Originally Posted by wheels_down
(Post 10301010)
There was no recovery at all in the dive which backs up the structural failure theory. They obviously had no control whatsoever in the high energy dive as considering the clear conditions (they would have seen the ocean floor approaching) there would have been some form of correction to avoid impact, but the numbers don’t show this. There is a lot of talk about pitot gives giving incorrect readings but this still does not explain why it dropped like a rock in VMC. There would have been some form of correction on the way down. |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10300705)
From the Preliminary Report:
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Originally Posted by matkat
(Post 10301153)
The fact that the installation of the pitot covers was not entered in the tech log was the final 'hole to line up' when I worked the line it was always policy to enter such into the tech log gear pins being the other, I am in no way saying that this system was in any way infallible but is certainly a good idea.
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SLF (meteorologist) here. Sad to read about all of the incidents related to unreliable airspeed readings. However, I've seen reference to 'GPS altitude' in this thread so GPS data is obviously available to the aircraft systems - would it be desirable to have a small display of GPS ground-speed or 3D speed-through-space available, and perhaps a rough ISA-derived Mach number, incorporated into the flight display panel to provided some reference in the case of having to deal with a UAS situation?
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Originally Posted by Triskelle
(Post 10301180)
would it be desirable to have a small display of GPS ground-speed or 3D speed-through-space available
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....568692bae4.jpg |
Originally Posted by FL11967
(Post 10300966)
Do the stats show that the Children of Magenta are crashing planes due to lack of manual flying skills? Are planes crashing on stormy 30 knots cross wind approaches? I would argue that that the pilots who flew AF447, Emirates 521, AA 8501, etc. could fly manual just fine. The problem was that they had no idea what the automation was doing when problems crop up. It's the sheer complexity of modern aircraft. Excellent in increasing air safety to unprecedented levels but has become incredibly complex for both "old school" and "magenta" drivers.
Indeed, one could argue that the AF447 accident was due to cognitive overload - the pilots simply got way behind the plane, lost any understanding of what was happening and stalled. The fact that the pilots stalled the plane is the conclusion of the report - not conjecture on my part, but it could be argued that if they had more time, to arrive at an understanding of the root cause of the issue - UAS or erroneous airspeed, they would have done better An hour here and there of added training isn't going to turn commercial pilots into test pilots. Which is essentially what they are asked to be when they end up outside the automated flying envelope. It is possible that the flight engineer on the old airliners would have been better equipped mentally to handle the diagnosis of the malfunction and tell pilots how to behave. But while he's been removed from the cockpit, Hal has not quite been able to replace him. So an interesting question which no one is willing to ask is whether the current generation of pilots actually have the intellectual abilities to troubleshoot the automation at the speeds at which incidents happen. Nobody would expect a surgeon to be of average intellectual ability - but his failure to correct a problem as it develops will only imperil one person's life. My feeling is that the safety improvements to the mechanics of airliners have already taken place to the point of diminishing returns, and that improving automation and training is where the safety issues now lie. Edmund |
Originally Posted by Triskelle
(Post 10301180)
SLF (meteorologist) here. Sad to read about all of the incidents related to unreliable airspeed readings. However, I've seen reference to 'GPS altitude' in this thread so GPS data is obviously available to the aircraft systems - would it be desirable to have a small display of GPS ground-speed or 3D speed-through-space available, and perhaps a rough ISA-derived Mach number, incorporated into the flight display panel to provided some reference in the case of having to deal with a UAS situation?
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Take this thought from an SLF for what it's worth, but when I read that the pilots could have saved the aircraft by looking up pitch and power settings on a chart, I ask what about that couldn't be done by a computer. Of course, the computer couldn't land the aircraft on pitch and power (or at least I don't think it could). But it seems a lot safer to hand control back to the pilots with the aircraft in a stable climb (in this case), and let them take things from there.
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I really am worried that a significant number of posters here who seem have no idea of what it is like to fly and airliner and so do not understand the priorities and the skills required to do the job but are now casting judgement on the very profession.
Indeed, one could argue that the AF447 accident was due to cognitive overload - the pilots simply got way behind the plane, lost any understanding of what was happening and stalled. The fact that the pilots stalled the plane is the conclusion of the report - not conjecture on my part, but it could be argued that if they had more time, to arrive at an understanding of the root cause of the issue - UAS or erroneous airspeed, they would have done better An hour here and there of added training isn't going to turn commercial pilots into test pilots. Which is essentially what they are asked to be when they end up outside the automated flying envelope. It is possible that the flight engineer on the old airliners would have been better equipped mentally to handle the diagnosis of the malfunction and tell pilots how to behave. But while he's been removed from the cockpit, Hal has not quite been able to replace him. So an interesting question which no one is willing to ask is whether the current generation of pilots actually have the intellectual abilities to troubleshoot the automation at the speeds at which incidents happen. Nobody would expect a surgeon to be of average intellectual ability - but his failure to correct a problem as it develops will only imperil one person's life. My feeling is that the safety improvements to the mechanics of airliners have already taken place to the point of diminishing returns, and that improving automation and training is where the safety issues now lie. And another thing. For all the prangs that occur, there are probably hundreds (if not thousands) of other non-prangs where the systems have lost the plot and the pilots have saved the day. I think I read there were 30 AF447-type incidents alone before the actual crash, all saved by the pilots. |
Very good remarks edmundronald I could not agree more. Same reasoning for us Controllers, ability to recover automation failures is almost nil. The good old adage : automation "de-skills" is not only correct but frightening since it is this de-skilled " magenta" generation which is currently training the young ones entering the profession(s).
