" Isnt lying to Congress an offense?"
Depends on who gets tagged with " lack of candor" Boeing is now searching for the Janitor who misplaced the ' documents' or forgot to keep the shredder turned on |
Originally Posted by gums
(Post 10646227)
Salute!
Thanks for the input, PEI OTOH, we see many raw data flight data recorder traces and have had super analysis amongst us, especially on the Tech Log. So seeing the data is not without precedent here, although the masses that read the New York Slime would not have a clue ( as they do not about many things) My point and maybe Stri and FDR and Edmund , et al be that the plane may be just fine at idle thrust versus high thrust or even cruise settings. How bad is the linearity? And I do not believe "Peter" has the actual plots from flight test data, Finally, the change to the amount of stab movement, etc after the initial implementation is, or should be, of interest to all of us. And "all of us" includes old farts like me that are now only SLF. As a SLF I once got a free bottle of champaign from the Western airline crew ( back a long time ago before being absorbed) for commenting to nearby SLF that the crack maintenance folks were repairing a hydraulic leak on the left main gear brakes. We had to delay about a half hour, and the nearby SLF were getting restless, heh heh. Crew told me that my commentary helped calm down the SLF and made things easier for all. I may only be a knowledeable piece of SLF nowadays, and it scares me more than the average piece sitting next to me when I see what this MCAS debacle has wrot. Gums sends, and Merry Christmas to all!!!! Math jargon Sri’s , “may exhibit non-linear feedback” is the engineer’s equivalent of saying may become EXTREMELY unpredictable. - one wants a system to be controllable - ie can be brought/forced to a desired eg. nice stable state starting from any state inside the envelope. - if the system is “linear” then a branch of engineering maths called LINEAR control theory applies, the domain where it is controllable is known, and eveything is “copacetic”, automation can be easily used, and the system may be approved on the virtues of its design. - if the system is “non-linear” and even worse if it exhibits non-linear feedback, then can as they say in the US it can “go postal”, and standard school maths can’t describe it nor control it. An auditor won’t certify such a system unless it is extensively tested -if the auditor be honest. And automation can be very unhappy about the surprises baked into such a unpredictable system. The suspicion is that MCAS is there to keep the MAX centered in an envelope where it appears linear, but that without MCAS it might get into states where it would be really hard to control (except for Chuck Yeager and you). The unfortunate joke is that the extant MCAS took several airframes into states where they were hard to control. Of course one could argue one can always deviate into a non-linear behaviour eg. stall, but the suspicion here is that the volume of linearity is more limited than it should be, and that really ugly things happen in places where certified airframes should still be acting nice. I’m sorry if the above is erroneous or unclear, my opinions are usually worth exactly what people are paying for them. Merry Xmas |
Originally Posted by edmundronald
(Post 10646581)
Gums,
Math jargon Sri’s , “may exhibit non-linear feedback” is the engineer’s equivalent of saying may become EXTREMELY unpredictable. - one wants a system to be controllable - ie can be brought/forced to a desired eg. nice stable state starting from any state inside the envelope. - if the system is “linear” then a branch of engineering maths called LINEAR control theory applies, the domain where it is controllable is known, and eveything is “copacetic”, automation can be easily used, and the system may be approved on the virtues of its design. - if the system is “non-linear” and even worse if it exhibits non-linear feedback, then can as they say in the US it can “go postal”, and standard school maths can’t describe it nor control it. An auditor won’t certify such a system unless it is extensively tested -if the auditor be honest. And automation can be very unhappy about the surprises baked into such a unpredictable system. The suspicion is that MCAS is there to keep the MAX centered in an envelope where it appears linear, but that without MCAS it might get into states where it would be really hard to control (except for Chuck Yeager and you). The unfortunate joke is that the extant MCAS took several airframes into states where they were hard to control. Of course one could argue one can always deviate into a non-linear behaviour eg. stall, but the suspicion here is that the volume of linearity is more limited than it should be, and that really ugly things happen in places where certified airframes should still be acting nice. I’m sorry if the above is erroneous or unclear, my opinions are usually worth exactly what people are paying for them. Merry Xmas |
Originally Posted by ktcanuck
(Post 10646588)
If you are saying that MCAS was a brute force way of stopping the Max getting into a [secret] corner of the envelope that was nasty but ended up, through some failure, putting the poor souls into a different nasty situation, I agree entirely.
