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Originally Posted by medod
(Post 10645191)
Whatever the exact reasons, the MAX’s big ass engines mean it fails 25.255 without MCAS. Yup. That's it. That is why I believe the MAX will never fly again in commercial service with less than three AoA vanes. |
[QUOTE=Grebe;10645167]The length of this thread and its previous makes it difficult to refer to specifics and what the past and current semi- technical discussions have been- since most of the current questions have long since been addressed- discussed- ad naseasum
So I'm going to post a few links to different blogs- which if 0ne takes the time to read and figure out how to go to previous and following on the site(s) listed will at least provide mostly rational discussion. https://www.satcom.guru/2019/10/flaw...-disaster.html https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/29/bj...-crash-part-5/ https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/0...g-737-ngs.html https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/6214...x-threads.html And from a long ago post somewhere in prune news and rumours one can find the below And re stick force found https://www.satcom.guru/2019/03/taki...aiting-on.html ........ This aspect is essential in ensuring the pilot does not have to push the yoke to stop the plane from pitching up, which violates positive stick force per g as required in 25.255.... ... stick force per g must be positive . .. |
Fitting a third vane?
You can see how hard it would be to add another AoA vane. It must not disturb the other sensors and they must not disturb it. When a good place is found in airflow analysis, there's probably a complex object behind the metal. When a final decision is made, the wiring to the black box will be a major undertaking when multiplied by the hundreds of existing MAX's. When the wiring is in, the black box will not have the slightest idea what to do with the information. It has no plughole labelled 'Additional Sensors'. I have a bad feeling it would not even have the capability of being modified to take a new input. You can see where this is going: not a chance of Boeing accepting this mod without one hell of a fight. AoA synthesis would be easier, and then, that information has to go somewhere. Picture pulled off a Seattle Times post from October. It says MAX, but not sure. However it allows my point to be made. https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....c8c1cfa5f5.jpg |
[QUOTE=jimtx;10645212]
Originally Posted by Grebe
(Post 10645167)
I think the slope of the stick force per G is positive. It's just not linear in the regime they are concerned with. § 25.255 Out-of-trim characteristics. [. . .] (b) In the out-of-trim condition specified in paragraph (a) of this section, when the normal acceleration is varied from + 1 g to the positive and negative values specified in paragraph (c) of this section - (1) The stick force vs. g curve must have a positive slope at any speed up to and including VFC/MFC; and (2) At speeds between VFC/MFC and VDF/MDF the direction of the primary longitudinal control force may not reverse. |
I think the slope of the stick force per G is positive. It's just not linear in the regime they are concerned with. Boeing's statement is basically MCAS is an augmentation to maintain proper stick force, but as far as I remember, reading everything here and everywhere else, they very carefully never say where they start from. Someone fly the plane w/o MCAS and report back. Then I'll believe it. |
I was right, and then left seat, for Transport Canada Aircraft Certification flight testing yesterday. The test pilot and flight test engineer, were extremely thorough. The FTE explained to me after the day's test flying that because of the concern that some compliance was not truly demonstrated for the MAX certification, Transport Canada was not going to allow themselves to be caught out not having thoroughly flying tested one of their programs, if another authority later inquired.
At least, with Transport Canada, the pendulum has swung back (and I suspect with EASA too). Where, in the past, they might have accepted my word as an aircraft certification delegate, now they want to see for themselves, 'cause they're on the hook for documenting the finding of compliance. Considering the MAX certification concerns, I can certainly see their point! |
You are correct Murphy. I use three alarms in different devices for critical events (like getting to work on time.) I haven't been late for twenty years now, and yes my colleagues notice.