On the ability for ATC to see the mode S parameters , ( the so called Enhanced FMS parameters) my center use them very successfully since a few years . The parameters downlinked are IAS and Mach number, Magnetic heading , vertical speed ( but very unreliable ) and the selected altitude ( the one the crew enters on the FMS) this last feature has almost eliminated levels busts, as a warning comes off on the ATC display when it differs from cleared FL by ATC . As to the vertical speed , it is very unreliable due accuracy of mode S (25 ft variations) it is common that short variations , especially in turbulence can send messages with 10.000ft VS. This is most probably why we see 30.000ft on the ADS-B diagram posted earlier. I would think it might be a brief acceleration, but not a continuous descent at that rate . This is why ADS-B readouts , and especially those from FR24, are not a good source for incident/accident investigation. To get a general idea , yes, but not much more. |
Originally Posted by Chu Chu
(Post 10301275)
Take this thought from an SLF for what it's worth, but when I read that the pilots could have saved the aircraft by looking up pitch and power settings on a chart, I ask what about that couldn't be done by a computer.
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Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
(Post 10301278)
As to the vertical speed , it is very unreliable due accuracy of mode S (25 ft variations) it is common that short variations, especially in turbulence can send messages with 10.000ft VS. This is most probably why we see 30.000ft on the ADS-B diagram posted earlier. I would think it might be a brief acceleration, but not a continuous descent at that rate.
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FDR Info...
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-...vered/10464204
Lion Air crash: Investigators recover 69 hours of flight data from black boxUpdated about an hour ago; Sun 4 Nov 2018, 8:29pmInvestigators have retrieved hours of data from the flight recorder of the Lion Air jet that crashed off Jakarta on October 29, killing 189 people on board.The news came as Indonesian authorities on Sunday extended the search at sea for victims and debris. National Transportation Safety Committee deputy chairman Haryo Satmiko told a news conference that 69 hours of flight data was downloaded from the recorder including its fatal flight. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 jet crashed just minutes after take-off from Jakarta on October 29 in the country's worst airline disaster since 1997. The flight data recorder was recovered by divers on Thursday in damaged condition and investigators said it required special handling to retrieve its information. The second black box — a cockpit voice recorder — has not been recovered but searchers are focusing on a particular area based on a weak locator signal. "From here we will analyse what happened to that flight," Nurcahyo Utomo, head of Indonesia's transportation safety committee, told reporters. Analysis of the data and a recovered aircraft landing gear and engine will begin on Monday and information will be passed to police if needed, Mr Utomo said. |
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To me this all boils down to a very simple set of questions. We have an airframe with a known set of technical issues which were easily managed on the previous flight. Those known issues should have generated a very specific review of certain procedures and been addressed in detail in the preflight planning/brief.
So... 1) were the memory items and checklist briefed prior to takeoff as would be expected? 2) was the problem identified in a timely manner and were the memory items and checklist preformed in a timely manner? If the airplane was in fact being flown utilizing pitch and power and suffered a loss of control then we have one set of issues. If an attempt to re-engage the AP was made you have a totally different scenario. Do we have any clear information on how the previous flight was conducted after recovery? Was the AP reengaged or did the FO hand fly the plane? What would the normal intent be for the PIC in these circumstances given the previous issues. If you (the professional captains here) were conducting the preflight brief would your stated intent be to return in the event of a technical issue or to troubleshoot and continue? To me the logical mindset would be to return but what is the SOP here? Would the thinking be identical to the previous flight where the issue was addressed very quickly and the PIC determined that it was both safe and prudent to continue the flight as scheduled? How long did the trouble shooting take and what was the configuration for the remainder of the flight (was it flown raw data?). Would this information be readily available to the crew in this flight? Was there a pressure to meet this standard and continue? From what I recall the previous flight declared an emergency but then pressed on. Could the same scenario have been playing out where even though a request to return was made that there was no real intent and that the upset occurred when they attempted to duplicate the previous flights configuration? Obviously something catastrophic occurred very quickly. If they felt they had addressed the issue and had the intent to press on would attempting to re-engage the AP and then having it spit the bit be more likely or would manually flying at the prescribed settings and being distracted while trying to troubleshoot be more likely? I'm guessing that the CVR will show that they were trying to continue the flight instead of having a 100% focus on configuring the plane for a return. |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10301315)
MH370 certainly is substantially in a worse off position after a number of years in deeper waters and ocean currents. . |
CVR Ping lost
now seeing rpts on cnn that they have lost the ping signal from CVR....getting buried ? |
Originally Posted by Smott999
(Post 10301354)
now seeing rpts on cnn that they have lost the ping signal from CVR....getting buried ? |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10300622)
Yes, a suitably equipped Mode S secondary radar can interrogate the aircraft's transponder for a number of parameters, including IAS.
TAS and heading, too, among others. |
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10301315)
Underwater footage shows debris of Lion Air jet crash
Regarding the problems during the previous flight and the ensuing maintenance I have some (outsider) questions. Can one assume that, via some type of communication, the maintenance crew was given a detailed account of how severely that flight was affected by whatever technical fault that occurred? Or would they have only had a piece of paper with a couple of short fault descriptions at hand? |
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