The answer to this question would be provided by flight test data without MCAS. I think that at this point certification without this data being published is not feasible, at least outside the US. Also, I would think that any pilot who gets into a MAX at this point should demand to know the real intended function of MCAS. It’s possible that at high AoA, elevator authority effects are very substantially different from the NG, which is why MCAS was redesigned to react fairly strongly. Please take this with a large grain of salt, I am not a pilot. Edmund |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10645986)
I'm not sure what the relevance of the "international investigation community" is.
ICAO Annex 13 is clear - only the party leading an investigation (here, the Ethiopian AIB) is authorised to release information, and it decides what will be released when, not the operator, manufacturer or any of the other parties affiliated to the investigation. |
Curious that the initial report on the Ethiopian accident has been removed from the ecaa.gov.et website. Anyone know where its gone ?
|
Originally Posted by edmundronald
(Post 10646614)
Yes. And we’re saying we believe that the envelope where the MAX is natively nice is too small ...
Also, I would think that any pilot who gets into a MAX at this point should demand to know the real intended function of MCAS. It’s possible that at high AoA, elevator authority effects are very substantially different from the NG, which is why MCAS was redesigned to react fairly strongly. Please take this with a large grain of salt, I am not a pilot. Edmund If one looks at all possible stable AoAs one would like to see a linear relation between the AoA of the wing and the stabilizer trim position required to balance it. But the Max seems to have another player on the teeter-totter and that is the nacelle of the engine which starts producing noticeable nose up pitch torque at high AoA. So the stab trim position is no longer quite as linear as it was. Since the elevator also affects the pitch torque, that's where the effect could be noticed by the pilot as they move the controls without adjusting the trim. The function of MCAS is to make it so the pilot doesn't experience this new player. Because it's just to offset the new player and depends on AoA and airspeed (because the amount of lift the stabilizer produces depends on those things to generate nose-up torque) it really isn't moving much or fast; it just has to be fast enough to keep up with AoA changes to the aircraft and to speed changes, neither of which ought to be particularly high. It gets more pronounced at low speeds because not only does the requisite high AoA needed to provide lift at low speeds increase the effect from the engine nacelles, the lower speed also means the stabilizer has less dynamic pressure to work with. This is no different than, say, rudder authority at low speed; the rudder has to move a lot farther to get the same effect at low speed than high speed. AFAIK that's the intended MCAS function. To meet a linearity requirement for pilot controls by rebalancing a larger input from the engine nacelles than was existent, but could be ignored, on earlier models. It's not fast enough for a negative stability situation, so that's not it. |
Originally Posted by George Glass
(Post 10646645)
Curious that the initial report on the Ethiopian accident has been removed from the ecaa.gov.et website. Anyone know where its gone ?
http://www.ecaa.gov.et/Home/wp-conte...MAX-ET-AVJ.pdf |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10646648)
An airplane in flight is essentially a teeter-totter balanced on the Center of Pressure (CP) for the entire airplane and is considered to be the point where the lift acts. One element of this is that lift from positive AoA produces a nose-down pitch torque. To counter that, the horizontal stabilizer produces a nose up pitch torque by pushing down on the aft end of the fuselage. When these are balanced everyone is happy, or at least the AoA isn't changing. Of note is that the stabilizer functions as a wing that produces lift opposite to the lift of the wing and has its own local AoA.