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Originally Posted by DieselOx
(Post 10645243)
Why do you think that? I hear a lot of people speculating that's the case, but no one has has definitively proven that one way or the other, directly from any data so far publicly available. Boeing's statement is basically MCAS is an augmentation to maintain proper stick force, but as far as I remember, reading everything here and everywhere else, they very carefully never say where they start from. Someone fly the plane w/o MCAS and report back. Then I'll believe it. |
You know, Boeing clearly have the expertise and experience to build the best passenger jet in this sector of the market, so why have they persisted all this time with ever more modified 737s? Plainly, the original design was good, and it could stand some enlargement, but with any design there comes a point where the possibilities for modification and improvement are exhausted. Looking at some of the larger NGs or the P-8 shows how far they came- and safely. But adding the LEAP engines was clearly a step too far. The 737 really needed a redesign into what would effectively be a new aircraft to accommodate the new engines, so why wasn't it done? If this jet is to return to the skies, it should get what it needs- new undercarriage, probably the wing repositioned on the fuselage, the engines where they should be, and many other changes. It will be too much of a change for the existing jets, but the MAXes could probably be modified into useful 737 variants using normal engines. Boeing need to get a grip. There's more to a company than just money and profit- there's also product. They should do what they know, better than anyone, needs done. Accept the sunk losses, repurpose the MAXs' into something else. Start on their A320, GTF engined competitor from scratch, restore their reputation, and make a damn good job of it. Go on to sell thousands of them, and make a fortune. edit. The MAX has LEAP engines, not GTF. Although both are much bigger and powerful than previously fitted power plants. |
Originally Posted by Nomad2
(Post 10645293)
You know, Boeing clearly have the expertise and experience to build the best passenger jet in this sector of the market, so why have they persisted all this time with ever more modified 737s? Plainly, the original design was good, and it could stand some enlargement, but with any design there comes a point where the possibilities for modification and improvement are exhausted. Looking at some of the larger NGs or the P-8 shows how far they came- and safely. But adding the GTF engines was clearly a step too far. The 737 really needed a redesign into what would effectively be a new aircraft to accommodate the new engines, so why wasn't it done? If this jet is to return to the skies, it should get what it needs- new undercarriage, probably the wing repositioned on the fuselage, the engines where they should be, and many other changes. It will be too much of a change for the existing jets, but the MAXes could probably be modified into useful 737 variants using normal engines. Boeing need to get a grip. There's more to a company than just money and profit- there's also product. They should do what they know, better than anyone, needs done. Accept the sunk losses, repurpose the MAXs' into something else. Start on their A320, GTF engined competitor from scratch, restore their reputation, and make a damn good job of it. Go on to sell thousands of them, and make a fortune. If this jet is to return to the skies, it should get what it needs- new undercarriage, probably the wing repositioned on the fuselage, the engines where they should be, and many other changes. It will be too much of a change for the existing jets, but the MAXes could probably be modified into useful 737 variants using normal engines |
When the wiring is in, the black box will not have the slightest idea what to do with the information. It has no plughole labelled 'Additional Sensors'. I have a bad feeling it would not even have the capability of being modified to take a new input. |
Originally Posted by DieselOx
(Post 10645243)
Why do you think that? I hear a lot of people speculating that's the case, but no one has has definitively proven that one way or the other, directly from any data so far publicly available. Boeing's statement is basically MCAS is an augmentation to maintain proper stick force, but as far as I remember, reading everything here and everywhere else, they very carefully never say where they start from. Someone fly the plane w/o MCAS and report back. Then I'll believe it. That poster was usually a very reliable and well-informed source. Unfortunately he hasn't posted for a very long time (probably the price for being too well-informed). |
Originally Posted by Nomad2
(Post 10645293)
You know, Boeing clearly have the expertise and experience to build the best passenger jet in this sector of the market, so why have they persisted all this time with ever more modified 737s? Plainly, the original design was good, and it could stand some enlargement, but with any design there comes a point where the possibilities for modification and improvement are exhausted. Looking at some of the larger NGs or the P-8 shows how far they came- and safely. But adding the GTF engines was clearly a step too far. The 737 really needed a redesign into what would effectively be a new aircraft to accommodate the new engines, so why wasn't it done? ... It's not clear the new version is a step too far. A lack of imagination seems to have prevented anyone from noticing the potential for disaster, even after the first crash when all the variables were laid out, plain to see. This is the first foray into a semi-aided system for a generally manually controlled plane. Unlike FBW, it doesn't require scrutiny of every detail of its function merely to fly. The autopilot was essentially unaffected by the engine change and defers to the pilots when a problem happens. MCAS sits in a similar position to the driving systems being used on cars that keep lanes and try to avoid collisions; they work but, since they depend on the operator, when there's an overlap of authority there's a much more complex potential interaction. |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10645325)
even after the first crash when all the variables were laid out, plain to see.
There are still many secrets - after the first crash very little was disclosed and what was was in tongues in the FAA AD that lacked much information that could have been included. Something like we expect more than 10 aircraft to crash over the next thirty years due to the MCAS system, based on known information relating to the first crash. |
Originally Posted by Superpilot
(Post 10645321)
It is possible to daisy chain data. There does not need to be a one to one relationship between sensor and input. You simply offset the values from one sensor by a known constant so it can be decoded later (in software) as coming from a separate source. This would be a major weight saving too. Acceptable to the FAA? Who knows...
