Exactly but it seems they did not even diagnose the problem correctly, with this cannon plug stuff.

So just to clarify regarding the last few posts

The STS reads from alternate FCC on alternate flights. Reset by the landing gear squat switch.

So on the previous flight which retained controlability during an entire night flight from Bali to Jakarta despite UAS on Captain side was followed by a flight which lost control in day VMC during a period of UAS on Captain side.

Hmmm, food for thought

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-...ights/10467826

Lion Air jet had problem with airspeed indicator on last four flights, Indonesia officials say

Updated about 4 hours agoTue 6 Nov 2018, 4:01amThe last four flights a Lion Air passenger plane embarked upon before its fatal descent into the Java Sea all had a problem with the airspeed indicator, Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee has found.
Committee head Soerjanto Tjahjono and investigator Nurcahyo Utomo told a news conference that the problem was similar on each of the four flights, including the one on October 29 that killed all 189 people on board.

The stunning revelation came after angry relatives confronted the airline's co-founder at a meeting organised by Indonesian officials.

At the meeting, Mr Soerjanto said information downloaded from the flight data recorder was consistent with reports the plane's speed and altitude were erratic.
Mr Soerjanto told reporters the safety committee was asking Boeing and air safety authorities in the United States what action to take to prevent similar problems on this type of plane around the world.

"We are formulating, with [the National Transportation Safety Board in the US] and Boeing, detailed inspections regarding the airspeed indicator," he said.

It was not immediately clear whether the reported problem stemmed from a mechanical or maintenance issue, nor whether US authorities would order any checks.

"Whether the trouble came from its indicator, its measuring device or sensor, or a problem with its computer — this is what we do not know yet," Mr Nurcahyo said.

"We don't know yet where the problem lies, what repair has been done, what their reference books are, what components have been removed.

"These are the things we are trying to find out: what was the damage and how it was fixed."
Many families face an agonising wait for missing relatives to be identified.

Police medical experts have received nearly 140 body bags of human remains and have identified 14 victims.

Relatives questioned why the plane had been cleared to fly after suffering problems on its Bali to Jakarta flight on October 28 that included a rapid descent after take-off that terrified passengers.
"Lion Air said the problem was fixed, is it true the problem was cleared?" said Bambang Sukandar, whose son was on the flight.

"If not, technicians in charge must be responsible."

Another man, who identified himself as the father of passenger Shandy Johan Ramadhan, a prosecutor in a district on the island where the flight was headed, said Lion Air had "failed" the families of victims."Since the time of the crisis, I was never contacted by Lion Air. We lost our child, but there was no empathy that Lion Air showed to us," he said.

After the meeting with passengers' relatives, Mr Rusdi left in a hurry, avoiding questions from reporters.

Safety experts have said it is too early to determine the cause of the crash of the flight.

Authorities have yet to recover the jet's cockpit voice recorder from the sea floor, just north-east of Jakarta, where the plane crashed 13 minutes into its flight.

Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The US manufacturer has delivered 219 of the 737 MAX jets to airlines around the world. The Lion Air crash was the first involving this type of plane, which was only introduced into service last year.

AP/Reuters

Why do you ask?
 

I keep wondering about the flight deck asking atc for their speed, when it should be available on the PFD. (I know, UAS, but why think ATC would know any more than you?) *Unless* something took out the PFD - maybe (and I apologize for even thinking it) the lesson of QZ8501 wasn't learned, and actions on the flight deck made a manageable situation much worse. I get the impression here that as long as the structure remains intact and one engine still turns, a 737 can still get you home, but panic can turn a wise man into a fool.

..I can only think of 3 conditions, where a modern jetliner would end up in a high energy descend (provided all flight controls are working normally)..
..Emergency descend, spiral, and out of trim..

