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Originally Posted by Loose rivets
(Post 10643880)
.....
However, my heart sank when I saw the lawsuit filed by the Dublin firm. Could it be that's why Dennis ordered the suspension of production? I suspect it is due to "simple" (that is if you have an advanced accounting degree which I don't ) math balancing the cost of continued production against the cost of a shutdown/restart. At some point the cost of cash to cover production/storage would start to go up significantly. Other factor could be advanced payments that were due X months before scheduled delivery, I would guess (understatement here) that those have pretty much dried up. |
Originally Posted by esa-aardvark
(Post 10644060)
The reality is the aircraft flew for nearly two years
How long did the Space Shuttle fly before the first disaster ? The rate of AOA sensor failure on the max was not unusual. If you monitor AOA sensor failures across a broader fleet, their average failure rate is consistent with the max experience. They occur for various reasons, and bird strikes are not the most common reason, but the average rate of failure is comparable. I've seen several reports on the NG over the past year for example. The space shuttle's operating environment was very different and its mission was inherently high risk. Its average rate of a catastrophic event during launch and re-entry was about 1/100 per flight hour even with excellent systems designs due to the need for minimum weight and the operating conditions of orbital speeds and transition from and to flight in the atmosphere. Its relevance to the max issues is limited other than to show what first-class critical flight control systems design looks like. |
Dave Therhino
Shuttle - I think you mean per flight. Back when I worked the figure was 1/100 per flight. I think the real concern is that Boeing programmed their flight software - MCAS to rely on a potentially unreliable sensor. MCAS was not able (programmed) to detect the failing sensor. Perhaps MCAS should have had a sanity check on reported AOA. How one validates such an apparently Ad-hoc piece of software is beyond me. My previous comment should have indicated that the expectation of an event is in the numbers that you (NASA or Boeing or FAA) should be calculating with. |
How about leaving MCAS the way it was and just change the AoA-sensors to some failsafe (including wrong installation and birdstrike) system? Like LIDAR or similar?
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Originally Posted by Sallyann1234
(Post 10644118)
Has any other passenger transport aircraft achieved a death rate of 137 per annum ?
de Havilland DH 106 Comet |
Originally Posted by esa-aardvark
(Post 10644265)
Dave Therhino
Shuttle - I think you mean per flight. Back when I worked the figure was 1/100 per flight. I think the real concern is that Boeing programmed their flight software - MCAS to rely on a potentially unreliable sensor. MCAS was not able (programmed) to detect the failing sensor. Perhaps MCAS should have had a sanity check on reported AOA. My previous comment should have indicated that the expectation of an event is in the numbers that you (NASA or Boeing or FAA) should be calculating with. I'm not sure I'm grasping everything you were trying to say with the rest of your comment, but my point was the AOA sensor behavior in the max fleet was not a huge outlier failure-rate wise, and it was the system architecture that caused the problem. I think we are probably saying the same thing. |
The sensors can always fail, even multiple sensors will fail in the same way sometimes (icing.) You have to make sure that when they fail, the plane degrades gracefully and predictably rather than pointing its nose at the ground. I seem to remember that some European guys were working on such a concept, whatever happened to it?
It occurs to me that all of the solutions that Boeing is now proposing (to a problem that they still have trouble admitting exists) were solutions that had to have been considered and discarded during the initial design of the MAX. They have proposed nothing that would have incurred any significant cost to the program, so why is this new way better? We are now trading out false activation of MCAS for false deactivation, and if MCAS was so important that it was worth the 346 lives lost why are we so casually disabling it? Remember that Boeing told the American President that the plane was perfectly safe after the second accident. |
Originally Posted by jbcarioca
(Post 10644329)
Maybe not since 1952 and we all know what happened to:
de Havilland DH 106 Comet The Comet 1 was in airline service for just under two years before grounding, the same as the MAX. In that time it killed 110 souls, compared with the MAX's 346. Much smaller aircraft, of course. |
Originally Posted by derjodel
(Post 10643967)
In fact, Boeing previously announced that they had stopped buybacks in mid-March, during the Q1 2019 earnings call on 24 April 2019. Transcript: https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/quarterly/2019/q1/1Q19-Earnings-Call-Transcript-(1).pdf Reviewing the 1Q, 2Q, and 3Q quarterly reports confirms this. $2341M worth of common shares were repurchased in Q1, $310M repurchased Q2 (with a note in the quarterly report that these were contractually obligated) and $zero repurchased Q3. Want to wager on what Q4 will say? https://investors.boeing.com/investo...s/default.aspx |
Wonder if they kept the -800 and -900 jigs? Just start building those again.
