fatbus

Things may have changed, but way back, it wasn't acceptable to have an open defect. If it couldn't be cleared, it went as an ADD "Acceptable Deferred Defect", which was in a separate section of the log. If not acceptable, the aircraft wasn't airworthy.

It could be aa simple as "Recurring defect not detectable on the ground. Crews are requested to monitor", but it would be there; right in your face.

DaveReidUK

Depends on the history. If the airplane has several clean flights in a row, I go back to the last flight with a squawk. If there are many deferred items or recent maintenance actions, I will go all the way back to the flight of the earliest deferred item, or to the last previous series of clean flights.

By "open defect " I meant differed and or MEL release . Good on ya for the pick up .

DaveReidUK

As required by my company, look back until the last weekly inspection. I’ve had to look at the last page, or for our more hypochondriac 319s, up to 40 pages. But it’s at least dictated by company policy.

FlyingStone

Well I am wondering why the thrust asymmetry was missed even with moving thrust levers, (that many claim are so essential).

FWIW I have flown many different types, including the B737 classic, and I have no problem at all with Airbus FBW lack of tactile feedback. Nor do I have a problem with scanning the instruments, which is what all pilots should be doing anyway - even with moving thrust levers - this was my point really.

There is no need to "stare inside the flight-deck" - a quick glance every 10 secs or so at the PFD and the N1/EPRs is all that is required. I reckon it takes about 2 seconds to look at the PFD and the engine gauges to assimilate the situation. Easy peasy ! :ok:

Our company provides us with a maintenance log history based on items. Either the last 20 items which have been closed or all items closed in the last 14 days, whichever is less.

And of course the maintenance release document which addresses currently known defects.

Confused by coupla posts before, discussing jammed cables,clutch, servo

I read from the interim report for press: While climbing, Throttle 1 slowly reduced. Not at the point at level off, but in climb. And Throttle 2 even increased N1 to hold speed. No stuck things, both moved. Right? Or did I miss something?
And if they take a look at the A/T system, that N1 reduction rather was by itself. Controlled most propably from A/T, not from the Pilot Flying.
Throttle 2 and Engine 2 haven't been an issue at all.

A repetitive technical fault
And Maintenance failed
And Pilots failed
Cockpit situation analyzed from CVR for contributional factors.

I’m fearing the notion that these fellows watched the split throttles and just hoped the AP would get them out of it. Ugh...

I suggest you read the interim report. The right throttle did not increase. Thrust/speed control in jets doesn't work like that in a normal climb.

I've been reading this 'thread' since the start, but sorry to note it's no longer getting updated "information" pieces such as normally contributed and commented on by the cognoscenti.
Have any more facts from the flight and/or cockpit recorders been revealed please ?

IIRC the CVR was downloaded 2-3 weeks ago. Things have indeed been quiet since.

It's been a month since the KNKT reported that all relevant data from the CVR was successfully downloaded (the data from the FDR was successfully dowloaded earlier). So it is very likely -- though not a certainty -- that the KNKT now understands what happended and why (root cause(s) and contributing causes). In due time (release of the Final Report) we will all know what they know.

From reuters:

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Friday it was requiring U.S. operators of 143 Boeing Co (BA.N) 737 Classic series airplanes to check for possible wire failures stemming from an investigation into an Indonesia crash in January.

waito

Around 1,000 aircraft potentially affected by the issue, though probably well under half of those still flying.

Some of the articles I saw on this mentioned that the FAA specifically said that while the issue stemmed from the Indonesia investigation, that this was *not* the cause of the accident. So, still a mystery.

At some third world operators, pilots are “not encouraged” to write up defects, particularly for what’s perceived as minor issues but would be expensive to fix. A culture of different standards is sometimes evident with “Everyone knows it does that, you just need to …….”, being ingrained. This is worse if the owner is closely involved in the day to day running.

A pilot can easily cost the company tens of thousands of dollars in a few minutes with a cheap Biro.

flight cat

It's "still" a mystery but not because of what FAA has said or not said in announcing that action. The final KNKT report is what is still missing. And FAA won't be making its own cause analysis and findings in this instance, in any event.

It's not really a mystery - the terms "latent failure" and "identified unsafe condition" are both readily understood across the industry.

It is perfectly normal for an investigation involving an aging aircraft to pick up issues unrelated to the cause, but still requiring remedial action. Investigators will be able to examine parts which are normally inaccessible.

Is this seriously embarrassing or are they just deadly slow?