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Grebe. It may not be how things happen at Boeing, North America- but it's exactly how things DO happen at Boeing Brazil. The GTF engined 190 E2 has a new undercarriage, with a repositioned wing, the engines where they should be, and many other changes- so maybe it's about time things changed in the US, Charlie? MechEngr. The Embraer 190 E2 carries a common type rating with the original E190, despite being effectively a completely different aeroplane and properly redesigned to accommodate the fuel efficient (and jolly powerful) GTF motors. I agree, that's what the customers want.... What they probably didn't want is a re-engined 737 that they are not permitted to operate. |
Originally Posted by Bend alot
(Post 10645331)
Cummon - plain to see!
There are still many secrets - after the first crash very little was disclosed and what was was in tongues in the FAA AD that lacked much information that could have been included. Something like we expect more than 10 aircraft to crash over the next thirty years due to the MCAS system, based on known information relating to the first crash. What information available now was not in the preliminary Lion Air report that made a difference? The Emergency Airworthiness Directive and associated AD does not leave much to the imagination, and anyone flying a Max should have read that preliminary accident report as if their life depended on it. In addition Boeing issued their own guidance directly to Max operators, with further details, such as that it operates only in flaps-up flight. They also issued a separate bulletin, number TBC 19, that described the 10 second run and then retrigger on any trim change with a 5 second delay. The only secret that is left is that if the maximum velocity is exceeded with the plane far out of trim that the trim wheels are too hard to turn. But if the initial guidance is used, the plane is never out of trim and never outside the velocity envelope, so planning for that is unexpected. I'd say it was up to every operator to carefully examine all the data about a crash involving their same type equipment and understand whether their training and other preparations were sufficient to deal with the situation. Had that happened the difficulty in using the trim wheels might have been exposed; certainly Mentour Pilot did his part and CP Bernd Kai von Hoesslin seems to have fought hard to do so as well, but it didn't seem to occur to Max operators to push back and go public with any flaws in the published documentation. |
MAX operators just like the shinny brochure parts.
The FAA AD on the matter was and is absolute rubbish, of the same level of the original certification of the MAX - just how Boeing told them it will say. The FAA does not have a massive credibility issue for non genuine reason/s. They blew it during the start, after the first accident, after the second and now the non reply to the Freedom Of Information request - that request was excluding the FAA and its discussions and decisions documents. It was a genuine request that if nothing to hide would have gone along way to regaining public trust. I went to the local mint the other day and said I am a customer I buy your gold bars but they are too small. I will remain a customer if you make them bigger, but you must not be more expensive than the local bank. That's what customers want. P.S. given half the pilots did "unexpected" things in the MAX test sims the other day with all the 20/20 of the last year - The prelim report and the AD were based on incorrect assumptions for many/most crews. |
Originally Posted by Nomad2
(Post 10645352)
Grebe. It may not be how things happen at Boeing, North America- but it's exactly how things DO happen at Boeing Brazil. The GTF engined 190 E2 has a new undercarriage, with a repositioned wing, the engines where they should be, and many other changes- so maybe it's about time things changed in the US, Charlie? MechEngr. The Embraer 190 E2 carries a common type rating with the original E190, despite being effectively a completely different aeroplane and properly redesigned to accommodate the fuel efficient (and jolly powerful) GTF motors. I agree, that's what the customers want.... What they probably didn't want is a re-engined 737 that they are not permitted to operate. There are about 7000 NGs and were orders for about 5000 Max's. That's one to two orders of magnitude greater investment in 737 operations. I see it's a FBW which covers a multitude of sins, so the comparison to the 737 is weak. " The E2 have 75% new parts" which would cripple logistics for an airline that had thousands of the old ones to maintain and were looking to expand with new ones; not a problem for the E190 series. (quote per the Wikipedia E2 page) It would have been an impossible sell for Boeing to make a plane that did not fit existing operations. I guess we'll see if Embraer can sell in quantity. |
Originally Posted by Bend alot
(Post 10645361)
MAX operators just like the shinny brochure parts.