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Originally Posted by SilverCityKid
(Post 10644244)
I have now realised that I may have been wrong about the decline in Boeing dating back to the cancellation of the B757 program. It may have started three years earlier.
Quote On September 4, 2001, the Boeing Company moves its world headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. The decision to leave Seattle, announced on March 21, 2001, affects about 1,000 jobs. Could this be relevant to the current problems ? Many would point to the merger with McDonnell-Douglas in 1997 as the point where Boeing's culture and direction shifted. The relocation of the headquarters to Chicago directly traceable to that event. Boeing's troubles could be traced to McDonnell Douglas purchase - LA Biz Observed |
Of course, the failure of today's Boeing 'Starliner' launch just increases confidence.
I heard there was something wrong in the programming of rocket burn .... |
Originally Posted by Dave Therhino
(Post 10644342)
I agree the number is also a good approximation of the per cycle risk because launch and re-entry were by far the most risky phases of flight. There were something like 150 missions (it's been a while since I added them up for a study), and two accidents, one on launch and one on re-entry. I specifically gave a ballpark per hour rate for launch and re-entry, for which I guessed 1 hour of exposure per cycle to those phases of flight. The risk in orbit is much lower, but still quite high theoretically compared to a commercial flight, though the record was good for those 150 or so flights.
I'm not sure I'm grasping everything you were trying to say with the rest of your comment, but my point was the AOA sensor behavior in the max fleet was not a huge outlier failure-rate wise, and it was the system architecture that caused the problem. I think we are probably saying the same thing. I think the launch event, from engine ignition to orbit is about 8-1/2 minutes, with the boosters running slightly more than 2 minutes. https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/s...-leinbach.html |
Originally Posted by turbidus
(Post 10644417)
Wonder if they kept the -800 and -900 jigs? Just start building those again.
|
Originally Posted by MPN11
(Post 10644439)
Of course, the failure of today's Boeing 'Starliner' launch just increases confidence.
I heard there was something wrong in the programming of rocket burn .... |
Originally Posted by Fly Aiprt
(Post 10644449)
Rocket ignition timing relying on a single clock. Which failed...
Either way not a good day for Boeing. I almost missed a flight once due to the classic AM/PM mistake, always use 2 alarms for anything critical since then. Now back to our regularly scheduled "not rocket science" 737/MAX programming. |
Originally Posted by Fly Aiprt
(Post 10644449)
Rocket ignition timing relying on a single clock. Which failed...
The cause of the issue, according to NASA, was with a timing system. Bridenstine said the mission elapsed timing system had an annonmally, so the vehicle thought it was a different time when it was supposed to fire the engines. NASA officials said they were eventually able to get the engines burning and the spacecraft is in orbit and doing well. But look at the $$ saved and schedule met |
The cause of the issue, according to NASA, was with a timing system. Bridenstine said the mission elapsed timing system had an anomaly, so the vehicle thought it was a different time when it was supposed to fire the engines. NASA officials said they were eventually able to get the engines burning and the spacecraft is in orbit and doing well. |
Originally Posted by Sallyann1234
(Post 10644118)
Has any other passenger transport aircraft achieved a death rate of 137 per annum ?
|
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
(Post 10644176)
This is utterly meaningless. Statistics based on two incidents . . . well, just isn't.
The following is based on years of strong feelings about ETOPS and indeed, very inexperienced P2's. I coined the phrase years ago, randomness comes in lumps. Also, given the two AoA sensor failures were of a disparate nature, having two failures so close together was bizarre bad luck. …………. . |
Originally Posted by Less Hair
(Post 10644293)
How about leaving MCAS the way it was and just change the AoA-sensors to some failsafe (including wrong installation and birdstrike) system? Like LIDAR or similar?