If one looks at all possible stable AoAs one would like to see a linear relation between the AoA of the wing and the stabilizer trim position required to balance it. But the Max seems to have another player on the teeter-totter and that is the nacelle of the engine which starts producing noticeable nose up pitch torque at high AoA. So the stab trim position is no longer quite as linear as it was. Since the elevator also affects the pitch torque, that's where the effect could be noticed by the pilot as they move the controls without adjusting the trim. The function of MCAS is to make it so the pilot doesn't experience this new player. Because it's just to offset the new player and depends on AoA and airspeed (because the amount of lift the stabilizer produces depends on those things to generate nose-up torque) it really isn't moving much or fast; it just has to be fast enough to keep up with AoA changes to the aircraft and to speed changes, neither of which ought to be particularly high. It gets more pronounced at low speeds because not only does the requisite high AoA needed to provide lift at low speeds increase the effect from the engine nacelles, the lower speed also means the stabilizer has less dynamic pressure to work with. This is no different than, say, rudder authority at low speed; the rudder has to move a lot farther to get the same effect at low speed than high speed. AFAIK that's the intended MCAS function. To meet a linearity requirement for pilot controls by rebalancing a larger input from the engine nacelles than was existent, but could be ignored, on earlier models. It's not fast enough for a negative stability situation, so that's not it. You have very cogently made the case -by reasoning- for the need for something like MCAS; of course if a new force is introduced it would be desirable to offset it if one wishes to use an extant control model. However you haven't really explored the issues which lead to this need, in other words what piloting a MAX without MCAS would look like. Also it is not at all obvious -in fact extremely improbable- that a given control model can be perfectly grafted on a different airframe by means of a simple mechanical accessory. Of course one could make the case that the mechanical aid creates a similar linearised behavior around equilibrium, bu it would still be required to demonstrate that the relinearised zones share the same volumes of state space, and that these volumes are the only regimes which are of practical importance during flight. Hence it would be very difficult to demonstrate by maths alone, without extensive testing that the MAX shares a control model with the NG and thus can share its certification. There is no evidence to date of the results of such testing. My understanding that under current regulatory rčgimes for civilian aircraft, acceptance of the airframe design WITH MCAS is conditioned on the behavior WITHOUT MCAS. Namely if without MCAS the airframe cannot be flown easily ie. can tend to stall or dive or do other wierd things, then the design would be classed as necessitating active control (MCAS) and couldn't be certified. Which is why Boeing so prudently talks of "linearizing" stick feel. I continue to believe that in a rush to acquire a grandfathered certification, Boeing was overly economical with the truth in its descriptions of the 737 dynamics, which explains Boeing's reluctance to reveal the exact design goals of MCAS. Most of the pilot readers here would appear to have no issue with MCAS certification if it were "just" a stick-pusher, but if it is a more complex entity as now seems likely, then a more careful certification process seems necessary. Edmund |
Originally Posted by edmundronald
(Post 10646664)
MechEngr,
You have very cogently made the case -by reasoning- for the need for something like MCAS; of course if a new force is introduced it would be desirable to offset it if one wishes to use an extant control model. However you haven't really explored the issues which lead to this need, in other words what piloting a MAX without MCAS would look like. Also it is not at all obvious -in fact extremely improbable- that a given control model can be perfectly grafted on a different airframe by means of a simple mechanical accessory. Of course one could make the case that the mechanical aid creates a similar linearised behavior around equilibrium, bu it would still be required to demonstrate that the relinearised zones share the same volumes of state space, and that these volumes are the only regimes which are of practical importance during flight. Hence it would be very difficult to demonstrate by maths alone, without extensive testing that the MAX shares a control model with the NG and thus can share its certification. There is no evidence to date of the results of such testing. My understanding that under current regulatory rčgimes for civilian aircraft, acceptance of the airframe design WITH MCAS is conditioned on the behavior WITHOUT MCAS. Namely if without MCAS the airframe cannot be flown easily ie. can tend to stall or dive or do other wierd things, then the design would be classed as necessitating active control (MCAS) and couldn't be certified. Which is why Boeing so prudently