"05:40:27 - the Captain advised the First-Officer to trim up with him"

The above quote is from frequentflyer789's Post #4882; however, the quote itself is merely a narrative account of cockpit conversations and is not from a transcript of the actual cockpit conversations. Has anyone seen/read a transcript of the CVR tapes? Will such a transcript be forthcoming?

Cheers,
Grog

Apparently there are 200-hour pilots out there flying nuclear-armed aircraft. So I've heard. Simulators have come a long way, thousands of hours of teaching people to fly single-engine airplanes really isn’t the greatest preparation for airline flying, and the CVR shows it was the Ethiopian FO’s suggestion to hit the cutout switches in the first place.

It also isn’t procedural having the terrain fast rising up out the window to smite thee. Desperate times maybe explain desperate measures.

At all events, there's 0.6% of the worldwide Max fleet gone in the space of five months. No survivors. My two cents: Boeing finally broke the 737 but good by dint of finally overtweaking it. Having done that, they took the stall-happy result and -- on the cheap -- hastily stuck a bandaid on it. Now they and their furious customers are wedded to this Frankenplane, so Boeing is working on a New & Improved Extra-Special Bandaid.
Onion News defined MCAS as "software designed to place all the blame on airline pilots".

Blaming the pilots for some imperfect systems layout sounds a bit unfair to me.

Actually it can take longer than 40 seconds. For just the 2 first steps out of 3. From one of my previous posts:

You could do all 3 steps in 5 seconds if you had no communication with the other pilot and didn't wait at all between the steps. But that doesn't sound very wise.

Later edit, actually I think that's one of the mistakes of the Ethiopian crew. They executed this checklist too hastily and they skipped the step about disabling the auto-throttles. If they did that, they probably would have payed more attention to their speed and adjusted it manually as needed. Instead, the engines remained at 94% until VMO, when from the FDR trace it seems the A/T lowered that to around 90%.

5 seconds for troubleshooting, so if you do not recognize a runaway trim in 4 seconds, you will be 2.5 units out of trim... when you turn off magic...(i.e. electrical trim)... exactly the same position of et302...
Probably can be recognized it in 2 seconds, plus 5 to troubleshoot..still almost in same situation
Would be interesting to see how many pilots in a SIM will react in less than 4 seconds

737 Driver " I just don't think Sully would have allowed his stab trim to run for 9 continuous seconds (that would be 37 spins of the trim wheel) before doing something about it, "

Let us remember that Sully let the speed decay below Vsub Ls and became aware of it when the fdr data shown to him.

No need for new switches or fancy logic:
All 737 up to 737NG have 2 switches, the right one disables auto trim, the left one disables pilot electric trim, and probably all electric trim.

For as yet unexplained reasons this was changed on 737MAX so that either switch disables all electric trim.

The switches were relabeled to primary and backup.

I can't quite understand why the function of the two switches was changed.
Previously, if I've read it right, one turned off MCAS etc. The other one turned off manual electric trim (on the yoke)

On the MAX, both switches have the same function (in series nogal!), ALL electrical trim is turned off,
leaving only a teeny-weeny wholly manual wheel that would take something like ten
minutes of hard winding (from a difficult position) to get the stabiliser back to even neutral.

That doesn't seem very sensible. Perhaps I've got it wrong.

Mac

To be fair the mentour pilot video was done in a "teaching/demonstration" mode, a real crew would have probably done it twice as fast.

Skipping autothrottle off step is significant, although much earlier on some pilots posted that simply chopping the throttle in their condition could have undesired effects and had to be done with some fitness.
In any case they were still under VMO when the cutout switches were actuated, have not seen any hard facts on what speed would allow manual trim given the trim state.

The real problem was using cutout before the AC was in trim. It is possible that once the FO called runaway trim the pilot jumped to that thought even though he was successfully trimming at the time.
It is not clear that the ET pilots were fully aware of the revised procedure, yet another painful hole in the cheese.

I read in the aviation press a remark from a guy with 12,000 hours on the 737, a sim instructor, who said he'd often seen airspeed drop off a crew's scan in circs far less stressful -- and confusing -- than these.

As for Sully-upon-Hudson, he's big into number of flying hours as a measure of competence. Free country. But to sound off publicly (as he did in the case of the Addis crash) does him no credit. I'm no airline pilot, but people I know, who are, resent Sully's near-deification by the media. Yes he refused to return to La Guardia, realized he couldn't make Teterboro, and instead chose that extremely long and wide, dead-calm liquid runway just off to his left. (Switching on the APU was an admirable brainwave.) They insist that any competent crew could have done what he and Skiles did, given the excellent conditions. (Imagine wind, choppy waves, lousy visibility --- or worse, that + mountains.)

derjodel is bang on that "machines need to be designed in a way to anticipate delayed corrective response". The Max looks fundamentally flawed. That new bandaid had better be Absolutely Perfect.