What is required when MCAS has failed safe, and how will the crew know? The original version used one sensor - this was because of an incorrect classification made during design. Such a change would possibly require extra training as a minimum but also exclude the grandfather rights. It is not a software fix. As for the return to service of the MAX - I think the March date will not be correct. I can not see the FAA making such a important decision without the second report being released, that is due in March and while the FAA will get an early preview. I think they will want the public reaction if such things like manual trim wheel get a detailed mention. |
Press release from yesterday:
FlyersRights Sues FAA For Refusal To Release Boeing 737 MAX Records Supported by a Team of Aviation Professionals Arguing for Transparency and Independent Analysis Before Any Decision to Unground the MAX is Made News provided by FlyersRights.org Dec 19, 2019, 17:04 ET WASHINGTON, Dec. 19, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- FlyersRights.org, the largest airline passenger organization, has filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. (1:19-cv-03749-CKK) seeking release of the Boeing Corporation's proposed changes to the 737 MAX submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FlyersRights.org previously submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the records on November 1st seeking expedited treatment, but the FAA failed to respond. Supporting the lawsuit are seven aviation experts who declared that they need the FAA to release technical details to them and other independent experts in order to be able to evaluate whether the 737 MAX is safe to fly. Paul Hudson, President of FlyersRights.org and member of the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee since 1993, explained, "Trust in the FAA and Boeing has been shattered due to astounding revelations of misfeasance and incompetence in originally certifying the 737 MAX aircraft as safe. Accordingly, to regain public confidence, the flying public needs and deserves independent expert evaluations of the changes that Boeing and FAA may deem sufficient to unground the aircraft." The seven aviation experts who have submitted declarations in favor of transparency and independent evaluation are: Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger- Retired airline captain, famous for the "Miracle on the Hudson" landing and aviation safety expert for over four decades Association of Flight Attendants-CWA- The largest flight attendants union, with nearly 50,000 members at 20 airlines Michael Neely- Thirty-three years of experience in commercial and military aircraft development programs since 1983, working for Boeing from 1995-2016 serving in Multi-Discipline Engineering and Program Office roles Javier de Luis- PhD Aeronautical engineer and scientist for 30 years and former lecturer at MIT Michael Goldfarb- Aviation safety management consultant and former Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Adviser to the FAA Administrator Gregory Travis- Computer software engineer with over 40 years of experience and pilot with over 30 years of experience Paul Hudson- President of FlyersRights.org and long-time airline passenger safety advocate The FOIA request can be found here: https://flyersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FlyersRights-10.31.19-FAA-FOIA-Expedited-Request.pdf The complaint can be found here: https://flyersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FlyersRights-v-FAA-Boeing-MAX-FOIA-Complaint.pdf FlyersRights.org is represented in court by Joseph E. Sandler of Sandler, Reiff, Lamb, Rosenstein & Birkenstock P.C., Washington, D.C. FlyersRights.org, established in 2007, is the largest airline passenger organization. It publishes a bi-weekly newsletter, operates a free hotline for airline passengers 877- FLYERS6, advocates for passenger rights and interests, represents passengers on the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee dealing with air safety, and maintains a staffed office in Washington, D.C. See: FlyersRights.org or https://twitter.com/FlyersRights. Media line 800- 662-1859. FlyersRights.org, 4411 Bee Ridge Road, 274, Sarasota, FL 34233 SOURCE FlyersRights.org |
Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
(Post 10644524)
Press release from yesterday:
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Originally Posted by Bend alot
(Post 10644526)
This just got another layer of messy!
I just did a quick read of the complaint. The argument is strong and the FAA clearly screwed up by not responding to the FOIA request with the prescribed time limits, which should make the case ripe for judicial review. Plaintiff's lawyers, Sandler Reiff, are fairly heavy-hitting DC political and regulatory practitioners. We need our real aviation lawyer, Willow Run, to weigh in on this, but a good guess would be that, although courts give deference to regulators on matters like this, this one probably won't go away quickly or easily, even if the district court isn't eager to deal with it. |
Originally Posted by Bend alot
(Post 10644517)
Repeated activation is an issue.