talks of "linearizing" stick feel. I continue to believe that in a rush to acquire a grandfathered certification, Boeing was overly economical with the truth in its descriptions of the 737 dynamics, which explains Boeing's reluctance to reveal the exact design goals of MCAS. Most of the pilot readers here would appear to have no issue with MCAS certification if it were "just" a stick-pusher, but if it is a more complex entity as now seems likely, then a more careful certification process seems necessary. Edmund You cannot use a stick pusher to change the balance of aerodynamic forces on the the plane, which MCAS does and a stick pusher does not. And if that stick pusher had the same authority to apply full-down elevator with as much force on the column as MCAS produced because, for the same AoA system malfunction, the controls felt the plane was in a deep stall, there would still be the same crashes. |
The question is about what it would feel like. I think it would feel as much like an NG at a similar load as anything because pilots spend so little time at high AoA and also little time hand flying that they have no good basis for comparison. We already have record of a flight without MCAS in the first Lion Air situation non-crash flight. The pilots made no comment on any difficulty of hand flying besides the obvious loss of electric trim. |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10646696)
The question is about what it would feel like. I think it would feel as much like an NG at a similar load as anything because pilots spend so little time at high AoA and also little time hand flying that they have no good basis for comparison. We already have record of a flight without MCAS in the first Lion Air situation non-crash flight. The pilots made no comment on any difficulty of hand flying besides the obvious loss of electric trim.
You cannot use a stick pusher to change the balance of aerodynamic forces on the the plane, which MCAS does and a stick pusher does not. And if that stick pusher had the same authority to apply full-down elevator with as much force on the column as MCAS produced because, for the same AoA system malfunction, the controls felt the plane was in a deep stall, there would still be the same crashes. A good example of this might be stall onset and deep stall recovery. Are they the same? Another nastier example is recovery from a strong accidental pitchdown. We can continue to argue this forever; it'll only be put to rest when either Boeing publishes the data, a non-us regulator rebels and does a test flight, or someone constructs a detailed aerodynamical simulation of the Max. Edmund |
Originally Posted by edmundronald
(Post 10646581)
...The suspicion is that MCAS is there to keep the MAX centered in an envelope where it appears linear, but that without MCAS it might get into states where it would be really hard to control (except for Chuck Yeager and you). The unfortunate joke is that the extant MCAS took several airframes into states where they were hard to control. I’m sorry if the above is erroneous or unclear, my opinions are usually worth exactly what people are paying for them... Merry Xmas All that really means, the cure may well have been far worse than the symptom. |
Originally Posted by PEI_3721
(Post 10646304)
The certification arguments for MCAS were flawed, but the principles were proven in flight test, certification, and subsequently commercial operations. MCAS worked as designed; however history shows that the supporting design was not fail safe, nor in that sense, were the interpretations, judgements, and approvals in the regulatory process; both systemic failures.
|
Originally Posted by turbidus
(Post 10646525)
AFTER all this time, they "FIND" documents that show troubling and further communications with Forkner?????
You can do a word search for "Forkner" and find them all???? what sort of software do the run there??? (oh...never mind) The finding may have been done long ago, the "need to disclose" may be the recent change. Finding (electronic) documents is relatively easy, can be done with software. Deciding which documents you "need to disclose" or which documents are protected from disclosure or even may not be disclosed, is a lot harder, cannot be done (in most cases) with software, and requires wetware. Expensive, legal, wetware. There is also a high stakes poker game going on between Boeing, Forkner and Justice Dept. / investigators. Forkner plead the fifth, clearly implying he has something to hide, something to sell, and something to gain from immunity - but no one knows what, maybe it's all a bluff. Boeing has to guess, because Forkner apparently isn't using Boeing legal counsel (no **** sherlock...) - which means they can't be sure if he is going to helpfully fall on his sword or come round behind them and stab them with it. |
Originally Posted by xetroV
(Post 10646732)
Are there any records of MCAS firing up as designed during actual commercial operations?
|
Originally Posted by fizz57
(Post 10645322)
The non-linearity issue was brought up by FCEng84 way back when the whole thing started in one of the now-closed threads. It is the stick force reversal and instability that are speculations, and came later.