The FAA AD on the matter was and is absolute rubbish, of the same level of the original certification of the MAX - just how Boeing told them it will say. The FAA does not have a massive credibility issue for non genuine reason/s. They blew it during the start, after the first accident, after the second and now the non reply to the Freedom Of Information request - that request was excluding the FAA and its discussions and decisions documents. It was a genuine request that if nothing to hide would have gone along way to regaining public trust. I went to the local mint the other day and said I am a customer I buy your gold bars but they are too small. I will remain a customer if you make them bigger, but you must not be more expensive than the local bank. That's what customers want. P.S. given half the pilots did "unexpected" things in the MAX test sims the other day with all the 20/20 of the last year - The prelim report and the AD were based on incorrect assumptions for many/most crews. The gold bar analogy is terrible, but it is right - if the mint can do that they will undersell the competition; that's how the market generally works. The AD is not issued in a vacuum. It does not include a complete how-to training course in learning to trim a plane. That was assumed to be trained into pilots, but it is clear the Ethiopian pilots did not do this and it is unclear why they did not do this. They did, however, ignore the clear admonition to never turn the trim enable switches back to enable if they had been disabled. The AD covered that and that allowed the last trim application the pilots did not counter. |
If MCAS was ‘just’ to get a common type certificate Boeing would have bit that bullet by now and the Max would be flying. No one goes $9 billion in the hole to avoid a training bill. The only plausible explanation for the time it has taken to fix this is that the aerodynamics without MCAS are fundamentally flawed, likely because the engines are to far forward and to high on the wing. The JATR and EASA both want to see the unaugmented aerodynamics. If after a year they have not seen them, or have seen them and won’t accept them, the Max is likely not certifiable. The Canadians have pretty much publically called Boeing bluff (‘if it’s OK without MCAS, certify it without MCAS’). The political pressure to certify the Max is immense. The technical case not to must be compelling. |
Originally Posted by SLF3
(Post 10645393)
If MCAS was ‘just’ to get a common type certificate Boeing would have bit that bullet by now and the Max would be flying. No one goes $9 billion in the hole to avoid a training bill. The only plausible explanation for the time it has taken to fix this is that the aerodynamics without MCAS are fundamentally flawed, likely because the engines are to far forward and to high on the wing. The JATR and EASA both want to see the unaugmented aerodynamics. If after a year they have not seen them, or have seen them and won’t accept them, the Max is likely not certifiable. The Canadians have pretty much publically called Boeing bluff (‘if it’s OK without MCAS, certify it without MCAS’). The political pressure to certify the Max is immense. The technical case not to must be compelling. |
Originally Posted by KelvinD
(Post 10645095)
Declaration: I am not a pilot! I have to ask a question that has been bothering me since this issue first arose: Why does the only indication of AoA have to be from a fallible instrument stuck outside on the airflow?
Originally Posted by KelvinD
(Post 10645095)
Declaration: I am not a pilot! Outside of aviation, there are many devices that can perform the same function, such as inclinometers etc, either working from a bubble indication or an object floating in a liquid.
Originally Posted by KelvinD
(Post 10645095)
Declaration: I am not a pilot! Why can a pilot not have an instrument, mounted inside the cockpit, that will give him an indication of AoA, regardless of what the airflow over an outside instrument tells him.,.
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Originally Posted by Nomad2
(Post 10645293)
You know, Boeing clearly have the expertise and experience to build the best passenger jet in this sector of the market, so why have they persisted all this time with ever more modified 737s? Understandably it may be hard to envisage it, but there is a possibility that Boeing no longer has the expertise and experience to build acceptable passenger jets. Those who designed the last successful Boeing jets are now retired, and there have been reports that Boeing clearly laid off senior engineers years ago. If that is true, where would the new engineers get their experience and expertise from ? |
You can see how hard it would be to add another AoA vane. https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....f598c2ef5f.jpg I was right, and then left seat, for Transport Canada Aircraft Certification flight testing yesterday. The test pilot and flight test engineer, were extremely thorough. The FTE explained to me after the day's test flying that because of the concern that some compliance was not truly demonstrated for the MAX certification, Transport Canada was not going to allow themselves to be caught out not having thoroughly flying tested one of their programs, if another authority later inquired. |
Originally Posted by KelvinD
(Post 10645095)
Declaration: I am not a pilot! (Have flown gliders only)
... Why does the only indication of AoA have to be from a fallible instrument stuck outside on the airflow? ... But the AoA is defined as the angle between the wing and the mass of air in which the plane is flying. Here are pictures of 4 planes just about to stall (from https://www.apstraining.com/resource/whats-the-big-deal-about-angle-of-attack/) https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....f56f792506.gif ... and the velocity shown here is relative to the local air-mass, not something you could measure with GPS. Smoke-tails at acrobatic displays confirm that AoA and attitude may have startlingly little relationship to each other, as in this eye-candy AOA versus pitch PS In clear air it might be possible to measure the the relative velocity of the air to the plane by some laser-based optical device. However in cloud, fog, heavy rain, icing-conditions, ... no way. (After AF447 they considered this avenue for airspeed measurement.) |
The MAX has a modern wing and the latest fuel efficient engines, it's a pity Boeing didn't bolt them onto a new fuselage instead of a relic from the 1950s first generation of jet transports.