What is required when MCAS has failed safe, and how will the crew know? The second is how will the crew know that MCAS software is operating correctly, but based on false inputs. This is similar to the first case because the crew isn't ever given raw data; it's all processed through some algorithm so it's back to some voting scheme. The way around algorithms would be to make a selsyn system that moved a mechanical AoA needle on the instrument panel, but it would not help if the needle or the AoA sensor was misaligned. Did MCAS fundamentally fail? Not on the accident aircraft - the algorithm and resulting software did exactly what it was supposed to do with the information it was given. Which leads to the third question - can humans fail safe when it comes to creating algorithms and then creating the software to carry them out? I'd say the answer is mostly yes, but no guarantee. What I think would work is a force sensor and monitor on the controls that would shout "PULL TOO HARD - RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP" and loop. This could operate outside all other software loops; it could have it's own box independent except for power. Add a 5 second delay against nuisance alerts and it should be good to go. The operation of MCAS wasn't the problem, the problem was allowing the buildup of excessive control forces that prevented the crews from holding the nose up because the plane was out of trim. .This covers all possible reasons for the trim to fail and tells the pilots what the solution is. |
Folks,
this is utter nonsense. A pilot should not have to deliberate trim runaways from activations of MCAS let alone MCAS in error. The complexity is astounding. And for what I ask rhetorically? Money. That's all. Profits. Ask yourselves, what is the absolute safest course of action to get this bird flying again? Answer, remove MCAS as our friend up in Canada mentioned months ago and segregate the NG from the Max for a period of 5 years or so. Training and crew scheduling both. Five years. After that we can consider the possibility of same type again. But it's really not. Will the regulators take this route ? It is the safest. I doubt it not only because it makes the Max so distant to the NEO cost wise to operate. Also, I feel Boeing may want to reserve this course of action for the next time a Max kills 200 people. This will be their last resort to give it one more shot. Someone needs to save Boeing from Boeing for Christmas this year. Happy Holidays All!!! |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10644558)
This is several questions. The first is whether the software that runs the MCAS algorithm is working correctly and how would the crew know it wasn't. This is the same unsolvable problem that software has always had. The usual approach is to hand an algorithm to a bunch of different software developers to run on different architecture computers and then depend on some other algorithm to decide if the answers are all close enough to select the "truth." This is seen in 2-of-3 voting systems, which are more, but not always, reliable.
The second is how will the crew know that MCAS software is operating correctly, but based on false inputs. This is similar to the first case because the crew isn't ever given raw data; it's all processed through some algorithm so it's back to some voting scheme. The way around algorithms would be to make a selsyn system that moved a mechanical AoA needle on the instrument panel, but it would not help if the needle or the AoA sensor was misaligned. Did MCAS fundamentally fail? Not on the accident aircraft - the algorithm and resulting software did exactly what it was supposed to do with the information it was given. Which leads to the third question - can humans fail safe when it comes to creating algorithms and then creating the software to carry them out? I'd say the answer is mostly yes, but no guarantee. What I think would work is a force sensor and monitor on the controls that would shout "PULL TOO HARD - RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP" and loop. This could operate outside all other software loops; it could have it's own box independent except for power. Add a 5 second delay against nuisance alerts and it should be good to go. The operation of MCAS wasn't the problem, the problem was allowing the buildup of excessive control forces that prevented the crews from holding the nose up because the plane was out of trim. .This covers all possible reasons for the trim to fail and tells the pilots what the solution is. |
The way around algorithms would be to make a selsyn system that moved a mechanical AoA needle on the instrument panel, but it would not help if the needle or the AoA sensor was misaligned. I can well see that Concorde pilots needed that information, but I'm not too sure it's needed on ordinary jet transport. Nice to have, but not needed per se. Also, that squitty little indicator on the $80,000 upgrade really doesn't seem adequate. More 'Shouting' on the flightdeck? Hmmm, not sure about that. 'PULLING TOO HARD.' etc. is needed. I think just a big red placard saying, 'DON'T PULL TOO FAR WHEN THE CONTROLS ARE SQUISHY.' would do it. After all, NO SMOKING worked in the DC3. Oh, wait, perhaps not. I still remember the smell of petrol and the piles of dog-ends in the screen's condensation trough. Just how much basic flying must be bellowed at the Magenta Line children? From Tiger to my first jet transport, the aircraft let me know by the seat of my pants that the wings were working. The feel of a slow aircraft was chalk and cheese . . . and sphincter-clamping. I just don't understand how anyone could be sitting on mushy air and not know. And yet it's happened, for a horribly long time on the 447. Do modern pilots never take the aircraft to the shake/nudge/push? Is it conceivable they really need that indication, all because a simulator is not capable of generating anything more than a vague illusion of g force? Later editions of Davis' HtBJ had an impassioned plea for pilots to be able to lay hands on a smaller training aircraft, not least of all because of the above. More costs? The need for this say, once every five years for something so important seems a small price, now this need is emerging from several major losses. |
This clip states at 3min:40secs that an analysis was done which determined that in its present form the MAX could expect a crash every 2-3 years due to MCAS, so no wonder it's been grounded.