That poster was usually a very reliable and well-informed source. Unfortunately he hasn't posted for a very long time (probably the price for being too well-informed). |
Originally Posted by xetroV
(Post 10646732)
Are there any records of MCAS firing up <em>as designed</em> during actual commercial operations? I wonder how an aircrew that somehow finds itself in the part of the flight envelope where MCAS would be activated would react to the sudden (presumably unexpected) automatic nose-down trim correction. MCAS may work as designed in that case, but what about the startled human element?
Last time I did a search of NASA's ASRS, there weren't any reports of such. |
Originally Posted by edmundronald
(Post 10646581)
Gums,
Math jargon Sri’s , “may exhibit non-linear feedback” is the engineer’s equivalent of saying may become EXTREMELY unpredictable. - one wants a system to be controllable - ie can be brought/forced to a desired eg. nice stable state starting from any state inside the envelope. - if the system is “linear” then a branch of engineering maths called LINEAR control theory applies, the domain where it is controllable is known, and eveything is “copacetic”, automation can be easily used, and the system may be approved on the virtues of its design. - if the system is “non-linear” and even worse if it exhibits non-linear feedback, then can as they say in the US it can “go postal”, and standard school maths can’t describe it nor control it. An auditor won’t certify such a system unless it is extensively tested -if the auditor be honest. And automation can be very unhappy about the surprises baked into such a unpredictable system. The suspicion is that MCAS is there to keep the MAX centered in an envelope where it appears linear, but that without MCAS it might get into states where it would be really hard to control (except for Chuck Yeager and you). The unfortunate joke is that the extant MCAS took several airframes into states where they were hard to control. Of course one could argue one can always deviate into a non-linear behaviour eg. stall, but the suspicion here is that the volume of linearity is more limited than it should be, and that really ugly things happen in places where certified airframes should still be acting nice. I’m sorry if the above is erroneous or unclear, my opinions are usually worth exactly what people are paying for them. Merry Xmas On the other hand, even the linear system might have uncontrollable and unobservable states. In a closed loop system, there tends to be observability problems that restricts the the usability of the closed loop data. If we consider MAX case, there are two independent feedback controllers: the pilot and the MACS. So both of them have to operate with restricted information. I see this as the root cause of the problems. When the system starts to work in an unpredictable way the failure analysis might become unreliable. I don’t understand why the MAX is still grounded. The control problems should be relatively easy to solve (with additional actuators) when the understanding of the underlying problem is present. My guess is that MACS was used to fix something else that stick force problem (in the control engineering referenced as open loop gain). My guess is that the system was there to prevent to enter to a envelope where the the real problems begins. For the political reasons it was named and defined to system that makes the “feeling” like NG. My guess is that the problem were solved if the politics, the "salesman's lies” and the lawyer advices were were forgotten and the raw engineering job from clean table were started. Some kind of spoiler in the wing root or somewhere near the pylon might be needed. There should be courage to think out of the box and forget the short term costs. |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10646797)
I'd guess that deployment of MCAS for real would result in at least an ASR. L
time I did a search of NASA's ASRS, there weren't any reports. I think what is meant here is a runaway MCAS activation following AoA sensor failure, - an erroneous activation which will not stop trimming as the perceived AoA would not reduce even when trim reaches the forward limit, because the sensor has failed, which Boeing mistakenly assumed would be recognised as a trim runaway. |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10646648)
An airplane in flight is essentially a teeter-totter balanced on the Center of Pressure (CP) for the entire airplane and is considered to be the point where the lift acts. One element of this is that lift from positive AoA produces a nose-down pitch torque. To counter that, the horizontal stabilizer produces a nose up pitch torque by pushing down on the aft end of the fuselage. When these are balanced everyone is happy, or at least the AoA isn't changing. Of note is that the stabilizer functions as a wing that produces lift opposite to the lift of the wing and has its own local AoA.