If the MAX can't be recertified then the supply chain may have a hope with the C919 which has a large amount of US sourced content. If the Chinese ramp up production to fill the void then there will be considerable demand for engines, APUs, FMS etc to be filled, keeping American workers in jobs. Limiting the contagion from spreading much beyond Boeing itself and the factory towns which produce the MAX would be preferable to the ripple through effect where shops are forced to close because workers lose their jobs at factories which supply components to larger manufacturers in different states which in turn supply Boeing. Even if some authorities accept a fix, the Chinese may demand substantial trade concessions in other areas in exchange for approving the aircraft. If these aren't forthcoming they could make any acceptance conditional on impossible terms such as a completely new flight control system or ban the aircraft all together. |
Pilots, Not the Plane, Keep the Boeing MAX GroundedAfter the tragedies, pilots will be expected to know less and religiously follow checklists more.By Dec. 20, 2019 5:18 pm ETHolman W. Jenkins, Jr. A Boeing 737 MAX in Renton, Wash., April 13, 2017. Photo: Ted S. Warren/Associated Press Ghosts and goblins are keeping the troubled new Boeing 737 MAX out of the air now. So much so that the company this week announced it will stop an assembly line that was producing dozens of planes a month to be stored in parking lots.After the first MAX crash took place in Indonesia in late 2018, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration decided to keep the plane flying. Consternation followed a Journal report last week showing that at the time the agency anticipated a MAX crash rate three times that of comparable airplanes. In the FAA’s defense, it also presumed that Boeing would fix the MAX’s faulty flight-control software well before another crash occurred. In the meantime, impressed upon pilots would be that any glitch could be quickly neutralized by throwing a couple of prominent switches. Which makes all the more urgent understanding why the next crash, involving Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, happened just months later. For the last three minutes of what was a six-minute flight, the offending software system, as per Boeing’s instructions after the Indonesia crash, was disabled. Yet the pilots never cut takeoff thrust despite a loud clacker warning that their airspeed was exceeding the plane’s design limit. With so much force acting on the plane’s control surfaces, they were unable, as Boeing’s new checklist also specified, to move the trim wheel manually to correct the nose-down trim imposed by the faulty software. They didn’t use the three minutes to heed the clacker and reduce their speed or briefly to relax pressure on the control yoke, which also would have helped free up the trim wheel. Instead, against all advice, they turned the software back on, which promptly put the plane into an unrecoverable dive. How much the Ethiopian crash even belongs in the same category as the Indonesia crash is debatable when all the facts are considered, albeit depending on whether you are more interested in focusing on aircraft design or on crew training. To pilots who came up with lots of hand-flying through the military or even the way hobbyist pilots do, it seems possible that understanding the impact of excessive aerodynamic forces on the trim wheel would have been second nature. Perhaps not so with the tens of thousands of classroom- and simulator-trained pilots who staff today’s fast-growing airlines in the developing world.A misplaced sensitivity has been working overtime to suppress discussion of this issue. The goal is not to excuse Boeing’s appalling original software implementation or rush the 737 MAX back into service. The discussion is unwelcome in aviation circles partly because the corollaries are unwelcome. If airplanes today must be designed so mass-produced, classroom-trained pilots can’t crash them, planes tomorrow will be designed to eliminate the pilot completely. In the meantime, better crew training could always be required, but the benefit might not be worth the cost given today’s already low accident rate thanks to the advance of automation. All this explains the bitterness that has crept into the debate, with a U.S. pilot union accusing Boeing of “blaming dead pilots for its mistakes” and Ethiopian Airlines threatening never to fly the 737 MAX again. For its part, the FAA knows it can’t guarantee against another Boeing crash any more than it can guarantee against another Airbus crash like the 2009 Air France disaster in the South Atlantic or 2013’s Asiana Airlines mishap at San Francisco’s airport. In all three cases, and in almost all crashes nowadays, flyable planes are flown into the ground by pilots either accidentally or intentionally (as with the 2015 Germanwings pilot-suicide crash). Boeing decided this week to curtail production of the grounded MAX for cash-flow reasons. The company knows the plane will fly again (as it should) partly because the global economy’s demand for air travel can’t be met without the MAX. Meanwhile, regulators have been throwing requirements at Boeing less related specifically to the MAX and very definitely related to new doubts about pilot readiness to deal with unexpected situations. Afoot in global regulatory circles already was a tendency, now accelerated, to reduce expectations about what pilots must know and do from memory. The goal will increasingly be to give them detailed checklists for every occasion. This will likely include, in any failure related to the automatic trim system, an explicit reminder not to overspeed.Whether or not this has much to do with the MAX anymore, it certainly has to do with the future of flying until robots finally push the pilot out of the cockpit altogether. Edited to improve paragraph formatting |
Is this another blame the pilots propaganda run? IIRC FAA and EASA and others have grounded the airplane for a reason or two.