|
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
(Post 10644583)
Nor would it help the pilot flying hadn't got the basic gut instincts of handling an aircraft that had slipped outside the envelope. Concorde had a huge AoA scale. IIRC, not far left of the flight system. The skippers of that aircraft would I'm sure have put its indications to good use.
I can well see that Concorde pilots needed that information, but I'm not too sure it's needed on ordinary jet transport. Nice to have, but not needed per se. Also, that squitty little indicator on the $80,000 upgrade really doesn't seem adequate. More 'Shouting' on the flightdeck? Hmmm, not sure about that. 'PULLING TOO HARD.' etc. is needed. I think just a big red placard saying, 'DON'T PULL TOO FAR WHEN THE CONTROLS ARE SQUISHY.' would do it. After all, NO SMOKING worked in the DC3. Oh, wait, perhaps not. I still remember the smell of petrol and the piles of dog-ends in the screen's condensation trough. Just how much basic flying must be bellowed at the Magenta Line children? From Tiger to my first jet transport, the aircraft let me know by the seat of my pants that the wings were working. The feel of a slow aircraft was chalk and cheese . . . and sphincter-clamping. I just don't understand how anyone could be sitting on mushy air and not know. And yet it's happened, for a horribly long time on the 447. Do modern pilots never take the aircraft to the shake/nudge/push? Is it conceivable they really need that indication, all because a simulator is not capable of generating anything more than a vague illusion of g force? Later editions of Davis' HtBJ had an impassioned plea for pilots to be able to lay hands on a smaller training aircraft, not least of all because of the above. More costs? The need for this say, once every five years for something so important seems a small price, now this need is emerging from several major losses. |
Originally Posted by krismiler
(Post 10644605)
This clip states at 3min:40secs that an analysis was done which determined that in its present form the MAX could expect a crash every 2-3 years due to MCAS, so no wonder it's been grounded.
https://youtu.be/fetgdmgPQ3M |
I think it is probable that pilot skills are deteriorating (along with pay) but I still fail to see what it has to do with this particular accident. If the plane flew into the ground and the pilots didn't notice because they were too enthralled with their cell phones that would be one thing, but all pilots involved in the three incidents understood what was wrong, the just didn't know what was causing it. Hindsight is 20/20; like viewers of a horror movie we know which door the monster is hiding behind, but the protagonists don't. The surving pilots identified the problem incorrectly but were lucky in that the actions taken to solve the nonexistant problem actually happened to solve the real one.
The poor pilots were at the root of a huge decision tree, and like they are trained to, attempted to find a solution in their procedures and manual. In this case it would have been better had there been no procedures or manual because they wasted time looking for information that was not there. A button that would have easily solved their problem (had they known about MCAS) had been disabled, leaving them having to figure out on the fly a "goldilocks" solution, turn off the electric trim immediately but not before using it to get back enough in trim to use the manual wheels, but not for too long or MCAS will reactivate (as it did.) This was not a bad play on a football field that we are arguing about, 346 people lost their lives due to an entirely predictable engineering fault. |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10644558)
This is several questions. The first is whether the software that runs the MCAS algorithm is working correctly and how would the crew know it wasn't. This is the same unsolvable problem that software has always had. The usual approach is to hand an algorithm to a bunch of different software developers to run on different architecture computers and then depend on some other algorithm to decide if the answers are all close enough to select the "truth." This is seen in 2-of-3 voting systems, which are more, but not always, reliable.