If one looks at all possible stable AoAs one would like to see a linear relation between the AoA of the wing and the stabilizer trim position required to balance it. But the Max seems to have another player on the teeter-totter and that is the nacelle of the engine which starts producing noticeable nose up pitch torque at high AoA. So the stab trim position is no longer quite as linear as it was. Since the elevator also affects the pitch torque, that's where the effect could be noticed by the pilot as they move the controls without adjusting the trim. The function of MCAS is to make it so the pilot doesn't experience this new player. Because it's just to offset the new player and depends on AoA and airspeed (because the amount of lift the stabilizer produces depends on those things to generate nose-up torque) it really isn't moving much or fast; it just has to be fast enough to keep up with AoA changes to the aircraft and to speed changes, neither of which ought to be particularly high. It gets more pronounced at low speeds because not only does the requisite high AoA needed to provide lift at low speeds increase the effect from the engine nacelles, the lower speed also means the stabilizer has less dynamic pressure to work with. This is no different than, say, rudder authority at low speed; the rudder has to move a lot farther to get the same effect at low speed than high speed. AFAIK that's the intended MCAS function. To meet a linearity requirement for pilot controls by rebalancing a larger input from the engine nacelles than was existent, but could be ignored, on earlier models. It's not fast enough for a negative stability situation, so that's not it. |
I also think that MCAS was never triggered in normal airline use. Day to day flying only uses a small, benign part of the flight envelope.
However, there might be situations (e.g. escaping extreme wind shears), where the relevant part of the flight envelope is entered. Having an unpredictable handling of the aircraft in such a situation might be the trigger for the next catastrophic accident. I think there is more to it than just unusual handling characteristics w/o MCAS. |
You should not expect to find any records of MCAS activation; they are not hazardous, exceptional, nor of interest unless the aircraft approaches an already identified safety boundary.
The design was intended to be a background operation, not seen or felt by the crew other than by close observation of trim activity. MCAS activation is no more unusual than STS operation. |
MCAS can be shown to be very logical.
But regardless of the parameters that activate it, and the absence of any intuitive means to inhibit a false activation, it still seems strange to invoke the most powerful effector on the airplane as a means to adjust stick force. What happened to springs and variable linkages? Also, let's not forget that MCAS became lethal when its authority was increased to deal with a second, lower-speed-range issue of non-linear force-to-alpha relationship. That's where someone needs to look at the "naked" characteristics - because MCAS 2.0 is more easily inhibited, increasing the chance that a MAX will enter that corner of the envelope unprotected. |
Originally Posted by JPcont
(Post 10646819)
I don’t understand why the MAX is still grounded. The control problems should be relatively easy to solve (with additional actuators) when the understanding of the underlying problem is present.
My guess is that MACS was used to fix something else that stick force problem (in the control engineering referenced as open loop gain). My guess is that the system was there to prevent to enter to a envelope where the the real problems begins. For the political reasons it was named and defined to system that makes the “feeling” like NG. My guess is that the problem were solved if the politics, the "salesman's lies” and the lawyer advices were were forgotten and the raw engineering job from clean table were started. Some kind of spoiler in the wing root or somewhere near the pylon might be needed. There should be courage to think out of the box and forget the short term costs. |
Originally Posted by safetypee
(Post 10646896)
MCAS activation is no more unusual than STS operation.
|
Originally Posted by safetypee https://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif MCAS activation is no more unusual than STS operation.
Originally Posted by Takwis
(Post 10646914)
Except that it moves the trim farther, and faster, and usually in the opposite direction.
Thus a normal activation might not be all that noticeable, especially given that STS is also tweaking trim although in opposite direction. Question for 737 pilots: Unless one was looking at the trim wheel would you even notice that a particular (short, not pathological) trim tweak was opposite the expected STS direction in a dynamic situation where MCAS would trigger? |
Originally Posted by clearedtocross
(Post 10646830)
Nicely explained, MechEngr, but that's the trim stability of a glider... Now add two large bonks with thrust/drag not vectored through cg and in line of flight, and you get another big factor influencing pitch moments. As we do not know in what flight regime(s) the unacceptable pitch up tendency occurs, the power (or idle drag) of the engines add to influencing factors you mentionned. What I cannot figure out - maybe some of you can - is the fact that the unwanted non-linearity does not occur with flaps/slats slightly extended.
