According to my information the accident airframe had the SFP (short field Performance) option.

But that doesn‘t matter, because the Aircraft is only a minor(if any) contributing factor.

Unstabilized high energy approaches produce overruns!

SFP option is irrelevant for landing perfs. It only affects the slats position at TO settings.

I think I am going to be judgemental here and agree because this is not an isolated incident for this operator.
This crew pushed on when they were high and long and the wind was 22G37KTS almost all tail on a wet runway.

That's just not true. It affects the landing performance significantly, particularly when paired with the optional 2-position tail skid.

Flight Controls

Especially on approach, the SFP ones really don't like slowing down even with "normal" tailwind, let alone 30+kts.

Some advice for these overrun airlines:

You SHOULD be established , ie configured, on speed, on glide slop and localiser established or visual equivalents. BUT
MUST be established by 500 feet OR its a mandatory go around,
Works!

Many U.S. airlines require the plane to be stable and fully configured by 1000 feet. However, on some carriers the rule appears to be by 80 knots on rollout. ;)

Good one;)

ROFL

Seems like another 'broken GA button/mindset' case...

That statement is wrong.

I heard of two pilots on the deck, the Turkish Captain is fine while Dutch FO was injured and required surgery. I don't think PGS has any South Korean pilots.

That being said, Pegasus is not P2F. At least not for the last 7 years I have been flying airlines in Turkey.

Some operators require:

1000 feet: Stable on instrument approach(s)
500 feet: Stable on visual approach
Land in touchdown zone

Stable criteria:
In general (varies from operator to operator) +10/-5 knots VREF speed and no more than FOM quoted ILS glide slope and LOC deflections, along with VNAV lateral and vertical approach tolerances for example.
Visual approach: No more than the speed variance above and no greater than 1000 FPM descent rate, unless corrections are made to be within limits at the 500 feet gate height.

If you aren't going to be stable or land in the touchdown zone, then a GA will be carried out and either pilot can call "Go around".

Seems straight forward, but I am surprised to see different performances during simulator training and the inability of PM to call "GA". In the real world, situations like this occur to experienced crews for one thing or another but typically fatigue or inexperience is also the issue.

I wonder how it is possible to stay on a 3.5• glide slope with such a wind.

Either rate of descent in excess of 1000 ft/min
or above the glide slope

A couple of years ago I remember talking to a former Turkish Airlines first officer who said the two years he had with that airline was the worst time of his career. His words (not mine) was captains had slapped his face, thrown paperwork at him, verbally abused him and generally acted like arrogant military trained cowboys. He said it made first officers scared of speaking up on final approach if the aircraft was clearly unstable as any suggestion that the captain's flying was outside published tolerances could mean there was a risk the first officer would be sacked for insubordination or a trumped up reason.

It is all too easy to say this is an extreme case of second or third hand generalisation. Maybe it is. But that is to ignore the facts and the type accidents as described where first officer verbal input to the captain may have resulted in a safer operation.

The military train their people very harshly in Turkey. Instant obedience to orders without questioning. Invariably Turkish airline captains were formerly military trained and their attitude to those of lesser rank flows down to the flight deck. The chap I talked to is now with another Middle Eastern airline and is happy with the flight deck atmosphere.

From his experience with two years in Turkish operated cockpits, the chap I talked to opined it is a courageous decision (as per Yes Minister TV series) for any first officer to make any SOP call-out that could reflect on the perceived professionalism of the captain. . Of course this does not apply to every Turkish cockpit but on the other hand the sort of accidents which seem to be prevalent cannot simply be swept under the carpet.

Lets not be coy or PC about these sort accidents. In the eyes of some culture driven captains the first officers are there to select flaps and pull up the gear and shut up. In so many airlines around the world ethnic culture overrules flight safety mores every time. That will never change. Lip service a plenty comes from management of these airlines but that is about all.

The core reason why Turkish aviation has some of the worst safety records in the western industry is cultural and mentality wise.
To change that is very difficult and we may continue to read sad headlines in the future. Hopefully not. While there are many well trained professionals with the right attitudes in Turkey, unfortunately they constantly run against the walls. Many of their airlines are notoriously badly managed. Profits are more important than flight safety for them. Flight crews are subject to a lot of indirect pressure to “be flexible” in everything from maintenance issues to duty time limits, in some cases loosing their jobs for diverting to alternates in bad weather because of the resulting costs. Training, flight deck standardization, CRM etc. too often leave a lot to be desired for. Long story short it is a very difficult environment to work in if you whish to do your job properly.

Best Regards
Foxy737

Re: Gear up, Flaps up, Shut up....
Can someone with knowledge of the Turkish culture explain the essence of the word Hocam. I can look it up of course on google translate. But is was used on the turkish amsterdam accident on the flight deck. (training situation)
Who would call who Hocam and why, in a steep crm gradient cockpit? Or in Turkish society in general?

B737 800 approach speeds are definitely higher than A320 and A320 Neos are even less by 5kts than A320 Ceos. So B737 landing distance should be marginally longer. Even in India the two carriers who fly 737 800s are having maximum excursions. But it's not only landing distance issue. According to me Airbus FBW which is flight path stable with automatic trim is an easier aircraft to handle, control and guide thanB737. So in challenging circumstances less gifted or poorly trained pilots are pushed to limit leading to these incidents.

Translates to “my master”, usually refers to up in the hierarchy.. One of colloquial means of addressing someone with respect.

Ryanair have a zero tolerance to unstabilzed approaches. An extant letter to the flight crews highlight this signed by the chief executive. Ignore this at your peril and you will be fired end of. They are not kidding. Fair play to Ryanair: the experience as a passenger can be excruciating but their operational standards are of the highest backed up by rigorous sops and excellent training.

Yes, if you manouevre the aircraft from it's own stable, balanced state, the crosswind portion of the wind vector on the ND begins to become meaningless.

For example, if steadily tracking the localiser of an ILS towards landing, with a notable crosswind component, the wind vector will be shown accurately, as the aircraft will have drift angle into the crosswind, whilst remaining on the ILS centreline. However, should you then decide shortly before landing that you wish to conduct the landing using the wing-into-wind technique i.e. the upwind wing lowered with aileron to stop drift off centreline, then whilst the fore-and-aft axis of the aircraft is aligned with the runway using some opposite rudder, the nav computer cannot 'sense' the drift i.e. it cannot determine the crosswind component.

Consequently, in this now slightly cross-controlled situation, with the aircraft heading the same as runway alignment, maintaining the ILS centreline, and the nav computer not detecting any drift, the ND wind vector will only display the applicable head or tailwind component, and display it as exactly that - a wind vector aligned with the aircraft heading, which itself is aligned with the runway!