The second is how will the crew know that MCAS software is operating correctly, but based on false inputs. This is similar to the first case because the crew isn't ever given raw data; it's all processed through some algorithm so it's back to some voting scheme. The way around algorithms would be to make a selsyn system that moved a mechanical AoA needle on the instrument panel, but it would not help if the needle or the AoA sensor was misaligned. Did MCAS fundamentally fail? Not on the accident aircraft - the algorithm and resulting software did exactly what it was supposed to do with the information it was given. Which leads to the third question - can humans fail safe when it comes to creating algorithms and then creating the software to carry them out? I'd say the answer is mostly yes, but no guarantee. What I think would work is a force sensor and monitor on the controls that would shout "PULL TOO HARD - RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP" and loop. This could operate outside all other software loops; it could have it's own box independent except for power. Add a 5 second delay against nuisance alerts and it should be good to go. The operation of MCAS wasn't the problem, the problem was allowing the buildup of excessive control forces that prevented the crews from holding the nose up because the plane was out of trim. .This covers all possible reasons for the trim to fail and tells the pilots what the solution is. |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10644558)
This is several questions. The first is whether the software that runs the MCAS algorithm is working correctly and how would the crew know it wasn't. This is the same unsolvable problem that software has always had. The usual approach is to hand an algorithm to a bunch of different software developers to run on different architecture computers and then depend on some other algorithm to decide if the answers are all close enough to select the "truth." This is seen in 2-of-3 voting systems, which are more, but not always, reliable.
The second is how will the crew know that MCAS software is operating correctly, but based on false inputs. This is similar to the first case because the crew isn't ever given raw data; it's all processed through some algorithm so it's back to some voting scheme. The way around algorithms would be to make a selsyn system that moved a mechanical AoA needle on the instrument panel, but it would not help if the needle or the AoA sensor was misaligned. Did MCAS fundamentally fail? Not on the accident aircraft - the algorithm and resulting software did exactly what it was supposed to do with the information it was given. Which leads to the third question - can humans fail safe when it comes to creating algorithms and then creating the software to carry them out? I'd say the answer is mostly yes, but no guarantee. What I think would work is a force sensor and monitor on the controls that would shout "PULL TOO HARD - RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP RETRIM NOSE UP" and loop. This could operate outside all other software loops; it could have it's own box independent except for power. Add a 5 second delay against nuisance alerts and it should be good to go. The operation of MCAS wasn't the problem, the problem was allowing the buildup of excessive control forces that prevented the crews from holding the nose up because the plane was out of trim. .This covers all possible reasons for the trim to fail and tells the pilots what the solution is. |
Waterpilot, can I assume from your handle that you are in fact a pilot?
but all pilots involved in the three incidents understood what was wrong, the just didn't know what was causing it. A button that would have easily solved their problem (had they known about MCAS) had been disabled, leaving them having to figure out on the fly a "goldilocks" solution, turn off the electric trim immediately but not before using it to get back enough in trim to use the manual wheels, but not for too long or MCAS will reactivate (as it did.) I am not trying to jump on the crew again here, they were faced with all the cacophony of alerts etc but trimming is so fundamental to hand flying that it needs restating that perhaps they do not hand fly enough to gain trim "feel". |
Originally Posted by jimtx
(Post 10644625)
Why don't we just turn MCAS off and when the autopilot is off and the airplane is in the envelope put a force sensor that says "don't pull too hard"? Rhetorical question of course as I can't envision anybody buying that the airframe is safe as is under human pilot control although it seems the autopilot would not be affected. But the above posts regarding freedom of information make me wonder what really is going on with the airframe as even the first AD did not caution about any regime once you successfully applied the runaway trim procedure. I can not make sense of the last BOE 1 flight aware track so I wonder WTF is going on.
To be fair, the ET302 crew failed to perform the AD or follow the FCOM information or read the Lion Air preliminary crash report. None of that seems to have been learned, if they even bothered reading it. I guess the AD should have said - pedal to the metal and ignore being out of trim is bad. Is that something pilots need to have written for them? The only way out is a plane that tells them to do their job. |
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
(Post 10644642)
Waterpilot, can I assume from your handle that you are in fact a pilot?