I expect that with flaps/slats that the pitch-down increases so much that the non-linearity contribution from the engine nacelles is back to being too small a relative contributor to notice. |
More on the "recently-acknowledged" messages:
Boeing Discloses More ‘Very Disturbing’ Messages on 737 Max(Bloomberg) -- A new batch of messages between Boeing Co. employees on the development of the 737 Max paints a “very disturbing picture” of concerns about the plane, according to an aide to a House committee. The documents were turned over to the Federal Aviation Administration on Monday, the agency said in a statement. The disclosure came the same day that Boeing ousted its chief executive officer. At least some of them were written by the same Boeing pilot whose 2016 messages were released in October and were the subject of sharp questioning by lawmakers, according to a person familiar with their contents who wasn’t authorized to discuss them. The communications haven’t been released publicly. The staff of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee are still reviewing the messages and didn’t provide specific details about what they contain. “But similar to other records previously disclosed by Boeing, the records appear to point to a very disturbing picture of both concerns expressed by Boeing employees about the company’s commitment to safety and efforts by some employees to ensure Boeing’s production plans were not diverted by regulators or others,” a committee aide said in a statement.“ The committee will continue to review these and other records provided by Boeing as part of the committee’s ongoing investigation,” the aide said. Boeing didn’t immediately respond to an emailed request for comment. This was the second time that the Chicago-based company has delayed turning over to the FAA sensitive messages related to the development of the 737 Max jetliner, which was grounded in March after a design flaw was linked to two fatal crashes, in Indonesia and Ethiopia. The earlier episode prompted a rebuke by the agency and helped lead to growing tensions between the regulator and the planemaker. The FAA didn’t comment in its statement on the content of the emails, saying only that they were under review. The company’s decision to turn the emails over to the FAA was reported earlier by the Seattle Times. The way Boeing handled the second set of records rankled the agency, according to a person familiar with the issue who wasn’t authorized to speak about it. Boeing told the FAA the messages existed in recent days, but didn’t initially provide them or disclose their contents, said the person. Boeing Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg stepped down on Monday, at least partly as a result of deteriorating relations with the FAA, according to a statement from the company’s board. In October, Boeing disclosed to the FAA instant messages and emails by a high-ranking company pilot who in 2016 expressed misgivings about the software implicated in two fatal crashes on the Max. Boeing had known about those messages since early in the year and turned them over to the Justice Department in February. It didn’t give them to the FAA immediately because of the criminal investigation into how the plane was approved, Bloomberg News reported at the time. The delay angered the FAA, which is charged with overseeing Boeing. One of the agency’s key tenets is that entities it oversees must disclose safety issues or possible breaches of regulations. In some circumstances, failing to tell the agency about such an issue may be considered a legal violation. “The FAA finds the substance of the document concerning,” the agency said in a statement on Oct. 18. “The FAA is also disappointed that Boeing did not bring this document to our attention immediately upon its discovery.” The November 2016 instant messages disclosed in October, which were reviewed by Bloomberg News, were between between Mark Forkner, then Boeing’s chief technical pilot for the 737, and another 737 technical pilot, Patrik Gustavsson. Forkner expressed concern that the flight-control feature later implicated in the crashes was “running rampant” and said he might have unknowingly misled the FAA about it. In separate emails he sent to an unnamed FAA official, he said he was “jedi-mind tricking” regulators outside the U.S. into accepting Boeing’s suggested training for the Max. A lawyer for Forkner, David Gerger, said issues raised in the messages were the result of balky simulator software and not a result of problems with the plane itself. Forkner believed the plane was safe and didn’t mislead the FAA, Gerger said. Gerger didn’t respond to requests to comment on the latest messages and whether they involved his client. |
Boeing plans to hand out "safety" cards to convince pax that Max is safe.