Fly the damn airplane...
 

Ancient Mariner: All this grandstanding makes me wonder if some of you have been in an emergency, a real emergency?
I've been fortunate/unfortunate enough to have been in a few, albeit maritime, not aviation related.
Everytime I was surprised to see "highly trained professionals", and I mean highly trained, we had realistic training once a week for these eventualities, totally break down and be unable to function. I not talking 30 seconds, 90 seconds, but unable, period.
Aviation is of course a totally different ballgame. :hmm:
Per

You are correct, aviation is (or should be) a different game. During the selection, training and ongoing check rides during one's career as a professional pilot the individual is constantly evaluated and tested. In an ideal world, if they don't cut the mustard they are cut loose - I have seen this happen a few times but unfortunately I have seen too many marginal pilots given complimentary passes on various sim rides, line checks, etc. Unions fighting back is probably why some of the marginal pilots get through; I suppose the corporation also calculates the probability of an event, the probability of two weak pilots being paired together and decides to take that risk. I would submit, however, that any one that totally breaks down and unable to function would not (or should not) hold a commercial pilot license.

As far as emergencies, I have had plenty...three engine failures, a couple of hydraulic system failures, blown tires, etc. I am no hero, I just do what I have been trained to do.

During a few day hiatus while on vacation the discussion pivoted to human factors which is undoubtedly an issue and particularly the "startle factor". I know of few emergency situations where the voice of a lovely lady comes over the speaker and says "Standby for xxxx" with xxx being a UAS, stab trim runaway, engine fire, etc. The startle factor is always there and it is accounted for in the certification of the aircraft, i.e. crew recognition and reaction time.

But after that "startle factor" period is over, it's time to get down to work and deal with the problem, usually with an emergency checklist and sometimes without (double engine failure, volcanic ash (BA flight in the 1980's), a complete hydraulic failure (UAL Sioux City), etc.). It is the job, the responsibility, of the professional aviator to react to the problem startle factor or not. If the professional pilot as an individual cannot get past the startle factor and focus on the problem and deal with it, then they should not have a license or type rating. If professional pilots collectively cannot manage the startle factor and deal with emergencies anymore then it's time to shut down the industry entirely as the traveling public cannot be guaranteed their safety in the even of an emergency.

Yes, there was a startle factor at lift-off on the two accident flights and one incident flight. In the case of the incident flight, they dealt with the startle factor, called for the UAS checklist, controlled the speed of the aircraft (i.e. flew the aircraft) and that allowed them to diagnose the MCAS issue when the flaps were raised. The dealt with MCAS by flying the damn airplane (trim and speed control) with a little help from a "friend" and carried on to destination with the stick shaker, UAS and manual trim. Bravo!

Yet the accident crews had the same startle factor and couldn't even get to first base, i.e. UAS drill. And they had almost two minutes to execute that simple, memory checklist. And had they done just that, they would not have been racing around at 340 kts, making manual trim and hand flying with nose down trim impossible due to control forces. Instead, they could have manhandled that aircraft while they sorted out the trim including using the manual trim wheel and could have flown all day long in that condition, just like the Lion Air incident flight.

As a professional aviator (and a person that flies in the back of aircraft a lot), it is my expectation that the aviators I work with or whom I have entrusted by life and that of my family to be competent enough to get over the startle factor and do what they are expected to - fly the damn aircraft and deal with the emergency. In the case of the MAX, the emergencies are known and have published procedures. This was not a double engine failure, volcanic ash, total hydraulic failure but a simple UAS. That is not asking too much.

As 737 Driver and others have been stating on this thread, this may sound harsh and hard-ass but that it is the professional responsibility of the a professional aviator. There is no denying that MCAS needs rework and there is not disagreement about that. But what we are arguing is that aircraft do have system failures and startle factor is a fact-of-life, but the pilots must have the training and experience to deal with it. They have to wear the big boy pants because they are the last line of defense.

As I mentioned a couple of thousands of post ago, the airline industry has been whistling past the graveyard for many years but now the chickens are coming home to roost (sorry about the mixed metaphors). It just takes some unexpected event now to cause an aircraft to crash - MCAS, no ILS approach available (Asiana SFO), an engine failure (ATR 42 TPE), a go-around (Emirates 777 DBX) and airplanes crash when trained and competent crews could have and should have avoided the loss of life and aircraft.

