Klasjet 737 trouble flying in IMC
I'm not a 737 pilot, so I'm sure I'll be corrected if my understanding of what's written here is wrong, but did this crew struggle to control the aircraft in IMC because the AP was inop?
Incident: Klasjet B735 at Madrid on Apr 5th 2019, navigation malfunction https://www.mitma.es/recursos_mfom/c..._report_nm.pdf |
I read it the same way:eek:
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Grossly speaking, and given the rather limited details in the reports, yes.
The aircraft took off with one autopilot (Captain's side) inoperative (legal per MEL), and lost the 2nd A/P (FO side) in the climb. So they had to fly stick and rudder and throttle by hand. What is not clear to me is what else the failure may have entailed. There is a suggestion in the tests made later that they may have also lost one or both EADIs ("glass" artificial-horizon displays, including a speed tape and glide-slope indicators - but not a full PFD). Leaving them with the backup "clockwork" instruments and a more difficult scan. And also (?) had an air data failure (speeds, pressures and temps for the A/P). Speed Tape EADI Looks to me like it took them a few minutes to get their heads back into "just fly it like a C172" mode. At which point they made a successful approach and landing. |
It seems as though a previous flight, the plane had a display problem. Unless I missed it, that was not mentioned for the incident flight.
The opening paragraph of the analysis would suggest that they had a fully functional aircraft, with the exception of the CA's speed bug. When analyzing this event, the first thing to note is the fact that having both autopilots become inoperative did not prevent proceeding with the flight in instrument conditions, since the instruments required to carry out a flight of these characteristics were available tothe crew at all times; namely, they had the artificial horizon, altimeter, variometer, anemometer, compass, turn and bank indicator and the engine instruments (intake pressure and engine pressure ratio). |
Would it be unreasonable to expect at least the Captain to be capable of operating using the STANDBY INSTRUMENTS and flying an ILS approach?
This would of course require appropriate training and practice in the simulator, with recurrent training every six months? Merely ticking the boxes to comply with the legislation probably needs a rethink. |
Quote form the AV herald report linked above:
In the case of the captain, he was a type rating instructor (TRI(A)), meaning he was not only very familiar with the airplane, its systems and its operation, but he had to be able to explain these concepts, that is, to convey them during training to other crewmembers in an operational setting, and to other pilots in general in a training setting. |
Check Airman
maybe I'm missing something but It's seems like it's conditional on why the AP was inoperative. If it was an instrument input error I suspect the struggle would continue with the AP turned off |
STANDBY instruments? I'm old enough to remember when those were the ONLY instruments. Yes, we aged aviators regularly flew the ILS to Cat 1 minima using those. Just needs practice, but economics doesn't allow the simulator time these days.
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The crew had problem with English as well. Emergency declared but didn't give the reason. Inquiry report is as vague as the crew leaves none wiser. Inability to handle with basic instruments how does it become decision making problem?
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If you don't use it, you loose it.....
Didn't something similar happen to the ba 320 when the cowlings flew off? |
Wasn't that as a result of the odd BA policy of prohibiting manual thrust use on the Airbus fleet. Makes you wonder what the Fleet Management of some of these airlines think they are achieving?
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This airline is an old boys club. A chip of the ol' Bloc. There's many in the region just like it. Mutual back scratching keeps the operation going. Albeit it, at a minimum standard.
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Meikleour
Increased safety margins. So I’m told:ugh: |
Check Airman : So how well did that work out!!!
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A320 is much easier to handle in this situation. Whatever attitude or pitch is set the FBW will look after pilot just needs to set thrust for the speed.
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Easier to handle, perhaps. But in the hands of "managers" (instead of pilots), it'll still bite. Wasn't there an A319 in London that had issues flying after an engine failure?
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Originally Posted by Meikleour
(Post 10881710)
Check Airman : So how well did that work out!!!
Maybe I'm unsafe- but I have a hell of a lot of fun being unsafe.:) click click |
Check Airman
I don't know which A319 you are talking about but if you can't do it in Airbus then you surely won't do it in 737. |
Interesting video, which I presume was created
before TCAS was mandated? |
its an ancient video oft repeated. Everything it says is not necessarily done today that way.
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Not sure what TCAS has got to do with it, but the video was made in 1999, I think. (There’s a date at the beginning)
Also not sure why vilas would say we don’t do things that way. I think it’s still very relevant today. What do you disagree with? |
Its a good video and a lot of experience of the presenter has gone into it. But it was made in 1997 and the examples and incidents mentioned are even before that. So as expected a few things are non contemporary. Today any traffic will be displayed on ND with TAs/RAs issued. Also even 200hrs FO will not use FCU to override the traffic. Yes! with AP/FD is equipped with TCAS the appropriate level of automation is just leave the AP on monitor TCAS BLUE and watch it do what it takes. One thing is clear the video is not about Airbus FBW because he talks about importance of following yoke and throttles for tactile feed back. Nothing of that is available in AB FBW. If you click ATHR as suggested you create problem in Airbus. Automation of 2020 is far more capable than 1997. Besides the pilots coming into automation then were also novices to FMS so when to get into it or out of it also had to be learnt. I have seen some instructors of 747 classic in serious trouble during 747 400 conversion. Today any one will follow ATC instructions with FCU and then do serious FMS work later. It's given thing. So everything from that video is not applicable today or if it is then it is being done. Today's AB FBW automation is meant for flying in automation not just to relieve the pilot fatigue. So good knowledge of automation is as important as good handling skills. This video mentions about A300, 757 etc you can't fly A350 with that philosophy.
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Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 10882445)
Today any traffic will be displayed on ND with TAs/RAs issued.
Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 10882445)
Today's AB FBW automation is meant for flying in automation not just to relieve the pilot fatigue. So good knowledge of automation is as important as good handling skills. This video mentions about A300, 757 etc you can't fly A350 with that philosophy.
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I mentioned it is not for AB FBW. Very little applies to Airbus. And as I said what is applicable where is applicable is done the way he says. So nothing new in 2020. In 1997 yes it was very informative. The lesson learned till 97 have been Incorporated. If not done after 23 years then the airline's training division is in hibernation.
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Vilas, you’re our resident expert on the 320, but I’m going to have to disagree with your automation philosophy today. Not all traffic will be displayed on TCAS. As such the AP/FD TCAS option will not always work. A few years ago, a crew had to ignore a TCAS RA, in order to prevent a collision.
The video was made when the only Airbus the airline operated was the A300. The general philosophy is still relevant today though. When immediate action is needed, turn off the AP. Even on the planes with AP/FD TCAS my airline’s RA procedure is still click click. |
Your airline may be an exception. But my point is nobody looks for an FCU mode for TCAS. Click, click for TCAS is the only way taught. The video is discussing woes of older generation pilots who were uncomfortable with automation in aircraft with basic automation. So the philosophy mentioned was eureka in 97 but not in 2020. AB FBW is flown by the manufacturer's procedures. 23 years is a long time, things move on. A350 in dual engine flame out AP is put on. Airbus is already in age of ATTOL. Besides Click, click not the only solution. Karachi they were high they did click, click but very little else and crashed. The general philosophy for any aircraft according to me is you must be in control.
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Vilas
Topic drift ~ the question was whether a pilot should be capable of hand flying the B737 when: i) the autopilot fails by using hand flying and FDs are available. ii) the A/P & FDs fails, and Raw Data hand flying is required. iii) the PFDs fail, and the Integrated STANDBY INSTRUMENTS are the only available source. New generation aircraft manufacturers will undoubtedly suggest the best ways to cope when the Shuttle One Tango hits the fan. The Q under consideration was a B737-500. |
Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 10882889)
The general philosophy for any aircraft according to me is you must be in control.
There are different traps today, such as the trap of instagram selfies to name the most visible one. The part where specific technology is discussed aged and became less applicable, the underlying human nature OTOH has not changed a bit. Today, capt. Vanderberg would have script about the low side of curve from the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yerkes%E2%80%93Dodson_law, managing fatigue by being responsible during pilot's off time, and EFB fixation. With the same message: a working pilots mind needs to be 3 minutes ahead of the plane nose. |
Yes, however not necessarily lazy pilot. Perhaps the pilots whose company SOPs mandate using the automatics. Or the tired pilot who does not want to risk making a mistake after a night Atlantic crossing or whatever, and having to go-around and incur more cost for the airline in fuel and a late arrival and writing a report.
The person(s) who need to take action are the chief pilots; They need to come up with ways of keeping their pilot's manual flying and instrument scans sharp. Such things need regular actual practice to keep them honed and stop them going rusty, but we are not allowed to take the aircraft home to practise in our own time. Ways could be employed on the line during normal Ops to help keep skills sharp and need not cost extra. |
Originally Posted by Check Airman
(Post 10882869)
A few years ago, a crew had to ignore a TCAS RA, in order to prevent a collision.
I have heard of one where a crew ignored a TCAS RA (and followed ATC direction instead) and had a mid-air collision. Do you have a reference? |
It never went beyond the ASAP stage, as I don’t believe it qualified as an incident. Just one of the many times pilots save the plane.
The occurrence was well known within the company, and was the reason the director of operations opted not to spend the extra money getting the AP/FD TCAS. |
The basic principle of TCAS is once the RA is issued never try anything against it by going visual. It's dangerous because you can't think for both. Also another thing from the video he says when runway is changed and you can see from miles what can the computer give you? It can give you a positive safe guard. Read the following
Incident: Air India B788 at Melbourne on Jan 14th 2014, nearly landed on small airport |
Cast your minds back to July 2002, when a DHL 757 & Russian airliner had a midair over Central Europe. The DHL complied with the TCAS, the Russian with ATC instruction (iaw their national SOP & incidentally that of Japanese SOP)
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18 years is a long time. Everyone didn't use TCAS then and TCAS itself has been improved. Present day problems need present day solutions. If the AI crew had looked at the ND they would not have landed themselves in trouble. Visual landing in Airbus I am sure in Boeing as well if you select just the RW it creates a center line with 5 miles fix. Unlike 1997 these are GPS primary days just keep the aircraft on the line and you couldn't go wrong.
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Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 10886043)
The basic principle of TCAS is once the RA is issued never try anything against it by going visual. It's dangerous because you can't think for both. Also another thing from the video he says when runway is changed and you can see from miles what can the computer give you? It can give you a positive safe guard. Read the following
Incident: Air India B788 at Melbourne on Jan 14th 2014, nearly landed on small airport |
The basic principle of TCAS is once the RA is issued never try anything against it by going visual. It's dangerous because you can't think for both. |
So where the primary instruments normal or not? According to this all where functioning normally (except the pilots).
https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/...nJrvk.facebook |
And if now you are in single engine, so only TA activated and for some reason a lost plane come to you, what you will do ? And what if you are in the cloud?
I got this in the SIM, at one point you will have to take a decision ... We be been told to not wait last moment and do correction depending of what other traffic do (if he is same level, to climb or descent, if he is descending towards you, to turn, ...) Like many time in aviation, the book don t have all answer and sometimes the answer is not good, not wrong, only grey |
And what if you are in the cloud? |
I don’t know the reason, but initially they thought they’ve got both IRSs failure.....
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