If you are you would know that if the aircraft is out of trim a pilot instinctively trims towards a more in trim pressure. The cause is not relevant in maintaining control initially, simply trim as you were taught from lesson one of flying. When it starts to go "out of trim" again the pilot again would trim the other way. This is how they stayed in the air as long as they did. Given they had cautions from rotation they knew they were having a bad day in the office. Call for the trim runaway QRH or unreliable airspeed and keep the nose up and either fly level or climb. The manual electric trim switch would have "easily solved" their initial control problem. I am not trying to jump on the crew again here, they were faced with all the cacophony of alerts etc but trimming is so fundamental to hand flying that it needs restating that perhaps they do not hand fly enough to gain trim "feel". |
Originally Posted by MechEngr
(Post 10644644)
Because one day a maint crew or a hungry rodent will screw something up that has nothing to do with MCAS and Boeing will be blamed for allowing the crash that happens because pilots forget how to trim the plane in their concern for the memory items they did not memorize Having the plane tell them what to do is the only avenue left.
To be fair, the ET302 crew failed to perform the AD or follow the FCOM information or read the Lion Air preliminary crash report. None of that seems to have been learned, if they even bothered reading it. I guess the AD should have said - pedal to the metal and ignore being out of trim is bad. Is that something pilots need to have written for them? The only way out is a plane that tells them to do their job. The first part is just useless waffle and by the time I actually get to the important stuff, my mind is far away. Put the relevant stuff first,then the unhelpful bureaucratic rubbish last, including the cost per US aircraft and to US industry - that is not safety it is distracting. |
Clearly not the place for yet another A v B debate, however please indulge me for one minute. No criticism intended, however an observation. Taking a much wider view, if a comparison between the 737 Max and the Airbus NEO, then the situation clearly illustrates a clear gulf of concurrent outcome created by the US version of Capitalism and Europe’s more multi nation more socialist based systems. I’m sure everyone agrees that It is generally valuable that the world has very different places and there are positives and negatives worldwide, however the Max story starting with the “Jurassic 737” to present day give a very damning illustration to the capitalist model that many see as the only way. Simplistically speaking the Airbus NEO, compared to the 737 max indicates the depth of difference both in combined gregarious multi nation effort versus a single nation capitalist creep. On every level from the decisions to continue production of the 737 for decades longer than they should, to the financially decided ongoing design upgrades, the implementation, the regulatory relationship and the following actions since the two fatal accidents there’s a catalogue of missed opportunities to make the right decisions. The world is watching the next moves at Boeing, the regulator and govt interventions very closely. The dilemma now for Boeing is that they are down a corridor an just about every door has a sign that says “do not follow this path”. The fact the NEO is doing what it says on the tin and generally quite successful, is actually forcing more pressure across the pond. Not to mention the advancements in the Chinese aviation sector. It is possible that the problem here isn’t Boeing per se, the specific problem is largely theirs, but under a very prescriptive and financially driven set of circumstances what has been revealed is a weakness in the Capitalist system. Akin to the exhaust port on the Death Star. It is interesting to see what happens next. I don’t personally think we will see the Max in the skies for a long time yet. The problem in the current economic model in the US is that the obvious correct path - starting afresh, will possibly lose far too much ground in the manufacture of narrow body medium range jet marketplace |
Had Boeing started work on a B737 replacement in the 1980s, it would have had a modern airframe comparable to the A320 which would have been able to accept upgrades as technology progressed. The A320 after 30 years is still a sound design which could easily go on for another 20 years with a few tweeks here and there. By then it will be 50 years old and the advancements made over this time period will make it worthwhile to a design a completely new type to replace it. Airbus will certainly have had their moneys worth by then.
The idea of Boeing exiting the narrow body market was previously mentioned, the B787 has been very successful for the company and whilst there are a few problems with the aircraft, it might be better to concentrate its resources in this area and address the problems within the company before looking at bringing another type into production, especially with what's going on with the B777X. The Comac C919 would be a worthwhile option for airlines in the meantime as even with the delays the program has had and inevitable issues which will be experienced with a brand new type, it's still way ahead of a B737 replacement being offered. If Boeing started work on a new narrowbody, in ten years time it could have a state of the art design which would surpass the by then 40 year old A320. Regaining market share from the Chinese would be their main concern as the C919 would be well established and likely substantially improved by then. Financing all of this would be a major factor as the loss of income from its cash cow together with the compensation payments due and cost of developing a new type could send the company to the wall, unless state support was provided and we know how anti the Americans are about that. It's the old question of how long you go on throwing good money after bad. |
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