These events should be a call to action by the entire industry - manufacturers who have hithertofore relied on experienced and trained pilots to save the day, regulators who are not demanding higher standards of pilot training and experience (i.e. actually hand flying and not watching the autopilot), airlines (for the same reasons) and pilot unions who have to own part of the responsibility for insuring their members uphold high professional standards which may mean actually hand flying aircraft.

Boeing erred with MCAS but the fault for these accidents are the result of failure of the players noted above.

Can you comment on the possibility that the ET crew diagnosed the UAS as a a false warning per the Boeing flow chart that was posted a while ago. My bolding'

Even if they did diagnose it as false warning it does appear they were continuing on rather than "land immediately"

It is possible that the real "startle factor" moment was the combination of autopilot disconnect followed by first MCAS trim, up till then it might have been in the 'understood and handled' category. The speed was about 250 knots at time of first MCAS input.

Another way of framing this is what if the bird strike (or whatever the cause) had happened at 05:39:55 after the flaps had been retracted following an uneventful takeoff, this would have left them in same state: Autopilot disconnect immediately followed by MCAS ND trim.

Note: I agree with much of what has been said on condition of pilot training/competency, seems to have devolved into a 'tick the checkbox' multiple choice exercise.

Please, let's not personalize this and attack individuals. 737 Driver has invested a lot of time and effort in addressing a lot of issues raised on this thread and for that he deserves everyone's respect whether you agree or disagree with him.

The crews of the accident aircraft did not meet the expectations of 737 Driver, myself and, most importantly, the passengers that bought tickets on those flights. While there are multiple events involved in these accidents, let's break this down to the first event which lasted up to 2 minutes before the flaps were selected up:

1. Explain to me how and why, long before MCAS reared its ugly head, that these crews could not recognize an UAS (stick shaker, IAS DISAGREE, etc) and not set an attitude and power setting per the NNC?
2. Explain to me how and why a professional flight crew would let the speed of the aircraft hit Vne (340 kts plus) while supposedly hand flying an aircraft?
3. Explain to me why one would engage the autopilot at 400 ft while in stick shaker (stall) or UAS?

This is a UAS event, pure and simple at this stage of the game. And they couldn't even do that! If they had an engine failure at V1 there is not a hope in hell that they could fly the aircraft if they couldn't even manage a UAS event. And, by the way, an engine failure before, during or after V1 has a startle factor too.

1. Explain to me how and why the crew of the Lion Air incident flight was able to do the UAS drill and also control the speed of the aircraft such that manually trimming the aircraft was possible and, indeed, were able to fly to destination with UAS, stick shaker and manual stab trim?

With respect to limitations of the manual trim of the B737, I know of no aircraft that can be flown at Vne with full nose down trim. No aircraft, flown by a professional, should be allowed to get into that corner. How about pulling those two levers between the pilots back to idle rather than leaving it at take-off power? That will quickly bring the speed of the aircraft into a regime where one can manually trim the aircraft. But that involves flying the damn airplane, a basic skill that the industry seems to have lost in this and other accidents/incidents recently.

It's true that the 777 had some quirks with the auto-throttle that contributed to these (non-fatal) accidents but nevertheless in the case of SFO four pilots in the cockpit watched the speed decay to a stall and in the case of DBX, nobody noticed that the thrust levers did not advance to go around after hitting the TOGA switches. This points to training (doing a visual approach in the case of SFO) and basic flying skills, i.e. monitoring the aircraft performance in the both cases.

It also points to way too much dependence on automation which, as many of us have pointed out on this thread, is a big, big problem in the airline industry today.

I have Zero credibility LOL. My handle on this forum is designed to be upfront about that.

No quarrel with L39 Guy's post. Even this: "Boeing erred with MCAS but the fault for these accidents are the result of failure of the players noted above."

I'll just repeat what I said earlier about 0.6% of the worldwide Max fleet disappearing (poof!) in five months owing to survivorless crashes. If we're admitting that Boeing erred with MCAS (and indeed part of that error was hiding the very existence of MCAS from crews and pretending to airlines that this airplane required no expensive stuff like like time-consuming training) then we're admitting that the Max accentuates normal human failings among crews and turns them into Lethal Errors, which somehow don't occur on other aircraft (ETH somehow has managed to operate the 777, A350, whatever, so far without incident). What does this tell us about the fundamental realities of the Max?