..This flight ended similar to the FlyDubai one..Investigators will find out what happened..Meanwhile,

Fly safe
B-757

Exactly, I think we are dealing with a lot of hogwash here.
VFR conditions, daytime, what is the problem of flying level even when your airspeed indicators show absurd numbers.
Fix thrust and maintain selected pitch, and you can even look out the windows ...
This accident shapes up to be one of the worst example of pilot's dereliction of duty ... unless something hit this aircraft or there was a bomb, or his wing fell off, etc.

This link was posted by @Centaurus on one of the Pacific forums.

Perhaps more than any dispassionate report this transcript of the CVR from AuroPeru 603 provides particularly useful insight into how erroneous instrument readings can cause serious havoc in the cockpit, despite thousands of hours of experience. Spoiler: this is a sad and scary read, and it doesn't end well.

I make no personal comment on similarities to the flight under discussion, but others have commented here on such things; this is it from the horses mouth :(

FP.

This has been discussed already in the thread, but yes P+A=P applies to all aeroplanes, even big jet ones. After the AF447 accident Boeing (and I'm guessing Airbus) rewrote the Unreliable Airspeed checklist and the initial (memory) steps are essentially: turn off the automatics, hand fly and set a Power and an Attitude. This will give you approximately straight and level flight. [ie Piloting 101: Aviate (P+A=P).] Once that is done and you have established safe manual flight, then the analysis and fault finding can begin. In my airline we've been getting regular Unreliable Airspeed scenarios in our Simulator exercises ever since AF447. I'm guessing it's not going to let up for quite some time yet.

The question now appears to be a Human Factors one: Why are crews not recognising Unreliable Airspeed events and applying the correct recovery procedures?

UAS after takeoff is straight forward procedure. But unreliable speed and complications of STS and feel can be hand full.

350 knots at 5000 feet seems indicate that the actual speed was not known by the pilots.

Maybe mining all public domain flight data might inform some useful airline statistics. The data of all four previous flights for this aircraft should indicate the UAS events as described by the investigators.

-comments from armchair-

Not entirely similar. The Captain on 8501 cycled the C/B for the FAC which is a big no no in flight. This will do a complete power down and power up of the computer which will, and did, lead to massive control surface displacement after the power was restored.

What am I missing here? These guys called V1 and V2 on the take-off run. Similarly with the infamous Brisbane take-off with pitot covers on.

How is this possible? Can the tape or covers on the pitots stretch enough to compress the air in the pitot to give accurate and consistent speed readings at ground level? That seems very unlikely.

Firstly with Aeroperu 603, it was the static ports that were covered, so the IAS will indicate correctly at the altitude the static ports were covered. During the take-off roll everything appeared and indicated normally, so V1 & V2 calls were OK. Different story once they climbed away from the altitude at which the static ports were blocked.

With MAS in Brisbane with the pitot tubes covered, both pilots observed red flags on their IAS displays. So how could they call V1 &V2? The interim ATSB report gives a clue: When the Captain called the 100 knot IAS check, the groundspeed was 100kts.

Sadly, that may have been more of a forlorn hope than an expectation.

To clear up any confusion, it now seems that ATC are unlikely to have had the necessary equipment (specifically EHS) to see JT610's IAS. And even if they did, it wouldn't necessarily have been any more reliable than what the crew's ASI(s) were displaying.

Re groundspeed, ATC would have access to that (probably both the GPS-derived GS being sent by ADS-B and a less accurate PSR-derived GS). Having said that, the crew would have also have had groundspeed in front of them, on both the PFD and ND, again derived from GPS and therefore not subject to any UAS issues.

I really don't understand what is so tricky about maintaining attitude by reference to PFD'S ADI when flying an airliner; even UAS checklists are telling us to do so.


[/QUOTE]..You will after you get more experience..Sounds like you haven´t seen the s**t hit the fan yet..

Fly safe,
B757

What will I see? That the shaker and the clacker might go off erroneously & simultaneously? That's what the QRH says and what is practiced in the sim.

Incidentally, the s***s that hit my fans (and props) so far were up to the point of impact contained in the guts of gulls, magpies, swallows and similar.

The other way round..