For instance, if a traveler doesn’t want to fly after buying a ticket, getting to the airport gate or even after boarding the plane, Boeing says that the airline could offer to rebook a flight, have flight attendants or pilots talk to the concerned passenger or hand out 3-by-5 inch information cards detailing why the Max is safe... In the most extreme cases, Boeing suggests using “techniques related to an inflight medical emergency to de-escalate. At times, the material is startlingly self-critical. In a draft memo Boeing prepared for airlines to share with employees such as flight attendants, the company suggests that airlines say: “Boeing understands that it fell short and let us down, as well as the flying public, and it has committed to continuous improvement and learning.... In a section of the presentation focused on social media and marketing, the company said it planned to “amplify any positive stories reported,” and that it intended to buy ads to promote the plane’s return to service. It said a company website dedicated to updates on the Max was being designed with “improved usability” and “stickiness” to “encourage more time on site and repeat visits,” phrases commonly used in the communications business. The presentation said Boeing’s “digital and media team” would be “monitoring social conversations around the clock. " |
Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10646980)
Boeing plans to hand out "safety" cards to convince pax that Max is safe.
If you can you should look at the "Customer Journey and Scenario map" presented in the article. Aside from the explicit sexism (the concerned passenger is a "she" in all scenarios) it is rather fascinating. For instance, "if anxious passenger is posting, then airline social care team provides information on the safety of the MAX and informs the airlines network operations center of anxious passenger, which informs flight crew, as needed." It looks like Boeing's not going to be comforted by the initial response to coverage of this scheme. Here's the most-recommended comment on the Times story: I'm pretty sure we all know this is baloney. Boeing slapped a software fix on a physics problem. Nope. No way am I getting on one of these. Boeing has demonstrated more concern for short term profits than for passengers. It gutted its own technical expertise. No 3x5 card is going to make up for that. What a joke. |
Suggestions for the 3x5 card:
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10647018)
Suggestions for the 3x5 card:
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10647018)
Suggestions for the 3x5 card:
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10646980)
Merry Christmas to all! |
Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10646980)
Boeing plans to hand out "safety" cards to convince pax that Max is safe.
If you can you should look at the "Customer Journey and Scenario map" presented in the article. Aside from the explicit sexism (the concerned passenger is a "she" in all scenarios) it is rather fascinating. For instance, "if anxious passenger is posting, then airline social care team provides information on the safety of the MAX and informs the airlines network operations center of anxious passenger, which informs flight crew, as needed." What will they do for the "anxious pilot?" |
Originally Posted by Water pilot
(Post 10647018)
Suggestions for the 3x5 card:
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Extract AV week Dec 23 Page 12
From piece titled Boeing 737 Pilots Focus on Modified procedures
Critically, Boeing believed an uncommanded MCAS activation would be diagnosed quickly as runaway stabilizer and be managed by following the appropriate checklist. When the Lion Air crew did not respond in this way, Boeing and the FAA decided a reminder of the runaway stabilizer procedure would suffice while Boeing was taking a few months to update the MCAS software. But the March 10, 2019, crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 was linked quickly to the MCAS as well, leading to the grounding of the MAX -aircraft MAX fleet and a deeper examination of where Boeing and the FAA had gone wrong. Among the many findings: The complexity of the manual trim-wheel procedure, which applies to all 737s, was not well understood. The new 737 training modules emphasize that pilots may need to use two hands to crank the wheel during a runaway trim scenario. *** That means it takes BOTH PILOTS *** It also says "unloading" the stabilizer—attempting to reduce airspeed and take the counterintuitive step of not pulling bark on the yoke even though the aircraft is trimmed nose down—may be necessary to move the trim wheel. **** JEEEZZZZZZZ **** Which also means you are in great position to Kiss your a** goodbye !! |
The new 737 training modules emphasize that pilots may need to use two hands to crank the wheel during a runaway trim scenario. *** That means it takes BOTH PILOTS *** |
Originally Posted by Grebe
(Post 10647144)
From piece titled Boeing 737 Pilots Focus on Modified procedures
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