is Roman the suspected Hamas agent in their narrative? I mean was the plane even swept for a potential bomb at any point? |
Alsacienne
In some places it is called ESTA. To be honest Russian intelligence is often presented as grotesquely incompetent as of late but they are suspected to have infiltrated the whole UK visa system so anything is possible… But for the case at hand the presence of Protasevich in Athens was of public record as he was covering Tikhanoushkaya’s appearance (not exactly clear what she was doing there meeting with various diplomats). A discrete surveillance up to the airport and seeing him board the Ryanair direct fight was all the intel needed |
letsjet
All passengers were disembarked and all their luggage unloaded and inspected. They spent 7 hours in a terminal building. |
By the time you've finished typing your ACARS message you'd be on the ground already.
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The people at FR must be blind not to see this. |
Mister Geezer
Lukashenka has no interest in apprehending Tsikhanovskaya - in fact he forced her to leave the country instead of keeping her under arrest! She is much less of a problem for him when she is abroad. Protasevich on the other hand was a major PITA for him thanks to his NEXTA Telegram channel (which was the news source about protests). Plus his girlfriend was reportedly running another Telegram channel where she published personal data on Belarusian cops involved in suppressing protests. They were easily the most wanted couple for Belarusian authorities. It was not a good idea to fly over Belarus for them (even without a bomb threat, you can always end up with an emergency landing). |
Just saw a news story that claims the threatening email was received 24 minutes after the plane was instructed to divert. The sham continues to unravel.
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here you go: https://news.yahoo.com/bomb-threat-c...203029699.html
And one from der Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/belar...5-d2e5030c2797 If these are real, the whole belarussian story just collapsed. |
Spiegel ist interesting.
They moved their wording from „entführt“ - abducted/hijacked to „zur Landung gedrängt“ - urged to land. They are as deep in the a… of the german government as a private news outlet in the western world can be. That might indicate a slight correction of narrative. The presence of the MiG at gun point has been uncorrected so far in this country’s media. |
Interesting the Speigel story ( normally very well informed) it says he email was sent to Vilnius airport at 12:25, so before they entered Belarus airspace. One possible scenario is that they probably thought that Vilnius would inform the crew via company frequency and the crew itself would announce it on on their frequency and would divert "naturally " to closest airport would would be Minsk. But that did not happen and as the aircraft was about to leave their airspace they quickly changed to plan B, only realizing afterwards they had not sent the email to themselves and someone stupidly did it retroactively .
The plot thickens.... |
Does anybody know if any and which EU countries have already introduced interdictions for Belavia/BRU overflight?
I can confirm that at 1000z there are no restrictions in Bucharest FIR (LRBB) and Sofia FIR (LBSR). Scheduled flights overfly Ukraine / Kyiv UIR (UKBU), as well. |
I think generally for the EU/UK level it's still officially at the level of "requesting" their registered airlines to avoid.
TBF it looks like most UK/EU operators are doing as requested. However if FR24 is to be believed some cargo operators, including some N reg ones, don't seem to have any many or inhibitions about continuing overflight. For example Thurs AM at 1040 UTC there's a Fedex flight (FDX21) westbound over Belarus to the south of Minsk |
If you look at the Minsk departure board (not a busy airport) there are 23 scheduled departures presently showing between 0300 and 1900. Nine of these are cancelled. Those which continue to operate are those to "friendly" countries!
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