Not sure what TCAS has got to do with it, but the video was made in 1999, I think. (There’s a date at the beginning)

Also not sure why vilas would say we don’t do things that way. I think it’s still very relevant today. What do you disagree with?

Its a good video and a lot of experience of the presenter has gone into it. But it was made in 1997 and the examples and incidents mentioned are even before that. So as expected a few things are non contemporary. Today any traffic will be displayed on ND with TAs/RAs issued. Also even 200hrs FO will not use FCU to override the traffic. Yes! with AP/FD is equipped with TCAS the appropriate level of automation is just leave the AP on monitor TCAS BLUE and watch it do what it takes. One thing is clear the video is not about Airbus FBW because he talks about importance of following yoke and throttles for tactile feed back. Nothing of that is available in AB FBW. If you click ATHR as suggested you create problem in Airbus. Automation of 2020 is far more capable than 1997. Besides the pilots coming into automation then were also novices to FMS so when to get into it or out of it also had to be learnt. I have seen some instructors of 747 classic in serious trouble during 747 400 conversion. Today any one will follow ATC instructions with FCU and then do serious FMS work later. It's given thing. So everything from that video is not applicable today or if it is then it is being done. Today's AB FBW automation is meant for flying in automation not just to relieve the pilot fatigue. So good knowledge of automation is as important as good handling skills. This video mentions about A300, 757 etc you can't fly A350 with that philosophy.

Not if it's a VFR outside of controlled airspace it won't.

There's many aircraft flying around that's not Airbus FBW, and a large part of the video very much applies even in 2020. AFAIK even on the 777/787, the TCAS manuever is still of the "click click, click click" variety.

I mentioned it is not for AB FBW. Very little applies to Airbus. And as I said what is applicable where is applicable is done the way he says. So nothing new in 2020. In 1997 yes it was very informative. The lesson learned till 97 have been Incorporated. If not done after 23 years then the airline's training division is in hibernation.

Vilas, you’re our resident expert on the 320, but I’m going to have to disagree with your automation philosophy today. Not all traffic will be displayed on TCAS. As such the AP/FD TCAS option will not always work. A few years ago, a crew had to ignore a TCAS RA, in order to prevent a collision.

The video was made when the only Airbus the airline operated was the A300. The general philosophy is still relevant today though. When immediate action is needed, turn off the AP. Even on the planes with AP/FD TCAS my airline’s RA procedure is still click click.

Your airline may be an exception. But my point is nobody looks for an FCU mode for TCAS. Click, click for TCAS is the only way taught. The video is discussing woes of older generation pilots who were uncomfortable with automation in aircraft with basic automation. So the philosophy mentioned was eureka in 97 but not in 2020. AB FBW is flown by the manufacturer's procedures. 23 years is a long time, things move on. A350 in dual engine flame out AP is put on. Airbus is already in age of ATTOL. Besides Click, click not the only solution. Karachi they were high they did click, click but very little else and crashed. The general philosophy for any aircraft according to me is you must be in control.

Vilas

Topic drift ~ the question was whether a pilot should be capable of hand flying the B737 when:

i) the autopilot fails by using hand flying and FDs are available.
ii) the A/P & FDs fails, and Raw Data hand flying is required.
iii) the PFDs fail, and the Integrated STANDBY INSTRUMENTS are the only available source.

New generation aircraft manufacturers will undoubtedly suggest the best ways to cope when the Shuttle One Tango hits the fan. The Q under consideration was a B737-500.

That connects well to my take on the video series. They target the lazy pilot, who through traps of automation becomes mind-absent in the flightdeck. And provide some great tips to protect both against personal laziness and automation traps as well.

There are different traps today, such as the trap of instagram selfies to name the most visible one. The part where specific technology is discussed aged and became less applicable, the underlying human nature OTOH has not changed a bit.

Today, capt. Vanderberg would have script about the low side of curve from the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yerkes%E2%80%93Dodson_law, managing fatigue by being responsible during pilot's off time, and EFB fixation. With the same message: a working pilots mind needs to be 3 minutes ahead of the plane nose.

Yes, however not necessarily lazy pilot. Perhaps the pilots whose company SOPs mandate using the automatics. Or the tired pilot who does not want to risk making a mistake after a night Atlantic crossing or whatever, and having to go-around and incur more cost for the airline in fuel and a late arrival and writing a report.

The person(s) who need to take action are the chief pilots; They need to come up with ways of keeping their pilot's manual flying and instrument scans sharp. Such things need regular actual practice to keep them honed and stop them going rusty, but we are not allowed to take the aircraft home to practise in our own time.

Ways could be employed on the line during normal Ops to help keep skills sharp and need not cost extra.

I haven’t heard of that one. I would love to read about it.

I have heard of one where a crew ignored a TCAS RA (and followed ATC direction instead) and had a mid-air collision.

Do you have a reference?

It never went beyond the ASAP stage, as I don’t believe it qualified as an incident. Just one of the many times pilots save the plane.

The occurrence was well known within the company, and was the reason the director of operations opted not to spend the extra money getting the AP/FD TCAS.

The basic principle of TCAS is once the RA is issued never try anything against it by going visual. It's dangerous because you can't think for both. Also another thing from the video he says when runway is changed and you can see from miles what can the computer give you? It can give you a positive safe guard. Read the following
Incident: Air India B788 at Melbourne on Jan 14th 2014, nearly landed on small airport

Cast your minds back to July 2002, when a DHL 757 & Russian airliner had a midair over Central Europe. The DHL complied with the TCAS, the Russian with ATC instruction (iaw their national SOP & incidentally that of Japanese SOP)

18 years is a long time. Everyone didn't use TCAS then and TCAS itself has been improved. Present day problems need present day solutions. If the AI crew had looked at the ND they would not have landed themselves in trouble. Visual landing in Airbus I am sure in Boeing as well if you select just the RW it creates a center line with 5 miles fix. Unlike 1997 these are GPS primary days just keep the aircraft on the line and you couldn't go wrong.

I agree with that statement- if things go wrong in a predictable manner- as TCAS is programmed for. In the particular incident, the Airbus encountered 2 planes simultaneously. Only one had a transponder. No substitute for 2 pilots up front.

Boeing SOP is that PM should be looking for the conflicting traffic, and then to "maneuver if needed". I'm not a fan of this advice and tend to think that PM's attention would be better spent monitoring PF, especially since the Boeing philosophy of disconnecting the autothrottle increases the PF's workload in addition to the RA startle factor.

So where the primary instruments normal or not? According to this all where functioning normally (except the pilots).
https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/...nJrvk.facebook

And if now you are in single engine, so only TA activated and for some reason a lost plane come to you, what you will do ? And what if you are in the cloud?

I got this in the SIM, at one point you will have to take a decision ... We be been told to not wait last moment and do correction depending of what other traffic do (if he is same level, to climb or descent, if he is descending towards you, to turn, ...)
Like many time in aviation, the book don t have all answer and sometimes the answer is not good, not wrong, only grey

Can you see in the cloud? When you see may be too late just follow TCAS.

I don’t know the reason, but initially they thought they’ve got both IRSs failure.....