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Originally Posted by Lake1952
(Post 10645574)
Pilots, Not the Plane, Keep the Boeing MAX GroundedAfter the tragedies, pilots will be expected to know less and religiously follow checklists more.(Difficult to read, too. The forum software often collapses paragraph and other formatting, but, if you check the preview before posting, you can manually insert the appropriate breaks,) |
Originally Posted by pilotmike
(Post 10645429)
Because that is how to measure AoA.
Because that would measure acceleration, whether gravity or acceleration of the aircraft, not AoA as required. You appear to be confusing the instrument (display) inside the fight deck, and the sensor from which the indication is derived. These are usually located outside of the flightdeck for most instruments. 787 does use inertial system for synthetic airspeed, etc https://www.isasi.org/Documents/libr...ducing-787.pdf Introducing the 787 - Effect on Major Investigations - And Interesting Tidbits Tom Dodt Chief Engineer – Air Safety Investigation ISASI September, 2011 see pages 39 thru 42 And boeing has a detailed document on ' Operational use of Angle of Attack |
Originally Posted by Lake1952
(Post 10645574)
Perhaps not so with the tens of thousands of classroom- and simulator-trained pilots who staff today’s fast-growing airlines in the developing world.A misplaced sensitivity has been working overtime to suppress discussion of this issue. The goal is not to excuse Boeing’s appalling original software implementation or rush the 737 MAX back into service.The discussion is unwelcome in aviation circles partly because the corollaries are unwelcome. If airplanes today must be designed so mass-produced, classroom-trained pilots can’t crash them, planes tomorrow will be designed to eliminate the pilot completely. In the meantime, better crew training could always be required, but the benefit might not be worth the cost given today’s already low accident rate thanks to the advance of automation.1. It is not "misplaced sensitivity to discuss today's appalling pilot skills"! It's pure and simple greedy, cynical economics who wants to silence the messengers. Name and shame it or shut up if you don't want to be outed as collaborateur. 2. The preposterous assumption that today's low accident is "given" thanks to the advance of automation is outrageous. Automation has its part in improvement, just as it has in many contributions of accidents. Nothing in safety is given. |
The hits just keep on coming. The full text may be behind the paywall for some readers. If folks get blocked, those of us with access can pull it out.
At Boeing, CEO's Stumbles Deepen a CrisisIn a tense, private meeting last week in Washington, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration reprimanded Boeing’s chief executive for putting pressure on the agency to move faster in approving the return of the company’s 737 Max jet. This was the first face-to-face encounter between the F.A.A. chief, Stephen Dickson, and the executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, and Mr. Dickson told him not to ask for any favors during the discussion. He said Boeing should focus on providing all the documents needed to fully describe the plane’s software changes according to two people briefed on the meeting. It was a rare dressing-down for the leader of one of the world’s biggest companies, and a sign of the deteriorating relationship between Mr. Muilenburg and the regulator that will determine when Boeing’s most important plane will fly again. The global grounding of the 737 Max has entered its 10th month, after two crashes that killed 346 people, and the most significant crisis in Boeing’s history has no end in sight. Mr. Muilenburg is under immense pressure to achieve two distinct goals. He wants to return the Max to service as soon as possible, relieving the pressure on Boeing, airlines and suppliers. Yet the company and regulators must fix an automated system known as MCAS found to have played a role in both crashes, ensuring the Max is certified safely and transparently. Caught in the middle, Mr. Muilenburg has found himself promising more than he can deliver. More |
Sounds like a trailer for a made-for-TV movie!
I am paywalled, but no real need to read more.... |
Originally Posted by Takwis
(Post 10645689)
Sounds like a trailer for a made-for-TV movie!
I am paywalled, but no real need to read more.... The challenges facing Mr. Muilenburg extend beyond returning the Max to service and the botched space capsule launch on Friday. The F.A.A. is aware of more potentially damaging messages from Boeing employees that the company has not turned over to the agency. |
Thank You, that was worth reading. I'd sure like to hear what some employees are saying.
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
(Post 10645673)
The hits just keep on coming. The full text may be behind the paywall for some readers. If folks get blocked, those of us with access can pull it out.
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/manu...lds-boeing-ceo |
Originally Posted by slacktide
(Post 10645703)
There's nothing new in this article. The Dickson-Muilenberg meeting happened on 12 December, and it was extensively discussed in the media at that time. Must be a slow news day at the Times.
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/manu...lds-boeing-ceo Yes, most of us read the earlier coverage and are aware of many of the details related in the Times story. It is not true, however, that "[t]here's nothing new" in the Times coverage and, more importantly, it's a long-form summary and analysis in the Sunday edition of the widely-acknowledged US "newspaper of record." Coverage like this has real impacts on the public and the markets. |
It's a good wrap up, but there are also some new puzzle pieces in there - at least new to me:
“If it was my call to make, Muilenburg would’ve been fired long ago,” Rep. Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon and the chairman of the House Transportation Committee investigating Boeing, said in an email. “Boeing could send a strong signal that it is truly serious about safety by holding its top decision-maker accountable.” With delays mounting, Mr. Muilenburg missed a chance to smooth things over with key customers. In September, he attended a gathering of a club of aviation executives called Conquistadores del Cielo at a ranch in Wyoming, according to two people familiar with the trip. As the group bonded while throwing knives and drinking beers, Mr. Muilenburg took long bike rides by himself. It was typical behavior for Mr. Muilenburg, an introverted engineer who prefers Diet Mountain Dew to alcohol, but it left other executives baffled. Re Forkner messages: Mr. Muilenburg said Boeing hadn’t told the F.A.A. about the messages out of concern that doing so would interfere with a criminal investigation being conducted by the Justice Department, according to two people briefed on the call. Mr. Dickson said the lack of transparency would only increase the regulator’s scrutiny of the company.
Mr. Muilenburg continued to press the F.A.A. In early November, he called Mr. Dickson to ask whether he would consider allowing the company to begin delivering airplanes before they were cleared to fly. The administrator said he would look into it but made no commitments, according to an F.A.A. spokesman.In an apparent misunderstanding, Mr. Muilenburg took the call as a green light. The next Monday, the company put out a statement saying it could have the plane to customers by the end of the year.Mr. Dickson told colleagues that he had not agreed to that timeline and felt as though he was being manipulated, according to a person familiar with the matter. Preceeding M's walk to Cannossa: In calls with F.A.A. officials, Boeing engineers began to float an idea for speeding the process: Perhaps the company should ask the agency to break with its foreign counterparts and approve the Max alone?The suggestion alarmed some F.A.A. officials, who worried that approving the Max without agreement from other regulators would be untenable, according to two people familiar with the matter. When they called Mr. Dickson to tell him of Boeing’s plans, he balked at the suggestion and eventually the company backed down. |
I think he biggest piece of new information in the article is about more messages between Boeing staff about faults with the plane. That’s very new.
I think the FAA should come out with a public statement of immunity and job security for any Boeing employee who was aware and/or participated in company communications regarding concerns about the MAX no matter how insignificant. There might have to be cooperation with law enforcement but that would help flush out the real story of who knew what and when they knew it. PLEASE QUIT THE PILOT BLAMING. I’m still seeing posts that are clearly veiled with insinuations. I’m also glad nobody took the bait on that post a few pages back claiming not to be a B vs A post. BTW..I’m not clear if my Canadian brother was actually talking about the MAX in his test flight post. If he was there was no mention of his findings. He might have been testing another plane. Carry on... :) |
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